


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ANALOGY:

CONSIDERED AS A GUIDE TO TRUTH,

AND

APPLIED AS AN AID TO FAITH.

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ANALOGY,

James McCosh

CONSIDERED AS A GUIDE TO TRUTH,

AND

APPLIED AS AN AID TO FAITH.

BY

JAMES BUCHANAN, D.D., LL.D.,

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"FAITH IN GOD AND MODERN ATHEISM COMPARED," ETC., ETC.

"Intellige ut credas."—ABELARD. "Crede ut intelligas."—ANSELM.

"Fides quærens Intellectum; Intellectus quærens Fidem."—BARTHOLMESS.

"La Foi a sa Raison: et la Raison a sa Foi."—VINET.

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
1864.

To the Memory

OF

WILLIAM CUNNINGHAM, D.D.

“ A few short years of evil past,
We reach the happy shore,
Where death-divided friends at last
Shall meet, to part no more.”



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P R E F A C E.

IN the Preface to a former work on the evidences of Natural Religion,* the author intimated his intention to follow it up with another on the Witness of God, or the Divine Evidence of Revealed Religion. The present treatise is not to be regarded as the fulfilment of that intention. In preparing the materials for his intended work on the Christian Evidences, he was struck with the predominant influence of Analogy, both on our estimate of the evidence, and on our conceptions of the truths, of Religion, whether Natural or Revealed; and it occurred to him that a treatise on that subject, considered in its various aspects and relations, might be useful as an intermediate link, and might form a vinculum, or bond of connection, between the two great branches of our Religious Knowledge. The occasion and object of the present Inquiry are fully explained in the Introduction.

From the nature of the subject, as well as from the plan which the author has adopted in treating it, he found it scarcely possible to avoid repeated references to the same topics in different connections; but these apparent repetitions will serve, it is hoped, to place such topics in different lights, and to increase, rather than to impair, the effect of the general argument.

Some questions have been discussed in connection with the General Doctrine of Analogy which may appear to be somewhat abstruse and metaphysical; but they could not have been omitted or evaded, if any attempt were to be made to get at the root of

* "Faith in God and Modern Atheism Compared." 2 vols. 8vo. 1856.

some prevailing errors on the subject. Those who feel no difficulty in regard to these speculative points, need not dwell on them, but pass on to the Sources and Applications of Analogy in matters of Faith, which may be more generally interesting, as being more practical, and closely connected with the facts of our common experience.

The author lays his account, of course, with criticism ; and he is not disposed to deprecate, or even to shrink from, it. He will thankfully receive, and consider with the utmost care, any strictures which may serve to correct the errors into which he may have fallen, or tend to enlarge his views of the important subject which he has undertaken to treat. He can truly say, that no one can be more sensible than himself of the manifold defects of his work ; but he is well assured, nevertheless, that the general scheme of thought is, on the whole, sound and invulnerable.

In the present state of literature, there is little encouragement to hope for immediate or rapid success in issuing a work of this kind. But "Let the bread float on the waters !" says Coleridge ; "if it be the Bread of Life, it will not have been utterly cast away." Animated by this assurance, one who believes with Bacon that "books should have no patrons but Truth and Reason," and who is assured, as the author is, that his work is designed for the vindication of both, may humbly, yet hopefully, commit it to the press, and say of it, without presumption, in the words of Milton—"It shall be ventured yet, and the Truth not smothered, but sent abroad, in the native confidence of her single self, to earn, how she can, her entertainment in the world, and to find out her own readers,—few, perhaps, but those few, of such value and substantial worth, as Truth has been ever wont in all ages to be content withal."

51, LAURISTON PLACE, EDINBURGH,
November 1863.

INTRODUCTION.

OCCASION AND OBJECT OF THE INQUIRY.

(1.) The following pages have been written under the impression that a fresh discussion of the principle of Analogy, and of its application to recent phases of religious opinion, might not be unseasonable in the present critical times. That principle will be considered, in the first instance, in its most general aspect, as a Guide to truth, a Ground of inference, and a Reason for belief, in every department of human knowledge; and then, secondly, and more specially, as an Aid to Faith, in so far as it may be legitimately applied either to the Evidences, or the Doctrines, of Natural and Revealed Religion.

(2.) The profound work of Bishop Butler, which is so generally known, and so justly esteemed, must ever retain its standard value as one of the few imperishable monuments of human thought. It appears to have been suggested by a remark of Origen to the effect, that "He who believes the Scriptures to have proceeded from Him who is the Author of Nature, may well expect to find the same sort of difficulties in them as are found in the constitution of Nature itself." This pregnant statement,—the brief utterance of a singularly original and versatile mind,—involves a principle which can hardly fail to be received as self-evident on the instant when it is clearly apprehended; and yet, the more it is reflected on, it will be felt to contain a profound meaning under its apparent simplicity,—to possess an elastic and ever-growing expansiveness,—and to admit of manifold and most important applications. That principle was the vital germ of Butler's work; it bore the same relation to the "Analogy" which the acorn bears to the oak.

Deposited in his rich, vigorous, and fertile mind, it took root, and, springing up, appeared at length in its maturity,—not an artificial structure, but rather an organic product, slowly but spontaneously developed from one prolific seed.

(3.) Butler's work, however, is entirely directed to the application of the principle, and waives all discussion of the principle itself. It assumes the existence in the human mind of a power of perceiving analogies, and makes its appeal to that power by presenting a variety of instances in which the evidences and truths of religion are manifestly analogous to those of our common secular knowledge; but it neither investigates the mental laws by which Analogy becomes a ground of inference and a guide to truth; nor the corresponding provision which is made for this method of reasoning in the constitution and course of Nature. Butler's mind was eminently practical; the most characteristic feature of his genius was profound sagacity and common sense; and although he was abundantly capable of purely abstract speculation, he rarely indulged in it, where his conclusions could be established by a direct appeal to *facts*. Hence, at the commencement of his treatise, he expressly waives all discussion of some points which might seem to lie at the foundation of his whole method of reasoning, and which have attracted attention more recently in connection with psychological inquiries respecting the nature, origin, and foundation of human knowledge.

SECT. I.—TOPICS WAIVED BY BUTLER.

(4.) In the introduction to his work, Butler waives the discussion of some points which can hardly fail to be regarded as of fundamental importance. "It is not my design," he says, "to inquire into the nature, the foundation, and the measure of probability; or whence it proceeds that *likeness* should beget that presumption, opinion, and full conviction, which the human mind is formed to receive from it, and which it does necessarily produce in every one; or to guard against the errors to which reasoning from analogy is liable. This belongs to the subject of Logic, and is a part of that subject which has not yet been thoroughly considered. It is enough to the present purpose to observe, that this general way of arguing is evidently natural and conclusive. For

there is no man can make a question but that the sun will rise to-morrow, and be seen, where it is seen at all, in the figure of a circle, and not in that of a square." It is worthy of notice, that Butler here speaks of different degrees of probability as arising from the perception of analogy; degrees of probability ranging from a mere "presumption," up through the various shades of "opinion," to "full conviction;" and further, that the example adduced,—namely, the belief that "the sun will rise to-morrow,"—belongs to the third class, and is a case of strict induction. He admits, therefore, that the analogy of our past experience, in combination with the action of our natural laws of thought, may give rise to a conviction so strong that it may be said to amount to a moral certainty; and this he ascribes neither to experience alone, nor to reason alone, but to reason acting on experience under the guidance of Analogy. But he offers no explanation of the mental laws which are concerned in the process; nor does he lay down any rules for determining the "measure" of probability in different cases, or for guarding against the "errors" to which reasoning from analogy is liable. He waives the question whence it proceeds that "likeness" should beget various degrees of belief; assigning as his reason for doing so, the imperfect state of that branch of Logic—the logic of Probability, to which it properly belongs. Leibnitz acknowledged the same defect in the science of Moral or Probable Evidence,* but neither he nor Butler undertook to supply the desideratum.

(5.) Butler was fully entitled to apply the principle, without entering into any philosophical explanation of it. For when one is convinced from his own experience, and from what he knows of his fellow-men, that any law of thought has a real existence in the human mind, and that it is in universal and constant operation there, it is not necessary that he should either explain its origin or prove its validity, before he appeals to it in argument. He may

* "L'art de juger des raisons vraisemblables n'est pas encore bien établi; de sorte que notre logique à cet égard est encore très imparfaite, et que nous n'avons presque jusqu'ici que l'art de juger des démonstrations."—*Meditations*, pp. 41, 43. Leibnitz and Wolff supplied some useful hints on the "Logic of Probability," which was afterwards treated more fully by

Mendelsohn, Condorcet, and Laplace, and especially by GARVE,—“De Nonnullis quæ pertinent ad Logicam Probabilium.” See DEGERANDO, “Histoire Comparée,” II. 135, 156. In our own country, the subject has been parcelled out in separate treatises on “Induction,” “Moral Evidence,” “Analogy,” and “Historical Testimony.”

assume it at once, and proceed to apply it, in the confident persuasion that, if it be indeed a principle of reason, it will come into spontaneous exercise, in every sane and healthy mind, on the presentation of appropriate objects. Believing that the perception of Analogy determines many of our judgments in common life, and constitutes one of the most familiar grounds of inference, Butler founds his reasoning upon it, without troubling either himself or his readers with any psychological inquiry concerning it. And he was entitled to do so, just as he might have asked his readers to look upon a visible object, without explaining the process of vision or the laws of optics, and to listen, without unfolding the theory of sound, or the laws of acoustics.

(6.) It may be useful, however, to note the points which he expressly waives, as these will serve to indicate some of the chief lines of inquiry which remain to be pursued. He declines to discuss three points:—The first is, “the nature, foundation, and measure of probability:” its nature, or what it is, and how it should be defined; its foundation, or in what circumstances it arises, and on what ground it rests; and its measure, or the rule by which we should estimate its amount in particular cases, since it may exist in different degrees, as “a presumption,” or as an “opinion,” or as “full conviction.” The second is, the connection between a sense of probability and the perception of Analogy; or the explanation of the psychological fact—“whence it is that *likeness* should beget those beliefs which it does necessarily produce in every one.” The third is, the need of a criterion, or of certain canons and safeguards by which we may be protected against “the errors to which reasoning from analogy is liable.” All these points belong to the general doctrine of Analogy, considered as a ground of more or less probable reasoning; and the mere fact that the discussion of them is avowedly waived in Butler’s treatise, may be accepted as one reason for instituting a fresh examination of the subject.

(7.) But this reason will acquire additional force if it can be shown that, since the age of Butler, some progress has been made in the psychological explanation of those laws of thought on which analogical inference depends, and also in the exposition of the principles which determine the nature, foundation, and measure of probability. It must be confessed that “the logic of Probability” is still an imperfect science, whether it be viewed in rela-

tion to the mental laws on which it depends, or the rules and canons which should regulate our confidence in its various applications. But unquestionably some progress has been made in explaining the one, and in systematizing the other. The question, "Whence it proceeds that *likeness* should beget that presumption, opinion, and full conviction, which the human mind is formed to receive from it," has been discussed, in our own country, by such writers as Hume, Priestley, and Mill; and on the Continent, the theory of Probability has been elaborately discussed, and applied to some subjects with all but mathematical precision, by Laplace, Condorcet, and others. But it is of more importance, with reference to our immediate object, to remark, that concurrently with the rapid advance of Inductive Science in all departments, there has been instituted a more careful analysis of the Inductive Process itself,—an examination of the principles on which its validity depends, and of the precise circumstances which render its conclusions more or less certain. It should never be forgotten that all Induction belongs to the head of moral, as distinguished from demonstrative reasoning; and that all its conclusions, however certain, fall to be ranked under the head of *probable* truth. The logic of Induction is still incomplete, but its foundations have at least been laid; and all inquiry on the subject is evidently tending more and more towards the conclusion so emphatically announced by the late Professor Baden Powell, that "THE SOUL OF INDUCTION IS ANALOGY." The speculations of Whewell and Mill on this subject, different and even opposite as they are in other respects, agree in this, that the perception of Analogy is necessarily involved in every process of Induction, and even in those preliminary operations of the mind which are subservient to it. Sir William Hamilton, too, resolves all reasoning into the exercise of Comparison, and the perception of resemblance or difference. "It may startle you," he says, "to hear that the highest function of the mind is nothing higher than Comparison; but in the end I am confident of convincing you of the paradox. Generalization, which is the result of Synthesis and Analysis, is an act of Comparison, and is properly denominated Conception. Judgment is only the comparison of two terms or notions directly together; Reasoning is only the comparison of two terms or notions with each other through a third. Conception or generalization, judgment, and reasoning, are thus only various applications of

Comparison, and not even entitled to the distinction of separate faculties.”*

(8.) Considering that the perception of resemblance or difference is involved in every act of judgment, and every process of reasoning, some reflective minds have been led to think that Analogy should not be left to occupy the subordinate place which has usually been assigned to it in works on Logic, as if it were only a lower species of moral or probable evidence; and Mr Field has even proposed to place it at the head both of the Inductive and Deductive methods of reasoning, as the *summum genus*, or the generic principle, on which all logical results ultimately depend. He proposes to supply a deficiency in these two methods, and to “restore philosophy to its original ground and native simplicity, upon the basis of a genuine logical Analogy, which supplies the forms sought through Induction, and the Universals to which Syllogism owes its validity.” Agreeably to this design, he treats at large of what he calls “Analogism” or “the Analogical process,” considered as “the basis of other modes,” or as a “third organ necessary for their completion;” and arrives at the conclusion, that “Analogism comprehends Syllogism and Generalogism fundamentally.”†

(9.) Whatever may be thought of Mr Field’s peculiar idea of “Triadism” or “Trichotomy,” as applied to the classification of the Sciences, and even to the subdivisions of each, he has unquestionably thrown some new light on the general subject of Analogy. His treatise is far from being perfect, but it is eminently suggestive; and, like a sharp ploughshare, it has turned up ground that had long lain fallow, and penetrated deep enough to lay bare the rock, and to open up veins of precious ore. Mr Field has fairly raised the question—How far the principle of Analogy is involved in all the processes both of Inductive and Deductive reasoning. And if it can be shown that by far the largest portion of our merely secular and scientific knowledge depends on the validity of that principle, this will serve at once to place the analogical truths of Theology on a firm foundation, and to afford a strong additional reason for a fresh discussion of the grounds on which they rest. For nothing can be more important, in the present state of speculation, than to show that Analogy, as applied

* “Lectures on Metaphysics,” vol. II. p. 14. | † Field, “Analogical Philosophy,” I. lxi. lxxi. 27, 209.

to Religion, is neither less legitimate nor less valid than when it is applied to any other department of human knowledge; and that in Science, as well as in common life, it asserts its prerogative, as a law of human thought, and a ground of rational belief.

(10.) From what has been said it appears that Butler avowedly waived the discussion of some points relating to the general theory of Analogy,—that these points have received some illustration in the progress of Psychological Inquiry,—and that they have a close connection with the doctrine of Induction, which has recently engaged the special attention of many thoughtful inquirers. And these considerations are adduced as a strong reason, or at least as a sufficient apology, for a fresh examination of the whole doctrine of Analogy, especially in its relation to the evidences and the truths of Religion.

SECT. II.—HISTORICAL RETROSPECT OF SPECULATION ON THE SUBJECT.

(11.) A second reason for instituting a fresh examination of the subject, is suggested by the historical course of speculation in regard to it, before and after the appearance of Butler's work.

(12.) The entire absence of speculative, and even of psychological, discussion in such a work as the "Analogy" is the more remarkable, because, in the earlier part of last century, there existed a strong tendency among educated men to inquire into the subject. While Butler was engaged, during nearly thirty years, in slowly maturing his views, other vigorous minds were busily occupied with the same theme. The first edition of what is now called *par excellence* the "Analogy" appeared from the Dublin press in 1736; but it had been preceded by three able treatises on the subject from the pen of Bishop Browne. The first, published in 1697, was "A Letter" in answer to a book entitled "Christianity not Mysterious," and was addressed to "all those who set up for Reason and Evidence in opposition to Revelation and Mysteries;" the second, entitled "The Procedure, Extent, and Limits of the Human Understanding," was published in 1728; the third, entitled "Divine Analogy, or Things Divine and Supernatural conceived by Analogy with Things Natural and Human," appeared in 1733. These works, but especially the two last, were devoted to the discussion of Analogy, as a law

of human thought, which regulates the method of our *conceiving* and *expressing* certain truths, and to the application of this doctrine as a means of confirming the evidences, and explaining the language, of Theology, Natural and Revealed. In the interval which elapsed between the publication of the second and third of these treatises, the acute and subtle mind of Bishop Berkeley was attracted to the same subject; and in his "Minute Philosopher," which appeared in 1732, he offered some strictures on a few unguarded expressions which Bishop Browne had unfortunately employed, but showed at the same time his own high appreciation of this method of reasoning, by presenting a continuous series of analogical illustrations, applied, often with great felicity and force, to the defence and confirmation of religious truth. Twelve years after the appearance of Browne's first and shortest treatise,—his "Letter" of 1697,—Dr King, Archbishop of Dublin, preached and published in 1709 a "Discourse on Predestination," in which the doctrine of Analogy is applied to some of the leading questions between Calvinists and Arminians, and which, we are told, "attracted so much attention as to pass through at least six editions soon after its appearance." To this Discourse Bishop Browne took exception, in the Introduction to the second edition of his "Procedure, Extent, and Limits of the Human Understanding," published in 1729,—acknowledging, indeed, that "His Grace rightly lays down Analogy for the foundation of it," but adding, that "for want of having thoroughly weighed and digested it, and by wording himself incautiously, he seems entirely to destroy the nature of it, insomuch that while he rejects the strict propriety of our conceptions and words, on the one hand, he appears to his antagonists to run into an extreme even below metaphor, on the other." On this and similar grounds it was also assailed by Dr John Edwards and others.

(13.) It can scarcely be supposed that a discussion in which such men as Archbishop King, Bishop Browne, Bishop Berkeley, and Dr Edwards were engaged, and which had a direct relation to the ground-principle of his own great argument, did not engage the attention of Bishop Butler; yet it is not a little remarkable, that he takes no notice of it, and never once alludes to the able treatises in which it was carried on, although they had all been published several years before his own. This omission might seem unaccountable, were it not for Butler's well-known aversion

to controversy,—the thoroughly practical design of his work,—and perhaps, also, his connection in early life with Dr Samuel Clarke and the school of divines who adhered to him, whose speculations found no favour, and received no quarter, at the hands of Bishop Browne. But Butler's silence, in the circumstances to which we have thus briefly referred, was itself significant, and two important inferences may be drawn from it. The first is, that, in his opinion, the principle of Analogy might be valid, and the process of analogical reasoning conclusive, notwithstanding whatever difficulty might be felt in regard to the philosophical explanation of either; and the second is, that, while he fully appreciated the value of Analogy in its relation to religious truth, he did *not* adopt the peculiar theory of Archbishop King,—for in speaking of “the opinion of Necessity, considered as influencing practice,” he never founds on the supposition that we can have no knowledge of the Divine Prescience or Predestination; and uniformly, throughout his whole treatise, he argues as if he believed that the wisdom, power, and goodness, which we ascribe to God, were of the same nature or kind, with similar properties which are revealed in the light of our own consciousness, although immeasurably superior to them.

(14.) King, Browne, and Butler made use respectively of the same principle of Analogy, but they applied it to different controversies, and in different ways. King attempted to apply it to the Calvinistic and Arminian controversy, as if it admitted of a partial and one-sided application to the intellectual perfections of God; Browne applied it to the Socinian and Arian controversy, chiefly in the way of explaining and vindicating the analogical language, which is used in Scripture to express the peculiar doctrines of Revelation; Butler applied it to the Deistical controversy, with the twofold view of enforcing, in the first instance, the practical truths and duties of Natural Religion, and of vindicating, in the second, the peculiar claims and doctrines of Revealed Religion. Butler's work, which appeared in 1736, was followed in 1750 by “The Analogy of the Divine Wisdom in the System of Things,” from the pen of Richard Barton, B.D., who refers to his illustrious predecessor in the same walk of inquiry, and excuses himself for writing again on the subject by the *naïve* remark, that “Analogy is copious, and may afford matter for more books than one;”—a remark which may still suggest an apology

for any one who ventures to institute a fresh examination of Analogy, with a view to the special exigencies of the present times.

(15.) Since that period, and especially in more recent times, the writers who have sought to illustrate and apply the principle of Analogy, in connection with the evidences and truths of Religion, may be divided into two distinct schools, which are severally marked by peculiar characteristics, and exhibit, in some important respects, different, if not opposite, tendencies. The one, adhering to the general principles of Bishop Browne, and imbued with the practical spirit of Bishop Butler, is represented in modern times by Dr Tatham in his "Chart and Scale of Truth," who explains our analogical conceptions of Divine things, and vindicates the analogical language of Scripture, on the same principles which had been expounded in the "Divine Analogy" of Browne,—by Bishop Hampden in his "Essay on the Philosophical Evidence of Christianity," which contains an able exposition of the leading principle of Butler's treatise, although it exhibits occasionally an undue degree of deference to the opinions of more recent writers belonging to the opposite school,—by Bishop Shuttleworth in his "Consistency of Revelation with Itself, and with Human Reason,"—by Mr Grinfield in his "Vindiciæ Analogicæ,"—by Mr Davison in his Notes to "Discourses on Prophecy,"—by Richard Watson in his "Review of Grinfield,"—and by Dr Chalmers in his "Prelections on Butler's Analogy."* The other school, following in the wake of Archbishop King, and seeking to carry out his peculiar views to the full extent of their legitimate application, is represented in our own times by Bishop Copleston in his "Inquiry concerning Predestination,"—by Mr Dalby in his "Defence" of Copleston against the strictures of Grinfield,—and by Archbishop Whately, who republished King's Discourse, with Notes and strong commendation, in the appendix to his Bampton Lectures. The difference between these two schools is more important than, at first sight, it may seem to be. It does not consist merely in a different application of the same principle, but in a different view of the radical nature, and real import, of the principle itself; and may be expected, therefore, when the tendencies of each system have been fully developed, to terminate in widely different results.

* Dr Hanna, the accomplished biographer of Dr Chalmers, has referred to most of the *commentators* on Butler's "Analogy" in his introduction to the "Prelections."—Posthumous Works, vol. IX. p. xlvii.

(16.) The real nature and the practical importance of this difference may be best explained by a brief reference to those circumstances, in the course of theological speculation in this country, which have invested it with an historical interest, as having an important bearing on the whole theory of our religious knowledge. When Archbishop King published his "Discourse on Predestination," he applied the doctrine of Analogy to explain—or rather to explain away—the language of Scripture on that subject. In doing so, he said, and said most justly, that "the nature of God is *incomprehensible* by human understanding; and not only His nature, but likewise His powers and faculties, and the ways and methods in which He exercises them, are so far beyond our reach, that we are utterly incapable of framing *exact* and *adequate* notions of them." But instead of stopping here, and representing our knowledge of God and His perfections as *true so far as it goes*, although *inadequate* to embrace the fulness of its Infinite Object, he goes on to teach that "the descriptions which we frame to ourselves of God, or of the Divine Attributes, are not taken from any *direct* or *immediate* perceptions which we have of Him, or them; but from some observations we have made of His works, and from the consideration of those qualifications that we conceive would enable *us* to perform the like:" that "it doth truly follow from hence that God must either have *these*, or *other faculties* equivalent to them," but that "we do not know what His faculties are in themselves"—that "we cannot but be sensible that they are of a nature *altogether different* from ours, and that we have no direct and proper notion or conception of them." It is no longer the *perfect adequacy*, but the *very* TRUTH of our conceptions which is called in question, as if the effects which we observe in Nature were not sure indications of wisdom, power, and goodness, *similar* to our own, but might be ascribed to other attributes "equivalent" to these, yet of "a nature altogether different from ours." Were this true, of course we could not only have no "direct and proper conception" of them, but we could have no conception of them at all; for we cannot conceive of such effects being produced otherwise than by those perfections, whose characteristic marks have been ascertained by our most undoubted experience, and are clearly discernible in the works of Nature. But passing from Nature to Scripture, he adds that the sacred writers "ascribe hands, and eyes, and feet to

God,"—that "*after the same manner*, we find Him represented as affected by such passions as we perceive to be in ourselves,"—and that "so, by the *same* condescension to the weakness of our capacities, we find the powers and operations of our minds ascribed to Him." And then, placing all the *three* on precisely the same level, as if each of them must be equally literal or equally metaphorical, and making no distinction between mere figures of speech and true proper analogies, he concludes—"It does not follow from hence that any of these are literally in God after the manner they are in us, any more than hands or eyes, than love or hatred, are; on the contrary, we must acknowledge that those things which we call by these names, when attributed to God, are of so very different a nature from what they are in us, and so superior to all that we can conceive, that in reality there is *no more likeness* between them than between *our hand and God's power*."

(17.) This application of the doctrine of Analogy was duly noticed by Bishop Browne in his preface to "The Procedure, Extent, and Limits of the Human Understanding."* He acknowledges that the Archbishop "intended to proceed on the foundation of Analogy," but takes express exception to his Grace's use of that principle on *two* distinct grounds;—*first*, that he does not discriminate aright between Metaphor and Analogy, but places them on the same level, as if the *metaphorical* expressions, derived from our bodily members or organs, had precisely the same claim to be regarded as literal and true, with the *analogical* terms derived from our conscious experience as living, intelligent, moral beings; and *secondly*, that in speaking of both as applicable to Religion, he describes the knowledge which we have of God and His Attributes by means of them, as not only inadequate, but "*infinitely short of truth*," and so *unlike* them that it is fit only to be compared to "the notion we form of a strange country by a map, which is only paper and ink, strokes and lines." In opposition to these defective and erroneous views, Bishop Browne is at pains to distinguish between Analogy and Metaphor, and to show that those properties and operations of the human mind which we attribute to God, have a real resemblance to some correspondent perfection in the Divine nature, such as does not exist in the case of bodily organs, and such as cannot be fairly represented or illustrated by any likeness between the figure of a country and the "strokes or lines of a map."

* Second Edition, 1729.

(18.) Unfortunately, Bishop Browne himself made use, in his first work, of an unguarded expression, which, although it was, as he thought, sufficiently qualified by the context, was interpreted as if no such qualification had been added, and exposed his argument to the risk both of being misunderstood by his friends, and misrepresented by his opponents. He had spoken as if "we could have no more notion of God than a blind man hath of light." The expression occurs more than once in his other writings; and it gave rise to the impression that, if we can only conceive of God as a blind man conceives of light and colour, by the analogy of what he learns through *other* senses than that of sight, we can have no distinct or true notions of Him at all, and that our religious knowledge must be extremely defective, or even positively erroneous. But nothing could have been further from his intention than to teach any such doctrine. His critics had forgotten that he had attached a technical and somewhat arbitrary definition to the term "idea," as denoting that which is obtained by direct perception or immediate intuition, and which is contradistinguished from whatever depends on inference, or is derived from reasoning, analogy, or any *mediate* process of thought; that, in this restricted sense, and according to his peculiar nomenclature, the conceptions which we form of our fellow-men, being also analogical, are no more strict or proper than those which we form of God and His perfections; and that he meant only to illustrate and apply the distinction which exists, in some respects, between our *mediate* and *immediate* perceptions of truth.

(19.) Bishop Berkeley seems to have overlooked this important qualification of Browne's statement; and he was the first to detect and expose, in his "Minute Philosopher," the disparity between the case of a blind man forming a conception of light and colours by their supposed resemblance to the objects of his other senses, and that of the human mind acquiring the knowledge of God and His Attributes through the medium of His Works or His Word. His seasonable strictures had the twofold effect of illustrating the real nature and right use of Analogy, and also of eliciting from Browne himself, in his second Treatise, an explicit disclaimer of the opinions which he had been supposed to inculcate, accompanied with a fresh exposition and defence of the truths which he really intended to teach.

(20.) Archbishop King applied the general doctrine of Ana-

logy to the special question of Predestination ; but that doctrine was far too comprehensive to be long confined to any one truth of Scripture, or to any single point of controversy between different sections of the Christian Church. The opponents of Christianity, and even of Natural Religion itself, might eagerly avail themselves of his Grace's argument, and apply it with powerful effect against other truths besides such as are peculiar to Calvinism. One striking proof both of the inconsistency and the danger of any partial application of Analogy to our religious conceptions, was speedily supplied by the speculations of Lord Bolingbroke, who admitted that we might have a true and proper knowledge of God's intellectual attributes from their resemblance to the powers and operations of our own minds, but denied that we could have any such knowledge of His moral perfections, since they must be entirely different from justice, goodness, and truth, as they exist in man. He received, as he merited, a severe chastisement from the powerful arm of Warburton.* Another striking proof of the dangerous tendency of King's theory was supplied by an acute and vigorous reply to it from the pen of Anthony Collins, an English Deist, the well-known author of "The Grounds and Reasons of the Christian Religion." He undertook to show that, on the principles of that prelate, it is impossible to prove the existence of God—at least of a living, personal God, such as Atheists deny ; and that we can have no true conception of His attributes—no real knowledge of His character,—without which there can be no ground for practical Religion. And in the estimation of several competent and impartial judges, his reasoning was conclusive, either against the evidence of Natural Theology, or against the soundness of King's theory.†

(21.) But neither Browne's strictures on King,—nor Berkeley's strictures on Browne,—nor the disclaimer and explanation which these elicited from Browne in his "Divine Analogy,"—nor Warburton's masterly exposure of Bolingbroke,—nor Collins's application of the principle to undermine the foundations of all Religion, have prevented some more recent writers from reproducing the doctrine of Analogy in its most objectionable form, and apply-

* Lord Bolingbroke, Works, vol. V. pp. 62, 87 ; "Divine Legation," Appendix to Book II.

† Biographia Britannica, Article "King." Grinfield's "Vindiciæ Analogicæ, P. II. p. 9. Davison on "Prophecy," p. 525.

ing it anew to the points in controversy between Calvinists and Arminians. Among these, Bishop Copleston holds a prominent place, who not only recommended King's Discourse in his own "Inquiry into Predestination," but adopted substantially the same line of argument. He says, for instance, that "these expressions—the eye, the hand, the arm of God, are analogical terms, not intimating any resemblance in the things spoken of, but faculties analogous, as producing similar effects, although widely different in themselves. And so, when we ascribe anger, jealousy, repentance, revenge, to God," . . . "it is not even pretended that there are qualities in His nature similar to these qualities in us." Nay, he goes further, and adds, that "when we speak of the wisdom and knowledge of God, His justice, mercy, love, long-suffering, the process is precisely similar to that before described." Here the purely metaphorical expressions, derived from the members and organs of the body, are placed on exactly the same level with the strictly analogical terms, which are derived from the faculties and affections of the mind; and it seems to be implied that there is no greater resemblance, or no more real likeness, to the Divine perfections, in the one case, than there is in the other.

(22.) The "Inquiry" called forth a vigorous antagonist in Mr Grinfield, who assailed it in his "Vindiciæ Analogicæ" with such effect, that Dr Copleston himself found it necessary to offer a series of "Remarks" in reply to his objections; and in doing so, was compelled to make concessions such as amounted, in the opinion of many competent judges, to a virtual surrender of the main point in debate. Mr Grinfield's testimony was all the more seasonable and effective, because he agreed with Copleston in his dislike of the peculiarities of Calvinism; but he saw that King's theory, while it was dangerous in other respects, could afford no effective argument against Divine foreknowledge and predestination; and he affirmed that "so far is this Discourse from being capable of rendering any service to us in our controversy with the Calvinists, that it virtually surrenders the cause into their hands, by admitting that we can know nothing, with any certainty or precision, respecting the Divine foreknowledge."* Similar views are expressed by Mr Davison, himself an alumnus of Oriel College, Oxford, where, at that time, the authority of Dr Copleston was paramount.†

* Grinfield, "Vindiciæ Analogicæ," P. II. 46, 47.

† Davison, "Discourses on Prophecy," p. 523.

(23.) Meanwhile Richard Watson, who, as a zealous Wesleyan, might have been expected to welcome a really effective argument against Calvinism, but who was also much too wise and wary to be caught with chaff, saw at once that if the theory of King and Copleston might be applied to our knowledge of the intellectual attributes of God to which Calvinists appeal, it might be equally applied to His moral perfections on which Arminians mainly depend; and in an able review of the discussion,* he gave in his decided adhesion to Mr Grinfield, while he looked askance at the Bishop's argument, as if he suspected it to contain more than met the eye,—as if he thought that it might carry *in græmio* weapons that could be turned against his own beloved Troy,—as if he remembered, although he could not politely repeat, the poet's words—

“Timeo Danaos et dona ferentes.”

(24.) Rejected alike by intelligent Calvinists and Arminians, as subversive of those fundamental truths which they hold in common, and which they regard as being not less important than any of the peculiarities of their respective creeds, it might have been expected that the theory of Archbishop King would not again be obtruded, at least for a considerable time, on the notice of the Church; or, at all events, that if it were revived, the new exposition of it would be accompanied with a solid and comprehensive answer to the grave objections which had been urged against it. But, influenced partly by Dr Copleston's strong recommendation of it, and yielding also to his own preconceived opinion of its merits, Archbishop Whately has reprinted King's Discourse in an appendix to his own Bampton Lectures, and added an Introduction, with a series of Notes, in which its leading principles are still maintained and defended. In doing so, he refers to the objections of Dr John Edwards; but takes no notice of Bishop Browne's objections to King's Discourse,—or of Berkeley's strictures on Browne,—or of Grinfield's reply to Copleston,—or of Richard Watson's review of both; nay, following as he does in the wake of Copleston, and speaking highly of his “Inquiry,” he takes no notice even of *Copleston's own concessions*, and proceeds to defend the theory, as if these concessions had never been made. He endeavours, indeed, in his work on “Logic,” to make some-

* Richard Watson, Works, vol. VII. p. 302.

thing of the ambiguity of the word *same*, when applied to different objects, as when all triangles are said to be in one sense *the same*, or when different persons are said to have the *same ideas*, the *same feelings*, the *same diseases*—alleging that in such cases it implies only “perfect similarity” or a certain “resemblance” merely. Be it so; if it be admitted that, in this sense, wisdom, power, and goodness are *the same* in man and in God, there will be no room at least for saying that we can have no true or proper conceptions of them, since, on that supposition, we may have as distinct a knowledge of His attributes as we have of the properties of our own minds. The tendency of this theory, in regard to the nature of our analogical knowledge, is to create a vague impression that there must be something peculiarly indefinite,—something even unreal or untrue, in our conceptions of God and His attributes; and when it is fully developed, and consistently followed out into all its legitimate consequences, it would leave no solid ground for any Theological belief, or any practical Religion.

(25.) Such a review of the history of speculation on the subject of Analogy, brief and summary as it is, should be enough to convince us of the fundamental importance of the question at issue, and of the extensive influence which the theory of King, Copleston, and Whately must exert on all our views of the meaning of Scripture, and even of the simplest articles of Natural Religion itself. The extent of its possible application is sufficiently indicated by Dr Copleston when he applies the same principle to all the Divine attributes without exception; and it is still more explicitly acknowledged by Archbishop Whately, when he tells us that “though Dr King’s primary object is to treat of Predestination and the doctrines connected with it,” we should greatly underrate the importance of his reasonings, if we suppose them to apply to that point alone. “The principles he lays down are at least equally applicable to every other mysterious doctrine revealed in Scripture; so that if we admit Dr King’s notions to be correct, they must be the proper basis of all sound Theology; and the Discourse might justly have borne the title of *A RULE FOR INTERPRETING ARIGHT THE SCRIPTURE ACCOUNTS OF GOD, AND OF HIS DEALINGS WITH MANKIND.*” This witness is true. The principle, if once admitted, must work out a REVOLUTION in all our notions of God and of Divine things. That which is acknowledged to be “a general principle of interpretation,” and which, if

it be valid at all, must be valid universally, and applicable to every analogical expression of religious thought, cannot be partially applied to one class of terms, such as those relating to Divine Foreknowledge and Decrees, as if it had some special and peculiar bearing on these:* it is equally applicable, and it ought to be impartially applied, to every doctrine which is expressed in analogical language. And were it thus consistently carried out to every notion or term derived from analogy, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to discover a point at which we could take our stand, short of the extreme doctrine of Spinoza, who denied the existence of any real analogy equally in the case of all the Divine attributes, and affirmed that there is no good reason for ascribing to God either reason, or feeling, or will, or conscious personality.†

(26.) It thus appears, that the recent course of speculation on the subject of Analogy, in its relation to religious truth, has resulted in the formation of two different and rival schools of interpretation, whose respective tenets have a most important bearing on the nature and value of our whole spiritual knowledge. Both parties agree that our religious conceptions, and the terms in which they are expressed, are formed from analogy; but here their agreement ends. They differ essentially as to the nature and substance of that knowledge of God and Divine things which may be derived either from Nature or from Revelation. The theory of King and Copleston exhibits a striking contrast, in this respect, to the doctrine of Browne and Butler. Compare the statements already quoted from the former, with the following passages, and the magnitude of the difference between them will be palpably evident. Bishop Browne is quite clear in affirming that, while our ideas of God are necessarily analogical, they are, on that account, not the less, but rather the more, clear, distinct, and true. "Though the knowledge we have after this manner of Divine and heavenly objects be analogical only, yet it is not delusive; it is just, and real, and true, and clear, as far as it goes." "Our knowledge of God and the things of another world is true, and solid, and real, and just, and founded on the very nature of things, though obtained by Analogy only; and the terms and language we use in speaking of them are as just and expressive, as when they are

* See Leibnitz, "Meditations," pp. 7, 8.

† Spinoza, Tractatus "Theologico-Politicus," 250, 319.

taken in their strict and literal propriety.”* The language of Butler implies the same opinion. “That this Being is not a creature, but the Almighty God,—that He is of infinite power, and wisdom, and goodness, does not render Him less the object of reverence and love than He would be, if He had these attributes only in a limited degree. . . . He hath given us certain affections of mind which correspond to wisdom, power, and goodness; that is, which are raised upon view of those qualities. If then He be really wise, powerful, and good, He is the natural object of those affections which He has endued us with, and which correspond to those attributes. That He is infinite in wisdom and goodness makes no alteration, but only that He is the object of those affections, raised to the highest pitch.”†

(27.) The existence of two rival schools, exhibiting such opposite tendencies of thought in regard to the interpretation of that analogical language which is equally employed by Natural and Revealed Religion, is sufficient to show that the time has arrived for a thorough revision of the whole question of Analogy; and for such an examination both of its fundamental principles and of its legitimate applications, as may serve to define its nature and establish its authority—to distinguish it from mere metaphor and figure—to remove the distrust with which it is often regarded, and to show its indispensable necessity, and manifold important uses, in connection with the whole scheme of our religious knowledge. Any inquiry of this kind should be brought down to the state of speculation on the subject at the present time, and should embrace, not only the points formerly specified as having been waived by Butler, but those also which have emerged since his day, or which have acquired greater prominence in recent discussions. Several points of this kind are suggested by the theory of King, Copleston, and Whately, which call for special consideration. They are merely indicated here, as finger-posts pointing to several distinct lines of future inquiry. The *first* is their definition of Analogy, as consisting in a resemblance of relations or effects merely, such as implies no similarity in the nature of the related terms, or in the causes from which the effects proceed.

* BROWNE, “Divine Analogy,” pp. 13, 41. See also “Procedure,” etc., 84, 113. LEIBNITZ, to the same effect, “Meditations,” pp. 27, 44, 51, 53.

† Butler’s “Sermons,” Halifax’s Edition, p. 160.

The *second* is the difference between Analogies, and such Metaphors as are founded on other relations than that of resemblance. The *third* is the nature of our analogical knowledge,—or whether it involves true and proper conceptions of God and His attributes, and of the truths which He may have been pleased to reveal.

SECT. III.—RECENT MISCONCEPTIONS OF BUTLER'S ARGUMENT.

(28.) A third reason for a renewed examination of the subject arises from prevalent misconceptions in regard to the object and effect of Butler's treatise.

(29.) It has often been objected to Butler's line of argument, that it serves only to *shift* the difficulty, not to solve it; that the objection which is removed at one point, returns upon us at another; and that, even were it valid, so far as it goes, we are not necessarily shut up in consequence to the reception either of Natural or of Revealed Religion, since the alternative of Atheism is still open to us. There is a remarkable conversation on this point between Pitt and Wilberforce, which the latter records in his diary, and which shows how far the mind of an acute and accomplished man of the world may be influenced by this objection. "Among other things," says Wilberforce, "Pitt declared to me that Bishop Butler's work raised in his mind more doubts than it had answered." Sir James M'Intosh, too, much as he admired Butler's Ethical writings, is reported to have said of the "Analogy"—"This can only be an answer to Deists,—Atheists might make use of his objections, and have done so." Another case of a similar kind is mentioned by Professor Sedgwick:—"To one who is still on the threshold of the subject and is stumbling among apparent difficulties, the argument drawn from Analogy may be of the deepest value. So much I may say from the remembrance of my own difficulties in early life. Thousands, I am certain, have gained both in their moral and intellectual health by the study of Butler; and, so far as I have heard, there never was but one person who was morally injured by it. He was a man of learning and great historical knowledge, of a severe logical mind, and apparently of a stern natural temper. In early life he became a Deist. But little satisfied in this belief, he studied Butler's 'Analogy;' and finding, during this study, the same or analogous

difficulties in Natural and Revealed Religion, he rejected them both, and became, through the rest of his life, an unflinching Atheist.”*

(30.) Mr Maurice has delineated, in his own graphic style, a state of mind, induced by the study of the “Analogy,” such as might be conceived to issue either in a life of serious practical religion, or a desperate plunge into utter and hopeless scepticism, according as the Gospel message was received or rejected. The legitimate effect of Butler’s reasoning is first described. “I can answer for myself, that what I owe more than anything else to Butler, and to Butler, so far as I can trace and define obligations, more than to any other man, is the sense of being *in* such a constitution (of Nature); one that I did not create, and have no power to alter, but with which I must be in conformity, or suffer the penalty of being at war with it. It is not the force of the comparison one thinks of first,—it is not the conclusiveness of the argument. What *facts* are these by which you are illustrating your Religion, Natural and Revealed? How profoundly important *they* are to me! This is a thought which startles and frightens a man, before he has time to calculate the effect of what he is reading on the mind of an opponent. I do not wonder that any one who has felt this, should speak of his first acquaintance with Butler as ‘an epoch in his life.’” . . . “What is it that commonly awakens a man out of his frivolity? What is that *fact* which presents itself to him when he begins to think earnestly? It is the sense of his own evil,—what is commonly called, and I do not think there is any better phrase to describe it by,—the conviction of sin. . . . This is what takes possession of me. All religion, as it seems to me, has to do with this. I cannot understand what it means, if it is not occupied about this fact of which I have become so terribly conscious,—if it does not explain that fact to me, and make known to me some other fact concerning myself which may render that less intolerable.”

(31.) The *facts* to which Butler refers, in illustrating the constitution under which we are placed as a system of natural and moral government, are well fitted to awaken, in every thoughtful mind, a conviction of sin; and, the Gospel message being adapted to a state of sin, as a remedy is to a disease, that conviction may prepare the mind for the cordial reception of a full and

* Sedgwick, “Discourse,” 5th edition, p. ccxxii.

free salvation, in the exercise of a simple, childlike faith. But this is far from being its invariable effect. There may be deep conviction of sin without saving conversion to God. Unbelief may not receive it as "a faithful saying, and worthy of all acceptance, that Christ Jesus came into the world to save sinners." Speculative minds may demand explanations which Revelation itself is not designed to afford. And in the absence of these they may express dissatisfaction with the "Analogy," or even with the Bible itself, and drift towards the extreme of utter Atheism. In such a case, Unbelief is not the effect of Butler's argument,—it must be ascribed to a very different cause.

(32.) Mr Maurice depicts the workings of a mind in this condition, when he says,—“A man returning to Butler, in the midst of this experience, or when he has just attained the result of it, feels what can only be described as a bitter discontent. . . . The ‘Analogy’ appeals to himself. And yet it talks to him about Nature, and a constitution of Nature, with which he, the sinner, can recognise no fellowship,—in which he has the least possible interest. It merely introduces the Bible as containing certain difficulties *like* those in the constitution of Nature, whereas he has fled to it as a refuge from the only difficulties that have really ever tormented him, or which appear to him of any consequence. . . . What if you are met with agreement, not objections? What if the unbeliever should say to you—You are quite right? I am tormented with perplexities, difficulties, anomalies, in the course and constitution of Nature. They haunt me by night and by day. The condition of millions of human beings in this country, in every country of the world,—their physical condition, their moral condition,—crushes me: it has taken away from me all faith that there is an Order in the Universe, or that there is a God of Order. I thought, perhaps, as you spoke of a Revelation of God, that might have helped me out of my infinite darkness—that might have given me some light and hope. I find from your own confession that it will not. You wish me to receive your Revelation because it leaves me where it found me,—not more hopeless, more Atheistic, than I was before. I thank you for the offer; but it is not what I want.”*

(33.) In a work, written on the Continent, but published in

* F. D. Maurice, “What is Revelation?” pp. 173, 176.

America, the principle of Butler's treatise is characterized as "the analogy of uncertainty" and "the analogy of mystery;" while his argument is said to depend on "the insufficiency of rational evidence," and to afford no ground for "Divine Faith."* And in our own country, the work which had long been regarded as an effective auxiliary to the more direct evidences of Religious Faith, has been described and treated as an ally to Scepticism.† "The strongest impression resulting from its perusal, is the deep spirit of Scepticism which it engenders, and the absence in it of any principle capable of effectually combating that Scepticism. . . . The fact now alluded to is, not only that it has stirred up the first serious thought upon the subject, which is necessarily attended by doubt, but that it has finished by leaving a permanent feeling of unsatisfactoriness rankling in the mind." "For this reason," says James Martineau, "I consider the 'Analogy' of Bishop Butler (one of the profoundest of thinkers, and, on purely moral subjects, one of the justest too) as containing, with a design directly contrary, the most terrible persuasives to Atheism that have ever been produced." Yet neither of these writers professes to have detected any flaw in his reasoning, or ventures to deny either the facts of natural experience to which he appeals, or the analogy which they bear to the doctrines of Revealed Religion. On the contrary, it is admitted by the one that, "Within itself, his logic may be, and indeed appears to be, perfect; so far as his own negative result is regarded within the limits of his own premises, it may be entirely conceded as faultless and irrefragable;" and it is admitted by the other, that "the comparison is made, point by point, till the similitude is undeniably made out. . . . I admit both the fact (of vicarious suffering in the natural world) and the analogy." How then, if the facts be certain, and the analogy evident, can there be any room for scepticism in regard to the conclusiveness of Butler's argument? or how do these writers attempt to dispose of it? The Socinian, clinging to his Theistic belief, seeks to represent these facts as of an "exceptional kind." "No resemblance to the system can be found in the Universe, except in those anomalous and seeming deformities which perplex the student of Providence, and which would under-

* H. E. Schedel, M.D., "The Eman-
cipation of Faith," I. 116, II. 265.

† S. S. Hennel, "Essay on the Scep-
tical Tendency of Butler's 'Analogy,'" p. 4.

mine his faith, were they not lost in the vast spectacle of beauty and of good." The bolder and more thorough-going disciple of Positivism, taking a more serious view of the facts, falls back on the "assumption" on which Butler's argument rests, and questions the existence of "an intelligent Author of Nature, and Moral Governor of the world."*

(34.) Are we to receive these statements as containing a correct description of the real character and proper effect of Butler's treatise? or must we ascribe them to some misconception of the precise object to which his argument is directed, and the limits which he prescribed to himself in the prosecution of it? We are profoundly convinced that a negative answer must be returned to the first, and an affirmative answer to the second of these two questions; but some explanation may be necessary to bring out and place clearly before the minds of our readers the grounds of that conviction, and to explain at the same time the origin of the misconceptions to which we have referred.

(35.) We cannot regard the case mentioned by Professor Sedgwick as a solitary, or even as a rare, example of the effect which may sometimes be produced on an unrenewed mind by the study of Butler's "Analogy;" but we ascribe that effect to the solemn and startling FACTS to which he appeals, rather than to his mode of reasoning upon them. There is much truth in the statement of Professor Blunt when, referring to Wilberforce's report of Pitt's remark, he says—"Pitt, in all probability, was speaking as a young man to whom the deep questions of our being agitated by Butler were altogether new, and who had felt none of the difficulties of religion, till he found them in the treatise devoted to their discussion."† In the case of such a mind, highly cultivated as it may be in other respects, but unaccustomed to serious reflection on the laws and condition of the Moral world in its relation to God and His government, there is an instinctive recoil from the truths of Natural Religion, when they are first pressed on its attention, not less than from the more peculiar doctrines of Revelation. Any work, therefore, which treats even of our natural relations to God in a serious and earnest spirit, and seeks to place clearly before the minds of

* James Martineau, "Studies of Christianity," quoted by S. Hennell, pp. 11, 12.

† Quarterly Review, No. CCVII. p. 161.

worldly men the solemn duties and responsibilities which these relations involve, may be expected to awaken, in the first instance, their latent aversion; and this aversion, unless it be subdued by the "glad tidings" of a full and free salvation, will prompt them either to dismiss the subject from their thoughts, or to cherish a habit of sceptical speculation, such as always amounts to practical, and may very easily pass into dogmatic, Atheism. For, in the words of an able writer, "Unbelief within the pale of Christianity never fails to become atheistic."* Butler's work, more perhaps than almost any other, is fitted to rouse an irreligious mind out of its habitual lethargy and indifference,—for it speaks much and earnestly, but with the utmost calmness, of the most solemn realities,—of God and our relation to Him,—of His holy law and righteous moral government,—of the supremacy of conscience,—of sin and its punishment,—of the dark mysteries of Providence and the awful prospects of Futurity—awful in any view that can be taken of them, whether as involving annihilation at death, or a continuance of conscious personal existence hereafter; and when such truths are pressed on his attention, every one who is yet unwilling to embrace the remedial scheme of the Gospel, will be tempted to banish them from his thoughts, or to look about for some speculative pretext that may serve to vindicate his unbelief, or at least to fortify his courage. It is in this state of mind—the most critical of which a responsible being can be conscious—that the "Analogy" becomes a severe test of his moral principle, and a touchstone of his honesty and earnestness in the pursuit of truth. And what renders it all the more impressive is that the reader's mind is brought into contact, not with speculative *opinions*, but with palpable *facts*—facts which he cannot deny,—which he cannot open his eyes without seeing, or consult his own consciousness without feeling; facts which are attested by the experience and observation of all men in every country, and in every age.

(36.) It is at this point that the alternative, which Butler's argument has been supposed to leave open, comes into view. Some may say, and a few have said, "He seeks to shut me up to Christianity or to Atheism; I choose the latter." But if this dark and dreary alternative be left open, it is solely because

* Isaac Taylor, "The Spirit of Hebrew Poetry," p. 12.

Butler has not dealt with it, and he has demonstrated at least that it is the *only* one. Had he achieved no higher service, he has, even by the confession of those who talk of their falling back upon Atheism, stormed and overthrown the intermediate fortress of Deism; and that, too, without taking up a single position, or employing a single weapon, which can be fairly regarded as coming into collision with any one of the evidences or the truths of Natural Religion. "He leaves two alternatives, and only two, in my judgment, open; he leaves two parties untouched: one is the Christian, and the other is the Atheist or Sceptic, whichever you please; but I am profoundly convinced he does not leave a consistent footing for anything between. . . . Assuredly for the specific object in view, no book written by man was ever more conclusive than that of Butler. For if you can show to an unbeliever in Christianity, who is yet (as most are) a Theist, that any objection derived from its apparent repugnance to wisdom or goodness applies equally to 'the constitution and course of Nature,' you do fairly compel him (as long as he remains a Theist) to admit that *that* objection ought not to have weight with him. He has indeed an alternative, that of Atheism or Scepticism; but it is clear he must give up either his argument or his Theism. It may be called, indeed, an argument *ad hominem*; but as almost every unbeliever in Christianity is a man of the above stamp, it is of wide application. This is the fair issue to which Butler brings the argument."* It may be added that even when the study of Butler terminates in Atheism, his work cannot be held responsible for a result which depends mainly on *facts* existing in Nature and attested by experience, taken in connection with the state of mind which we bring to the consideration of them. For, just as neither the volume of Nature nor the volume of Revelation can be held to produce the Unbelief which often springs up on a survey of their mysterious contents, so the "Analogy" is in no case the *cause* of Atheism; it is at most only the *occasion* of eliciting and making manifest a spirit of ungodliness which otherwise might have remained latent, and, in some cases, perhaps, the means of converting practical, into speculative, Unbelief.

(37.) Mr Maurice has put certain pleas into the mouth of a sceptical student of the "Analogy," supposed to be on the verge

* Henry Rogers, "Eclipse of Faith," p. 411.

of Atheism ; but he must have forgotten, as he takes no notice of the fact, that Butler himself had anticipated some such objections to his argument,—that he had described them, and their authors too, in his own quiet style of grave sarcasm,—and that he had answered them beforehand. “If every one would consider, with such attention as they are bound, even in point of morality, to consider, what they judge and give characters of, the occasion of this chapter would be, in some good measure at least, superseded. But since this is not to be expected,—for some, we find, do not concern themselves to understand even what they write against,—since this treatise, in common with most others, lies open to objections, which may appear very material to thoughtful men at first sight, and, besides that, seems peculiarly liable to the objections of such as can judge without thinking, and of such as can censure without judging ; it may not be amiss to set down the chief of these objections which occur to me, and consider them to their hands.”* Has the Bishop anticipated the objections of Mr Maurice ? “A man,” says the latter, “returning to Butler, in the midst of this experience, or when he has just attained the result of it” (that is, a sense of evil or conviction of sin), “feels what can only be described as a bitter discontent.” Why ? Is it because, as some of Butler’s warmest admirers have felt,† his account of the Gospel, and of the remedy which it reveals for the evils of our present condition, is somewhat meagre and unsatisfactory ? No, but because he speaks only of a remedy, and does not undertake to account for the evils themselves,—that he makes no attempt to clear up “those difficulties in the constitution of Nature” which are *like* such as are found also in the Bible, and which are “the only difficulties that have really ever tormented him, or which appear to him of any consequence.” What is this but an expression of “bitter discontent,” that Butler has not been able to remove all the difficulties which have ever perplexed inquiring minds, and especially that he has not solved,—and has made no attempt to solve,—the grand problem of the existence, the origin, and the duration of evil, under the government of God ? Unless this can be done, nothing else, it would seem, can be of any avail. A sufficient and suitable remedy for existing

* “Analogy,” Part II. c. 8.

† Chalmers, Posthumous Works, vol. ix. pp. 26, 32, 34, 59. Bishop D.

Wilson, Preface to Collins’ Edition of the “Analogy,” p. xi.

evils, such as Butler refers to when he speaks of Sin and Salvation,—of Sin as originating in the will of man, and of Salvation as provided by the grace of God, including Redemption by the blood of Christ, and Regeneration by the Holy Spirit,—will still leave room for “bitter discontent,” unless the fall and all its consequences can be satisfactorily explained;—“I expected that your Revelation would throw some light on these difficulties, but it leaves me where it found me;—I thank you, but it is not what I want.”

(38.) On this point, Butler had expressly declared beforehand, that his treatise was not, and could not be, satisfactory. He anticipates the objection that “it is a poor thing to solve difficulties in Revelation, by saying that there are the same in Natural Religion, when what is wanting is to clear *both* of them of these their common, as well as other their respective, difficulties.” And how does he meet it? “The thing wanted,” he says,—that is, what men require,—“is to have all difficulties cleared. And this is, or, at least for anything we know to the contrary, it may be, the same, as requiring to comprehend the Divine nature, and the whole plan of Providence from everlasting to everlasting.” He makes no attempt, therefore, to meet this extravagant demand; but he offers to prove that were all Religion, Natural and Revealed, removed out of the way, the same or similar difficulties would still remain, since they are inherent in the constitution of Nature itself, and involved in our common experience, or mere secular knowledge. He compares *three* different schemes,—the scheme of Revealed truth,—the scheme of Natural Religion,—and the scheme of our common secular experience: he finds certain points of analogy between them,—as in other respects, so especially in this,—that some difficulties are common to them all; and infers that we cannot reject the claims of religion on the ground of *these* difficulties without also rejecting, on the same ground, the truth of our common knowledge, and sinking into the abyss of universal Scepticism. Nor can it be truly said that he “only shifts the difficulty,” “removing it at one point, while it only returns upon us, perhaps with redoubled force, at another.” In point of fact he makes no attempt to *shift* any difficulty from one point to another in the whole line of his inquiry; he merely recognises a difficulty wherever it is found to exist; and so far from seeking either to shift or to solve it, he leaves it unexplained, and merely

accounts for its being a *difficulty to us* by referring to the limited range of our faculties, and the partial nature of our knowledge.

(39.) It may be said that, in referring to the limitation of our faculties, and the imperfection of our knowledge, he takes refuge in "mystery." But is there no mystery in our purely natural knowledge? Does not all knowledge run up into mystery? Beyond the luminous phase which is apparent to our reason, is there not a wide margin of shade which cannot be penetrated by its utmost efforts? Mystery there is, and must be, as long as the mind is finite. Omniscience alone could comprehend all, and explain all. But must the "Analogy of Religion, Natural and Revealed, to the Constitution and Course of Nature" be on that, or on any other account, characterized as the "analogy of uncertainty" or the "analogy of mystery," and described as "depending at bottom on the insufficiency of rational evidence"? So far from being a mere appeal to our ignorance, or depending on the "insufficiency of rational evidence," Butler's argument, as he tells us himself, is not "an argument taken merely, or chiefly, from our ignorance, but from somewhat *positive which our observation shows us*." It is an appeal to the known constitution and course of Nature—in other words, it is an appeal to FACTS. It speaks, no doubt, of cases of uncertainty, of mystery, and of total or partial ignorance; but these, too, are *facts*; and they may be found to be in strict analogy with other facts which belong to the domain of Natural or Revealed Religion.

(40.) Mr Maurice's objector evidently speaks as an extreme sceptic, and as an incipient, if not as an avowed, Atheist; for he says—"The condition of millions of human beings . . . has taken away from me all faith that there is an Order in the universe, or that there is a God of Order:" "And your revelation leaves me where it found me, not more hopeless, more Atheistic, than I was before."—But Mr Maurice must have entirely misconceived the nature of Butler's argument. It is not directed against Atheists: it is not designed to prove the existence, or perfections, or natural government, of God; on the contrary, it assumes these elementary truths, as being either undeniably evident, or at least as being generally admitted by those to whom his treatise is addressed. For "an Author of Nature is here supposed." "My design is to apply it (that is, Analogy) to Religion in general, both Natural and Revealed,—taking for proved, that there is an intelligent

Author of Nature, and natural Governor of the world. For as there is no presumption against this prior to the proof of it, so it has been often proved with accumulated evidence,—from this argument of *analogy and final causes*, from abstract reasonings, from the most ancient traditions and testimony, and from the general consent of mankind. Nor does it appear, so far as I can find, to be denied by the generality of those who profess themselves dissatisfied with the evidence of Religion.” “An Author of Nature being supposed, it is not so much a deduction of reason, as a matter of experience, that we are under His government.” From these explicit statements, it appears that Butler held Analogy to be applicable, among other proofs, to the establishment of the existence and government of God; but that he purposely abstained from so applying it, and contented himself with “taking it for proved” by the accumulated evidence to which he refers.

(41.) The truth is, that, in his days, there were two classes of Deists—one who held, like Herbert of Cherbury, all the articles of Natural Religion, including the doctrine of a moral government now, and of a righteous retribution hereafter: another who admitted the existence of God, at least in terms; but denied that we could know anything of His moral perfections, or could prove either the doctrine of His Providential Government, or the certain immortality of the Soul.* It is evident that Deists of the latter class, while they professed to hold the first principle of Natural Theology—that “God is,”—denied those truths which alone can lay a firm foundation for practical *Religion*, since they did not acknowledge—that “He is the rewarder of them that diligently seek Him.” Butler’s argument is entirely directed against the latter, and does not deal, at least directly, with the former. But had any one said to him—“Your doctrine leaves open to me the alternative of Atheism,” he might have replied—“My argument is not specially directed against those who deny the existence and natural government of God; but beware of supposing that what I have assumed as true, or as generally admitted, cannot be established by sufficient proofs,—for this same doctrine of Analogy, in connection with final causes, might be applied for that end, and would afford an undeniable evidence in favour of Theism. When it is said, therefore, as we often hear it said, that Butler’s argument leaves open

* Leland’s “Deistical Writers,” vol. I. 2; II. 353.

only two alternatives,—Christianity or Atheism,—the statement is true in so far as it implies that there is no consistent standpoint intermediate between the two, such as Deists profess to occupy, while they nevertheless reject both; but it is far from implying either that there is no valid evidence for Natural Religion apart from Revelation, or that, on the rejection of Christianity, a sceptic has no barrier to surmount before reaching the extreme of Atheism. In this, as in other respects, the proper import and precise object of Butler's argument have been grievously misconceived or grossly misrepresented.

(42.) It should never be forgotten that his argument is avowedly nothing more than an application of Analogy to certain specific cases. It bears as its general title, "The Analogy of Religion;" and consists of two parts, "the Analogy of Natural," and "the Analogy of Revealed Religion." The former is addressed to those who believe in God as the Creator of the world,—but who refuse, from whatever cause, to believe those other truths concerning Him which are necessary to make Theistic belief a ground of practical *Religion*; and with reference to this class of men his object is to prove, from the Analogy of Nature, that there is no valid objection against the doctrine of a moral government and a future state of retribution, and that, God's existence being admitted, He ought to be worshipped and obeyed. The latter is addressed to those who "believe in God," but do not "believe in Jesus Christ whom He hath sent;" and with reference to this class, again, his object is to prove that there is such an Analogy between the scheme of Revealed Religion and the constitution and course of Nature, as is sufficient to neutralize their chief objections against that scheme, and to afford a clear presumption, or strong probability, in favour of the belief that God is the author of both. This is a perfectly legitimate line of argument, and may be thoroughly conclusive for the object which he had in view. Butler had a right to select his own theme, and to restrict his reasoning rigidly to the discussion of such topics as properly belong to it, even although, in doing so, he refrained from urging the direct proofs either of Natural or of Revealed Religion, and left many questions that might be raised in regard to them to be settled in another way.

(43.) We have sometimes thought, however, that, in conceiv-

ing of the scope and object of Butler's treatise, a certain degree of confusion has arisen from two distinct causes,—first, from the restricted, and somewhat arbitrary, sense in which he uses the term—Natural Religion; and secondly, from the very general and abstract title which he gave to his work. In its usual acceptation, the term—Natural Religion—includes all those religious truths and duties which, whether discoverable or not by the unaided light of nature, are supported at least by a body of natural evidence, as distinguished, in that respect, from those other, and more peculiar, doctrines of Scripture, which rest mainly on the authority of Revelation. In this comprehensive sense, it may be said to consist of two great branches,—the one, relating to the fundamental truth of the existence of a living personal God, and His peculiar perfections and prerogatives; the second, to His Providence, as a scheme of Natural and Moral Government, applied to man's probation here, and preparatory to a state of retribution hereafter. Butler draws a line of distinction between these two parts of Natural Religion, and bestows a different treatment on them. He assumes the former, without adducing the proof; and proceeds on this ground, to vindicate the latter by means of analogous facts in the constitution and course of Nature itself. His argument is not made to embrace, as it might have done, the proof of the fundamental article of all religion, the existence of God; this is assumed or presupposed, if not as being undeniable in itself, at least as not denied by the parties with whom he is immediately concerned. His argument is perfectly legitimate and conclusive, so far as it goes; but the full force of Analogy is not exhausted by this one application of it. It may be as effectively employed against the Atheism of the present, as it was against the Deism of a former, age; and, perhaps, now when Butler's argument is made a pretext for that more extreme form of Infidelity, it may be seasonably and usefully extended, so as to include the proof of God's existence and attributes, as well as the other truths of Natural Religion. That Butler conceived it to be capable of such an extension is evident from his own words; "My design is to apply it to that subject in general (Religion), natural and revealed; taking for proved, that there is an intelligent Author of Nature, and Natural Governor of the world. For as there is no presumption against this prior to the proof of it, so it has often been proved with accumulated evidence—from *this argument of*

Analogy and Final Causes. . . . Nor does it appear, so far as I can find, to be denied by the generality of those who profess themselves dissatisfied with the evidence of religion."

(44.) Another source of misconception or confusion of thought, in regard to the nature and object of Butler's Treatise, may be found in the general abstract title which he has bestowed on it. After the whole work has been carefully perused and studied, that title is found to be a correct and appropriate description of its contents; but the first impression left by it on the minds of many is often one of bewilderment, as if it were felt to be vague and indefinite. Not a few seem to have no other idea than that it was his object to illustrate merely the analogy between Natural and Revealed Religion,—a subject which is one of great importance in itself, and well worthy of distinct consideration,—but which is only a subordinate branch of Butler's scheme, and not the most characteristic feature of it. The title, when correctly understood, imports that his leading object is to illustrate the Analogy, first, of Natural, and secondly of Revealed, Religion to the "Constitution and Course of Nature," so as to bring both into alliance with the familiar facts of experience; and any allusion that is made to the analogy subsisting between the two branches of Religion itself, however instructive and valuable it may be, is incidental, merely, and subservient to that original design. The "Analogy of Religion to the Constitution and Course of Nature" is an expression so general and abstract, that it needs to be illustrated by particular examples before we can have any very definite conception of its meaning; and even then, it restricts the arguments to certain kinds of Analogy only—those, namely, which arise from a comparison of Religion with the facts and laws of the Natural world,—a large class, certainly, since it includes the whole contents of our common secular experience; but there are other Analogies besides those arising from that source,—such as the analogy between the constituent parts of Revelation itself, or between the Type and the Antitype, or between the successive Dispensations of Divine Truth,—or between the system of doctrines and the corresponding system of practical duty—which may contribute largely to enhance the strength of the evidence, and which are eminently fitted to attract the interest, and determine the convictions, of reflecting men.

(45.) The misconceptions which prevail in some influential

quarters in regard to the object and effect of Butler's Treatise, and which have found expression in the objections to which we have referred, must be admitted to afford sufficient reason for a renewed consideration of the whole subject of Analogy. They suggest, also, the specific point for further inquiry—Whether Atheism be, as several writers have alleged, the natural or legitimate result of his line of argument? or whether the same principle of Analogy, which he applies to one department of the subject, may not be extended to the proof of the existence and perfections of God? Butler has himself sanctioned the application of Analogy to this point, and affirmed that it had been often proved “from analogy and final causes;” not from analogy alone, nor from final causes alone, but from the two combined,—the existence in Nature of certain arrangements which indicate design, and the interpretation of these signs according to the analogy of our own conscious experience. The evidence is substantially the same in kind with that by which we become acquainted with the existence and mental properties of our fellow-men; and that evidence is judged of, in either instance, by the same rule, the analogy of our own consciousness. In both, Experience and Analogy are combined, and our belief is their joint product. Were either wanting, there could be no ground for such belief. There is no such difference, therefore, between our religious belief in regard to God, and our common secular belief in regard to our fellow-men, as would warrant us in rejecting the one while we retain the other. With this effective weapon in our hand, we need not quail before any opponent who tells us that Butler leaves him the alternative of Atheism. We have only to extend the argument so as to make it embrace, not only the Deistical controversy to which it was applied by him, but also the more daring speculations of our own age, in which the spirit of Unbelief is seen in its full and final development, either as a cold speculative Atheism, or as a dreamy mystic Pantheism.

SECT. IV.—TENDENCY TO AN UNDUE EXTENSION OF ANALOGY.

(46.) A fourth reason for instituting a fresh inquiry into the whole subject of Analogy, and determining the limits within which it may be safely and usefully applied to matters of faith,

may be derived from the tendency, in some quarters, to extend its application beyond these limits, and to employ it as a rational proof of certain doctrines of Scripture, which must ever rest mainly on the authority of revelation. It is quite as necessary, in present circumstances, to guard against the possible abuse, as to vindicate the legitimate use, of Analogy in its application to Religion. In one sense, it may be even more necessary to do so; since any attempt to substitute analogy, or any other argument derived from reason and experience, in place of the revealed will of God, as the chief ground of faith in the peculiar doctrines of Scripture, would be neither more nor less than a new form of Rationalism, and would leave our faith to rest, not on the solid rock of Divine authority, but on the unstable and shifting sands of mere human opinion. Yet a tendency towards this dangerous extreme has been manifested, in recent times, by several distinguished writers.

(47.) A leaning in this direction was manifested towards the end of last century in the able and ingenious “*Pensées*” of LAMOURETTE, the favourite divine of Mirabeau;* for, although he repeats over and over again that the analogies on which his reasoning is founded are not offered as proofs of the peculiar doctrines of Revelation, the general impression which his treatise is fitted to leave on the minds of most readers is, that human reason, if it be unable to discover, is capable at least of proving these doctrines by a rational evidence, which leaves them to depend little, if at all, on the mere authority of the Revealer.—A similar remark is applicable to the natural analogies which have recently been employed in Germany, in France, in America, and in England, to illustrate or prove such doctrines as that of the holy Trinity. Mr Field in his “*Analogical Philosophy*” has gone very far in this direction;—as also Mr Tupper in his “*Probabilities an Aid to Faith*.”—An able writer has recently avowed his “conviction, that there is no doctrine revealed in Scripture, the truth of which is not susceptible of *logical proof*,” and his “design to draw out in a philosophical method (that is, on the ground of pure reason), the principal doctrines of the Bible.”†

* “*Démonstrations Évangéliques*,” Tom. XIII. p. 330. “*Le Système du Christianisme entrevu dans son An-*

alogie avec les Idées Naturelles de l'Entendement Humain.”

† Rev. J. W. Maillor, “*The Philosophy of the Bible*,” p. iv. 4.

(48.) The philosophical explanations which have been given of such doctrines as those of the Trinity and the Incarnation, founded on some fanciful natural analogies, are fitted to exert an injurious influence, both in the way of substituting a mere figment of human reason for a truth of Divine revelation, and of shifting the ground of our belief from the infallible authority of God to the ingenious speculations of men. Let the reader reflect on the following examples, and he will see what the danger is, against which we are anxious to guard, in any attempt to apply Analogy to the proof or illustration of the peculiar doctrines of Scripture. Speaking of the Trinity in Unity, Cousin finds its analogue in "the fundamental fact of Consciousness,"—the Ego, the Non-Ego, and the relation between the two,—and affirms that the same three elements are necessarily recognised in God, that is the Trinity, or a triplicity which develops itself in three forms essentially identical.* Professor Bautain has recourse to many natural analogies to show that the doctrine of the Trinity is not only credible in itself, but manifested by a multitude of facts;—they are such as these,†—all life is developed in three terms, all being subsists in three phases: our conceptions are regulated by a trinal law,—in the simplest figure there are three lines, in every body three dimensions,—three words constitute a proposition, three propositions constitute a syllogism; the Trinity is a universal law extending to all Being in its development, and of this law the Christian doctrine is the rigorous expression. F. Schlegel founds his argument on what is involved in "the cognition of Life in general,"‡ and Mr Oken on a Mathematical analogy: "As the complete principle of Mathematics consists of three ideas, so also does the primary principle of Nature, or the Eternal. The primary principle of Mathematics is *zero*; so soon, however, as it is actual, it is *plus* or *minus*; or the primary idea resolves itself at once in being into two ideas, each of which resembles the other in essence, but differs from it in form. Thus it is here one and the same essence under three forms,—or three are one. . . . How one may be three, and three one, is thus rendered comprehensible only by Mathematics!"§ It is curious to mark

* M. Cousin, "Cours de Philosophie," Introd. I. 133, 156.

† M. Bautain, "Philosophie du Christianisme," I. 7, 38, 242.

‡ Fr. SCHLEGEL, "Philosophy of Life," pp. 190, 200. (Bohn.)

§ OKEN, "Physio-philosophy," p. 17.

the marvellous change which has come over the spirit of philosophical speculation on this subject during the last half-century. Formerly the Trinity was scouted as a contradiction in terms; now it is discovered to be a fundamental law of human thought! Formerly the Christian doctrine could scarcely obtain a patient hearing; now, in the words of Abbé Maret, “les vingt dernières années nous ont gratifiés d’une demi-douzaine de Trinités: nous avons la trinité Hegélienne, la Trinité Saint-Simonienne, deux ou trois trinités Progressistes, et une trinité Eclectique.”*

(49.) Speaking again of the Incarnation, a writer of the Eclectic School tells us that, as the Trinity is nothing more than the idea of the Infinite, and of the finite, and of the relation between the two, so the Incarnation represents nothing more than the manifestation of the infinite reason in the finite intelligence of man.† Hegel, again, affirms that, as in the doctrine of the Trinity, the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit represent the Infinite, the finite, and the union of the two,—their identity first, then their distinction, and then at last their return to identity; so the doctrine of the Incarnation has a meaning no less philosophical,—it represents the manifestation of the Ideal in the real, so that the Incarnation is perpetual, and continually renewed in all ages of time; God is continually becoming incarnate both in nature and man.” And in the same spirit Arnold Ruge assures us that “Christianity places the Divine principle in Man, and thus establishes Heaven upon the earth. Philosophy steps forth and says, You can know nothing higher than the Spirit,—the human mind is that Spirit, and all greatness and all dignity is its work.”

(50.) Whatever else may be thought of these speculations, every competent scholar will admit that they are utterly indefensible, on exegetical grounds, if they are offered as the true interpretation of the language of Scripture, and that they have none but a fanciful resemblance to the doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation as these were taught by the Evangelists and Apostles. They can only be regarded as philosophical substitutes for these Scriptural truths. They can explain nothing, and they can prove nothing, of what God has revealed concerning them. Yet the fanciful resemblance, which human ingenuity may think it can

* MARET, “Theodicée,” p. 218.

† Damion, as quoted by Maret, “Panthéisme,” p. 30.

discover between such speculations and the truths of Scripture, is treated as if it amounted to a true and proper analogy, and applied, not indeed to prove these truths, but rather to set them aside or explain them away.

(51.) The existence of such a tendency to discover natural analogies and apply them to matters of faith, and the dangerous consequences which have resulted from it in the recent history of speculation, should teach a wholesome lesson of caution to Christian apologists, lest they should be unwarily seduced into a similar error. We are under no necessity of proving the peculiar doctrines of Scripture by rational arguments or natural analogies; it is sufficient if we can show that the Bible is the Word of God, and that these doctrines represent its true meaning. Analogy may be highly useful in neutralizing objections, and in affording a strong probability that the Author of Nature is also the Author of Scripture; it may even in some cases supply a confirmatory evidence in favour of particular doctrines, by showing that they are not at variance, but in entire harmony, with the laws of human thought, or the facts of our actual experience. The resemblance, however, on which it founds must not be superficial or fanciful, but real and radical, implying a common property, or a common principle, in each of the objects compared. It may be true that "when reason is aided by Revelation to perceive a truth, the accordance of that truth with her own most profound deductions is, to her, a clear testimony to its validity," but we are jealous of any proposal "to establish the doctrine of the Trinity on a rational and Scriptural basis, chiefly by means of certain natural analogies supplied by the consciousness of the human mind."*

SECT. V.—ADDITIONAL SOURCES AND APPLICATIONS OF ANALOGY.

(52.) A fifth reason for reconsidering the subject may be derived from the expediency, in present circumstances, of training thoughtful minds to the habit of marking *all* such analogies, from whatever source they may be derived, as may be useful in con-

* J. B. Walker, "Philosophy of the Divine Operations in Redemption," p. xi. 2.

firming or illustrating the evidences and truths of religion, and of applying them, with ease and promptitude, to all the various questions which are continually arising in regard to matters of faith.

(53.) The Constitution and Course of Nature, when compared with the Scheme of Religion, Natural and Revealed, suggests a multitude of analogies of which Bishop Butler has made admirable use ; but there are other analogies besides these, and such as stand very closely connected with our religious beliefs. There are many interesting and instructive analogies which belong to the scheme of Revelation itself, and which come into view on a simple comparison of one part of it with another—a comparison which may be made without assuming, in the first instance, its Divine origin, although it may gradually lead us up to the conviction of that,—but which may proceed simply on the fact that the Scriptures, as they have been put into our hands, are so related to each other as to exhibit many internal analogies. We may compare, for instance, the successive Dispensations of Revealed Religion—the Primeval, the Patriarchal, the Mosaic, the Prophetical, and the Christian ; or we may compare its Theological doctrines with its Ethical lessons, and both with its ritual observances ; above all, we may compare the Types of the Old Testament with their antitypes in the New. It were surely a strange omission did we find no place for this marvellous scheme of prefiguration in treating of such analogies as may be a Guide to Truth and an Aid to Faith : for the use and importance of Analogy, as at once a source of evidence, and a vehicle of religious instruction, could scarcely have been more emphatically taught than it was by the fact that, when no natural symbols could be found adequate to represent supernatural truths, *a new class of analogies was created on purpose* as the best preparation for Christianity, and visibly exhibited beforehand in the history and ritual of the Jewish Church. These analogies, belonging to the scheme of Revelation itself, demand our careful study as well as those which may be derived from the Constitution and Course of Nature ; and with reference to both, it will be found practically useful, as conducing to greater clearness of conception, to reduce them to distinct heads, and to specify the different sources from which they are derived, and the precise relations on which they respectively depend.

(54.) The habit of marking such analogies, whether they be exhibited in Nature or in Scripture,—of tracing them to their

respective sources,—and meditating on their precise import and proper application,—is eminently conducive to the instruction and healthy activity of our minds; and every new question which arises affords additional scope for its exercise. It may be safely affirmed that all the most important problems of modern thought—all the questions which have recently engaged speculative minds,—in connection with the theory of our religious knowledge, admit of being illustrated, and, to a large extent, determined, by a fair and legitimate application of Analogy.

(55.) Are we called, for example, to consider the claims of Rationalism, and to decide how far it is entitled to place Revelation at the bar of reason, and to make man's wisdom the criterion and test of God's truth? May we not find a guide to a right and safe conclusion on this subject in the Analogy which subsists between the two volumes of Nature and Revelation, as having the same common relation to the mind to which they are respectively addressed? And if it be the great lesson of Inductive Science that "Man is the mere interpreter and minister of Nature," may we not infer that, as he is bound to bring his views into conformity with the lessons of Experience, instead of bending these lessons into compliance with his own preconceived opinions, so he is bound, in dealing with Scripture, to act in a similar way? Nature or Experience being the supreme standard in the case of our natural or secular knowledge, may it not be that Scripture is the supreme standard in the case of our supernatural or spiritual knowledge, and that the proper function of Reason, in either instance, is simply to read and interpret the lesson which is set before it? Or, again, are we called to pronounce on the claims of an opposite system which denies the right, or discourages the exercise, of private judgment, and demands unconditional submission to Church Authority, in matters of faith? May we not here, also, find a guide to a right and safe conclusion in the Analogy which subsists between our sacred and our secular knowledge, as having a common origin in some manifestation of truth which bears the impress of Divine authority, and which must, in all cases, be the standard of ultimate appeal? May we not vindicate the use, while we guard against the abuse, of private judgment in Religion as well as in Science; and refuse to acknowledge any authority which forecloses an appeal to Nature, in the one case, or to Scripture, in the other? Or still further, are we perplexed

by the subtle reasonings of modern Spiritualism, when it disparages a "Book revelation" or denies any supernatural communication of truth from the mind of God to the mind of man, seeking to substitute for it an "internal inspiration," or "a light within," or "a subjective religious consciousness"? May we not here also find a guide to a right and safe conclusion in the Analogy which subsists between our secular and spiritual knowledge, in respect to the method in which they are severally imparted? Is not our whole natural knowledge dependent, both for its commencement and its advancement, on a Revelation which is exhibited to us in the works of nature and the events of experience, and by which our mental powers, otherwise dormant, are stimulated into active exercise? And how is all the accumulated wisdom of past ages preserved for our benefit, and transmitted as their most precious inheritance to our posterity, but through the medium of Books? These are only a few specimens of a large class of questions, comprising some of the most important problems of modern thought, which may be illustrated, and, to a large extent, determined, by a fair application of Analogy: and few who are even moderately acquainted with the recent course of speculation on such subjects, will refuse to acknowledge the expediency of training thoughtful minds to the habit of marking such analogies as may afford some useful light, and of applying them with promptitude and precision to all the various questions which may successively arise. Such analogies will often be a Guide to truth, a Shield and Safeguard against error, and an Aid to Faith.

(56.) The great argument from Analogy is far from being exhausted. It is fresh as ever, and ready to be applied to every new phase of error. It is applicable to all the great religious questions which engage the thoughts of educated men in this era of transition—this age of critical doubt and restless speculation. The reason is clear,—NATURE and SCRIPTURE—the two standing Witnesses for God, survive all vicissitudes of human opinion, and, like the greater and lesser lights in the firmament, remain serene and stable, whatever passing clouds may for a time envelope them. Their consentient testimony, when they speak of the same truths, and their analogy, when they teach different lessons, can hardly fail to confirm our belief in the Divine origin of both.

(57.) The reasons which have been assigned for a fresh exa-

mination of Analogy in its religious bearings, may serve at once to explain the design of this treatise, and to vindicate it from any charge of undue presumption. One of the best effects of any such attempt will be a revived interest in those great works which a former age has bequeathed to us. These treatises must always retain their standard value in the estimation of studious men, and can never be surpassed or superseded, however they may be supplemented and illustrated, by succeeding writers. But every new age has its own peculiar exigencies, its popular questions, its philosophical tendencies, and its characteristic spirit. New errors arise, or old errors in new forms; obsolete heresies are revived, or reappear in a different guise; and the Protean changes of Opinion call for a diversified exhibition even of unchangeable Truth. A fresh application of Analogy, adapted to the present state of society, may serve, perhaps, to awaken a more general interest in the writings of a former age on the same subject. How many are there among the best educated men of the present generation who have ever read the "Divine Analogy" of Bishop Browne? And if the "Analogy" of Bishop Butler is more generally known, how few are there who have become so familiar with its leading principle, and so saturated with its spirit, as to be able and ready to apply his great argument to the questions of the day as they successively arise? There are works whose titles are so currently known, that their contents are presumed, often on very insufficient grounds, to be as generally understood and appreciated. But may it not be said of some of our great English apologists, as the President Riambourg said of his own countrymen,—"*Il n'y a que trop de jeunes hommes aujourd'hui pour qui nos chefs-d'œuvres sont comme s'ils n'existaient pas*"? *

(58.) The reasons which have been assigned for instituting this inquiry serve also to indicate the topics to which our attention should be chiefly directed; and they may be most conveniently discussed in their proper order by dividing the work into three Parts:—

- I. THE GENERAL DOCTRINE OF ANALOGY.
- II. THE SOURCES OF ANALOGY IN MATTERS OF FAITH.
- III. ANALOGY APPLIED TO MODERN RELIGIOUS QUESTIONS.

* Riambourg, "*Rationalisme et Tradition*," p. 467. Paris, 1838.

PART I.



THE

GENERAL DOCTRINE OF ANALOGY.

THE GENERAL DOCTRINE OF ANALOGY.

(59.) Although it is perfectly legitimate to assume and apply any recognised principle of reason, without offering a formal explanation of its origin or defence of its validity, yet it may be expedient, in certain circumstances, to subject it to careful examination,—to compare our own conscious experience of its operation with what we may observe in the reasonings and language of our fellow-men,—and to satisfy ourselves that it should be regarded as a universal and permanent law of human thought. In doing so, we are not seeking to prove—what must ever be incapable of proof by reasoning—the trustworthiness of our rational faculties; we are seeking merely to ascertain that the principle in question has a real existence in our mental constitution. This can only be ascertained by its actual operation, from which we may learn also its peculiar functions and proper uses. Such an inquiry is the more necessary, when any law or process of thought has become the subject of doubt or of controversy,—when different opinions have been held in regard either to its general validity or the value of its special applications,—and when a difference of opinion on these points may have a tendency to diminish our confidence in the conclusions which depend upon it. The principle of Analogy has come to be regarded in this light. Many must be conscious of a vague feeling of insecurity in yielding themselves to its guidance, and specious reasons have been assigned for doubting its authority, and for regarding and treating it as more closely allied to Imagination than to Reason. An argument from Analogy is often estimated as little better than a metaphorical illustration, or figure of speech. There is reason to believe that this disparagement of its validity and value has arisen from some misconception of its real nature, or from some confused suspicion that likeness

or resemblance cannot, in any case, be admitted as a ground of inference or reason of belief, without exposing us to the hazard of mistaking fancies for facts, in matters both of philosophy and faith. Nor is this error to be corrected by a hasty or superficial glance at the subject. There is ample room, as well as urgent need, for careful discrimination in the treatment of this subject. We must examine Analogy in its essential nature, in its legitimate influence, and in all the variety of its manifold applications, if we would ascertain in what cases, and on what conditions, it is available in argument, and in what circumstances it is applicable only for illustration or ornament.

CHAPTER I.

ANALOGY; WHAT IT IS.

(60.) We propose to consider Analogy, in the first instance, in its most general aspect, as applicable to every department of human knowledge; and in doing so, it should be our primary object to form a clear and definite conception of—What it is. This is the more necessary, because it is often spoken of in a vague popular sense, and also because, when it has been treated as a subject of philosophical inquiry, it has sometimes been described in terms, which exhibit a partial and defective definition of its nature.

SECT. I.—RECENT DEFINITIONS OF ANALOGY.

(61.) Several modern writers, of no mean authority and reputation, have defined the term Analogy, when used in a strictly philosophical sense, as one that denotes merely a *resemblance of relations*, or a *similarity of effects*. This definition of it has been generally adopted by the disciples of Archbishop King. He had broached the idea that Analogy consists merely in similar relations or similar effects, and had insisted chiefly on the latter. Copleston and Whately do not give so much prominence, as he did, to the one relation of cause and effect, but speak more generally of a resemblance of relations. “Analogy does not mean,” says Dr Copleston, “the similarity of two things, but the similarity, or sameness, of two relations. There must be more than two things,—there must be at least three, and in most cases there are four. . . . And things most unlike and discordant in their nature may be strictly analogous to one another.” Dr Whately is equally explicit; “Two things may be connected by Analogy, though

they have in themselves *no* resemblance ; for Analogy is the resemblance of ratios or relations : thus, as a sweet taste gratifies the palate, so does a sweet sound gratify the ear, and hence the same word ‘sweet’ is applied to both, though no flavour can resemble a sound in itself.”

(62.) Such is the favourite formula or definition which has been adopted by the writers of this school, and which has been so generally received without objection, both by philosophers and divines, that to reject or even to question it may seem an act of temerity or presumption. It is susceptible, too, of a plausible defence, arising from the fact which is admitted on all hands, that “similar relations” and “similar effects” constitute one large class of analogies, and occupy, also, an important place among those *signs* and *indications* to which we refer in proof of a more radical and intimate resemblance between the properties of certain objects, or the nature of certain causes. This is not denied ; but the question remains—Whether Analogy can be justly said to consist *exclusively* in a resemblance of relations or of effects ? or whether it may not also involve, in some cases though not in all, a resemblance in the essential nature and characteristic properties of the “objects” whose relations are compared, and of the “causes” whose effects are found to correspond ?

(63.) The importance of this question, in a Theological point of view, becomes apparent when we look to the application, which the writers of this school have made of their favourite formula, to our knowledge of God and His attributes. Their doctrine not only affirms that Analogy consists in a resemblance of relations, or a similarity in effects, but it implies also that this Analogy can, in no case, warrant us in affirming a likeness in the nature of the related objects, or of the causes on which similar effects depend. If this doctrine be true, what becomes of our Theology ? According to Archbishop King, the Divine attributes, whether intellectual or moral, are “of a nature altogether different from ours”—“we have no direct or proper notion or conception of them ;”—“we are sure only that they have effects like unto those that do proceed from wisdom, understanding, and foreknowledge in us ;” and therefore “God must either have these, or some other faculties and powers equivalent to them ;” but “the likeness lies not in the nature of them, but in some particular effect or circumstance that is in some measure common to both.” That there

may be no doubt of his meaning, he illustrates it by affirming that "God's attributes are of so very different a nature from what they are in us"—that "there is no more likeness between them than between our hand and God's power," or, "between a country and the map which represents it," or, "between time, velocity, and motion, and the mathematical lines and figures which are employed to express them;" in short, "we have no proper notion of them, any more than a man born blind has of light and colours." Such a theory must, of course, affect all our views of the first truths of Natural Religion, and also of the meaning of Revelation itself; for Scripture makes large use of analogical terms, and could not, in fact, avoid the use of them, if it was to be adapted to the laws of the human mind. But we wish, in the first instance, to discuss the subject on its broad general merits, as a question in Philosophy, and apart from any application which it may have to Theological science. For if this definition of Analogy be true in Theology, it cannot be false in Philosophy; and if it be false in Philosophy, it cannot be true in Theology.

(64.) Thus considered, it appears to be liable to several fatal objections.

(65.) 1. The fact that we discern, in some cases, a resemblance of relations or effects, where we have no reason to believe that the related objects or the operative causes are, respectively, alike in their essential nature, does not warrant the conclusion that we cannot, in any case, discover a more intimate and radical analogy, or determine the circumstances in which such an analogy may be safely affirmed. It being admitted that similar relations and effects do not always imply a sameness of nature or cause, the question remains whether they may not sometimes do so; and in what cases, if in any, analogous relations and effects may be regarded as signs and indications of an intimate and radical analogy in the nature of things?

(66.) A national revolution is often compared to an earthquake, or a volcanic eruption; and justly, so far as the effects are concerned; we may even say that, in several respects, the causes of such catastrophes resemble each other, since, in either instance, there may have been a slow, but ever-increasing accumulation of the explosive elements on which the result depends:—but here the analogy ends,—for there is no resemblance in the nature of the

moral and physical elements which are concerned in the result. In like manner, there may be a similarity of relations, where there is no ground for inferring a resemblance between the objects, whose relations are alike : the relation between the queen bee and the hive may be similar to that which subsists between a monarch and his subjects, and yet it cannot be said to imply or to indicate any resemblance between the nature of the bee and that of a human ruler. It is the relation, and the relation only, in respect to which the two cases are analogous, or, at most, that relation may show that there is some analogy between animal instinct and human reason. But, in other cases, similar relations may imply and indicate a more intimate resemblance in the nature of the objects compared, arising from the possession of certain properties which are common to both. There is an obvious analogy between the Governor of a city and the Commander of a ship, as each stands in a similar relation to those who are subject to his authority ; but it is such a relation as implies or presupposes a deeper and more fundamental resemblance between them *as men*, endowed with common properties, and possessing the same powers of intelligence and voluntary activity.

(67.) A single instance,—a crucial case,—of such intimate resemblance, is sufficient to decide the question,—and such an instance may be found in the knowledge, which we acquire by experience and analogy, of the actual existence, and the mental characteristics, of our fellow-men. We observe certain effects, which are interpreted as signs indicating the operation of life, and intelligence, and will. These effects resemble those of certain powers and faculties of which we are personally conscious ; and from the analogy of our own experience we are constrained to refer them to the same or similar causes. These powers and faculties may be different, in some respects, in different individuals ; they may differ in degree, in strength, in vivacity ; but they agree in the one cardinal point,—the real *fundamentum relationis*,—on which the analogy depends ; and we have just as little doubt of the substantial sameness of the cause, as we have of the similarity of the effects. Who would ever dream of saying, in this case, that these effects, exhibiting the well-known marks of moral causation, imply no corresponding resemblance in the nature of their causes, or that our fellow-men “ must either have the same faculties ” with us, or “ other faculties and powers equiva-

lent to them?" Any other than a living, intelligent, and voluntary cause, is felt to be excluded by the very nature of the effect; and the supposition of an "equivalent" cause, not partaking of the characteristic properties of our own minds, is rejected at once as inadmissible.

(68.) This decisive example is sufficient to show that, if there may be cases, as there unquestionably are, in which similar effects do not imply the same causes,—a town, for instance, reduced to the same state of dilapidation and ruin by causes so dissimilar as an earthquake, a conflagration, or a siege,—there are other cases, in which similar effects do indicate the operation of similar causes; and that, practically, we have little difficulty in discriminating between the two. And this same example may be extended from our knowledge of the properties of man to our knowledge of the perfections of God; for Dr Whately himself has said that "the proof of a Being possessed of them" is "in fact the very same evidence on which we believe in the existence of one another." "How do we know," he adds, "that men exist?—that is, not merely beings having a certain visible bodily form, for that is not what we chiefly imply by the word 'man,' but rational agents such as we call men? Surely not by the immediate evidence of our senses (since mind is not an object of sight), but by observing the things performed,—the manifest result of rational contrivance. If we land in a strange country, doubting whether it be inhabited, as soon as we find, for instance, a boat or a house, we are as perfectly certain that a man has been there, as if he had appeared before our eyes. Now we are surrounded with similar proofs that there is a God."* It will hardly be denied that, in the case supposed, we infer from similar effects the existence of a being with similar properties to our own. And from this example it is clear, that there may be other cases in which similar effects warrant the inference of similar causes; and not only so, but that there are also certain characteristic marks which enable us to determine in what circumstances such an intimate and essential analogy in the nature of the causes may be safely inferred.

(69.) 2. The definition of Analogy as "the resemblance of relations or ratios" leaves out of view the use which we make of it in connection with that large portion of our knowledge which

* Whately, "Notes to King's 'Discourse,'" p. 468.

is conversant, not with relations only, but with concrete objects, and substantive realities.

In one sense, it may be said that all our knowledge is *relative*, because it depends upon and presupposes a correlation between the subject and object of thought,—between the percipient mind and that which is perceived by it. Thus considered, knowledge itself is a relation; and if, for that reason, all our cognitions be called relations, the resemblance between them may, in the same sense, be called a resemblance of relations. But this is not the reason why Analogy is defined as “a resemblance of relations.” Reference is made to the relations which the objects of thought bear, not only to the mind that perceives them, but also to one another: “to certain other objects,” or to “some other things.” It is with reference to *such* relations—not between the subject and object of knowledge, but between the different objects when compared with each other—that Dr Whately describes Analogy as a “resemblance of ratios,” and insists that “the two things are not necessarily themselves alike, but stand in similar relations to other things.”

If we have cognitions which are not conversant with relations only, but with concrete objects also and their properties, whether peculiar or common; and if these objects and properties, when compared, are seen to resemble each other respectively, not less than relations do, then there is evidently room for another kind of Analogy, or rather for a more comprehensive definition of it. That we have cognitions which are not conversant with relations only, is manifest from the whole doctrine of direct or intuitive perception; and is in fact involved in the knowledge of any relation whatever, as well as in the idea of Analogy. For no relation can be perceived without some knowledge of each of the related terms. The perception of Analogy, like that of every other relation, is not exclusive, but comprehensive, of the objects which are compared; and these objects, as well as their resemblance or difference, are known, in many cases, by immediate intuition. Until some such objects have been presented to the mind, or at least conceived by it, there is no room for comparison, and none, consequently, for the perception of Analogy, or of any other relation between them. The first and most fundamental question here is—Have we any direct and immediate knowledge,—any knowledge that is independent of all other relations except

that which subsists between the mind and its objects? If we have any such direct knowledge, may not its objects be found to resemble each other, and to give rise to judgments of analogy, long before we have ascertained the other relations which "they bear in common to some other things"? May we not know some of their properties by a direct act of perception, and discover similar properties in different objects, while as yet we know little or nothing of the relations which they bear to anything else, or of similar relations subsisting betwixt different pairs of objects? And is not the mere perception of resemblance, while other relations are unknown, a simple and primitive, but not the less a real and true, judgment of analogy?

(70.) 3. The definition of Analogy which represents it as a "resemblance of relations or ratios" is founded on a comparatively small part of human knowledge,—the sciences of number and quantity; and, with reference even to that part of it, is incorrect, since it omits the consideration of that common property belonging to the related terms, on which the analogy mainly depends.

(71.) The definition of Analogy which is adopted by Dr Copleston and Dr Whately, is evidently derived from the sciences of Arithmetic and Mathematics, and is applied to all other subjects, however different from those of number and magnitude. One obvious objection might be taken to it,—namely, that while every ratio has the nature of a relation, every relation cannot be expressed in the form of a ratio. But another, and still more formidable objection to it, is suggested by the fact that, even in the abstract sciences themselves, Analogy does not depend only upon ratios, nor does it consist exclusively in a resemblance of relations. It presupposes and subsumes, also, the radical resemblance of the object whose relations are compared,—the properties or affections which are common to all numbers and magnitudes,—the homogeneous nature of the quantities themselves, as well as the similar proportions which they bear to each other. Suppose that in other cases "Analogy can be traced," as Dr Copleston contends, "between things which are perfectly heterogeneous," this is assuredly not the fact in the sciences of number and magnitude; for these subjects have, respectively, the same nature, and certain common properties or affections, which belong to every sum and to every figure, and which constitute the ultimate "fundamentum relationis" on which all demonstrative reasoning depends. Besides the ratio (or *λογος*)

that may exist between the particular terms of a series of numbers or magnitudes, there must also be a common relationship (or *αναλογία*) between all the members of the same series. Without this, there might be a resemblance of mere relations, but it could prove nothing. The demonstrative power of Analogy, in mathematical or arithmetical science, depends entirely on the assumption that every number or magnitude possesses the same nature, and the same common properties, with every other which is brought into comparison with it.

(72.) Or, to use the words of Mr Grinfield, "If there were no universal properties belonging to them, they could not be compared in any way as magnitudes; there could be no common properties predicated concerning them; and, in that case, there could be no *αναλογία* subsisting amongst them." "The proper subject of mathematical investigation is magnitude, which always implies extension, divisibility, composition of parts, measurability, etc." "It is on this common relationship, which subsists among all these terms taken collectively, that the power of Analogy depends, which could not exist independently of those general affections to which all magnitudes are liable, and without which, magnitude itself could not form the subject of mathematical investigation."*

(73.) Here, then, is one large class of cases, in which Analogy does not consist merely in similar ratios or relations, but implies also a fundamental resemblance in the very nature of the objects compared; and if there be one such class, there may be many more. This fact is adduced to show, not that a resemblance of relations can in no case indicate, or even constitute, a true Analogy, but that Analogy does not consist *merely* in a resemblance of relations, and that it is not necessarily exclusive of a more intimate likeness in the nature of the objects themselves. It teaches us that, in framing a definition of Analogy, we should make it wide enough to embrace two distinct sets of cases; the first, comprehending those in which we discern similar relations merely, and which can only be applied for the purpose of illustration or ornament; the second, including those in which we discover similar effects, and infer the same characteristic properties. We think it a defective and

* Grinfield, "Vindiciæ Analogicæ," Part I. pp. 3, 5, 6; also Part I. 8, 18; Part II. 22, 41, 83.

incorrect definition of Analogy, to say that it amounts to nothing more, in any case, than "a resemblance of ratios or relations,"—since it excludes a resemblance between different objects in their characteristic properties and essential nature, and speaks only of "similar relations," as if, because Analogy amounts to nothing more in some cases, it must necessarily be limited to that in all.

(74.) 4. The definition of Analogy which represents it as consisting only in "a resemblance of relations or ratios," seems to have been framed with some reference to the Scholastic distinction between *univocal*, *analogical*, and *equivocal* terms; a distinction which is both correct and useful in other respects, but affords no ground for affirming that Analogy denotes nothing more than a resemblance of relations, or that it cannot, in any case, indicate a more intimate and radical resemblance, in the essential nature, or the common properties, of the objects compared.

(75.) In treating of general terms, it is necessary, as well as useful, to mark the distinction between such as are *univocal*, *analogical*, or *equivocal*; and in treating of Analogy, it is equally necessary to bear in mind that certain expressions, which are used with reference to God and the creature, are not employed either *univocè*, on the one hand, as if there were no difference, nor *equivocè*, on the other, as if there were no real resemblance, between them; but that they are employed *analogicè*, which implies that there is a real resemblance in some respects, while there is also a real difference in others.—The Scholastic distinction was intended to mark the different senses in which the same term may be applied to different objects. In some cases, the term denotes the existence of a common nature, or the possession of the same characteristic properties,—as when all possessing the same powers, although in different degrees and with many individual peculiarities, are called "men;" and in these cases, the common name is said to be *univocal*, and denotes such a degree of resemblance as amounts to generic sameness, or identity of class, which is quite consistent with distinct individuality. In other cases, the same term is applied to objects which have no common properties, and sometimes, even no apparent resemblance, as when the word *file* is used to denote sometimes an iron instrument, sometimes a line of soldiers, and sometimes a series of papers.* In this case the term

* J. S. Mill, "System of Logic," I. 57.

is said to be æquivocal or ambiguous. But intermediate between the two, there is a large class of expressions which are neither univocal, nor yet æquivocal ; they are such as are properly analogical, and denote a real resemblance between the objects to which they are applied, but such a resemblance as does not amount to generic sameness or class identity. Some of these terms, however, are not purely analogical, but metaphorical also ; when they are founded on other relations besides that of resemblance. The scholastic writers applied these distinctions in treating of all the terms that are usually applied both to God and the creature ; and were careful to show that they must not be understood either *univocè* or *æquivocè*, but *analogicè* only. A specimen of their reasonings on this point will be found in the Appendix.*

(76.) But it would be a gross perversion of their meaning, did we suppose that, in denying the *univocal* sense of such terms as being, will, intelligence, and love when applied to God and the creature, they intended to teach that these terms were *æquivocal*, or that they implied no real resemblance between the properties of the Divine and human mind. On the contrary, they were careful to show that they were strictly *analogical* ; that they implied a real resemblance, while they did not affirm a generic sameness ; and that they were the more suitable to express our conceptions of the Divine Being, because, along with this real resemblance, they left room for a wide difference between His nature and our own. But some recent writers, founding on the fact that such expressions are not univocal, have spoken as if they were æquivocal, or could have no precise or intelligible meaning ;—forgetting apparently that analogical, and even metaphorical terms, may imply a real resemblance. The resemblance may not be of the same kind in all cases ; and hence the necessity for the distinctions between different classes of general terms ; but the mere fact that we do distinguish analogical from univocal expressions, as denoting, respectively, a more or less perfect resemblance, is sufficient to show that we can discriminate between those instances in which a generic sameness is discerned, and those other instances in which we can only affirm some sort of similarity between two or more objects of thought. All univocal expressions denote such a resemblance between the objects to which they are applicable as amounts to

* Appendix. Cardinal Cajetan, “De Nominum Analogiâ.” Also Suarez and Aquinas.

generic *sameness* ; while analogical terms denote a real resemblance without affirming that the objects to which they are applicable belong to the same genus. And in the Theological use of such expressions, it is peculiarly necessary to bear this distinction in mind ; as it serves the double purpose of showing that while there is a real resemblance, there is also a radical difference between the mind of man and the mind of God—that while the one may be a created image, it can in no respect be an adequate representation, or fit measure of the other. If man's mind cannot be the measure of the created Universe, much less can it be the measure of Him who is higher than the Universe, and who is infinite and incomprehensible in His nature, and in every attribute which belongs to it.

(77.) In the use of general abstract terms, it is necessary to distinguish between those cases in which they imply a generic resemblance arising from common properties in the objects to which they are applied, and those other cases in which they denote merely some similarity in their effects or relations. The general abstract term *humanity* belongs to the former class, since it implies a generic resemblance arising from the possession of common properties in all the individuals who are included under it ; but when we speak of *beauty*, or *the beautiful*, we make use of a term or an epithet which belongs to the second class ; for while it implies some resemblance between the various objects to which it is applied, that resemblance does not consist in the possession of common properties, but merely in similar effects or relations. The analogy which depends merely on a resemblance of effects and relations, while it may be sufficient to explain and justify the use of the same general expression with reference to objects which are, in other respects, essentially different, should never be confounded with that more intimate and radical analogy which subsists between objects which are generically the *same*, as having certain common properties. The former may be useful in the way of illustration, but we cannot reason upon it as we may reason upon the latter. The epithet *beautiful*, for instance, in its primitive acceptation, is applicable only to what is pleasing to the sight, *sweet* to what is pleasing to the palate, *soft* to what is pleasing to the touch, *harmonious* to what is pleasing to the ear : and this resemblance between them, in respect merely to their similar effects on different organs, may be sufficient to account for what has been called the

“progressive generalization” of the term *beauty* which is applied to them all, and for the transference of expressions derived originally from one sense to denote the perceptions of another, as when we speak of sweet sounds, of harmonious colouring, or of beautiful music. But the resemblance in such cases consists merely in similar effects, or similar relations to our percipient faculties; and we should err, as Mr Stewart has shown, should we infer from it either that the objects which produce these sensations resemble each other in their essential nature, or that there must exist in all of them “a common quality of which Beauty is the sign.”*

(78.) 5. Besides being defective and incorrect in itself, the definition of Analogy as a mere resemblance of relations or effects, will be found to be cumbrous and embarrassing in its practical application. It may be very true, that in a common case of numerical proportion, “there must be more than two things to give rise to two relations; there must be at least three, and in most cases there are four.” It may be equally true that, in working such a case, we must keep the two pairs of terms distinct, and institute an exact comparison between their ratios. But in other cases, belonging to the province of moral reasoning, this method would be unnecessarily complicated and insufferably tedious. It would resemble the formal method of reasoning by Syllogism rather than the logic of common life. The mind forms its analogical judgments by a shorter and quicker process. It compares two objects, and finds that they agree in some general notion which is common to both; and it forthwith gives them a common name, which is applicable to both, so far, and only so far, as the resemblance betwixt them extends. That common name may be univocal, where generic sameness is discerned; or it may be analogical only, where a real resemblance exists such as does not imply that the objects belong to the same class. The works of Nature and the works of Art exhibit similar marks of intelligent design, and this is sufficient to convince us that, however much they may differ in other respects, they are strictly analogous to each other. In acquiring the conviction of the existence of our fellow-men, there is no formal process of reasoning founded on a comparison of abstract relations, such as could be expressed in the form of a numerical proportion or ratio, but a direct and almost

* D. Stewart, “Philosophical Essays,” 260-290.

intuitive perception of resemblance between the manifest signs of their living intelligence and activity and the facts of our own conscious experience. In all such cases, it is sufficient if two objects, when compared, are found to agree in the same general notion, whether a common term be applied to them univocally, or only analogically.

(79.) For the reasons which have been briefly indicated, we cannot accept that definition of Analogy which represents it as consisting in a mere "resemblance of relations or effects." We admit that a resemblance of relations,—such as the relation of a civic magistrate to his fellow-citizens, as compared with that of a commander of a ship to his crew,—may amount to a true and proper analogy; and that a resemblance of effects may indicate a similarity, in some respects, between the causes by which they are respectively produced. But, this being admitted, we cannot affirm that there is no other analogy between different objects, excepting such as consists in a resemblance of relations and effects: there may be, as we think, a relation of a more radical and intimate kind,—a resemblance between the essential nature, and the common properties, of the objects compared, such as may be clearly discerned in itself, and also easily discriminated from any more superficial or accidental likeness.

SECT. II.—BUTLER'S ACCOUNT OF ANALOGY.

(80.) What, then, is the most correct definition, or rather, the most comprehensive description, of Analogy?

Bishop Butler seems to have used the term in a very wide and general sense. He has nowhere offered a precise definition of it; but has significantly indicated, in a single pregnant sentence, the idea which he meant it to convey. He refers, generally, to the doctrine of "probability," which he justly describes as "the guide of life;" and, more particularly, to that kind and degree of probability, "be it less or more," which arises from the perception of "likeness." He speaks of this perception of likeness as "begetting presumption, opinion, and full conviction;" so that he includes every degree of likelihood, from the lowest presumption up to the highest inductive proof; and he thus specifies the sources whence it is derived: "That which chiefly constitutes *probability* is expressed in the word *likely* (verisimile),

that is, *like* some truth or true event: like it (a) in itself, (b) in its evidence, (c) in some, more or fewer, of its circumstances."

(81.) Bishop Fitzgerald, commenting on this compact sentence, which, like many more of Butler's, condenses much meaning in a few simple words, conceives that three kinds, or rather three sources, of Analogy are distinctly indicated. (a) "'Like it in itself'—seems to indicate the case in which we have ascertained the whole nature of the truth, or known fact; *e.g.*, ascertained the whole of the conditions upon which a given consequent takes place; this is the case of a *strict induction*. (b) 'Like it in its evidence,'—when the same testimony or proof which we have found credible for some cases, leads us to believe something else. (c) 'Like it in some, more or fewer, of its circumstances,'—refers to analogies in the popular sense of the term; that is, as previously explained, 'such arguments from resemblance as fall short of full proof, and, as such, are contradistinguished from strict induction.'"^{*} Butler includes, therefore, every kind and degree of *probability*, from whatever source it is derived, and his argument takes a wide range, from the slightest presumption in some cases, to the highest moral certainty in others.

(82.) It should never be forgotten that, in the current language of philosophy, *probability* stands opposed not to *certitude* but to *demonstration*. In the words of Mr Grinfield, "*probability* is not opposed to *certainty*, but to *mathematical proof*,—it does not necessarily imply *doubt*, but merely the absence of that kind of evidence which belongs only to things that admit of accurate measurement."[†] "It is the essence, you say, of an argument from analogy to be *probable* only, and not *demonstrative*. Yes, to be *probable*, in the *philosophic* meaning of the word, which is opposed not to certainty but to mathematical proof." In this sense all inductive conclusions, however rigorous the process by which they have been reached, and however conclusive the evidence by which they have been established, fall to be ranked (most inconveniently as we think) among *probable truths*; but that *philosophical* expression is entirely misunderstood if it be interpreted in the *popular* sense as signifying conclusions resting on insufficient or defective evidence.[‡]

^{*} Fitzgerald's Edition of Butler's "Analogy," p. 4.

[†] Grinfield, "Vindicæ Analogicæ," P. II. pp. 18, 69.

[‡] See "Faith in God, and Modern Atheism Compared," vol. II. p. 295. De Quincey, "Sketches Critical and Biographical," Works, vol. II. p. 192.

(83.) Butler nowhere defines Analogy as “a resemblance of ratios or relations,” and his description of it is much too general and comprehensive to be restricted to that alone. His accomplished annotator, indeed, tells us that “Analogy is properly the resemblance of relations; and an argument from analogy, an argument founded upon that resemblance.” It would be difficult, however, to show that Butler conceived of, or treated, it in this way; he speaks little of abstract relations, and much of concrete realities or substantive facts; and it would be an irksome and most unprofitable task,—were any one to attempt it,—the task of recasting the “Analogy” so as to make it square with that technical definition,—of singling out and setting forth the different pairs of objects, and the distinct sets of relations, on which he founds, and of eliminating every argument that rests on any other kind of *likeness*. His reasoning, however, relates only to *likeness* considered in its relation to probability, or as a source of evidence or proof:—it takes no account of Analogy except in so far as it affords a contribution, “be it more or less,” to the establishment or confirmation of the truth; and for this reason, he is at no pains, as he was not in any respect called, to distinguish between different kinds of Analogy, further than by specifying the different degrees of that kind of it which alone is applicable to the purposes of proof. This he does by marking the degrees of evidence which “beget presumption, opinion, and full conviction;” but he had no occasion to treat of Analogy in any other respect, or to mark the distinctions which must be drawn between its various uses, when it is understood, in a more general and comprehensive sense, as including *illustrative*, not less than *inductive*, examples.

SECT. III.—DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN DIFFERENT CASES OF ANALOGY.

(84.) It may be useful, however, to advert to these *distinctions* in giving a general account of Analogy, and attempting to show, What it is? Such distinctions are not popular or attractive,—they are often decried as technical or scholastic,—but they are indispensable to correct thinking on any complicated subject. “Among the aids to reflection,” says Coleridge, “place the following maxim prominent,—let distinctness in expression advance side by side with distinction of thought. For one useless subtlety

in our older divines and moralists, I will produce ten sophisms of equivocation in the writings of our modern preceptors ; and for one error resulting from excess in distinguishing the indifferent, I could show ten mischievous delusions from the habit of confounding the diverse.”* Some such distinctions must necessarily be made in treating of Analogy, for there is a real and important difference between various cases, which may all be comprehended under that general term. In ordinary conversation nothing is more common than to speak of *real* and *fanciful* resemblances, of *natural* and *artificial* similitudes, of *obvious* and *recondite* or *far-fetched* analogies ; and in any discussion of the subject it is necessary to take notice of these acknowledged diversities, and to discriminate between cases in which the resemblance is slight and superficial, as depending on points of secondary importance, and such as resemble each other in *essential* and *characteristic* respects. The extension of the same common term to all such cases need create no confusion, and can foreclose no question, in regard to their character and claims : it will still be competent to inquire what use should be made of them respectively, whether for proof or illustration ; and the numerous varieties with which we are called to deal, will only serve, when duly discriminated, to show how wide is the range, and how various the uses, of the principle of Analogy.

(85.) It is necessary, in the first instance, to distinguish between such analogies as may be employed for the purposes of proof, and such as are applicable only in the way of illustration. The latter may possess great power in the hands of the poet or the rhetorician, as a method of conveying to the minds of others a vivid idea of his meaning, and may become, through the medium of imagination, a powerful instrument of persuasion ; but the former only belong to the province of the reasoner. The two, however, are often used indiscriminately, and analogies which are merely illustrative are strained as if they were capable of yielding a certain amount of proof. From this cause has arisen a feeling of prejudice against all analogical reasoning, as if the occasional use of fanciful analogies were a sufficient reason for distrusting such as are sound and true. It should be remembered, too, that metaphorical and figurative expressions, which are chiefly used for illustration or ornament, do often contain a real analogy, or a latent proof.

* Coleridge, “Aids to Reflection,” I. p. 31.

(86.) In regard to the first class of analogies,—those which may be employed for the purposes of proof,—it is necessary further to distinguish between such as are *strictly inductive*, and yield conclusions which possess scientific certainty; and such as fall short of a full inductive proof, but may yield a greater or less amount of probable evidence.—This distinction depends on the *nature of the analogy* which is discerned in different cases. Sometimes it is seen to imply a participation of the same common properties by different objects, such as entitles us to rank them under one genus, as possessing the *same* nature, in so far as these properties are concerned, although they differ in other respects. At other times, it is seen to imply, not *sameness*, but *similarity* only, in these respects; a real resemblance, such as may warrant a presumptive or probable opinion, but cannot afford ground for a strictly scientific proof.—We are thus called to distinguish between *sameness* and *similarity*; and yet *sameness*, in this connection, is nothing more than perfect resemblance. It is not used in the same sense as when it is applied to denote the identity of individual objects,—the objects may be different, but they are said to be generically the same, when they are found perfectly to resemble each other in the possession of certain common properties. We say that human nature is everywhere the *same*, for while all men are distinct persons and have individual peculiarities, they possess certain common attributes which entitle them to be ranked under the same genus, and to be distinguished from all other animals. There is not only a resemblance, but a resemblance of such a kind, and in such essential and fundamental respects, as warrants us in saying that they are generically the *same*. It may be difficult, in some cases, to determine what kind and what amount of similarity is necessary to constitute this kind of sameness,—but this must be done, if we are to distinguish at all between Induction and Analogy; or rather between Analogy considered as a ground of inductive certainty, and Analogy of a lower or less perfect kind as a ground of probable opinion. For this difference between the two kinds of Analogy is the only ground for the distinction which is commonly said to subsist between Inductive and Analogical reasoning.*

* Dr Priestley, "Examination of Reid," etc., p. xli. Dr M'Cosh, "Intuitions of the Mind," p. 275.

(87.) Other distinctions have been variously stated by different writers.* But for our present purpose, it is sufficient merely to indicate the various aspects of the subject by which they have been naturally suggested.

(88.) When respect is had to the *objects* in which Analogy is discerned, it is distinguished into Mathematical, Physical, and Moral, Analogy. Mathematical Analogy depends on the common properties which belong to all magnitudes ; Arithmetical Analogy on the common properties which belong to all numbers ; and these properties constitute the ultimate ground of all reasoning on their ratios, relations, or proportions. Physical Analogy subsists partly between concrete objects and partly between their abstract relations. When the latter alone are concerned, and when they admit of being clearly conceived and distinctly defined, the physical sciences may be treated to a large extent with mathematical precision, and the fundamental ideas on which they depend—such as those of force, motion, and velocity—may even be represented by lines, figures, or numbers. But when concrete objects are concerned, no analogy can be discerned between different things in *all* respects : there may be some points of resemblance, but there are also points of diversity ; and both must be taken into account. For resemblance in all respects is not necessary to constitute a true and proper analogy ; it is sufficient if there be a real likeness of some kind ; and any argument that is founded upon it must be strictly limited to the precise amount of agreement.—Moral Analogy comprehends a vast variety of cases, ranging from resemblances which are useful only for illustration or ornament, through every degree of probability up to moral certainty. There may be more or fewer points of resemblance—and these may be essential and characteristic, or slight and unimportant ; the resemblance itself may be more or less perfect, it may be weak or strong, it may be clearly seen, or only dimly discerned ; but it is enough to constitute a Moral Analogy, if there be a resemblance in one or more respects, whether it be such as is applicable in the way of proof, or only in the way of illustration.

(89.) When respect is had to the *uses* to which Analogy is applied, it is distinguished into Moral and Metaphorical, or, as the

* Compare Field's " Analogical Philosophy," I. 182 ; Grinfield, " *Vindiciæ Analogicæ*," P. I. pp. 12, 33 ; Bishop Browne, " Divine Analogy," 368, 377, 439-449.

distinction has sometimes been stated, into Proper and Figurative Analogy. By Moral and Proper Analogy, the writers who have employed this distinction meant to denote that which may be used in reasoning as a ground of inference; by Metaphorical and Figurative Analogy, that which is applicable only for illustration or ornament. The distinction is an important one; but it points rather to the uses to which certain analogies are applicable, than to the essential nature of the analogies themselves. These uses, however, must depend on the kind of analogy which is discerned in different cases.

(90.) We may sum up the results of our inquiry in a few words. It has been shown that, if any kind of resemblance may be called, in popular language, an *analogy*, it is all the more necessary to discriminate aright between different kinds of resemblance, in respect both to their essential nature and the various applications which may be made of them,—that not only confusion of thought, but serious error may spring from blending them all together, and treating them as if they were one and the same,—that, partly from this cause, many writers have entertained and expressed an inadequate estimate of the value of Analogy as a guide to truth, while others have unduly restricted its definition, by making it to consist *exclusively* in a resemblance of relations or similarity of effects. It has also been shown that, in every instance, Analogy, when perceived, implies some knowledge of each of the two terms of a comparison,—that it involves a perception of resemblance where there may also be diversity, in other respects,—that the objects compared can only be known by their respective properties, and these properties by their manifestations or effects,—that the use which should be made of any particular analogy depends entirely on the nature of the resemblance in each individual case,—and that in applying it we must confine ourselves to the points in which a real likeness exists, and not exceed the limits to which that likeness extends.

(91.) When the term Analogy is taken in a stricter sense, not as denoting *any* kind of resemblance, but *such* a resemblance as may be applied in argument or made a ground of inference, it may be described as consisting in a real and radical likeness between two or more objects of thought, which is made manifest to us by their being observed to possess the same characteristic properties, or to exhibit similar relations, or to produce the same or

similar effects. The shorter and more antithetic statement which represents it as "a resemblance, not of objects, but of relations," has already acquired extensive currency, and will probably long retain its popularity, owing partly to the comprehensive brevity of its terms, and partly to the weight of authority by which it has been sanctioned. I prefer, however, the less striking, but more correct, description of it which serves to guard equally against two distinct errors,—the error of those, on the one hand, who hold that it consists *merely* in a resemblance of relations, and implies no resemblance between the objects themselves; and the error of those, on the other hand, who imagine that any apparent resemblance, however superficial or unimportant, may be applied equally with every other to the purposes of argument or proof. Each of these errors would go far to invalidate the force of analogical reasoning; but each of them is sufficiently excluded by requiring a real resemblance between the objects in respect of some of their characteristic properties or fundamental laws. Viewed in this light, the perception of strict logical Analogy necessarily implies, *first*, a knowledge, derived from experience or testimony, of certain objects or facts; *secondly*, a knowledge, derived also from experience, of some of the relations of those objects, their essential properties, or fundamental laws; *thirdly*, a comparison of two or more objects in respect of these relations, properties, and laws, when they have thus been ascertained; and *fourthly*, a perception of their resemblance, when they are thus compared: and it is this resemblance, and this only, which, when it is clearly discerned, becomes a guide to truth, a ground of inference, and a reason for belief, in any department of knowledge. And if it be duly considered, that the Analogy holds only so far forth as the precise point of resemblance extends,—that it is not impaired by any difference *in other respects*,—and that the differences which do, or do not, affect it, may be easily determined by considering what is the precise point that is really essential or important, and whether the difference affects *that* or leaves it unimpaired, we shall see cause to conclude that Analogy may be a safe, as it is an indispensable guide, in the path of Inductive Inquiry.

(92.) We have not excluded *similarity of relations* from our account of Analogy; we have merely endeavoured to show that there are other resemblances which should equally be comprehended under it. The common relations which two sets of ob-

jects bear to a third afford a fine subject for the exercise of Comparison, or, as Sir William Hamilton calls it, the Faculty of relations; and may afford ample materials both for illustration and inference. But the resemblance which two objects bear to each other in their characteristic properties and manifest effects may often be directly discerned, without the intermediation of any third term of Comparison; and such cases of resemblance should not be excluded from our account of Analogy, since they constitute, as we apprehend, the ground of our first analogical judgments, by which we begin at an early period to generalize our knowledge, and to classify the objects to which it refers according to their most obvious properties, while as yet their manifold relations to other objects are altogether unknown. Were we to omit the latter, and to exhibit the former only in our account of Analogy, we should be chargeable with the same error which might be justly imputed to the Logician, were he to make no reference to the direct, intuitive judgments which are involved in all our acts of simple apprehension, and confine his attention exclusively to those which belong to a process of reasoning, requiring intermediate terms of comparison. It may be owing, perhaps, to their thinking rather of *analogical reasonings* than of *analogical judgments*, that some writers have insisted so much on a *resemblance of relations*, to the exclusion or comparative neglect of other kinds of resemblance. But both must be included in any comprehensive account of Analogy, since it should contemplate all the judgments which proceed from Comparison and depend on Resemblance.

The writers who have treated the subject have given marked prominence sometimes to one, and sometimes to another, kind of resemblance. Some specimens are given in the Appendix.

CHAPTER II.

ANALOGY ; HOW IT DIFFERS FROM METAPHOR AND MERE FIGURES OF SPEECH.

(93.) It seems to be supposed by many that ideas which cannot be fitly expressed or represented without the aid of natural analogies, may be held, on that account alone, to be purely imaginary ; and hence it is often thought sufficient to say in answer to an argument couched in analogical terms, that the language is metaphorical, as if Analogy were a mere figure of speech. In such statements it appears to have been forgotten that figurative language itself is not necessarily, or in all cases, the embodiment of a mere fancy, and that metaphor, when correctly employed, is far from being a synonyme for unreality. So far from this being the true state of the case, figures are employed to give *additional* force and vividness to our conceptions of some things, by means of other things more familiarly known. It should be further remembered that there are different kinds of figurative representations,—the metaphor, the simile, the analogy, the allegory, the parable, the type ;—and that it is peculiarly necessary to discriminate aright between those which are merely *illustrative*, and such as are strictly *analogical* ; otherwise we shall fall into one or other of two opposite errors—the error of regarding every metaphor as having all the force of analogy, or the error of regarding every analogy as being nothing more than a metaphor, or figure of speech.

(94.) When all sorts of imagery are classed together, and called by a common name as figures of speech, we are apt to overlook the difference which may subsist between them, and to think only of the resemblance which that common name denotes or

implies. Yet the difference between two or more of the various species of images or figures, which are all included under that generic name, may be as real as their resemblance is ; and it may be of such a nature as to make it in the highest degree dangerous to confound one kind of imagery with another.*

(95.) All *figures* are founded on the perception of *relations*, and many of them on the relation of resemblance ; but others depend on relations of a totally different kind, such as the relation between an organ and a faculty,—or between an instrument and an agent, or between an effect and its cause.—We are now to inquire how far this consideration may enable us to distinguish aright between Analogy and Metaphor.

SECTION I.—THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ANALOGY AND METAPHOR CONSISTS CHIEFLY IN THEIR DEPENDING ON DIFFERENT RELATIONS.

(96.) It may be difficult to state in precise terms, wherein the difference between Analogy and Metaphor exactly consists, and there is room for much diversity of opinion and of statement in regard to it : but the fact that there *is* a difference, such as it is necessary to mark, must be apparent to all. In attempting to explain it, some might think it enough to say, that Metaphor comprehends cases of apparent resemblance in superficial or unimportant respects, while Analogy relates only to those in which there is a resemblance between the essential properties or fundamental relations of the objects compared.† But such a distinction, however true and important in other respects, will scarcely be found adequate as an explanation of the real difference between them, while it must be liable to the objection of being somewhat arbitrary in its application to particular cases. We prefer another method of stating the difference, which brings prominently into view the precise point on which it chiefly depends.

(97.) Many metaphors do not depend on the relation of resemblance at all, but on some other relation of a totally different kind ; as when a *light* is called a *lamp*, not because they resemble

* Du Marsais, "Des Tropes," p. 33, etc.

† Dr Copleston's "Inquiry," pp.125, 127. Dr Tatham, "Chart and Scale of Truth," II. 140, 142.

each other, but because they are related as cause and effect. Many metaphors, again, may be said to imply or express a real resemblance, or to contain and convey a true analogy, as when *truth* is called a lamp ; but here *metonymy* is added to metaphor,—there is an intermediate change by which a sign, founded on some *other* relation, is first introduced, and thereafter transferred, along with the thing signified by it, to something else. In the case of Analogy, there is a real resemblance between the two objects which are *directly* compared with each other,—as when knowledge, wisdom, power, justice, and goodness, as they exist in man, are said to be *analogous* to similar, but infinitely higher, perfections in God. In the case of Metaphor, there is often no resemblance between the *sign* and the thing *signified by it*, although there may be a real resemblance between the latter and something else with which it is compared, in virtue of which the same sign may come to be equally applied to both.—Thus the eye is first made the symbol or sign of human intelligence, and the arm of human power,—the corporeal member or organ being *substituted* for, and made to *represent*, these properties in man,—and thereafter transferred to denote similar perfections in God, on the ground of a real analogy, not between the *sign* and anything like *it* existing in the Divine nature, but between the *properties* which it represents equally in the case of man and God.

(98.) In the case of Analogy, there is a direct comparison, without any intermediate sign or figure of speech, between two things which resemble each other ; in the case of Metaphor, there is either no such resemblance at all, but another relation altogether—such as that between an organ and a faculty, an instrument and an agent, a part and the whole—or, where a real resemblance exists, it is indicated indirectly and by substitution, by means of a sign previously adopted to represent, in the first instance, the human property, and afterwards transferred along with it to denote or illustrate the Divine. According to Dr Campbell, all Tropes “imply the *substitution* of one word for another, when the things signified are related. *The only difference among them is that they respect different relations.*”* But when he adds that, “in the metaphor, the sole relation is resemblance,” and that “this is a figure founded entirely on the resemblance which one object bears

* “Philosophy of Rhetoric.”—II. 153.

to another," the statement must either be understood as relating only to such metaphors as are perfectly pure and simple, or it must be regarded as incomplete and inaccurate. For while there are metaphors which depend simply on the relation of resemblance, there are others in which several distinct relations are combined. When *light* is used to denote truth, the metaphor may be said to be pure or simple, for it depends entirely on the resemblance or analogy which is seen to subsist between that which enlightens the eye and that which has a corresponding effect on the mind: but substitute a *lamp* for *light*, and make it to represent truth as before, there is now a new relation superadded to that of mere resemblance; and while there is still the same analogy as before between light and truth, there is no analogy whatever between the *object* which is used to represent light and the truth to which it is metaphorically transferred. A lamp has no *resemblance* to light, but is *related* to it in another way; and its being *so* related to it, is the reason why it is employed, in the first instance, to denote light, while the resemblance which exists between light and truth is the reason, again, why the same expression is subsequently transferred also to the latter. In such cases, the trope is not a pure and simple metaphor, founded only on the relation of resemblance, but a metaphor combined with another figure derived from a relation altogether different;—and hence it can only be adequately designated by a complex phrase, as when it is said that the name of one thing is transferred to another *per metonymiam metaphorica*.*

(99.) A writer who has treated this subject with great ability observes, that "In every Metaphor three things are carefully to be attended to,—the original, immediate, and proper signification of the word,—the signification to which it is transferred and applied,—and the similitude, analogy, and proportion between the things themselves, in some affection, property, or adjunct which are denominated by it." But he adds, "In most Anthropopathies, *besides a metaphor there is also a metonymie*." And the metonymie is founded on a relation different from that of resemblance. "A metonymie is the misnaming of things, or the putting of one thing for another, when, though they have a connection as correlates, the one is not of the nature and essence of the other.

* Dr Seiler's "Biblical Hermeneutics," pp. 46–50.

Thus the cause is frequently put for the effect, and the effect for the cause ; the subject for the adjunct, and the adjunct for the subject ; the act or affection conversant about any object for the object itself ; and the object sometimes for the act ; the sign for the thing signified ; and the thing signified for the sign.”*

(100.) There can be no difficulty in ascertaining whether, in any particular instance, the trope is a pure and simple metaphor, founded entirely on resemblance, or a metaphor combined with another figure depending on a different relation, if we only take the trouble to inquire what relation it is which subsists, in the first instance, between the sign and the thing signified by it, before there is any transference of either to a different object. What relation subsists between the lamp and light?—is it resemblance, or is it something else? That same relation, and no other, is also implied when the term *lamp* is transferred from *light* to *truth*, on the ground of the obvious analogy between the two. In like manner, there is a simple metaphor, founded on the mere relation of resemblance, when the terms which are first used to denote the knowledge, wisdom, power, goodness, justice and truth belonging to man, are subsequently transferred to denote corresponding perfections in God ; but when terms descriptive of bodily members or organs are also applied to Him, there is here a combination of two distinct figures resting on different relations,—the relation between the organ and the faculty, or the instrument and the effect, which it is employed to represent ; and the relation of resemblance which subsists, not at all between the sign and the thing signified by it, but between the two things to which the same sign is equally applied. When the *eye* is selected to represent the knowledge, or the *arm* the power of God, there is an intermediate substitution of one term for another, by which the corporeal member or organ is made, in the first instance, to stand as a sign of *human* knowledge and power ; and, thereafter, this sign is transferred to denote similar perfections in God,—not because there is anything in His nature corresponding to the bodily organs from which the metonymical metaphor is derived, but because there is something in His nature which corresponds to *the thing signified by it*.

* Robert Ferguson, “The Interest | port and Use of Scripture Metaphors,”
of Reason in Religion, with the Im- | pp. 300, 316.

(101.) That this is a correct account of the difference between the ascription of mental properties and that of corporeal organs to God, is sufficiently evinced by one simple consideration,—namely, that there is really no *resemblance* betwixt these corporeal organs and the mere *human properties* which they are employed, in the first instance, to signify or represent. It is not because the one *resembles* the other, but because they are related as an instrument to its use, or as an organ to its function, or as a cause to its effect, that the eye is substituted for knowledge, and the arm for power; in other words, the corporeal organs are employed as signs to denote a spiritual property, not by reason of their having any resemblance to that which they represent, but by reason of the well-known uses of the eye and the arm. For this reason, the eye is substituted for knowledge, and the arm for power, the instrument in either instance being regarded simply as a sign of the property; and this sign is applied to denote the mere *human* property long before it is transferred to the Divine; it is frequently and familiarly employed in common speech to denote mental powers which have no *resemblance* to it, but with which it has a connection of another kind, since it relates to the instruments on which these powers depend. For what *resemblance* can be conceived to subsist between the eye of man and his knowledge, or between his arm and his power? They are *related* to each other, but assuredly the relation is not that of resemblance. In like manner, human speech is represented sometimes by the *mouth*, “at the mouth of two or three witnesses,”—sometimes by the *tongue*,—“a soft tongue breaketh the bones,”—and sometimes by the *lip*, “the lip of truth shall be established for ever;” not surely because there is any resemblance between these signs and the thing signified by them, but simply because they are parts of the organ or instrument of speech. Now when there is no resemblance between the sign and the mere *human* property which it is first employed to represent, why should it be thought that there must be a resemblance between the same kind of signs and corresponding properties in the Divine nature, when they are transferred to God? In other words, if there be no real resemblance between that sign and what it is used to represent in man, why should there be any resemblance between that same sign and the Divine nature to which it is transferred? In the case both of such metaphors as are founded only on analogy, and of such as depend also on some other relations, there is

a resemblance between certain properties which belong to man, and certain perfections which are ascribed to God; and the difference between the two consists in this, that, in the one, these properties and perfections are *directly* compared without the intervention of any metonymy, or the substitution of one thing to represent another, while, in the other, they are compared also, but the comparison is expressed by means of an intermediate sign, derived from another relation than that of resemblance, such as fitly enough represents the thing signified by it, but has no conceivable likeness either to the human property to which it is first applied, or to the Divine perfection to which it is afterwards transferred.

(102.) Metaphorical terms may, in every instance, be translated into pure analogical language by the simple expedient which Pascal suggests as useful in every kind of reasoning—that of substituting the mental conception for the verbal expression of it; which would amount, in the case before us, to a reduction of the metaphor to its real meaning, and such an analysis of its constituent elements as would enable us to discriminate what is founded on the relation of resemblance from that which depends on other relations of a totally different kind. It would then be seen that a metaphor—*quà* metaphor, or so far as it is *merely* such—is not a pure and simple analogy;—that it is a figure of speech, by which a part is made to represent the whole, or an organ its use, or an instrument its effect;—that it is fully formed and familiarly understood as a sign of mere human properties in the first instance,—and that when it is transferred, on the ground of analogy, to other objects, that analogy consists in the radical resemblance between the two cases, and does not imply any resemblance between the *sign* and the *thing signified* by it.

(103.) It were easy to state in detail a multitude of distinctions between Analogy and Metaphor;* but we have judged it best to point out rather the radical difference on which all these distinctions ultimately depend. It is only necessary for our present purpose to add that some terms may be described either as analogical or metaphorical; and that many terms which were metaphorical in their origin, have ceased to be regarded as such

* Bishop Browne, "Procedure, Extent, and Limits," etc., pp. 105, 107, 132, 142; "Divine Analogy," pp. 2, 8, 42, 70, 145. Dr Felton, quoted in Grinfield's "Vindiciæ," P. II. p. 75.

and come to be used as common appellatives. "To this class belong almost all the words that are applied to denote our mental powers or operations, which were all at first derived from sensible objects or impressions, but have almost ceased to be regarded as figurative. Thus we speak of a *piercing* judgment, and a *clear* head, a *soft* or a *hard* heart, a *rough* or a *smooth* behaviour. We say, *inflamed* by anger, *warmed* by love, *swelled* with pride, *melted* into grief; and these are almost the only significant words which we have for such ideas." . . . "In every language, too, there are a multitude of words, which, though they were figurative in their first application to certain objects, yet, by long use, lose that figurative power wholly, and come to be considered as simple and literal expressions."*

(104.) It should not be forgotten that while Metaphors, as such, are mere figures of speech, they may contain and convey a true and proper analogy, and, for this reason, may be applicable to the purposes of proof and instruction, as well as of illustration and ornament. "Metaphors, *so far as they are founded on correct analogies*, have the nature both of arguments and of philosophical truths; for the justness of the analogy is that which constitutes the excellence of the metaphor; and wherever there is a just analogy there is a conclusion rightly drawn from premises, as well as a detection of a point of agreement in different subjects."† The use of metaphor presupposes some analogical knowledge, and is only a figurative and striking method of expressing it.—Metaphor is, in many cases, "the clearest mode of expression that can be adopted; it being usually much easier for uncultivated minds to comprehend a similitude or analogy, than an abstract term."‡ When it is said, therefore, that "a metaphor cannot prove anything, while an analogy may," the statement can only be admitted as true in so far as it relates to the metonymy or other relation which is involved in the metaphor, but cannot be applied to the analogy which the metaphor may also contain. It can only mean that the metaphor, *quà* metaphor, and as distinguished from analogy, can prove nothing. It is of the highest importance, how-

* Dr Blair's "Rhetoric," I. 91, 100, 252, 256. See also Hartley "On Man," p. 184; Ernesti's "Institutes," I. 42; Campbell's "Rhetoric," II. 153, 158; Whately's "Rhetoric," 271;

Sir William Hamilton, Lectures, I. 134.

† Dr Hampden's "Essay on the Philosophical Evidence," p. 71; see 201.

‡ Dr Whately's "Rhetoric," 271.

ever, to bear in mind, that although they may be distinguished, they are seldom disjoined; that a metaphor generally covers a true and proper analogy; and that the most rhetorical figures are often real and effective arguments from analogy. For this reason, we cannot effectually dispose of an argument, as many seem to suppose, by saying merely that—the language in which it is expressed is *metaphorical*. This may be true; but the question remains—Does the metaphor employed contain a true and proper analogy? or is it a mere figure of speech founded on another relation than that of resemblance? In the latter case, it can prove nothing; in the former, it may be applied in argument as well as used for illustration. The greater part of the metaphorical language of Scripture is expressive of real analogies; and for this reason it is as instructive as it is rich and copious.*

SECT. II.—THE DANGER OF CONFOUNDING METAPHOR WITH ANALOGY.

(105.) If we have given a correct account of the radical difference between Analogy and Metaphor, serious errors may be expected to arise from confounding the two, or placing the one on the same level with the other.

(106.) There are two opposite, but equally dangerous extremes into which men are prone to fall,—the extreme of supposing *that all metaphorical expressions are properly analogical*, on the one hand;—and the extreme of supposing *that all analogical expressions are merely metaphorical*, on the other.

(107.) The *first* extreme consists in supposing that all metaphorical expressions are properly analogical, and this led to the error of ascribing a body, and bodily members or organs to God. The more enlightened of the Greek and Roman sages acknowledged God to be a pure spirit, having no body and no corporeal organs: but the origin of the vast system of Idolatry which prevailed among the Gentiles generally, has been traced to their error in mistaking metaphorical for proper language, on the one hand, and in substituting the sign for the thing signified, on the other. “By this fallacy,” says Sir Thomas Browne, “we proceed

* Dr Tatham, “Chart and Scale,” II. 148. Note Q.

when we conclude from *the sign to the thing signified*. By this encroachment Idolatry first crept in.”*

(108.) Some of the earlier Socinians distinguished aright between the analogical and metaphorical expressions of Scripture; especially Crellius, who makes use of almost the same form of expression which we have employed, in describing the *complex* character of the latter, as consisting of two distinct figures combined.† But some of their followers, overlooking that important distinction, were led to ascribe to God a material body and corporeal organs, similar to our own; and to revive the old heresy of the Anthropomorphites, as that is described by Epiphanius and Theodoret. Thus Mr Biddle, in his “Catechism,” had proposed the question, “Is God in the Scripture said to have any likeness,—similitude,—person,—shape?” and had attempted to answer it by showing, in substance, that “God is a person shaped like a man.” In proof of this startling position, he founds chiefly on those more general statements which speak of the image, likeness, and similitude of God, as if that necessarily implied a corporeal resemblance between God and man; and makes little use comparatively of the passages in which we read of God’s eye, or God’s arm,—of God’s mouth, of God’s lips, or of God’s breath, although these might well have been regarded as the most explicit testimonies in his favour. If he ever thought of them in connection with his general theory, he may have been deterred from applying them in argument by two distinct considerations;—the *first* arising from the fact, so clearly and strongly stated by Crellius, that in all such metaphors there is a metonymy as well as an analogy; and the *second*, from the still more potent fact, that these metaphors are taken, not only from the body of man and its various organs, but from certain parts also of the inferior animals, and even of inanimate nature. This last consideration is sufficient to decide the whole question. For, in the words of Dr Owen,‡ “Because the Scripture speaks of

* Sir Thomas Browne, “Vulgar Errors,” p. 13.

† CRELLIUS, “de Deo,” lib. 1, c. 15, p. 107. “Ex his intelligitur, membra humani corporis, quæ Deo in sacris literis ascribuntur, uti et partes quædam aliorum animantium, quales sunt alæ, non nisi improprie Deo tribui; siquidem a spiritus naturâ prorsus ab-

horrent. Tribuuntur autem Deo *per metaphoram cum metonymiâ conjunctam*. Nempe quia facultates vel actiones Deo conveniunt, illarum *similes*, quæ membris illis, aut insunt, aut per ea exercentur.”

‡ Dr Owen’s “Vindiciæ Evangelicæ,” Works, vol. VIII. p. 148.

the eyes and ears, nostrils and arms, of the Lord,—and of man being made after His likeness,—if any one shall conclude, that He sees, hears, smells, and hath the shape of a man ; he must upon the same reason conclude that He hath the shape of a lion, of an eagle, and is like a drunken man, because in Scripture He is compared to them, and so of necessity make a monster of Him, and worship a chimera.” This first extreme, which arises from the groundless supposition that *all metaphorical expressions are founded only on the relation of analogy*, is so grossly offensive in its results, as well as so evidently false in itself, that the mere exposition, is a sufficient exposure, of it.

(109.) The *second* extreme, which is founded on the opposite supposition that *all analogical expressions are merely metaphorical*, is less glaringly absurd, but not, perhaps, less dangerous in its consequences, than the former. Being less offensive, it may be made to appear more plausible, than the theory which ascribes a material body and corporeal organs to the Divine Being, and may even be the more readily admitted because it seems to afford an easy way of escape from the arguments to which that theory appeals. But in seeking to avoid Charybdis we may only strike upon Scylla ; and, in reality, if we escape, by this means, from the error of ascribing bodily members to God, we can only do so at the sacrifice of all the knowledge we can ever acquire of His spiritual nature and real character. For that knowledge is necessarily *analogical* ; our conceptions of all His attributes are formed, not less than the terms by which they are expressed, with reference to the intellectual and moral properties of our own nature which *resemble* corresponding perfections in the Divine ; and if there be no real resemblance between them, or if there be no other resemblance than that which subsists between the Divine nature and our corporeal frame, we can have no true or useful knowledge of God at all.

(110.) This is the extreme towards which speculation has been tending in this country for more than a century. So far from ascribing a material body or corporeal organs to God, Divines have united with Philosophers in affirming the spirituality of His nature,—and so far this is well ; but they have not stopped here, where they might have taken up an impregnable position,—they have advanced a step farther and maintained, not merely that our conceptions of God are *analogical*, for that is true,—but that,

being *analogical*, they may be placed on the same level with such as are *metaphorical*, as if there were no real, or, at least, no essential difference between conceptions which depend on the relation of resemblance, and others which depend on relations of a totally different kind.

(111.) Because the sacred writers speak of the *eye*, the *hand*, the *arm*, and the mouth of God, we are not warranted to say, that human organs or corporeal members are ascribed to Him, *in the same sense, and for the same reason*, that they speak of His knowledge, His wisdom, His will, His justice, and His goodness. The latter are ascribed to Him *analogically*, on account of the real resemblance which is seen to subsist between the manifestations of His infinite perfections and the effects of similar properties in ourselves: the former are transferred to Him *metaphorically*, because they were used, in the first instance, as signs founded, not on the relation of resemblance, but on other relations, to denote the properties of our own nature, and afterwards applied to denote corresponding perfections in the Divine Being, because there is a true and proper analogy between those properties and these perfections. The prevalence of erroneous views, arising from this source, has been already assigned as one of the reasons which have induced us to institute a fresh examination of the subject; and it is a reason which seems to acquire greater force and weight, the longer we reflect upon it.

SECT. III.—THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN ANALOGY AND METAPHOR EXPLAINS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A TRUE AND FALSE ANTHROPOMORPHISM.

(112.) According to its etymology, the term Anthropomorphism should properly be limited in its application to such opinions as imply the ascription to God of a bodily form or figure; but, in current use, it is extended so as to include Anthropopathy,—and to denote every doctrine which ascribes to Him any property—whether corporeal, intellectual, or moral—which belongs also to man.

(113.) In its more restricted sense, as denoting the ascription to God of a bodily form and material organs, it is condemned by the simple fact, that God is a Spirit, incorporeal, invisible, and

impalpable. Him “no eye hath seen or can see,” and for this reason, He cannot, and therefore should not, be represented by any image or figure addressed to the bodily eye.*

(114.) In its more extended sense, as denoting the ascription to God of any property, whether intellectual or moral, which belongs also to man, it cannot be absolutely rejected, without undermining the foundations of all Theology. For if there be a *false*, there is also a *true* Anthropomorphism, which is necessarily implied in the analogical character of our religious knowledge,—as this again rests ultimately on the fact that man was made in the image of God ; and our horror for the false should, on no account, be allowed to deter us from the frank avowal and firm defence of the true. When thus employed the term is not to be understood, according to its etymology, as if it ascribed a visible form or figure to the Divine Being, but in its extended sense as including every resemblance between God and man,—a sense which has not been imposed upon it by Divines, but rather forced upon them by the objections of their opponents. The use of the term in this sense is, in some respects, to be regretted ; since it seems to imply a connection between two systems of thought which have no real resemblance ; but it has become so common that we can scarcely meet the objections which have been founded on it, otherwise than by carefully discriminating between that kind of Anthropomorphism which we reject as false, and that other and widely different kind of it which we accept as true.

(115.) There is a *true* Anthropomorphism, which is involved alike in Natural and in Revealed Religion. “We may confidently challenge,” says Kant, “all Natural Theology to name a single distinctive attribute of the Deity, whether denoting intelligence or will, which, apart from Anthropomorphism, is anything more than a mere word, to which not the slightest notion can be attached, which can serve to extend our theoretical knowledge.” In like manner, the whole language of Revelation itself is thrown, if we may so speak, into an anthropomorphic mould,—being adapted, in this as in every other respect, to our ordinary human faculties, and the natural laws which regulate all our conceptions of intellectual, moral, and spiritual things. Of these we have no direct perception, except in so far as they stand revealed in the light of

* Calvin’s “Institutes,” B. I. cxx. vol. I. pp. 79–88.

human consciousness ; and from this source are those ideas first derived which are afterwards transferred, on the principle of analogy, to such intellectual and moral qualities as are seen to be similar to our own, whether they be manifested in the speech and actions of our fellow-men, or in the works of creation and providence. When they are transferred to God, they are employed, according to the distinction of Aquinas, not *univoce* but *analogice*:—they are not ascribed to Him *as* they exist in man, nor regarded as being in all respects the *same* with His perfections ; the *difference*, as well as the *resemblance*, must be taken into account.

(116.) In short, there is a false Anthropomorphism, which is founded merely on metaphorical language or figures of speech, derived from other relations than that of resemblance ; and there is a true Anthropomorphism, which is founded on real and proper analogies, although these may often be couched also in the language of metaphor. The latter is at once so natural and so inevitable, that if we attempt to avoid it, by divesting our religious language of all traces of its analogical origin, and casting it anew in the mould of abstract, philosophic thought, we deprive it of all power to instruct the understanding as well as to impress the heart. It has been justly said, that there is “ a morbid horror of what they are pleased to call Anthropomorphism, which poisons the speculations of many modern philosophers.” “ They want a truer and juster idea of the Deity as He is, than that under which He has been pleased to reveal Himself ; and they call on their reason to furnish it. Fools, to dream that man can escape from himself,—that human reason can draw any but a human portrait of God. They do but substitute a *marred and mutilated humanity* for one exalted and entire ; they add nothing to their conception of God as He is, but only take away a part of their conception of man. Sympathy, and love, and fatherly kindness, and forgiving mercy, have evaporated in the crucible of their philosophy ; and what is the *caput mortuum* that remains, but only the *sterner features of humanity* exhibited in repulsive nakedness ?”*

* MANSEL, “ Limits of Religious Thought,” pp. 17, 18.

CHAPTER III.

ANALOGY ; ITS GROUND IN NATURE AND MAN.

(117.) The exercise of thought necessarily implies both a *subject* and an *object*,—a subject which thinks, and an object which is thought of ; and the relation between the two is the fundamental ground, and indispensable condition, of all knowledge. We can neither account for the origin of knowledge, nor give a correct description of its nature, by ascribing it to either apart : we must trace it both to the constitution of the human mind, and to the phenomena which come under its notice.

(118.) Nature and Mind are mutually adapted,—the facts of the one are related to the faculties of the other ; there is a real correspondence, a true “pre-established harmony,” between the two ; and it is in virtue of this correlation between the subject and object of thought, that knowledge of any kind becomes possible ; while its extent is limited by the inexorable law which requires that whatever is known shall fall (“*intra nostram analogiam*”)* within the compass of our faculties,—as related to their objects.

(119.) While the relation between the subject and object of thought is the necessary condition of knowledge in general, the special ground of analogical knowledge lies partly in the existence of various *classes* of objects, and partly in the power, belonging to our own minds, of perceiving the resemblance and difference betwixt them. Our analogical knowledge rests on a special relation between certain *faculties* in the inner, and certain *facts* in the outer, world : and may be said, therefore, to have both an internal ground in the constitution of the human mind, and an external ground also in the constitution of nature. These two grounds are distinct and independent, for there is no necessary connection between them ; but in point of fact, they are so closely united as to lay a firm foundation for the whole of our analogical knowledge. It depends, however, on several special adaptations, which must be distinctly considered.

* Lord Herbert, “*De Veritate*,” p. 13 : “*Conditio prima est, ut intra nostram stet Analogiam.*”

SECT. I.—THE GROUND OF SCIENTIFIC, OR LOGICAL, ANALOGY.

(120.) There is a real, profound, and most marvellous relation between the *laws of the human mind*, and the *order of external nature*; and this may be regarded as the ground of Scientific, or Logical Analogy.

(121.) The correspondence between the two is marked and striking. It depends on the co-existence and correlation of two sets of facts, not necessarily connected, but actually conjoined, and whose combination is the indispensable condition of all analogical inference. The one is, the existence of certain faculties in the human mind, by which man is enabled, not only to perceive many objects, but also to compare them with one another,—to discern their difference or resemblance,—to arrange *similar* instances into classes,—and to reason analogically on the ground of their likeness. The other is, the existence of a corresponding order in Nature, which affords ample scope for the exercise of these faculties,—which stimulates them into active operation,—and which is found to answer, at all points, to the anticipations suggested by reason, so as to afford a practical verification of its most general and comprehensive conclusions.

(122.) This remarkable correspondence between the Mind of Man and the Order of Nature is exemplified in the domain both of Physical and Moral Science. If the former be divided, according to the happy generalization of Professor Robison, into the science of “contemporaneous” and the science of “successive” nature, a similar correspondence between the laws of thought and the facts of experience may be discerned in each of these branches of inductive inquiry.

(123.) In the former, a comparison of different objects, with respect to one or more of their several qualities and relations, combined with the natural processes of abstraction and generalization which spring up spontaneously in every mind, conducts us to conclusions wider than the particular instances actually observed, but not wider than the *analogy* which subsists between them. These instances are regarded simply as *samples*, while their characteristic properties are treated as *signs*, of the whole class to which that analogy extends. To this mental law we are indebted for that indispensable condition of Science—the classification of

objects according to their known resemblance in one or more respects. And the actual existence in Nature,—not of *universals* corresponding to our abstract conceptions,—but of concrete *genera* and *species*,—that is, of objects resembling each other in some things but differing in others, and capable therefore of being ranked under distinct heads,—is the external fact which corresponds to that inward law, and affords a practical verification of it, in the domain of contemporaneous nature.

(124.) In the latter, again—the science of successive nature,—the relation of constant succession gives rise, as soon as it is clearly discerned, to the belief that the same antecedents will be followed in all other cases by the same sequences; in other words, that the same causes, acting in the same circumstances, will uniformly produce the same effects. This belief rests on an inductive inference, suggested, perhaps, by an original law of thought, and derived, it may be, from a limited number of instances, but extended, on the principle of Analogy, to all cases in which the same conditions exist, and leading up to the grand conception of Natural Laws. This is the mental product; and the actual constancy of Nature—or the observed regularity of her processes—is the external fact which corresponds to this inward law of thought, and affords a practical verification of the conclusions to which it leads.

(125.) In both cases, we are guided by Analogy; for it is the perception of resemblance which gives us the idea of Natural Classes in the one, and of Natural Laws in the other: and in neither must our conclusion exceed the precise limits to which the *Analogy* is known to extend.

(126.) Nor is it only in material Nature that we discern this correspondence between the laws of mind and the facts of experience: it is equally discernible in the Moral world. There, too, relations are marked,—such as the relation of parent and child, of brother and sister, of master and servant, of ruler and subject, of a benefactor and the recipient of his bounty: and no sooner are they believed, or even supposed, to exist between certain parties, than the mind, acting under the influence of a connatural law by which it is “a law to itself,” discerns certain “ethical proprieties” which are instinctively felt to belong to them, and constructs a scheme of Duty, which is held to be binding universally wherever such relations subsist between in-

telligent and moral beings. And such is the correspondence between this innate law, and the actual constitution of things, that when we carry it forth from the recesses of our own breast, we find its analogue in that scheme of government which is in operation everywhere around us,—which is felt to be real even by those who rebel against it,—which imposes its restraints where it fails to subdue resistance,—and which connects, by an invisible but indissoluble bond, the Moral with the Physical world, since it makes suffering to follow in the wake of sin, and employs sentient pains and pleasures as instruments of moral instruction and discipline. The sense of Duty, springing from Conscience within, accords with the general scheme of Government which we find established around us; and conduces to the ends, although it is not dependent on the calculations, of *Universal Utility*.

(127.) But even in Deductive Science itself, with its trains of strictly demonstrative reasoning, we have a similar and, in some respects, a still more striking example of the same truth. For, that the human mind, starting from simple sensations, many of which are common to it with the inferior animals, should be able, by its own innate activity, to form conceptions,—such as those of number and magnitude, space, and time, and motion,—and to construct out of them a science of purely abstract truth, such as is independent of experience, except in so far as its first rudimentary conceptions, embodied in definitions and axioms, may have been derived from that source: that this science, a mere product of the mind's spontaneous activity, should possess the character of demonstrative, and even of necessary, truth, so as to be applicable universally to the same relations in all places and at all times; and that it should proceed throughout on the mere analogy or proportion of ratios, or the resemblance of known relations, where the related terms are, in their own nature, homogeneous,—surely this is a fact of profound significance, which may well impart, even when it is viewed solely with reference to the mind itself, a sublime and elevated conception of its inherent powers. But it becomes doubly impressive when this pure mental product is carried out and applied to the material system by which we are surrounded,—when it is found to hold good in regard alike to terrestrial and celestial Mechanics,—when the sensible creation without is seen to correspond with that intellectual creation within,—when man reads, as it were, the laws of his own mind legibly in-

scribed on the tablet of Nature, and is able to interpret that volume by the light of his own reason ;—how can he fail to see in this marvellous correspondence between the scheme of Abstract Thought and the system of Concrete Being, a manifestation of the Wisdom and the Will of One, who is at once the “Father of spirits” and the Architect of Nature, or to bow before Him in heartfelt adoration, saying, “*Omnia in mensurâ—et numero—et pondere, disposuisti*” ?

(128.) The correspondence which thus subsists between the laws of the human Mind and the Order of Nature, may be regarded as the ground of Scientific or Logical Analogy. Each of the two correlates is equally indispensable, and in the absence of either there could be no room for Analogy, as a Guide to truth, or as a Ground of inference. Were either the constitution of the human Mind, or that of Nature, different from what they are, the very conception of analogy would be impossible, and science unattainable. If the mind, on the one hand, possessed the power of perceiving external objects, but had no faculty of comparison such as might enable it to discern their difference and resemblance, and no faculty of conception to form general notions, there could be no room either for Classification or for Inference ; and man would be, like the inferior tribes, only so far sentient and intelligent as to be fitted for the common purposes of a mere animal existence. If the mind, on the other hand, were endowed with all its actual capacities, but placed in a scene the reverse of that by which it is now surrounded ; if there were no classes of similar objects, no genera or species in Nature,—no orderly arrangements and no regular successions ;—if each object were presented individually in a state of solitary isolation from every other, and all events occurred irregularly and at random, as if they were not subject to any discoverable law,—there might still be room for some knowledge, since these objects and events are supposed to be matters of actual experience, but there could be no room for scientific arrangement or inductive inference, since these depend on real analogies, and presuppose the order and regularity of Nature.

(129.) If the general relation established between the Mind and Nature be sufficient to afford a striking evidence of adaptation and design, the more special relation which depends on the existence of objects similar to each other, and the perception of

their resemblance when they are compared, may be fairly regarded as an *additional* proof of the same kind. It depends on a distinct consideration, namely, the co-existence of analogies in Nature with the faculty of comparison and the perception of resemblance which belong to Mind; and these two have no necessary connection, since the one might be conceived to exist apart from the other. It follows that their actual combination, which is matter of experience, and their harmonious concurrence towards the same end, as joint-factors of human knowledge, can only be ascribed to the wisdom and the will of One who hath "made all things double one against another," and co-ordinated the most diverse objects, with a view to the accomplishment of His grand designs.*

SECT. II.—THE GROUND OF SYMBOLICAL OR EMBLEMATIC ANALOGY.

(130.) A remarkable correspondence has been established between the *sensible and spiritual* systems, in virtue of which the one is adapted to represent or shadow forth the other, and this may be called the ground of *symbolical or emblematic* Analogy.

(131.) This is a distinct ground from the former: it is not now the adaptation between the laws of the human mind and the order of external nature of which we speak; but an additional arrangement by which natural, material, sensible symbols are provided for the expression of our highest thoughts. By the former we are enabled to reason on the principle of Analogy in matters of Science; by the latter, to represent one thing by means of another,—to illustrate our meaning by natural images,—to make material things the types of mental, sensible things of spiritual, earthly things of heavenly,—and to invest Truth in the garb of Poetry.

(132.) Many symbols and metaphors are founded on other relations than that of resemblance, as when a part is put for the whole, an organ for a faculty, or an instrument for an agent;—and the precise nature of the relation on which each of them depends should be ascertained and considered with a view to determine

* Bishop HALIFAX, Preface to his Edition of Butler, xxvii.

their legitimate application. But some of them are unquestionably founded on the relation of resemblance, and all such may be characterized as analogical symbols, or emblematic analogies.

(133.) It is an undoubted fact, that by far the larger part of the language which is employed to express mental, moral, and spiritual truths is derived from sensible things; and, language being a mirror which reflects the unseen processes of thought, this fact implies that the mind makes use of natural analogies in conceiving, as well as in expressing, these truths. It follows that such analogies exist and are easily discernible; for the use of them is spontaneous and universal: and this implies a real correspondence or adaptation established in Nature between all its departments, by which provision is made for finding in one of them fit signs or symbols of those things which belong to another.

(134.) Nor is this application of Analogy confined to the professed Poet, any more than the inductive use of it is confined to the professed Logician or man of Science; for as there is a logic, so there is also a poetry, of common life. As all men reason analogically, so all men conceive and speak analogically; and the popular language of every nation, while it always expresses logical relations, is pre-eminently characterized by poetical imagery. The extent to which the mind instinctively makes use of natural images both in conceiving and expressing its thoughts, might be illustrated by a simple enumeration of those familiar phrases which are everywhere current in common speech, and for which it would be difficult, if not impossible, to invent and introduce an intelligible substitute. Knowledge is represented as being the object of *thirst*, of *pursuit*, of *search*, of *discovery*: truth is said to be *clear*, *pure*, *profound*, *precious*: religion is described as *vital*, *vigorous*, *sound*, *healthy*, *unspotted*, *undefiled*: God Himself is called *the Light of life*, *the Sun of righteousness*, *the Shepherd of Israel*, *the Physician of souls*, *a Father*, *a Master*, *a Lawgiver*, *a King*, *a Ruler*, *a Judge*: His dispensations are described as *a great deep*; His faithfulness as *a buckler* and *a high tower*; His word as *a lamp* to our feet, as *food* for our souls, as the *milk* by which we are nourished, the *strong meat* by which we grow. And these descriptive epithets or expressions, so frequently and familiarly employed, are all analogical,—they are founded on a real resemblance between two things which are tacitly compared, and they make use of a sensible symbol to represent a spiritual truth.

(135.) The poetic differs from the common mind, not in possessing any peculiar faculty which is altogether wanting to the latter,—for how then could the creations of the poet become intelligible or interesting to the mass of his fellow-men?—but in possessing the same faculties in a pre-eminent degree,—a quick and lively susceptibility which renders his impressions peculiarly fresh and vivid,—a clear and almost intuitive perception of latent analogies, much more akin to philosophic genius than it is often supposed to be,—and the habit of contemplating truth, not so much in its mere abstract relations, as in its concrete manifestations in the actual world around him. A true poet is no visionary, he is the ideal painter of the real and the true. He finds in Nature the prototypes of all his highest creations : for Nature supplies both the thought, and the symbol by which it is most fitly expressed. And hence it has been finely said of him by one whose writings exemplify what his words describe,—“His thoughts were twin-born,—the thought itself, and its figurative semblance in the outer world. Thus, through the quiet still waters of his soul, each image floated double, ‘swan and shadow.’”*

(136.) It thus appears, that a real ground exists in Nature for analogical illustration, as well as for analogical reasoning, and that it mainly consists in the marvellous correspondence which has been established between material and mental, sensible and spiritual, earthly and heavenly things,—a correspondence which extends to every department of thought, and enables us to find in one of them fit signs or symbols of things belonging to another.

(137.) Like the adaptations already mentioned, this additional provision by which one thing is made the symbol of another, has been recognised as affording a new manifestation of design—a fresh proof of the “manifold wisdom of God.” For, in the words of Professor Sedgwick, “The external world proves to us the being of God in two ways ; by addressing the imagination, and by informing the reason. It speaks to our imaginative and poetic feelings ; and they are as much a part of ourselves as our limbs and our organs of sense. All the touching sentiments and splendid imagery borrowed by the poet from the world without, would lose their magic power, and might as well be presented to a cold statue as to a man, were there no *pre-ordained harmony* between

* Longfellow's “Hyperion,” p. 15.

his mind and the material things around him. It is certain that the glories of the external world are so fitted to our imaginative powers as to give them a perception of the Godhead and a glimpse of His attributes ; and this adaptation is a proof of the existence of God of the same kind with that we derive from the adaptation of our senses to the constitution of the material world.”*

(138.) The Divine Teacher made large use of the principle of Analogy, both when He spoke of “earthly things” as symbols of “heavenly,” and when He had recourse to Parables, which in all ages and nations have always been, and ever will be, the most effective vehicles of popular religious instruction.† Sometimes by referring to the familiar objects and processes of Nature,—sometimes by alluding to facts falling within the range of common experience,—sometimes even by the use of a supposed case or fictitious narrative, He illustrated some principle which was equally manifested in the lower sphere of natural, and in the higher sphere of supernatural, truth. No one can fail to appreciate the profound practical wisdom of that method of teaching by which He appealed, in the first instance, to *facts* familiarly known and universally acknowledged, and sought, by means of these, to lead His disciples up, by a natural analogy, to the recognition and reception of the higher and more spiritual doctrines which He came to reveal. And who has not felt, on reading the narrative of His personal ministry, the peculiar charm—the deep human interest—the practical power—the warm feeling of life-like reality, which this method of discourse imparted to every lesson which He taught ?

(139.) The correspondence which has been established between the material and the mental, the sensible and the spiritual systems, and which constitutes the ground of Symbolical or Metaphorical Analogy, is subservient to several distinct purposes in connection with the education and instruction of the human mind. Not only does it minister largely to the pleasures of thought, by opening up a boundless field for the Imagination and presenting a multitude of objects fitted to stimulate its activity, but it aids us both in *conceiving* and in *communicating* truth. It imparts peculiar clearness to our conceptions of one thing, by means of another more familiarly known ; and, by illustrating some principle which is seen to

* Sedgwick's “Discourse on the | † Barton, “The Analogy of Divine
Studies of Cambridge,” 5th Ed. p. 20. | Wisdom,” pp. 35, 48, 82, 90.

be common to both, it supplies an analogical proof, such as is felt to have considerable weight when the analogy is clear and strong. Each of these statements is at direct variance with a corresponding error on this subject. It seems to be supposed by many that symbolical and metaphorical expressions, even when they involve or imply a true analogy, can have no effect in the way of giving us clearer conceptions of the truth, and still less in the way of proving it : that they are mere ornaments of style which serve for the embellishment of discourse,—that they may please the fancy, or gratify the taste, or affect the feelings of men, but should have no power to influence their judgment, or to determine their convictions. But figurative language is not necessarily the embodiment of a mere fancy. On the contrary, figures are employed to give force and vividness to our conceptions of some things by means of other things more familiarly known. In point of fact, the figure in the case of a natural analogy, so far from being shadowy or unreal, is the thing that is already known to us, and by means of which we are enabled to conceive and express the higher truths in which the same principle is seen to be involved. And further, every such figure, though it be expressed in metaphorical language, if it rests on a real analogy, contains a *latent proof*. For be it expressed by Metaphor or by Parable, in Poetry or in Prose,—let it be such as exhibits the same principle exemplified only in a higher and a lower sphere, then the familiar fact of experience will serve to accredit the supernatural doctrine with which it is so related, and will be regarded both as illustrative of its import, and as confirmatory of its truth. The reason is obvious. A principle is established by experience : that principle is seen to be common to two distinct cases, which differ in other respects, but agree in this : and so far as that agreement extends, they are seen to have an equal claim on our belief. Consistency requires that we admit the one, if we cannot deny the other, or at least that we should not object to the one *as involving that principle*, unless we can show that it is not equally involved in the other. And this is universally felt to afford a legitimate presumption, amounting in many cases to positive proof, even though it should be presented in figurative language, instead of being exhibited in an abstract statement or a syllogistic form.

(140.) A single metaphor founded on a real analogy, may often contain and convey an effective proof ; and much more a

parable in which the similitude is extended so as to include more points of resemblance than one. Let us select an example of the way in which our Lord employed the most familiar objects and facts in the natural world as symbols of religious truth. When He spoke of "the lilies of the field" and "the fowls of the air," He made use of two natural analogies,—the one derived from the vegetable, the other from the animal kingdom ; each complete in itself, and both illustrative of the same general principle, which is only transferred from these lower instances to the higher relation between Man and God. They are adduced as illustrations, but not surely for the mere embellishment of discourse ; they are also applied as proofs, because the same principle is equally applicable wherever the same or similar relations exist ; and the points of difference, as well as the points of resemblance, between the cases are marked so as to give His argument the force of an *a fortiori* proof.—Pointing to the vegetable kingdom of nature, He says,—“Consider the lilies of the field, how they grow ; they toil not, neither do they spin, and yet I say unto you that even Solomon in all his glory was not arrayed like one of these. Wherefore, if God so clothe the grass of the field, which to-day is, and to-morrow is cast into the oven, shall He not much more clothe you, O ye of little faith ?” How naturally such an analogy will occur to reflecting minds, and with what power it carries home to the heart a conviction of the truth, is strikingly exemplified in a touching incident recorded in the life of Mungo Park, when he found himself in the midst of a vast wilderness, and surrounded by savage animals and still more savage men.—“My spirits,” he says, “began to fail me ; but, at this moment, painful as my reflections were, the extraordinary beauty of a small moss in fructification caught my eye. ‘Can that Being,’ thought I, ‘who planted, and watered, and brought to perfection, in this obscure part of the world, a thing which appears of so small importance, look with unconcern upon the situation and sufferings of creatures formed after His own image ? Surely not.’ Reflections like these would not allow me to despair. I started up, and disregarding both hunger and fatigue, travelled forwards, assured that relief was at hand ; and I was not disappointed.”*

(141.) Pointing, again, to the animal kingdom, our Lord says,

* Life of Mungo Park.

—"Behold the fowls of the air, for they sow not, neither do they reap, nor gather into barns, yet your heavenly Father feedeth them." "*Therefore*, take no thought, saying, What shall we eat? or what shall we drink? for your heavenly Father knoweth that ye have need of all these things." It is an argument, as well as an illustration; an argument that may be derived from many sources, and presented in a great variety of forms: but who does not feel the force of the proof, as well as the exquisite beauty of the image, as it is expressed in the lines of Bryant on the flight of a migratory water-fowl?

"Whither, midst falling dew
While glow the heavens with the last steps of day,
Far, through their rosy depths, dost thou pursue
Thy solitary way?

Vainly the fowler's eye
Might mark thy distant flight to do thee wrong,
As, darkly painted on the crimson sky,
Thy figure floats along.

There is a Power whose care
Teaches thy way along that pathless coast—
The desert and illimitable air,—
Lone wandering, but not lost.

Thou'rt gone—the abyss of heaven
Hath swallowed up thy form; yet on my heart
Deeply hath sunk the lesson thou hast given,
And shall not soon depart.

He, who from zone to zone,
Guides through the boundless sky thy certain flight,
In the long way that I must tread alone,
Will guide my steps aright."

The *latent proof* which is involved in such analogies as these should be carefully marked.

SECT. III.—THE GROUND OF THEOLOGICAL AND RELIGIOUS ANALOGY.

(142.) The resemblance betwixt Man and God, which is implied in the sublime statement that “God created man in His own image,” is the proper and special ground of Religious Analogy.

(143.) This is a distinct and additional ground, not exclusive of the two already mentioned, but rather their necessary complement ; for no other relation than that of a *real resemblance* between God and man could afford an adequate foundation either for those conceptions, or those modes of expression, which belong to Theology and Religion, and which are all framed in the mould of Analogy. It is true, that there is a manifestation of God’s perfections—an impress of His image—on the face of Nature ; but it is a still higher truth, and one without which no other would supply an adequate ground either for Theological knowledge or for practical Religion, that Man is himself the living image of God,—the liveliest representation of what He is,—the only being on earth whose nature *resembles* that which is Divine.

(144.) We can only conceive of the Divine perfections as *similar* to those properties of which we are conscious in our own breasts ; and, for aught we know, this may be a universal law of thought throughout all orders of created intelligence. There may be,—doubtless there are,—higher orders of intelligent beings,—pure spiritual essences,—endowed with nobler capacities than ours, and not subject, as we are, to the laws of matter, and the conditions of sense ; but even of them nothing higher can be said than that they were, like ourselves, created in the Divine image, though, it may be, in a more eminent degree ; and in their case, not less than in our own, religious knowledge may be dependent, to a large extent, on the analogy of their own conscious experience, as living, intelligent, personal, moral agents. It is conceivable that angels and seraphim themselves,—living as they do in the immediate presence, and enjoying the beatific vision, of God,—may still be dependent for their religious knowledge, both on the *manifestations* of the Divine perfections which they are privileged to witness in the boundless field of the created universe, and on the analogy of their own mental consciousness. We have no reason to suppose that their knowledge is so purely *intuitive*, as to be altogether inde-

pendent of observation and experience ; or so *direct and immediate* as to derive no aid from Analogy. Even a seraph's eye may not "gaze direct on the Infinite," or see Him whom "none can see and live,"—Him who is "Invisible,"—who "dwelleth in light which is inaccessible and full of glory."*

(145.) In the case of "the spirits of just men made perfect," although there will be a difference, and a very great one, between "faith" and "vision,"—between the condition of those who "see through a glass darkly" and of those who "see face to face," that difference may not consist in the entire suspension of their former method of conceiving Divine things, or in the sudden disuse of all significant manifestations from without, and all instructive analogies from within ; but rather in the personal presence of Him who is, and will ever continue to be, to them "the brightness of the Father's glory, and the express image of His person," and in their enhanced capacity of spiritual discernment, arising from the perfection of their moral nature, when they "shall be *like* Him, for they shall see Him as He is." When they shall be "conformed to the image of His Son," that image, discerned in their renewed and purified nature, may still be the means of enabling them to conceive analogically of the Divine. At all events, here, in this lower world, men conceive of all spiritual truths through the mediation of natural things, and according to the analogy of their own conscious experience, which reveals properties different from those of material nature, and analogous to the highest Perfections which they can ascribe to the Supreme Being.

(146.) The same principle of Analogy is exhibited in different applications ; it moulds our conceptions and determines our judgments with reference to our fellow-men, as well as with reference to the Divine Nature ; and a clear idea of its functions and uses in the one case may throw much light on its correspondent functions and uses in the other. It has been distinguished, accordingly, into *human* and *Divine* Analogy. By means of *human analogy*, we acquire a knowledge of the existence of our fellow-men, and a conviction that their natural powers, appetites, desires, and passions are similar to our own. We discern, as it were, the

* See Morell's "Lectures on the Philosophical Tendencies of the Age," pp. 76, 83, 160, 164 ; and Morell's "Philosophy of Religion," p. 27, for an opposite view.

image of our own minds in each of them,—not an exact resemblance in every point, for there may be many minute, circumstantial diversities of temperament, disposition, and character, and no two minds may be found to be in *all* respects alike,—but a real resemblance, notwithstanding; and that too in certain essential features or properties which are common to them all, just such as exists between the manifold varieties of human faces, or the variegated leaves of the same tree. If we can thus discern in our own minds the image of those kindred minds by which we are surrounded, and if we can even reason respecting them on the analogies supplied by our own individual consciousness, why should we not be able to rise, on the ground of similar indications, to the knowledge of the Supreme mind? and why should that knowledge, although analogical in its origin, be either less real or less certain than that which we possess of the existence and qualities of our fellow-men? If *human* analogy be so sure a guide, in the one case, merely because one mind is regarded as the mirror which reflects, or the image which represents, other minds, why may not *Divine* analogy be equally conclusive, if Man be, as he unquestionably is, the liveliest representation of God on the earth?

(147.) But how is this *resemblance* between Man and God established? Is it assumed merely, and asserted without proof, or is it capable of being confirmed by sufficient evidence? There is strong evidence, arising from several distinct sources. There is, *first of all*, the evidence which arises from the mere existence of the mind itself,—a self-conscious, intelligent, and active being, which knows that it is neither eternal nor self-existent, but originated and derived; and which cannot account for its own origin without ascribing it to a Being possessing similar Perfections to those with which it is itself endowed. For an intelligent mind cannot be the product of an unintelligent cause; nor can a living spirit spring from lifeless matter. There is the evidence, *secondly*, which arises from our intellectual consciousness;—for that enables us to form the general conception of *design*, and to recognise its characteristic marks, whether as it is exhibited in the work of our own hands, or in the works of our fellow-men; and when we observe similar marks of design in the works of Nature,—when we see the same laws of thought of which we are conscious within, reflected back upon us from without, how can we resist the conclusion that the Author of Nature possesses intelligence similar to

our own? There is the evidence, *thirdly*, which arises from our moral consciousness: for we are conscious of a law properly moral, not self-originated or self-imposed, but connatural to our being, and interwoven, as it were, with the very texture of our minds,—a law by which we are made to feel, often against our will, that we are, and ever must be, a law to ourselves: and this consciousness is sufficient to impress us with the conviction that the Father of our spirits is also the author of that Law, and that He must possess moral Perfections similar to those which we are thus constrained to recognise as “holy, and just, and good.” There is the evidence, *fourthly*, which arises from the course of Providence,—when carrying forth from the chamber of our own breasts the idea of law and duty suggested by our moral consciousness, and applying it to the events of human life, just as we carried out the idea of design, suggested by our intellectual consciousness, and applied it to the phenomena of Nature,—we find that without as within,—in the external world as well as in the recesses of our own hearts,—there are undeniable traces of a moral Government,—the breath of a moral atmosphere by which we are everywhere surrounded; and how can we resist the conclusion, that the Lord of conscience is also the moral Governor of the world, and must Himself possess perfections similar to those qualities of character which the whole course of Providence is fitted to sanction, encourage, and reward? There is the evidence, *finally*, arising from the express declarations of Scripture, which recognise and ratify all the previous deductions of natural reason from the facts of consciousness and experience, and supply in addition the sublime historical fact, that in the day when God created man, He said, “Let us make man in our image, after our likeness;” and “so God created man in His own image: in the image of God created He him.”*

(148.) This evidence, however, while it is sufficient to establish a real resemblance between our Minds and the Author of our being, is perfectly compatible with, and may even be said to imply, such a real difference as must necessarily subsist between the Creator and the creature. It amounts to a proof of *similarity*, not of *sameness*. We should equally err, at two opposite extremes, were we to overlook either the points of resemblance or the points of difference; and to say that there is no more resemblance, on the

* Gen. i. 26, 27.

one hand, between the properties of our minds and the perfections of the Divine nature, than there is "between man's hand and God's power," or between "the lines of a map and the country which it represents,"—or, that there is no such difference between them, on the other hand, as to disqualify us for fully comprehending any one of the Divine attributes, or sitting in judgment on the Divine procedure. These opposite extremes are equally dangerous; for if there be no real resemblance there can be no true knowledge of God at all, or such only as "a blind man may have of light and colour:" and if there be no real difference, then "the things of God, which are known only by the Spirit of God," might be as adequately comprehended as "the things of a man that are known by the spirit of man, which is in him." But the doctrine of Analogy is the *via media* between the two extremes; it affirms a real resemblance, but admits a real difference: for similarity is not sameness, nor does resemblance imply identity.*

(149.) While some resemblance between the Divine and human natures has been generally admitted, and regarded also as the ground of Religious Analogy, different views have been taken of the nature of God's image on the soul of man. Bellarmine distinguishes between the *image* and the *likeness* of God, and considers the one as descriptive of the *nature*, the other of the *character* of man in his pristine condition.†—When Calvin says that "the image of God includes all the excellence in which the nature of man surpasses the other species of animals," his statement is wide enough to comprehend whatever peculiar prerogatives or powers may belong to it, such as reason, conscience, will, and immortality; as well as those graces or qualities of character with which man was originally endowed. And both must be taken into account, if we would give a full scriptural view of what is implied in the Image of God. For the essential nature of the human soul as an immaterial and spiritual being, and the intellectual and moral faculties which belong to its constitution, do unquestionably form a part of that image of God in which man was originally created; while its chief and most important features consisted in certain

* Grinfield, "Vindiciæ Analogicæ," P. II. p. 68. Bishop Browne, "Divine Analogy," 342, 355, 468, 507. Bartholmess, "Histoire Critique," II. 121.

† "Imago ad naturam—similitudo ad virtutes, pertinet; proinde Adam peccando non imaginem Dei, sed similitudinem perdidit." See also Möhler's "Symbolism," vol. I. p. 34.

graces of character, which belonged, not to the unalterable *constitution* of human nature, but to its *condition* as it came from the hand of its Maker. These two must be carefully distinguished, since, in one sense, the image of God remains even in fallen men, while, in another, it has been sadly defaced. Whatever belongs to the *constitution* of human nature remains; while its whole *state* or *character* has undergone a lamentable change. Hence divines have found it necessary to distinguish between the *constitution* and the *condition* of man, on the one hand, and between what they have called the *natural* and the *moral* image of God, on the other. The latter distinction must be understood as referring to the resemblance between the *nature* of God and the *nature* of man, considered essentially as spiritual beings, possessing similar properties or powers of intelligence, will, and spontaneous activity; otherwise the use of the epithet “natural” would be inappropriate, and might even produce an erroneous impression, since, in our fallen state, sin, however contrary to the *constitution* of our nature, as Butler has shown it to be, is notwithstanding eminently *natural* to us, as we now come into the world.

(150.) It is surely conceivable that man’s *state* or *character* might be changed, while his *nature* or *constitution* remained the same, just as the structure of his body is not affected, although its health is sadly impaired, by disease: and that he might thus retain, even in his fallen state, a certain resemblance to God in the indestructible frame of his spirit, and the various powers which belong to it, while he had ceased to reflect His moral image, or to resemble Him in His holy character. In one sense, he still is—in another, he is not now,—the image of his Maker; and each of these truths must be kept steadily in view, if we would see, on the one hand, the firm ground which is laid for Religious Analogy in the remaining resemblance betwixt man and God, so far as that resemblance extends; and yet guard, on the other, against the dangerous errors which must arise from the undue extension of it beyond the points of real resemblance, as if there were no difference in any respect between His character and our own. The experience of the whole world has shown, that men naturally conceive of God according to the analogy of their own conscious experience as living, personal, intelligent, and moral beings: and that their chief error has consisted,—not in denying the resemblance on which that analogy depends,—but in extending it far beyond the

legitimate point, and supposing that "God was altogether such an one as themselves." Both the native strength of the principle, therefore, and also its lamentable perversion, may be seen in the fact that, in the progress of human degeneracy, it became the prolific root of that superstition and idolatry, by which the heathen "changed the glory of the incorruptible God into an *image made like to corruptible man.*"

(151.) The doctrine of Religious Analogy, therefore, sound and precious as it is, must be carefully considered and correctly understood, in order to its being safely applied. Were man still in the state in which he was originally created, there might be no need for any distinctions to make its meaning plain. Then his whole nature was an unsoiled mirror which reflected the image of its Maker. But Sin, with its dark shadow, has come between the soul and God; nay, sin has corrupted the soul itself, defiling and tarnishing that mirror, once so pure and spotless; and while he still retains a constitutional resemblance to God in the structure of his powers as a living, intelligent, active being, he has ceased to reflect His moral image, or to resemble Him in His holy character. Hence the necessity of a distinction between the *natural* and *moral* image of God. The former belongs to the *nature* of man, and is essential and indestructible; it consists in his spiritual essence as a living, self-conscious, intelligent, moral, and active being, and it can never be destroyed while man is man. The latter belongs, not to the nature of man, but to his *character*,—not to his being, but to his well-being. It consists in holy dispositions and habits, such as are agreeable to the will, and similar to the perfections, of God Himself; and this, in the case of a responsible agent, subject to law and placed under probation, may be utterly lost, while his mental powers are not destroyed. His nature remains, but not its perfection,—it is the same nature *depraved*. The dignity of man is still seen in the indestructible constitution of his mind, but his debasement is also seen in the actual condition to which he has been reduced by sin.

(152.) Such is the light in which man is, unquestionably, represented in Scripture. A certain resemblance betwixt man and God is supposed to exist even after the fall; for murder is prohibited on this ground, when God said, "Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed, *for in the image of God made He man;*" and even the sin of evil-speaking, when the apostle

says of the tongue, "Therewith bless we God, even the Father, and therewith curse we men which *are made after the similitude of God.*" The folly of Idolatry itself is powerfully proved by the application of this analogy, when Paul, addressing the cultivated Athenians, exclaimed, "Forasmuch, then, as *we* are the offspring of God, we ought not to think that the Godhead is *like* unto gold, or silver, or stone, graven by art and man's device."* There is still, therefore, a certain remaining resemblance between the nature of man and the nature of God: but his character has ceased to resemble that of "the Holy One and the Just:" the moral image has been effaced by Sin, and can only be restored by Grace.

(153.) This view of the actual condition of man, so clearly recognised in Scripture, is confirmed by our most familiar experience; we feel that there is something *godlike* in our nature, and yet something also *not godlike* in our character; and our conscience responds to what is revealed both concerning the original dignity, and the actual debasement, of man. And this twofold truth will be found to have an important connection with the right application of Analogy to Religion. It shows, that since there is, and ever must be, a real resemblance, in some respects, between man and God, there must also be a firm ground for Religious Analogy, so far as that resemblance extends: but that, since there is a want of resemblance, and even a manifest contrariety, in other respects, it would be neither legitimate nor safe to extend the analogy further, or to suppose that God's character is altogether similar to our own. There is a resemblance of some kind betwixt man and God, otherwise we could form no conception of His nature and attributes; and that resemblance, such as it really is, or such as it is only conceived to be, will always determine, to a large extent, our conceptions of the Divine Being. This is a great truth, and it has its foundations deep in the nature of man. When a resemblance in *some* respects is mistaken for resemblance in *all*, it seldom fails to generate low and unworthy conceptions of God: yet, in the actual condition of men, the idea of some such resemblance has a natural, and almost inevitable, tendency towards this practical result; and were they left to themselves, unaided by a purer light than their own reason can furnish, they would probably continue to frame their conceptions of the Divine

* Gen. ix. 6; Jas. iii. 9; Acts xvii. 29.

Being according to the analogy of their own personal consciousness, or, at the best, after the model of the strongest, the wisest, or the purest of their species. This is the natural tendency of all men, while they are left to the guidance of the mere light of Nature; and hence the necessity, with a view even to a pure Natural Theology, of some other manifestation of God than what they can discern in the troubled mirror of their own minds,—some stable, external revelation of the truth concerning Him, which shall not be dependent on their subjective experience,—above all some such personal manifestation of His true character as shall serve to rectify their conceptions of it, by raising them above the standard of their own disordered nature,—by exhibiting perfect manhood united with “the express image of His person” in the Incarnate One. For when we are thus enabled “to behold, as in a glass, the glory of the Lord,” “we are changed into the same image” by the transforming power of the Spirit; and when the Divine image is thus restored by grace, our new-born consciousness of spiritual life enables us to conceive of God, no longer according to the analogy of our disordered experience, but according to the higher analogy of our now regenerate nature; we begin to see everything in a clearer and purer light,—we judge by a higher standard than that of reason blinded, and conscience defiled; and the very truths which were once regarded and treated as “foolishness,” are now found and felt to be “the wisdom of God” and “the power of God.”

(154.) It will always be necessary, in the present state of man, to protest against a tendency towards a false anthropomorphism, and to guard against the dangerous errors which may arise from that source. In this sense, and to this extent, we gratefully accept the seasonable caution of Dr Bruce: “When our mind is anxiously framing a religion for itself, the mood in which it happens to be for the hour is very like a mould which fashions and decides the shape of it. If we make a religion at all for ourselves, we may almost be said to make it ‘in our own likeness.’ If we excogitate and so create a religion for ourselves, we are sure at least to colour it with the hue of our own fancy, much as light takes on the particular colour of the stained window through which it passes.”* But if there be a *false* anthropomorphism, there is also a *true*,

* Dr John Bruce, “Biography of Samson,” p. 113.

which is involved in all our conceptions of God, whether derived from Nature or from Revelation, and which still adheres to them even in the case of a renewed mind. The sublime idea that man was originally made "in the image of God,"—and that when His moral image was effaced by sin, His personal Image was "manifested in the flesh," that His moral likeness might be restored to every renewed soul,—serves, not only to lay a firm ground for Religious Analogy, but also, when it is clearly apprehended and habitually realized, to raise the mind to a serene elevation, whence Faith looks down with pity on the paltry charge of anthropomorphism, and where the pressure of such an objection has ceased to be felt. If it implies nothing more than that there is a resemblance between Man and God, and that our conceptions of the Divine nature are framed, so far as that resemblance extends, according to the analogy of our own, then, so far from being ashamed of it, we glory in it, as a truth which reminds us of the dignity from which we have fallen, but to which we may yet be restored; and still more because it reminds us of Him who united the Divine and the human in His own person, and thus became to us, and to the whole universe of intelligent beings, the brightest and most impressive manifestation of "the Invisible God." Give us this one sublime conception,—let it become the habitual conviction of our minds,—let it be cherished and realized as a luminous truth that is taught and accredited alike by reason and by revelation,—and we rise superior to every assault directed against Religion on the ground of its supposed derivation from the nature of Man, and shall neither be ashamed nor afraid to vindicate the analogical language in which it speaks of the nature of God.

CHAPTER IV.

ANALOGY; ITS INFLUENCE ON THOUGHT AND LANGUAGE.

(155.) It may serve at once to illustrate still further the nature of Analogy, and to prepare the way for explaining its manifold applications and uses, if we mark its influence, from the earliest dawn of conscious intelligence, both on the process by which ideas are first formed, and on the various modes in which these ideas are represented or expressed.

SECT. I.—THE INFLUENCE OF ANALOGY ON THE FORMATION OF OUR CONCEPTIONS.

(156.) While a child is yet ignorant of language, and incapable, therefore, of receiving instruction from the oral teaching of others, he has no means of acquiring knowledge of any kind, except such as may arise from impressions through the medium of his bodily senses, and the spontaneous activity of those native powers which are inherent in the structure of his mind, and which, although dormant until they are awakened by some object from without, are called into immediate exercise by the first lessons of experience.

(157.) At first his knowledge is conversant only with *concrete objects* or *complex wholes*,* and with the strong, but confused, impressions which he receives from them; and perhaps, for a time, his consciousness may be so vague and indistinct, as to resemble a dream or a reverie, in which objects and impressions are interblended, as it were, in one synthetic experience.

(158.) But the native powers of his mind, acting under laws

* Comte, "Cours de la Philosophie," I. 170. Perron, "Idées Fondamentales," pp. 155, 229, 285, 404.

Sir William Hamilton, "Lectures on Metaphysics," II. 144.

impressed on its constitution, are soon called into action, and forthwith give rise to certain trains of thought. One of the first which comes into operation is the power of Comparison. No sooner are two objects presented to the eye, whether belonging to the same or to a different kind, provided they be in some way distinguishable from each other, than the mind instinctively compares them,—marks their resemblance or difference,—and forms a judgment concerning them in these respects. This act of comparison has reference, in the first instance, to *complex wholes*, which are the original objects of all perception, and which are immediately judged to be *like* or *unlike* to each other, before many of their other relations have been observed. This primary perception of resemblance is a judgment of Analogy, and is sufficient of itself to show that Analogy is not a mere resemblance of relations, since it is actually pronounced, and gives rise to a rudimentary classification of *objects*, before any other relation than that of resemblance or difference has been distinctly apprehended. It is as natural, intuitive, and irresistible, as is the perception of the objects themselves.

(159.) It is probably the *difference* of objects which first awakens attention, for all knowledge implies “distinction,” and involves judgment and comparison; but difference implies its correlative—*sameness* or *similarity*,—and the two constitute together the first elements of human thought. “To note and to take account of differences is the first instinct of reason; to note and to take account of a *sameness*, connecting such differences and reducing them to accordance, is the second instinct of reason. Where the one duly follows the other, reason comes to rest or to its state of acquiescence. . . . It is the perception of difference that first awakens attention, and which attracts the eye and stimulates the mind. But then it is the perception of sameness or identity that leads it forward as if by a charm. The two perceptions, alternately taking effect, constitute the fascination of the philosophic life.”*

(160.) As the relation which is first discerned is that of resemblance or difference, so Imagination is developed before voluntary Attention; and Poetry precedes Science.† But Comparison is soon followed by Abstraction, by which the mind, which had previously marked the likeness or unlikeness of particular objects,

* Isaac Taylor, “The World of Mind,” 57, 68.

† Degerando, “Des Signes et de l’Art de Penser,” II. 472.

now discriminates between their various qualities, and forms general notions of them, by that native power of reason which enables it to evolve the abstract from the concrete. In intimate connection with this power, although in some respects distinguishable from it, is the faculty of Generalization, by which we refer many particular objects to the same class on account of their common points of resemblance, or to distinct species of the same class, according to the specific differences which are found to co-exist with a generic resemblance.

(161.) These three powers,—Comparison, Abstraction, and Generalization,—are equally native to the mind, as constituent elements or laws of reason, and come into operation naturally and spontaneously, as soon as materials are furnished for their exercise by the data of sense and consciousness. They produce by their joint action a large class of *general notions*, which have a most important connection with the subject of Analogy. For all these general notions are founded on the perception of resemblance, either between individual objects, or between one or more of their respective properties and relations.* On comparing them, we arrange these objects, according to their perceived resemblances or differences, in distinct classes, which are more or less *extensive* in an inverse proportion to the number of the properties which are *comprehended* under them. We thus form a series of conceptions, of greater or less generality, rising in regular gradation from lower to higher, and still higher, classes, by the successive abstraction of some peculiar property or specific difference, till we reach the most universal and abstract ideas which it is possible for the human mind to conceive. The general conceptions which are thus formed are among the earliest products of human thought, and they arise spontaneously, from the intuitive perception of resemblance and difference between the objects compared, long before they are made the subject of reflex consideration or philosophical analysis, just as the action of the bodily organs is not the less regular and healthy while as yet their functions are almost unconsciously discharged. They are independent of language, and anterior to it, although they are afterwards fixed and stereotyped in *general terms*.

(162.) These terms denote ideas which may be described as the

* Degerando, "Histoire Comparée," I. 149, 312. Sir William Hamilton, "Lectures on Metaphysics," II. 262, 288, 292. Dr T. Brown, "Lectures," pp. 214, 260, 301.

generalized results of *experience*, when experience is understood in its widest and truest sense, as including the operations of our own minds as well as the observed phenomena of nature. If they are derived from experience, in this sense, then they are neither unreal nor arbitrary; they are not mere *entia rationis*, still less the fictions of fancy; for classes and relations are not *created*, they are merely *perceived* by reason; they are as real as are the individual objects of perception; and our ideas of them are formed, not capriciously, but by a comparison of actual realities, and an intuitive perception of their resemblance or diversity. The fundamental conceptions of Arithmetic and Geometry are purely abstract, but surely they are true and real; and the same may be affirmed of all our general notions, if they have been legitimately formed. Resemblance, for instance, is not imagined merely; it is intuitively discerned on a comparison of certain objects, when they are found to possess common properties, or to exhibit similar relations.

(163.) It is the more necessary that these general notions should be distinct and definite, because all reasoning depends on a correct apprehension of what is really involved in them. In the formation of general abstract conceptions, the grand defect which may be said to be the cause of all subsequent errors in reasoning upon them, lies in the want of a distinct perception of individual things, and a hasty generalization founded on partial and defective data. For while the mind has the power of forming such notions, it *can only conceive by means of particular objects, and their observed properties and relations*. This law of thought is a necessary safeguard against error, and it supplies the vinculum which connects our most abstract conceptions with facts, and imparts to them a substantial value, as being not mere mental creations, but generalizations from experience.

(164.) The generalized notions which are thus formed are the first foundation of reasoning, and may themselves be called intuitive or primary inductions. They occupy the place of first principles or axioms, and are employed as premisses from which other conclusions may be inferred. And as they presuppose the exercise of Comparison, and the perception of Analogy, they are sufficient to show that Analogy enters as a constituent element into the first and most fundamental processes of human thought.

SECT. II.—FIGURES OF THOUGHT AND SPEECH.

(165.) We have adverted to the manner in which our general notions are formed, because it is important to show, as Gassendi has done, that Analogy is a *means of conceiving*, as well as a *method of reasoning*. We now advance to another topic which will bring us a step nearer to our practical object, by laying open the original springs of analogical and figurative language. We confine our remarks, in the first instance, to the manner in which the mind, having formed its conceptions, *represents them to itself*, reserving for future consideration the means by which it afterwards communicates them to others.

(166.) Here it will be necessary to consider what takes place in an individual mind, and the laws by which it is regulated, when it *makes one conception the sign or representative of another*. It will be found that there are *figures of thought*, which, in the order of nature, precede *figures of speech*; and that the latter are only the outward expression of the former.* For,

“Thought leapt out to wed with Thought,
Ere Thought could wed itself with Speech.”†

(167.) There are two fundamental distinctions which must be kept steadily in view, if we would form a clear and correct idea of the influence of Analogy in determining the way in which one conception is made to stand for, and to be the sign, of another. We must carefully distinguish between our *Reproductive* and *Representative* faculties, on the one hand, and between the power of *Imagination* and that of *Conception*, on the other.

(168.) By the *Reproductive* faculties we mean those by which ideas previously formed, or objects previously perceived, are recalled to consciousness, and made present again to the mind;—such as Memory, which retains and recollects what is past, so as to give it a present subsistence in our thoughts,—and Imagination, which brings sensible things vividly before the mind after they have ceased to be the objects of actual sensation,—which exhibits a picture of what was once visible,—which renews sensible impressions formerly felt,—such as were excited by the beauty of a landscape, or the music of sweet sounds, or the dread magnificence

* Dr Hugh Blair, “Rhetoric,” I. 246, 285, 290.

† Tennyson, “In Memoriam,” xxiii.

of a thunder-storm, with some of the pleasing, or plaintive, or painful emotions with which they were respectively associated. As thus reproduced, they are purely *ideal*, but not, on that account, the less true, as elements in our actual consciousness. The reproductive faculties, acting under the laws of Association, or of "simple and relative suggestion," which prompt us to connect one idea with another by means of their perceived relations, give rise to trains of thought, more or less involuntary, in which the relation of *resemblance* exerts a powerful, though not an exclusive, influence.

(169.) By the *Representative* faculties, again, we mean those by which we are enabled and prompted to make one object or one idea the *representative of another*,—so that it becomes the sign, index, or type of something different from itself, but somehow related to it. Sir William Hamilton uses these terms in a somewhat different sense; but this is a matter of mere terminology: and we think it useful to distinguish, in this way, between those cases in which previous ideas or impressions are merely reproduced and made present again to the mind, and those other cases in which, by an act which is additional to the former, the mind makes one object or idea to stand for, and *represent*, another.

(170.) It is of still greater importance, with a view to our ultimate object, to mark the distinction between *Imagination* and *Conception*. No doubt they are intimately related, and, like all our other faculties, may operate together and be mutually auxiliary to each other. But they are nevertheless, widely different, and might even be supposed to exist severally apart, or in very unequal strength. Conception is the faculty of forming *general* ideas, and presupposes the exercise of abstraction and comparison; Imagination, in so far as it is simply reproductive, is the faculty of recalling *particular* objects or impressions, and placing them anew in a vivid light before the mind. The mere reproduction of sensible images may be conceived to take place in some of the lower animals, although they are incapable of forming general abstract ideas; for Imagination, in this restricted sense, is more closely allied to the senses than to the intellect. It is usually limited to *sensible images* of those things which had once been the objects of perception, whereas Conception deals chiefly with abstract qualities and relations. It implies a perception of resemblance, or of common properties, belonging to different objects, and involves an exercise of comparison, abstraction, and general-

ization. Imagination belongs chiefly to the Poetic, and Conception to the Philosophic mind ; but so far from being necessarily incompatible or mutually exclusive, the one is eminently subservient to the other ; and the combination of the two constitutes the highest style of genius.*

(171.) General notions, thus formed, include all the particular objects on whose resemblance, in certain respects, they are founded, and may be said to *represent* them, in so far as that resemblance extends. Some ideas thus become the *images* or representatives of other ideas. Reid and Arnauld overturned the theory of intermediate images in the perception of external objects ; but we may still distinguish, as Dumarsais and the French school have done, between those ideas which stand for individual objects only, and those more general and abstract notions which are framed out of these by a purely mental process, and seek, with Kant, to establish "the representative character of our intellectual conceptions." And this is more important than, at first sight, it may appear to be. For these general notions are used as axioms or premisses in reasoning, just as definitions are employed in Geometry. They are employed to represent the whole class of particular facts which are comprehended under them ; and they can only be safely

* The distinction between Imagination and Conception is well stated by Bossuet : " L'Imagination n'est autre chose que *l'image de la sensation*." . . . " Il y a une grande différence entre *imaginer* le triangle et *entendre* le triangle. Imaginer le triangle, c'est s'en représenter un d'une mesure déterminée, et avec une certaine grandeur de ses angles et de ses cotés ; au lieu que l'entendre, c'est en connoître la nature, et savoir en général que c'est une figure a trois cotés, sans déterminer aucune grandeur ni proportion particulière. Ainsi, quand on entend un triangle, l'idée qu'on en a convient a tous les triangles, equilateraux, isoscèles, ou autres, de quelque grandeur et proportion qu'ils soient. Au lieu que le triangle que l'on *imagine* est restreint a une certaine espèce de triangle et a une grandeur déterminée.

" Il y a encore une autre différence entre *imaginer* et *entendre* ; c'est qu'entendre s'étend beaucoup plus loin

qu'imaginer. Car on ne peut imaginer que les choses corporelles et sensibles ; au lieu que l'on peut entendre les choses tant corporelles que spirituelles, celles qui sont sensibles et celles qui ne le sont pas ; par exemple, Dieu, et l'âme.

" Ainsi ceux qui veulent *imaginer* Dieu et l'âme tombe dans une grande erreur, parce qu'ils veulent imaginer ce qui n'est pas imaginable ; c'est à dire, qui n'a ni corps, ni figure, ni enfin rien de sensible."

" A cela il faut rapporter les idées que nous avous de la *bonté*, de la *vérité*, de la *justice*, de la *sainteté*, et les autres semblables. . . . Elles ne peuvent pas être imaginées, mais seulement *entendues*."

In the next section he shows " comment l'Imagination et l'Intelligence s'unissent et s'aident, on s'embarassent, mutuellement." Bossuet, " De la Connoissance de Dieu et de Soi-même," pp. 67, 145.

applied in argument when they correspond exactly to the facts from which they were educed. Should any doubt arise on this point, the only remedy for it lies in a fresh appeal, such as Bacon recommended, to the experience on which our primary conceptions are founded. In the Theistic argument, for instance, the general notion of *design* is made to represent a large class of facts, all exhibiting the same characteristic marks of adjustment, adaptation, and orderly arrangement;—if that general notion has been correctly formed, and if it is found to have a counterpart in the works of nature, the argument is irresistible; but if it be called in question,—if it be alleged either that there is no order in nature, or no such order as implies design,—then we must have recourse anew to the *facts* on which our conception of design, and the evidence of its existence in nature, depend. For “we can judge of things, only according to our manner of *conceiving* them; only after certain *primary notions and ideas*, which, in some sort, constitute our understanding, and which are the necessary bases of our reasonings.”*

(172.) A general notion may be justly held to be the *representative* of all the particular experiences from which it has been formed; but the question arises,—and it is a very important one,—whether it can itself be *represented*, and if it can, then in what way? It is impossible, as we have seen, for the mind to *imagine* what it can nevertheless *conceive*; but it is not, on that account, incapable of *representing* its most abstract general conceptions. This may be done in *three* distinct ways. *First*, an individual object is selected as an example, and employed as a sign, of the class to which it belongs; as when the general abstract notion of a triangle is represented by a diagram, whether actually portrayed, or only imagined, which must really be the delineation of a particular figure of that class, but is employed to represent all figures, however different in other respects, which resemble each other in having three sides and three angles. *Secondly*, another object, having some resemblance to those which the mind seeks in some way to figure to itself, is selected as an emblem or symbol of what cannot be otherwise represented; as when the abstract general notion expressed by the term Truth is exchanged for the sensible idea of *Light*, or as when the power of intellectual perception is conceived of as the *eye* of the mind. *Thirdly*, another object still, which

* Frayssinous, “Conferences on Religion,” I. 133.

neither belongs to the class from which the general notion was formed, nor yet exhibits any resemblance to them, may be selected as a representative sign, by reason of its having some *other relation* to these objects;—it may be related as the cause is to the effect, —or as the organ is to the faculty,—or as the instrument is to the agent. Thus grey hairs,—the effect,—are made to represent old age;—a shade, the trees which produce it,—the eye is put for the power of vision, the hand for the power of action, the feet for the power of motion. For every other relation, as well as that of resemblance, may serve to associate one thing with another in our thoughts, so as to make one thing a fit index or representative of another.* These are all, be it observed, *figures of thought* before they become *figures of speech*; they are the various ways in which the mind *represents to itself* the objects of its knowledge; and such of them as depend on *comparison* imply a real likeness in the things, while those which are founded on some other relation than that of resemblance, must not be confounded with the former, but interpreted strictly with reference to that relation, whatever it may be, which suggested this special mode of representation.†

(173.) In one or other of these ways the mind *represents to itself* those conceptions which, as being general and abstract, cannot be reproduced in the sense of being *imagined*; and these methods of representation must be carefully distinguished, for much error may arise from their being confounded. They are not only distinct but diverse. The first is the representation of a class by an individual example; the second, the representation of one object or relation by another on the ground of their resemblance or analogy; the third, the representation of one term of any relation by its correlative, whatever the nature of that relation may be. To the acute mind of Bishop Berkeley we owe the important doctrine, that “an idea which, considered in itself, is particular, becomes general by being made to *represent* or stand for all other particular ideas of the *same sort* ;” for example, “a particular line is with regard to its signification general, since, as it is used by the geometrician, it *represents* all particular lines whatsoever, so that what is demonstrated of it, is demonstrated of all lines, or, in other

* David Hartley, “Observations on Man,” p. 186. Dr Campbell, “Rhetoric,” II. 153, 163. Dr Blair, “Rhetoric,” I. 262.

† M. Dumarsais, “Des Tropes,” *passim*.

words, of a line in general." Of this doctrine Hume said, "I look upon this to be one of the greatest and most valuable discoveries that have been made of late years in the republic of letters."* Berkeley did "not deny absolutely that there are *general ideas*," although he denied that they were "*abstract*," and chiefly, it would seem, because such ideas could not be *imagined*, or represented otherwise than by particular examples; it being impossible, in his opinion, to form the general idea of a triangle, since it must be neither oblique nor rectangular, neither equilateral, equicrural, nor scalene, but *all and none* of these at once. But although it cannot be reproduced to the eye or the imagination otherwise than in the form of a particular figure, it may be *conceived* by the understanding as a figure consisting of three sides and angles, abstraction being made of all specific differences between one triangle and another; and this conception of the properties which are common to all triangles, and which constitute their generic likeness, may be so clear and distinct as to serve all the purposes of reasoning, although it can only be represented by some individual example of the class. In like manner, one object may be made to represent another, not as belonging to the same class or possessing the same properties, but as being *analogous* or, in some other respect, *related* to it.

(174.) We have hitherto spoken of pure *mental representations*, or the methods by which the mind represents *to itself* the objects of thought; and these have engaged our attention in the first instance, because, in the order of nature, figures of thought precede figures of speech, and the latter can only be explained with reference to the former, of which they are the outward expression and visible embodiment. But the influence of Analogy cannot be fully illustrated without referring also to the methods by which the mind *expresses* its thoughts to others, as well as *represents* them to itself. It has been well said that Language is the mirror of Thought; and that in studying the phenomena and laws of mind, we may be relieved in part from the difficulty which is felt in the direct contemplation of them, by considering them as they are reflected back upon us from those forms of expression in which they have found an actual and permanent representation.† Language, whether oral or written, is unquestionably a product of

* Berkeley's Works (Wright's Edition), I. 78.

† Degerando, "Des Signes et de l'Art de Penser," I. pp. iv. vi., etc.; "Histoire Comparée," I. 151.

intelligence ; and a product so marvellous that it has become a question whether its origin should be ascribed to Reason or to Revelation,—to the natural intelligence of man or to the supernatural inspiration of God.* But whether invented or revealed, it is at least employed by man as a fit instrument for the expression of his thoughts, and may be expected, therefore, to afford some illustration of the principles which are at work within, and some important facilities for detecting those general laws which regulate both the acquisition and the communication of knowledge. For, as in all other cases, we study causes in their effects, and principles in their outward manifestations, so we may trace the laws of Thought in the general structure, and constituent elements, of Language.

(175.) Little as we may think of it, human language is one of the most wonderful things in the world. It is the expression of thought by means of sensible signs, and the medium of communication between mind and mind. It is addressed to the outward senses, chiefly those of sight and hearing. “*Signa sunt verba visibilia*,” says Augustin, “*verba signa audibilia*.” And thus the most abstract conceptions of the mind, not less than its sensible perceptions or impressions, are embodied, as it were, in a visible symbol, or conveyed in an audible sound.

(176.) It would be difficult to exaggerate the influence of Analogy on the forms both of natural and artificial language.

(177.) There is a natural language of Signs which precedes the conventional language of speech and writing, and which must always be employed, in the first instance, in communicating with the minds of little children. Some mental operations must have taken place before signs even of this kind came into use, for signs are the mere expression of thought. The purely natural signs which were employed before artificial symbols were introduced, were probably such as had some resemblance to the objects which they were designed to signify. A perception of Analogy, therefore, and a judgment founded upon it, was anterior, not only to what is now called figurative language, but even to the simplest and rudest signs which represented the first rudiments of human thought.

(178.) The natural signs which may be supposed to have been first employed, and which are still in use in the early treatment of infant minds were addressed, some to the eye, and some to the ear ;

* De Bonald, “*Recherches Philosophiques*,” I. 240, 274, 336.

and Bishop Warburton has traced the history of these two classes of signs from their earliest rudiments through all their successive changes, and illustrated, at the same time, their intimate relation to each other, in an interesting and instructive disquisition on the natural progress and development of the various methods of expressing and representing the ideas of the human mind.* From his account it appears that of the signs addressed to the ear, some of the earliest were *imitative sounds*, in which the voice was made to repeat the peculiar and characteristic cries of different animals, such as the roaring of a lion, the bleating of a lamb, the bellowing of a bull, the neighing of a horse, the humming of an insect, or the warbling of a bird, so as to denote by means of such audible signs the different creatures whose characteristic marks they are; and these sounds, although derived from particular instances, were soon extended to denote the whole class or species of animals who resembled each other in that respect. Of the signs addressed to the eye, some of the earliest were *pictorial figures*, in which an image or visible form of any object was portrayed; as when the figure of a horse was made to stand for the living reality, and became even a mark or sign of the whole species.

(179.) The original figures of natural objects were abridged by the Egyptians, and still more by the Chinese, and became a pictorial character, or a system of Hieroglyphics, but still continued to be signs of *things*, not of *words*. They seem to have been abridged in several distinct ways, and these throw some light on the laws which regulate the formation of figurative language. They were abridged, first, by making one object to represent another, on account of some resemblance between the two, and thus creating a set of analogical signs, as when a fox was made to represent a cunning man, and a lion a courageous one; secondly, by putting a part for the whole, as when a battle was represented by two hands holding a shield and a bow, or a siege by a scaling ladder; thirdly, by substituting the instrument for the agent, as when the figure of an eye was employed to represent omniscience; and fourthly, by making a visible figure the sign of an abstract general conception, as when a circle was made an emblem of eternity.

(180.) The Hieroglyphic characters, previously abridged and reduced, in some cases, to mere marks or arbitrary signs, but

* Warburton, "Divine Legation," vol. II. p. 23.

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still representing *things* and not *sounds*, gave place to a regular alphabet of articulate sounds, and a corresponding series of uniform visible marks,—these marks being employed, not as formerly to represent *things*, but *sounds* only. In this way, the *audible* and the *visible* methods of representing thought came to be combined ; for the new arbitrary signs might be arranged in a thousand different ways so as to form a vast variety of distinct words ; and these words might be addressed to the mind either through the *eye* or the *ear*. Thus oral and written language—the expression of thought by a combination of articulate sounds, and by a corresponding series of visible symbols—became the instrument of communication between one mind and another.

(181.) When thought is represented or expressed by alphabetic characters, it is said to be conveyed in artificial or conventional language ; but this language, not less than that of natural signs, exhibits unequivocal evidence of its having been moulded and fashioned by the perception of analogy.—Dr Reid has shown that in its radical constituents language is the same everywhere, while it exhibits innumerable diversities of structure and form. It is found, for example, that all words of whatever kind may be reduced to eight or nine classes, called the parts of speech ; and that of these only one class, consisting of such nouns as are used as proper names, represent individual objects, while all the rest are general terms, which represent either whole classes of objects, or qualities common to different objects, or relations subsisting between one object and another.* They imply, therefore, a perception of relations, and especially of the relations of resemblance and difference, by which particular objects, when compared, are classed together or distinguished according as they are seen to be *like* or *unlike*.

(182.) Dr Adam Smith, in a valuable paper entitled, “Considerations concerning the first Formation of Languages,” which is often appended to his “Theory of Moral Sentiments,”† has shown that such substantive nouns as were used at first to denote particular objects did not continue to retain their original character as proper names. For when other objects were perceived which were seen to have the same common character and to exhibit the same appearances, the name which was at first the distinctive mark of a particular individual was transferred, on the

* Dr Reid, “Essays,” Essay V. c. 1.

† Glasgow Edition, p. 468. 1809.

ground of this obvious *analogy*, to the whole class of similar instances, and what had hitherto been a proper name became, even in the case of substantive nouns, a *general term*. Thus one river,—the first that was known,—became the representative of all rivers, one cave of all caves, one man of all men, one circle of all circles; and this quite naturally, since the extension of the term so as to include all *similar* cases proceeded on the principle of Analogy. As their experience enlarged, and men observed many objects of the same kind, “they would naturally,” as Dr Smith thinks, “bestow on each of these new objects the same name by which they had been accustomed to express the similar object they were first acquainted with. The new objects had none of them a name of its own, but each of them exactly *resembled* another object, which had such an appellation.” It was impossible that men “could behold the new objects, without recollecting the old ones, and the name of the old ones, to which the new bore so close a resemblance. When they had occasion, therefore, to mention, or to point out to each other, any of the new objects, they would naturally utter the name of the correspondent old one, of which the idea could not fail, at that instant, to present itself to their memory in the strongest and liveliest manner. And thus, those words, which were originally the proper names of individuals, would each of them insensibly become the common name of a multitude.”

(183.) It is surely a striking proof both of the influence which the perception of Analogy exercises on the formation of language, and also of the law by which men are led to make one object to stand for, and represent, another, that substantive nouns, which were originally proper names, came afterwards, for the most part, to denote the whole class of objects which were found to possess the same general character, and that other and more distinctive names were employed when it was necessary to designate particular individuals. Viewed in this light these general words are really *figurative* expressions, although they are not generally described as such; just as many terms, originally metaphorical, lose that character by long continued use, and come to be employed as common forms of speech.* “In every language there are a multitude of words, which though they were figurative in their

* Grinfield’s “*Vindiciæ Analogicæ*,” P. II. p. 86. Copleston’s “*Enquiry*,” p. 124.

first application to certain objects, yet, by long use, lose that figurative power wholly, and come to be considered as simple and literal expressions.”* “Many or most common figures pass so far into literal expressions by use, that we do not attend at all to their figurative nature.” “If we suppose a people so rude in language and knowledge, as to have names only for the parts of the human body, and not to have attended to the parts of the brute creatures, association would lead them to apply the same names to the parts of the brute creatures, as soon as they became acquainted with them. Now here this application would at first have the nature of a figure ; but when by degrees any of these words,—the eye, for instance,—became equally applied from the first to the eyes of men and brutes, it would cease to be a figure, and become an appellative name.”†

(184.) If this be a correct account of the terms which denote our general conceptions, it can scarcely be a matter of surprise that we are unable to represent these conceptions to our own minds, or to place them before our imaginations, otherwise than by falling back on the process by which they were originally acquired, and recalling a particular object or example so as to make it the representative of the class to which it belongs. For we conceive only by means of particular objects, and no “general notion can be represented in imagination, except in a concrete or singular example.” “We cannot represent to ourselves the class *man* by any equivalent notion or idea. All that we can do is to call up some individual image, and consider it as *representing*, though inadequately representing, the reality. This we can easily do, for as we can call into imagination any individual, so we can make that individual image stand for any, or for every, other which it *resembles in those essential points* which constitute the identity of the class.” Hence general names are justly described as “abbreviated definitions,” such as imply in every instance a perception of *analogy* and an act of judgment ;—and for the same reason they have been called “*termini similitudinis*,”‡—a designation which sufficiently indicates their analogical origin.

* Blair's Lectures on Rhetoric, I. 256; also Campbell's Rhetoric, II. 153, 158.

† Hartley, “Observations on Man,” 6 Ed., 1834, p. 184; also Ernesti's

Principles of Interpretation, I. 42. Sir William Hamilton's Lectures, I. 133; II. 169, 297, 313.

‡ Sir William Hamilton's Lectures, II. 288, 293.

(185.) Next to proper names for particular objects, and general words for classes of similar objects, others would come into use as soon as the mind began to distinguish between its different impressions ; and among the first of these, *adjective nouns*, which denote certain *qualities* in the objects by which these impressions are supposed to be produced. And here, as in the former case, each quality is first observed in an individual case, and is denoted by a peculiar term, corresponding to a proper name ; but afterwards, when various objects are found to possess the same quality, that term is generalized so as to be comprehensive of all the cases which *resemble each other in this respect*. Thus one object exhibits a colour which is called green, another a colour which is called red ; one object affects the palate with a sensation which is called sweet, another with a sensation which is called bitter ; and were no other objects known, possessing the same properties, or producing the same effects, these adjectives might continue to be, as it were, the proper names of the qualities belonging specifically to those objects in which they were first observed ; but as soon as other objects are seen to correspond with these, in exhibiting the same appearance or producing the same impression on the senses, the adjective nouns are, like the substantive, converted into *general words* which are applicable to all the cases in which the same phenomena occur. Afterwards, by a further process of abstraction, the quality is considered by itself apart from the concrete objects to which it belongs, and designated by the still more abstract, if not more general, substantive terms *greenness* and *redness*, *sweetness* and *bitterness*, which represent the general idea derived from our whole complex experience of such sensations.

(186.) If we have correctly described the process of human thought and the structure of human language, it must now be apparent, that the perception of Analogy lies at the foundation of all our general conceptions, as well as of the general terms by which these conceptions are denoted ; and that no adequate estimate can be formed of its influence on all our trains of thought, and all the conclusions in which they terminate, if we confine our view merely to the *analogical reasonings* which assume and apply these conceptions in argument, without also taking into account the *analogical judgments* by which these conceptions were originally framed. It is the more necessary to illustrate this view of

the subject, because it has been overlooked by many, and is, perhaps, thoroughly appreciated by few. When we speak of analogical reasoning, as a guide to truth and a ground of inference, we are often supposed to refer merely to those arguments which may be founded on the resemblance of different cases subsequent to the formation of the general conceptions which enter into every process of reasoning, and which are assumed and applied as incontrovertibly true. Such reasonings are perfectly legitimate, and where the conceptions on which they depend are admitted, they may be felt to be valid and conclusive; but should these conceptions be themselves called in question, it may be necessary to fall back on the grounds of experience on which they ultimately rest; and surely it cannot fail to be interesting and instructive if we can succeed in showing that the same principle of Analogy which is applied in our subsequent reasonings is also involved in our original conceptions, and that both rest ultimately on the firm ground of experience interpreted according to the natural laws of human thought. It is, practically as well as speculatively, important to know that all our *analogical reasonings*, in which general terms denoting abstract conceptions are unavoidably employed, may be traced up to their source in those *analogical judgments* by which these conceptions were framed.

(187.) Objections have been raised sometimes against the use of *abstract terms*, sometimes against the employment of *figurative language*, in the statement of moral and religious truth. These objections are seldom stated in the shape of definite propositions; they exist, rather, as vague prejudices, which are not, however, the less influential because they assume no tangible form. Were they expressed in words, they might be found to amount to some such statement as this—"You seek to convince me by argument, and you place before me only a number of mere abstractions, or figures of speech?" It is always a suspicious circumstance when an objection cannot be so much as stated otherwise than in terms which are sufficient of themselves for its refutation. This suspicion attaches very strongly to any objection that can be raised against the use of abstract terms, or figurative language: *it cannot even be stated without the use of such expressions as are sufficient to refute it.*—Take the above statement of it, and analyse it:—What is it to "convince"? is not this a general word, somewhat abstract, and in its original etymo-

logy, figurative? What is "argument"? does it not denote an abstract idea? "You place before me"—is not this a figurative phrase, and does it not include two pronouns and a preposition, each of which expresses what Dr Smith describes as "one of the most subtle and refined abstractions which the mind is capable of forming"? You speak of "abstractions,"—what are these, or is the term unmeaning? and you speak of "figures of speech," this being itself a *figure*, but surely one which represents some thought.—In short, all language is *representative*, since it proceeds on the principle of representing one thing by means of another; and whatever reasons may exist for the usual and convenient distinction between *literal and figurative language*, the representative character of both should never be forgotten, nor should the distinction between them be so understood as to imply, that the one must necessarily be either a less true or less clear method of representing thought than the other. On the contrary, figurative language may call in the aid of Analogy to impart *additional* vividness to our conceptions of truth.

(188.) In considering the influence of Analogy on the formation of Language, we must not dwell exclusively on what have been called "figures of speech." There is a deeper and more pervading analogy than that which is represented by mere tropes and metaphors. It underlies all general terms, and is involved in every general notion. It runs through the whole structure of language, and subsists between all its constituent parts. Hence "Grammatical Analogy" was among the ancients a distinct branch of study. Julius Cæsar wrote upon it;* and although his treatise has been lost, some fragments of it have been preserved by Suetonius, Aulus Gellius, Macrobius, and Priscian. These fragments are given in Oberlin's edition of Cæsar's works under the title "De libris Analogiæ." Quintilian also treats of it,† and it was largely discussed in the middle age by the Schoolmen. In

* Cicero, "Brutus, sive de claris Oratoribus," c. 72; *Rhætorica*, vol. II. p. 121, Foulis' Edition.

† Quintilian, "De Institutione Oratoria," Lib. I. c. 6. "Ejus hæc vis est ut, id quod dubium est, ad aliquid simile, de quo non quæritur, referat, ut incerta certis probet, quod efficitur duplici via, comparatione et diminutione." Butler has taken the

first part of this sentence for his motto; but Dr Fitzgerald justly remarks that Quintilian is speaking of language, not of thought—that "Analogy was among the ancients an established part of Grammar," and that "by the Schoolmen it was generally referred to terms, rather than propositions." Bacon, referring to Quintilian, proposed to form a certain grammar, not upon

illustrating the analogy of words or names, they often shed light on the analogy of the conceptions and thoughts which were represented by them. The subject is one of great extent, and cannot be adequately illustrated here. It should be studied in connection with such works as that of Degerando, "Des Signes et de l'Art de Penser;" that of Cardinal Cajetan, "De Nominum Analogia;" and that of Dumarsais, "Des Tropes."

SECT. III.—ANALOGIES AND IMAGES COMPARED.

(189.) Reverting to the distinction formerly marked between Imagination and Conception, we think it may be useful at this stage to institute a comparison between Images and Analogies, and to inquire in what circumstances, and to what cases, they are respectively applicable.

(190.) Our general position on this subject may be thus stated, that *analogies supply the place of images in the case of those truths of which no image is possible*. Reason and Imagination are distinct faculties; the former produces ideas or conceptions, the latter, images; and these are so different that we cannot, in many cases, imagine what we can most clearly conceive, while we can conceive of things of which no image can be formed. But the analogy subsisting between different objects of thought may serve the same purpose which, in other cases, is served by images. We may find an analogy where we can have no hope of forming an image. One object may be made the image of *another*, when the latter could furnish no image of *itself*. We can form an idea of a father and a son, or of a sovereign and his subjects:—but the relation between a father and his son, or between a sovereign and his subjects, cannot be represented by the imagination,—it is discerned and apprehended only by the reason. Yet if we discern a resemblance between these two relations, then, so far as that resemblance extends, a father becomes the natural image of a benignant monarch, and children become the natural image of dutiful subjects; and not only may the one illustrate the other, but it may afford ground also for analogical reasoning, which will be sound and

any analogy which words bear to each other, but upon "the analogy or relation betwixt words and things."—

The "Advancement," by Devey, pp. 64, 218.

valid in proportion as the analogy has been correctly apprehended and applied.

191. There are certain objects of thought which we can not only recall to our recollection, but reproduce, as it were, in their original likeness by the power of Imagination, and which we recognise as soon as they reappear, since they have an exact resemblance to what was once actually present to our sense or consciousness. These are objects which have previously affected the mind, and have left their own impression upon it,—an impression which remains long after they have themselves been withdrawn, and which may be revived at any time by the mind's native power. We can thus image to ourselves a horse, a tree, a house, a landscape, or a lake, such as we have previously seen, and we seem to see it again, although absent, because it is reflected in the mirror of our own imagination. Visible objects are most frequently, and perhaps most vividly, recalled by this marvellous power; but it is not confined to these—it may equally recall the impressions which have been made on any one of our senses, and even the more inward sentiments and emotions of the mind itself. Thus we recall a tune which we formerly heard, not by the mere exercise of memory, but by the reproductive energy of imagination, which “without voice or sound,” and in the deep stillness of silent thought, wakes the ideal harmony within, and makes it sweep, in measured cadence, over all the nerves of the soul. Thus also a previous state of mind, not depending on mere sensation, but arising from some more inward occasion of joy or sorrow, of satisfaction or remorse, may be recalled and renewed by the reproductive power of Imagination, which serves, as by a magic influence, to revive whatever has been once present to the mind.

(192.) The reproduction of such objects and impressions is the proper function of imagination; and the more distinctly and vividly it presents them anew, the more instantaneously and the more certainly are they recognised as being an exact resemblance to our past experience. In this respect, the work of imagination is similar to that of the painter or sculptor, whose object it is to delineate a faithful portrait, or to exhibit a life-like representation, of the object of his study. It cannot create new objects or new impressions, although it may exhibit them in new combinations; it must derive all its materials from experience, although the forms into which they are thrown may have no actual

existence in nature. It may construct an ideal fabric, such as has no real prototype, but every stone in that fabric comes from the quarry of fact. It is no more able to form an image of any visible object which has not first been seen, or of any mental impression which has not first been felt, than it is to create an additional sense or invent a new mode of feeling. It cannot delineate any state of mind otherwise than by combining the elements of its common consciousness. The power of imagination, therefore, is limited and subject to laws; it cannot pass beyond certain bounds, which are imposed upon it by the very constitution of nature; and within these bounds, however capricious and irregular its exercise may seem to be, it is still restrained by the tie which connects it with the facts of experience, and cannot, even in its wildest flights, dispense with the atmosphere in which alone, like Kant's "dove," it can "move onward."

(193.) But there are certain other objects of thought, equally real with these, which differ from them in this, that, clearly and distinctly as they may be conceived of, they cannot be figured or pictured by any effort of fancy; they are *intelligible* but not *imaginable*; they may be understood, but cannot be recalled except by the intellect which gave them being and form. They are general notions which are indispensable for the purposes of reasoning; but the inward mirror which reflects other objects of thought, can form no image of these. It may reflect the image of an individual man, or of a particular triangle; it can form none of the general notion of man, or the general notion of a triangle.

(194.) But although they cannot be *imaged* or *pictured*, they may be *represented* in one or other of the various ways already described; and when the representation is founded on the relation of *resemblance*, *analogies* supply the place of *images*, and serve, to a large extent, the same useful purposes. They are a sort of rational imagery, by which the nature and relations of things "seen and temporal" are made to symbolize those which are "unseen and eternal." "Earthly things" become the exponents and types of "heavenly things."—And the importance of these natural analogies becomes strikingly apparent, when it is considered that there is no other way in which *spiritual truths*, however clearly conceived, can be represented in thought.

(195.) The difference in this respect between sensible and spiritual things is recognised by Joseph Glanville. "Men would

form some *image* of the soul in their fancies, as they do in the contemplation of corporeal objects, but this is a wrong way of speculating immaterial things, which may be seen in their effects and attributes, by way of reflection; but if, like children, we run behind the glass to look for them, we shall meet nothing but disappointment."* But the writer who has placed this subject in the clearest light is De Bonald; he shows that we can neither imagine what we conceive, nor conceive what we imagine.†—"In the field of human investigation," says Thomas Carlyle, "there are objects of two sorts;—the visible, including not only such as are material and may be seen by the bodily eye, but all such likewise as may be represented in a shape before the mind's eye, or in any way *pictured* there; and secondly, the invisible, or such as are not only unseen by human eyes, but as cannot be seen by any eye,—not objects of sense at all—not capable, in short, of being pictured or imaged in the mind, or in any way represented by a shape, either without the mind or within it. If any man shall here turn upon us, and assert that there are no such invisible objects,—that whatever cannot be pictured or imagined (meaning imaged) is nothing, and the science which relates to it nothing, we shall regret the circumstance. We shall request him, however, to consider seriously and deeply within himself, what he means simply by these two words, GOD and his own SOUL; and whether he finds that visible shape and true existence are here also one and the same."‡

(196.) Bossuet has drawn, as we have seen, the same distinction between the powers of Conception and Imagination; and that distinction is sufficient to show that we may clearly conceive what cannot be imaged or pictured. But the lesson is not complete unless we add that *analogies are fitted and designed to supply the place of images* where, from the nature of the case, images are impossible.

* Glanville's "Essays on Philosophy and Religion," p. 2.

† "C'est une vérité importante de l'analyse de l'esprit humain, et qui, ce me semble, n'a pas encore été aperçue, ou du moins suffisamment développée, que ces deux facultés *d'ideer* ou *concevoir*, et *d'imaginer*, sont distinctes l'une de l'autre à tel point que, nous ne saurions imaginer ce que nous con-

cevons, ni concevoir ce que nous imaginons: ou, en d'autres termes, que nous ne pouvons nous former des images de nos idées, ni des idées de nos images."—"Recherches Philosophiques," vol. II. p. 78; see also II. 86, 106.

‡ T. Carlyle, "Miscellanies," vol. I. p. 69.

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CHAPTER V.

ANALOGY ; THE WIDE RANGE OF ITS APPLICATION.

(197.) There is reason to believe that not a few entertain inadequate views of the practical value of Analogy, merely because they have been accustomed to think of it only in some one or other of its various connections, and have never taken a comprehensive survey of the extent of its influence over the whole domain of human knowledge. Such views may be best corrected and enlarged by considering it, in some of its principal aspects, as it is exhibited in the familiar experience of common life, and illustrating *the wide range of its actual application*.

(198.) Such and so extensive is its influence, that it may be said to have a close connection with *every* part of human knowledge. It stands related equally to the first foundations and simplest elements of common thought,—to the instruments or signs by which our ideas are represented and expressed,—to every Science without exception, which seeks to arrange the materials of our knowledge and to co-ordinate them under general laws,—and, especially, to the truths of Religion, Natural and Revealed, which depend, to a large extent, both for their evidence, and their interpretation, on the perception of Analogy.

SECT. I.—ITS APPLICATION TO OUR COMMON NATURAL KNOWLEDGE.

(199.) The primary elements of our natural knowledge may be said to spring up spontaneously from the direct intuitions of sense, external and internal—that is, of sensation and consciousness.* But no sooner are certain phenomena, material or mental,

* See Dr M'Cosh's seasonable and valuable work, "The Intuitions of the Mind." (Murray: 1860.)

observed, than forthwith there is called into action within the mind itself, a power, hitherto dormant, but whose perceptions are as intuitive as those of sense and consciousness,—the power of comparing different objects of thought,—of perceiving their relations to one another, and marking especially the relation of resemblance and difference. Without this additional power, the mere perception of individual phenomena would be comparatively useless, and could only give the knowledge of such particular facts as might fall under our immediate observation; but by the faculty of comparison, which involves the power of perceiving relations, and among these the relation of resemblance, we are enabled to rise from individual facts to general conceptions, and ultimately to universal laws.

(200.) As the perception of Analogy is thus natural and spontaneous, so its influence is co-extensive with the exercise of all our faculties, and affects, more or less, the formation of our most common opinions and beliefs. What can be more direct or intuitive than the perceptions of Sense, or what more independent of everything except the mind with its corporeal organ and its material object? Yet the primary judgments which we pronounce on the data of sensation itself, are determined to a large extent by the perception of analogy, or at least are so dependent upon it that they could not be formed without it. A child who has been once scorched ever afterwards dreads the fire, and acts on the conviction that the same cause will invariably produce the same effect. This conviction may be ascribed to an original law of thought such as Reid and Stewart have supposed to be necessary to account for our belief in the constancy of Nature; but granting the existence of such a law, could it come into operation without the aid of analogy, or that perception of resemblance which is necessarily involved in the conception of the *same* or *similar* causes and effects?

(201.) A child sees the form, and hears the voice, and touches the body of his parents, and brothers and sisters; and one of his earliest judgments affirms the existence of living beings around him similar to himself. Could this judgment be formed without the aid of analogy? It does not depend on analogy alone, for facts of experience and laws of reason are equally concerned in the result; but could these facts and laws account for it apart from the perception of resemblance which is involved in the

judgment itself, and which is, in fact, its most prominent and important feature? It is a simple natural induction, but it depends upon an analogical judgment, without which it could have no validity or value.

(202.) As we advance in life our whole conduct is regulated by the *analogy of our past experience*. Practical wisdom and prudence mainly consist in the right application of its lessons to our future conduct. Our judgments are determined, and our practice is regulated, by the same principle. In our intercourse with our fellow-men, if we have ascertained the character of an individual, we judge of his probable conduct accordingly. When we hear an evil report of one whom we have previously known to be a just and generous and upright man, we say at once that it is *unlikely*, and it will require strong evidence to countervail this moral improbability. When we hear an evil report of one whom we have previously known to be base, or sensual, or deceitful, we say at once that it is *not unlikely*;—it is in keeping with his character; and although this general presumption will not warrant a belief of that evil report, without evidence of the specific charge, it will be sufficient, at least, to prevent us from trusting the man, or having any dealings with him, such as we might have with one who is known to be thoroughly trustworthy.* Our judgment, in either instance, is formed according to the analogy of our previous experience.

(203.) All our anticipations in regard to the future are entirely dependent on the analogies of the past. On this ground, we count on the regular succession of the seasons; on this ground, we sow in the hope that we shall reap; on this ground, we engage in enterprises which we know to be accompanied with many hazards, if the balance of probability appears to be in favour of their success;—and on this ground, we act with a measure of confidence proportioned to the number of analogous cases which seem to warrant our expectation of the desired result.

(204.) To this extent, the practical influence of Analogy in the ordinary affairs of life is acknowledged by those who have been most sceptical in regard to its claims in matters of religion; and Hume himself has distinctly recognised it. “All our reasonings concerning matters of fact, are founded on a species of *analogy*,

* Barton, “The Analogy of Divine Wisdom,” p. 46.

which leads us to expect from any cause the same events which we have observed to result from similar causes. When the causes are entirely similar, the analogy is perfect, and the inference drawn from it is regarded as certain and conclusive: nor does any man ever entertain a doubt, where he sees a piece of iron, that it will have weight and cohesion of parts, as in all other instances, which have ever fallen under his observation. But where the objects have not so exact a similarity, the analogy is less perfect, and the inference is less conclusive; though still it has some force, in proportion to the degree of similarity and resemblance.”*

SECT. II.—ITS APPLICATION TO EVERY BRANCH OF SCIENCE.

(205.) As the influence of Analogy is discernible in the earliest stages of thought, so it continues to be our companion and guide in every department of philosophical inquiry. The wide range of its application can only be fully estimated by those who have traced its footprints through the whole circle of the Sciences, and who are able to detect its presence where it may not be conspicuously or strikingly displayed. Every Science, properly so called, depends on relations; and of these the most important, and the one without which no other would lead to any useful practical result, is the relation of resemblance; so that all science must necessarily be, to a large extent, dependent on the perception of Analogy. The proposition, thus generally stated, is so evidently true, that it scarcely needs to be established by proofs: but our conviction of its truth may be deepened, while our sense of its importance will be enhanced, by considering in detail some of the numerous applications of Analogy.

(206.) Its first and most fundamental application is that by which it enables us, as we have seen, to form, in one department of Science, those conceptions of Genera and Species,—and, in another, those conceptions of Natural Laws,—which constitute the first foundations of Philosophy, in the two great domains of contemporaneous and successive nature. “Our labour must therefore be directed,” says Bacon, “towards inquiring into, and observing, resemblances and analogies, both in the whole and

* Hume's “*Essays*,” vol. II. sec. ix. p. 119.

its parts, for they unite nature, and *lay the foundation of the Sciences.*"* "Relations of resemblance form the subject of the science of physical induction. 'These are a grammar,' says Berkeley, 'for the understanding of nature.' The perception of such resemblances, and the conviction of their indefinite extension, form the ground of that antecedent probability which encourages the inductive inquirer to advance from the known to the unknown."† "Analogy has a scientific use which is conspicuously displayed, when it acts as a necessary supplement and auxiliary to inductive reasoning, without which, this useful part of logic would remain very defective and confined. When the philosopher has founded a general truth upon a certain number of particular comparisons, it is by the help of analogy that he gives it an extent over all *similar* instances throughout the universe."‡

(207.) If this be true of Science in general, it is equally true of each of its particular branches. We have seen the influence of Analogy on the formation of Language ; it might be expected, therefore, to hold a prominent place in the Philosophy of Grammar. We find, accordingly, that "the regularity or *analogy* (as it is called by grammarians) which runs through the different classes of words, in every language, in respect of their inflexions, forms of derivation, and other verbal filiations or affinities,"§ and which serves also to connect one language with every other, so as to lay a foundation for the Comparative philosophy of Grammar, attracted the attention of scientific men at a very early period, and was largely illustrated by Quintilian and Julius Cæsar.

(208.) It has been applied also to the methods of numeral notation in Arithmetic and Algebra,||—to the cognate science of Mathematics,¶—to every distinct branch of Inductive Physics.** It is applied to Physiology, which takes note of the innumerable analogies subsisting between the different species of vegetable and animal tribes, as well as the more general analogies of *life*, subsisting between the two kingdoms, in respect to the several processes of nutrition, secretion, and respiration by which it is

* Bacon, "Novum Organum," by Devey, p. 494.

† Dr Harris, "Pre-Adamite Earth," pp. 113, and 141, 181, 188.

‡ Dr Tatham, "The Chart and Scale," I. 56.

§ Dug. Stewart, "Elements," II. 249.

|| Ludlam's "Rudiments of Mathematics," 37, 41. Dégérando, "Des Signes," II. 191.

¶ Dug. Stewart, "Elements," II. 456.

** Comte's "Cours de la Philosophie Positive," V. 259, 277.

sustained.* It is applied to Comparative Anatomy, as in the case of John Hunter, who, "finding many things in the human body difficult to be understood, began to compare its structure with that of inferior animals, where the similar parts were more simple. It was his object in this, to comprehend more thoroughly the human economy, and the general laws of life. The most familiar animals were sometimes of the greatest consequence to him in his researches, but he also was anxious to obtain those which were rare."† It is applied to Medicine generally, for "Physicians must, for the most part, be directed in their prescriptions by *analogy*; and the constitution of one human body is so *like* to that of another, that it is reasonable to think that what is the cause of health or sickness to one may have the same effect upon another."‡ It is applied by Lawyers and Judges in every case whether of civil or criminal procedure; for what are *precedents*, to which so much importance is attached, but *parallel or analogous cases*? And wherein does the skill of the Advocate or the wisdom of the Judge consist, if it be not in seizing hold of the real points of resemblance, between them, and founding his plea or his decision on these, while he disregards all circumstantial differences as having no relevant bearing on the point at issue? It is by analogy only that we can judge either of the past or the future; for, with certain necessary limitations, it may be truly said, that "it is one and the same Nature that runs her course; and whoever shall sufficiently consider the present state of things, may from thence certainly conclude, both the future and the past."§ It is on this principle that Geology proceeds, in speculating both on the changes which have occurred in the crust of the earth, and on the animals which once inhabited it, as indicated by their fossil remains: || and on the same principle is built the whole doctrine of the Calculation of Probabilities, which seeks to find a constant ratio between terms which are known to be variable, by striking an average of all cases that fall under our observation, so as to make it the basis of a safe rule for Insurance against the risk of fire, or loss of life, or casualties at sea. ¶

* John Barclay on "Life and Organization," 476.

† "Biography of Self-taught Men," Art. Hunter.

‡ Dr Reid, "Essays" (by Hamilton), p. 237.

§ Montaigne's "Essays," II. 178.

|| Comte, "Cours," II. 367; V. 100. Sedgwick's "Discourse," 145.

¶ Glassford "On Law of Evidence," pp. 85, 189.

(209.) Analogy has been applied to every branch of Science which relates to Man. It has been applied to Psychology, whose principal terms are derived from sensible things, and transferred, analogically, to mental phenomena : to Ethics, whose truths can scarcely be expressed otherwise than by language borrowed from earthly relations, and are best illustrated by examples and parables ; to Politics,—in which “ we reason, for the most part, from analogy ; for the constitution of human nature is so similar in different societies or commonwealths, that the causes of peace and war, of tranquillity and sedition, of riches and poverty, of improvement and degeneracy, are much the same in all : ”* to the Philosophy of History, which is founded on the known laws of the human mind, and which, by the rule of analogy, enabled the sagacity of Burke to predict the course of a Revolution, and the profound mind of M'Crie to detect in prevailing principles the germs of coming evil : and even to the Arts,—for “ it is thus that every art, liberal or mechanical, elegant or useful, except those founded on pure mathematics, advances toward perfection. From observing similar but different attempts and experiments, and from comparing their effects, general remarks are made, which serve as so many rules for directing future practice ; and, from comparing such general remarks together, others still more general are deduced.” †

SECT. III.—PRESUMPTIONS IN FAVOUR OF ITS APPLICATION TO NATURAL AND REVEALED RELIGION.

(210.) We have thought that it might be useful to offer some specimens of the general influence of Analogy on all our trains of thought, and the wide range of its application both to our common and to our scientific knowledge, with the view of conveying some adequate sense of its importance and value as a guide to truth ; and of showing that it cannot be rejected as an unknown or incompetent witness, however we may be entitled to sift its evidence, and estimate the weight of its testimony, when it is applied also to the purposes of Religion. It should surely diminish the distrust with which many regard the use of Analogy—when it is employed to illustrate the evidence, or to accredit

* Dr Reid, “ Essays,” 237 (Hamilton).

† Dr Campbell, “ Rhetoric,” I. xxi.

and confirm the truths, of Religion—if it can be shown, that it is equally employed in every other department of human thought,—that it is involved in every process of Induction,—and that in pursuing the path of Theological inquiry, we are only following the guidance of the same principle, which conducts us to the most assured results of Science. It is true, indeed, that Analogy yields different degrees of evidence in different cases,—amounting in some, to a bare presumption, in others, to a higher or lower degree of likelihood, in others still, to moral certainty; and it must be reserved, therefore, as an open question which this general proof of the wide range of its application cannot foreclose, how far it is capable of being applied with effect to matters of Faith. But admitting this, it is still something to know that, in some at least of its applications, it has been found capable of affording various degrees of probable evidence, and even of amounting to a valid and conclusive proof; and, that in following the clue which it puts into our hands, we are not striking off, or diverging from, the ordinary course of rational investigation, but adhering to the same method, and advancing in the *same line*, by which we have already arrived at many of our most assured and important convictions.

(211.) If religious truth be a homogeneous part of the great system of human knowledge,—if it be not entirely isolated from all other subjects, or altogether inaccessible to our common faculties,—if it be not so utterly alien from the general scheme of thought as to be incapable of being, in any respect, proved or illustrated by the ordinary rules which regulate our judgment in all other cases, it might be expected that the principle of Analogy, which exerts so great an influence in every other department of inquiry, should also come into operation when the objects of Faith are presented to our minds. It may, possibly, be useful in explaining, illustrating, and confirming the truths of Religion; it may even be indispensable as a *conditio sine qua non* of all Theology—so indispensable, that the conceptions peculiar to Theology could neither be framed by the human mind, nor expressed in intelligible language, without its aid. We find, accordingly, that it has a most important application both to Natural, and to Revealed, Religion.

(212.) On the supposition that there is a valid evidence for the truths of Natural Theology, and the duties of Natural Religion, there is evidently a strong presumption in favour of the idea that analogy may be largely concerned in the conception and

expression, the illustration and proof, of these, the simplest rudiments of Theistic belief. For Theology and Religion, considered as resting upon a body of natural evidence, belong to the domain of our natural knowledge, and may be presumed to be dependent on the same laws, and subject to the same conditions which are applicable to every other department of it. This presumption arises partly from the extensive application of analogy to all other subjects which fall within the wide range of human knowledge,—partly, also, from the common origin of all truth, secular or spiritual, in the Divine Mind, and its communication to His intelligent creatures through the medium of certain manifestations, adapted to the mental faculties to which it is addressed. If we conceive of God as the God of truth, and as the only Teacher of all the truth which we can ever know, whether it relates to things seen and temporal, or to things unseen and eternal, we can hardly fail to believe that, as He has made large use of analogy in every department of our common secular knowledge, so He may make our religious knowledge, in so far as it is purely natural, dependent also on the perception of analogy, as one of its constituent elements or indispensable conditions.

(213.) On the supposition, again, of a supernatural communication of truth from the mind of God to the minds of men, it is not unnatural to expect that it would be adapted to their ordinary laws of thought, and expressed in their own familiar modes of speech. And if both their trains of thinking, and their forms of expression, are usually regulated by the principle of Analogy, it is only reasonable to suppose that Revelation itself will be cast into the same mould, and bear the same impress. The truths revealed will be expressed in analogical terms, illustrated by natural imagery, and confirmed by parallel cases, derived from actual history or delineated in instructive parables. The most cursory inspection of Scripture is sufficient to show that this natural expectation has there been fully realized. It abounds in figurative and metaphorical expressions ; it makes large and frequent use of types and parables ; it reasons from the analogy of human properties and relations to such as are Divine ; it employs “ things seen and temporal ” to shadow forth and represent “ things unseen and eternal.”

(214.) That Analogy is frequently appealed to, and exemplified, in Scripture, is a fact which no one can doubt ; and it will

be generally admitted that the use which is there made of it is eminently illustrative of the wisdom with which its lessons have been adapted to the purposes of popular religious instruction. Every one must be sensible that a bare abstract statement of moral or spiritual truth would have possessed little power to interest or to impress the minds of men, in comparison with the more familiar, but far more effective, representation of it by means of natural imagery and well-known analogies. Would you render it powerless as a means of arresting the attention of men, and awakening their interest in Divine things, you could not succeed more effectually in any other way than by translating its emblematic and symbolical language into the frigid formulas of philosophy. The substitution of the *abstract* for the *analogical* conception, would reduce the truth to a mere "ens rationis," and smite it with the curse of barrenness.* By means of analogical terms, and analogous cases, the truth is both more clearly and more impressively taught,—it is invested with an additional charm which serves to excite and sustain a deeper feeling of interest; it acquires an aspect of verisimilitude, which diminishes the feeling of strangeness of which we are conscious when new and startling doctrines are for the first time presented; and it may even receive a certain amount of positive support from the exhibition of other facts in which the same principles are seen to be involved. All this is generally admitted, but it is not often, perhaps, duly considered how extensively, and in what various ways, Analogy is employed in Scripture, or to what purposes it is there applied.

SECT. IV.—THE SCRIPTURAL APPLICATIONS OF ANALOGY.

(215.) If we inquire in what way, and to what extent, Analogy is employed in Scripture, we shall find that it is there applied with a copiousness and frequency, a richness and variety, which make it one of the most prominent and characteristic features of Revelation. Divest the Bible of its analogical terms, its natural imagery, its symbolical illustrations, its instructive types and parables, and you deprive it of its peculiar charm,—of all that is best fitted to arrest the attention, to convince the judg-

* "Il est un moyen très simple," says Franck, "de delivrer la Théodicée de toute ombre d'anthropomorphisme, —c'est de réduire Dieu à une abstraction, —à l'abstraction de l'être en soi."

ment, and to impress the heart. But, happily, the attempt to do so is impossible ; Analogy is interwoven with its very texture, and cannot be separated from it without destroying its substance as well as its form.

(216.) Account for it as we may, the fact is certain that the language of Scripture is, to a large extent, analogical. Besides the formal comparisons and figurative illustrations which it employs, even the individual terms which are used in speaking of God and Divine things, are derived, for the most part, from some corresponding property in man, or some familiar object in nature. It speaks of God as Light, and Life, and Love ; as a sun and shield ; as a rock, a refuge, a fortress ; as the fountain of living waters, and the horn of salvation ; it speaks of His attributes under names borrowed from corresponding perfections in ourselves,—of His wisdom, His power, His holiness and justice and truth, His faithfulness, His pity, His compassion, His tender mercy :—it speaks of His relations to us, as a Father, a Benefactor, a Friend, a Lawgiver, a Governor and Judge, a Redeemer, a Deliverer, and a Saviour ;—it speaks even of the personal distinctions in the Godhead under the analogical terms of Father, Son, and Spirit. It speaks of all other things in the same way,—of sin, as a *debt*, and of a *ransom* by which the debt is discharged ; as a *crime*, and of the *satisfaction* to justice by which it is expiated ; as a state of *bondage*, and of the *redemption* by which the captive is set free : of conversion as a new *birth*, of practical religion as a new *life*, of the Christian's course as a *race*, of the Christian's experience as a *warfare*, of the Christian's success as a *victory* and a *triumph*. In short, all the individual expressions which are of the most frequent occurrence in Scripture, bear the undeniable impress of Analogy, as having been borrowed from some familiar fact of human experience, which affords the only key to their true meaning, and reflects upon them the light of a vivid and instructive illustration.—This is the fact, whatever explanation may be given of the reason of it ; a fact which is apparent on the most cursory inspection of the language of Scripture, and which becomes only the more certain in proportion as our study of it is minute and profound.

(217.) Nor is it difficult to discover why it should be so. For Revelation, to be useful to those for whose benefit it is designed, must be adapted to the constitution of the human mind, and the

natural laws of human thought;—it must speak, therefore, in human language, and in no other way could its truths be intelligibly expressed. It is not unreasonable to expect that, in the event of a supernatural revelation of His mind and will, God would so far condescend to the limited capacities of men, as to make use of those familiar analogies with which they are daily conversant, and employ them as vehicles for conveying spiritual instruction. And in adopting this method, so far from introducing a new or arbitrary invention, He would only be accommodating His teaching to their usual and unavoidable habits of thought, and choosing the only practicable way of expressing such conceptions as He might wish to convey to their minds. For such a use of Analogy “is from absolute necessity, because we have neither proper ideas or words, nor direct conceptions of things Divine and immaterial; and must therefore not think nor speak of them at all, unless we perform it by a similitude and correspondency with things human and immediately known. God’s knowledge, for instance, could never have been justly and usefully conceived by us at all, if we did not form a conception of it by analogy with that knowledge and thinking which we experience in a human mind.”*

(218.) If this be a correct view of the language of Scripture, it follows that, even after a supernatural revelation has been vouchsafed, our religious knowledge must still retain its analogical character, and that all our views of God and of Divine things must be formed with reference to some property of our own minds, some object in nature, or some fact of experience, which has a resemblance to the higher truths, of which we are enabled, by means of these, to acquire a true and clear, though inadequate, conception. They convey, not a full *comprehension*, but a real, though imperfect, *apprehension*, of the truth, such as is suited to our limited faculties in the present state, and sufficient for all the practical purposes of a religious life. It may be justly described as “such an approximation to the truth as earthly images and figures may supply to us;” but it is very far from having any resemblance to the notion which “a blind man may form of light and colours.” In the case of a blind man there is no *real resemblance* between light and colours and anything else with which

* Bishop Browne, “Divine Analogy,” p. 10.

he can compare them ; whereas analogical knowledge implies at once a real resemblance between the image and the reality, and such a measure of truth as that resemblance may indicate or suggest to our minds.

(219.) Besides being involved in many individual expressions, originally figurative or metaphorical, which occur in Scripture, Analogy is explicitly employed, and becomes clearly visible, in those more extended comparisons which are of frequent occurrence there, and which serve partly to express or convey, partly to explain or illustrate, and partly to prove or confirm, the truth. These more explicit comparisons may be said to bear the same relation to the individual expressions already referred to, which subsists between similes and metaphors.* They are exemplified in various forms,—in Visions, in Symbols, in Types, and in Parables, as well as in mere verbal comparisons.—We find that even in revealing the truth to the minds of His chosen servants, God is said to have often accommodated the method of Divine communication to the ordinary laws of human thought, and especially to have made use of Visions,† by which the senses or the imagination were made auxiliary to the acquisition of spiritual knowledge, and the exercise of religious faith.

(220.) Nearly akin to the revelation by Vision, is the method of teaching by Symbols. Scripture makes mention of *symbolical objects*, and also of *symbolical actions*, which are both exemplified in the sacramental ordinances of the Church. Symbolism, in the Scriptural sense of the term, depends on the relation subsisting between two things, by virtue of which the one becomes a fit representative or instructive sign of the other. Some symbols are natural and bear an obvious resemblance to that which they represent ; while others are purely arbitrary, and originate either in positive institution or conventional agreement ; and for this reason the right interpretation of Symbolical language, such as is employed in the Apocalypse, may be justly said to be a science of itself.‡

* Glassius gives this definition of it : “ Metaphora est similitudo brevis ad unam vocem contractam ; ” “ similitudo est collatio *explicita*, metaphora autem *implicita*. ” —Philologia Sacra, pp. 56 and 715.

† Num. xii. 6 ; Gen. xv. 1, 12, 17, xxviii. 12, 17 ; Job xxxiii. 15 ; Isa.

i. 1, vi. 1 ; Ezek. i. 1, viii. 3, x. 1–22 ; 2 Chron. xxvi. 5 ; Dan. vii. 1, viii. 2 ; Acts x. 3, 11, ix. 10, 12 ; 2 Cor. xii. 1.

‡ Wemyss, “ Key to the Symbolical Language of Scripture,” Clark’s “Biblical Cabinet,” vol. XXVI.—a valuable work, founded on the “Symbolical Dictionary” of Daubuz.

(221.) The use of Analogy for some of the highest ends of religious instruction is conspicuously exhibited in the magnificent system of Types. This system was adapted to the Church's non-age or minority, for "God taught His people, as we teach our children; first by sensible and external signs, as we do by pictures and stories, before abstract truths can be apprehended."* It has been well described by Lamennais "as prophecy in action;"† for it had the essential nature of prophecy, as it prefigured and foreshadowed things to come; but of prophecy visibly embodied, and constantly exhibited, as it were, in dramatic representation. There were many classes of types, but they may all be reduced to two general heads—the Ritual and the Historical. The Ritual included typical persons and offices, such as prophets, priests, and kings; typical ordinances, such as circumcision and the passover, —atonement and intercession, and many more: while the Historical included all those events in the national history of Israel, which were so ordered as to prefigure, both in their own nature, and in the order of their succession, the dispensations of God towards His Church under a scheme of grace and redemption. Every one who considers what is said in Scripture both of the ordinances of the Jewish Church and of the events of their national history, must admit that, in the view of the sacred writers, both were typical; for of the one it is said that they "were figures for the time then present," and "a shadow of good things to come, but not the very image of the things"—"patterns of things in the heavens"—"an example and shadow of heavenly things:"‡ and of the other, "These things were our examples (τύποι)"—"all these things happened unto them for ensamples (τύποι), and they are written for our admonition upon whom the ends of the world are come."§ But their typical import cannot be understood, nor their value, whether as a means of instruction or as a source of evidence, be duly felt and appreciated, without comparing the type with the antitype, and discerning the *analogy* which subsists between the two. For typical prefiguration, while it depends on positive institution and implies a preordained connection

* Charlotte Elisabeth, Introduction to "The Gospel of the Old Testament,"—a summary of Samuel Mather on "The Types," p. xxi.

† "Essai sur l'Indifférence," III. 398.

‡ Heb. viii. 5, ix. 9, 23, x. 1. See Dr Owen's "Preliminary Excitation" to his "Commentary on the Epistle to the Hebrews," Works, vols. XXII. XXIII.

§ 1 Cor. x. 6, 11.

by Divine appointment, proceeds invariably on the *relation of resemblance*. The same principle is involved in the shadow and the substance, but exhibited in a lower or higher form of its manifestation. For "*there, in that fundamental, internal harmony and agreement, we are to seek for the resemblance, which constituted the relation between type and antitype . . . the one manifesting, in regard to present and earthly things, the same rules, relations, or principles of government, which the other did, in regard to spiritual and heavenly things.*"*

(222.) If the whole Typical System is based on the principle, and depends for its use on the perception, of Analogy ; and if that system be one of the most prominent and characteristic features of the whole scheme of Revelation, may it not be said that Scripture, not less than Nature, has been adapted to this fundamental law of human thought, and that the power of comparing different things, and marking their points of resemblance and agreement, is as indispensable in the study of Revealed Religion as it is in the pursuit of natural knowledge ? May it not even be said, that God has put signal honour on Analogy by practically recognising its importance, both as a medium of instruction, and a method of proof ? Have we not abundant reason to admire that wonderful provision of Divine wisdom, by which, when all mere natural analogies were insufficient adequately to represent the peculiar and supernatural truths which were about to be revealed, a new set of *analogies was called into being*, by the erection of a National economy and a Ritual worship among the Jews, as if on purpose to supply "figures" adapted to the "new creation" such as might serve the same uses in connection with our Religious knowledge, as are served by the ordinary symbols of nature in regard to common things ?—Who will venture to say that Analogy can have no application to Revealed religion, when it is indispensable to the interpretation of a large part of Scripture itself ?—or that any such application of it is unimportant, when all the most peculiar doctrines of the Gospel are couched in terms borrowed from the Symbolic of the Old Dispensation ?

(223.) Nor was it only under the preparatory, and comparatively imperfect, dispensation of Divine truth, that Analogy was employed as a vehicle of religious instruction ; it was signally

* Dr Fairbairn, "Typology of Scripture," I. pp. 55, 70.

honoured by being frequently and powerfully applied, both for illustration and proof, by our Lord Himself, during the course of His personal ministry. We find the crowning evidence of its value in the fact, that He “who spake as never man spake,” not only referred to the types of the Old Testament as capable of affording spiritual instruction to His disciples, but made use also of *natural analogies* to illustrate and verify His own teaching, in those wonderful Parables, which awakened the interest, and drew forth the admiration alike of the learned and the ignorant, partly by their simple beauty, and partly by the profound truth which they contained and conveyed. As long as His Parables are known and appreciated, there can be no reason to doubt that Analogy may be usefully applied even to the truths of Revealed Religion. Our Lord evidently regarded nature as a Symbol, whose literal meaning might have a spiritual application; and hence he spoke of knowledge under the name of light,—of spiritual renovation as a birth,—of faith as a mental eye-sight,—of the Spirit’s agency as similar to the influence of the unseen wind.—Nor was it only in His Parables that our Lord made use of imagery derived from the volume of Nature; He reasoned, also, with the Scribes and Pharisee on the principle of Analogy, and applied the facts and lessons of the Old Testament, which they professed to believe, to neutralize their objections against His own doctrine or practice, and even to *prove* by that means the truth which He taught. When they objected that His disciples, in plucking the ears of corn when they were hungry, did “that which is not lawful to do upon the Sabbath-day,” He simply adduced from the Old Testament *two analogous facts*. “He said unto them, Have ye not read what David did when he was an hungered, and they that were with him,—how he entered into the house of God, and did eat the shew-bread, which was not lawful for him to eat, neither for them which were with him, but only for the priests? Or, have ye not read in the law, how that on the Sabbath-days the priests in the temple profane the Sabbath, and are blameless?” These two facts—the one the conduct of David with reference to the shew-bread, which was consecrated not less than the Sabbath,—the other the conduct of the priests with reference to the Sabbath itself, are adduced as analogous to the conduct of His disciples in plucking the ears of corn, on the ground that, while they differ from it in other respects, they involve the same

general principle, that what is consecrated to God may, in a case of necessity be used as common. And this mode of reasoning from the analogy between the cases compared is more than an *argumentum ad hominem*, and does more than merely neutralize an objection, it establishes a general principle, which is equally applicable to them all, and, by this means *proves* the truth which He meant to teach. When they objected, again, to His healing the sick on the Sabbath, He simply adduces an *analogous fact* derived, in this instance, from their own familiar experience: "What man shall there be among you, that shall have one sheep, and if it fall into a pit on the Sabbath-day, will he not lay hold on it, and lift it out? *Wherefore* it is lawful to do well on the Sabbath-days."* Our Lord thus made copious use of Analogy Himself, and He approved it when it was employed by others. "This method of conveying Divine truths into the minds of men, by associating them with truths of which they were previously possessed, and these the most natural and familiar, was universally adopted by our Lord. . . Instead of defining or syllogising, we find Him perpetually illustrating and explaining spiritual and heavenly things by the analogy and similitude of those which are temporal and earthly." From "the numerous parables, similitudes, and analogies, which He employed on all occasions to convey His supernatural truths to men, we may infer that *this method of reasoning is specially consecrated to the service of religion.*"†

(224.) We have thus seen that Analogy has a wide range of application in connection with the truths even of Revealed Religion;—that its impress is visible in the individual expressions and figures of Scripture;—that its use was implied in the visions which were vouchsafed to the prophets, and in the symbols which were employed for the instruction of the people;—in the Types which prefigured "better things to come," and in the Parables which formed one of the most characteristic features of the personal teaching of our Lord.

* Matt. xii. 4, 5, 11.

† Dr Tatham, "Chart and Scale," II. 30, 33, 66.

CHAPTER VI.

ANALOGY ; ITS SEVERAL DISTINCT USES.

(225.) In prosecuting our inquiry into the doctrine of Analogy, considered in its most general aspect as applicable to every department of human knowledge, our next object should be to distinguish aright between the various Uses to which it is subservient. This is the more necessary, because there is reason to think that the very number and variety of its applications have operated injuriously in the way of creating, in some minds, a groundless prejudice against it, as if, being often employed for the purpose of mere illustration by the Rhetorician and the Poet, it could not also be validly applied as a method of reasoning, or a ground of inference, by the Philosopher and the Divine.

(226.) Its Uses are various, while they are easily distinguishable from each other: and it will be found to be of considerable practical importance to discriminate carefully betwixt them, and to mark the distinct reasons on which they severally depend. They may be conveniently arranged under *four* general heads, according as Analogy serves either *first*, for expression, illustration, and ornament; or *secondly*, for classification and arrangement; or *thirdly*, for suggestion and discovery; or *fourthly*, for reasoning and inference,—by neutralizing objections, in some cases, —by imparting, in others, a character of *verisimilitude* to certain truths which might seem strange and almost incredible but for their resemblance to facts more familiarly known,—and, in not a few, by supplying a certain amount, more or less, of positive evidence, which may range from the lowest presumption, up through various degrees of probability, to the highest certainty.

SECT. I.—ITS USE FOR EXPRESSION, ILLUSTRATION, AND ORNAMENT.

(227.) The influence of Analogy on the formation of our ideas, and the various methods of expressing or representing them, has been already illustrated ; and now it is only necessary to mark this as one of its various Uses, and to appreciate the benefit which arises from it in the process of thinking, and the mutual interchange of thought.

(228.) The existence of figurative terms in all languages, and the familiar use of symbols and images in every age and clime, afford sufficient evidence to show that Analogy is useful for the expression and illustration of thought, and that such a use of it is natural, inevitable, and universal. So far from being the artificial effect of refined culture, or the slowly matured product of advancing civilisation, figurative language seems to have been a plant of spontaneous growth, and one that was most luxuriant in the earlier ages of society. Poetry appeared before the dawn of Science ; and imagery was common while Induction was in its infancy, and existed only in the simplest form of natural inference. The first language of men bore the impress of analogy in its primary constituent elements, as well as in its general structure ; and many forms of expression which were originally figurative or metaphorical have ceased to be regarded as such, only by their having become the recognised signs of the ideas which they were employed to represent.

(229.) In every department of knowledge, excepting only the purely abstract sciences, figurative language supplies the most striking and the most agreeable method of expressing thought.—Even in abstract science, the intellect is aided by figures or diagrams, presented to the eye, or pictured by the imagination. And in all other cases, the peculiar power of imagery, judiciously chosen and happily applied, is universally felt and acknowledged. A single metaphor, appropriately selected, will often awaken a more vivid idea, and leave a deeper impression, than the most elaborate statement of truth in abstract language. Nor is it difficult to discover the reason of its power ; it stimulates the imagination while it instructs the intellect, and serves to explain and illustrate the lessons which it teaches, by making some natural and well-known

object a symbol of another less familiar to our thoughts, and conveying insensibly a latent argument founded on the analogy between the two. Its magic influence is often seen in the triumphs of the Orator; it may be justly described as the very soul of Poetry.

(230.) Any apparent resemblance, however superficial, between different objects, may serve to make the one suggestive of the other, and to lead to their being applied in the way of mutual illustration. When the resemblance, however, is slight,—or when it rests on the mere accidents, rather than on the essential nature and characteristic features, of the objects compared,—it makes a feeble and transient impression on the mind, in comparison with that which is produced by a more radical and intimate likeness, arising from the participation of common properties or production of similar effects. It will be found, accordingly, that the largest and by far the most impressive portion of figurative language—the most graphic imagery in common use,—is derived, not from a simple comparison of objects in respect to their more superficial aspects, but from a comparison of their essential properties; and that they contain a real, but latent and undeveloped, analogy. Imagination may detect resemblances, indeed, between things that are most widely different, and the disclosure of these fanciful similitudes often adds the charm of surprise and novelty to the effusions of Poetry and Wit. For wit, like poetry, is more akin to philosophic genius, through the ready perception of analogies, than it is often supposed to be: and it has been justly said that, “Paradoxical as the statement may at first sight appear to many who have been accustomed to consider wisdom and wit as dwelling apart, we doubt whether there is any one attribute so common to the highest order of mind, whether scientific or imaginative, as some form or other of this (latter) quality. . . And we may add that, *a priori*, we should expect it to be so. That same activity of suggestion, and aptitude for detecting resemblances, analogies, and differences, which qualify genius for making discoveries in science, or, under different modifications, for evoking the creations of imagination, may well be supposed not to desert their possessor, when, for playful purposes, and in moments of relaxation, he exercises himself in the detection of the analogies on which wit and drollery are founded.”* A striking confirmation of the

* Edinburgh Review, Jan. 7, 1847, vol. 85, p. 195.

truth of these remarks may be found in the fact that the richest description of wit, perhaps, which exists in our language came from the pen of one of the profoundest Mathematicians of England.*

(231.) Some of the metaphors in common use are founded on a very general resemblance between different objects of thought. When we speak, for example, of a *sweet* scene, or a *sweet* tune, we tacitly assume a resemblance between the relation which such a scene bears to the eye, or such a tune to the ear, and that which some other object bears to the sense of taste; a resemblance which amounts to little more than their being severally productive of an *agreeable effect*, although on different organs. When it is said, again, that "Attention is to consciousness what the contraction of the pupil is to sight;" or "that attention is to the eye of the mind what the microscope or telescope is to the bodily eye:" or again, that "the Mishna was like the Code of Justinian, embodying the national laws; the Gemara, like his Pandects, embodying the mass of precedents:" we have similitudes, couched in such terms, as make one thing to be the explanation of another, and thus convey a clearer and more vivid conception than could easily be expressed in any other way.†

(232.) Several distinct benefits arise from the use of Illustrative Analogy in every department of knowledge. It serves, first of all, to make the *truth clearer*, as Coleridge has observed;‡ and to associate it with objects which are fitted to recall it to the mind. It affords, secondly, through the medium of association, an important aid to the memory in retaining and recollecting its acquired knowledge; for, in the words of Bacon, "Emblems bring down intellectual to sensible things, and what is sensible always strikes the memory stronger, and sooner impresses itself than when it is intellectual. And therefore it is easier to retain the image of a sportsman hunting the hare, of an apothecary ranging his boxes, an orator making a speech, a boy repeating verses, or a player

* Dr Isaac Barrow, "Sermon on Foolish Talking and Jestings," Works, vol. I. p. 351 (Hughes' Edition, 1830). Sir William Hamilton's Lectures, I. 248. Farrar's Science in Theology, p. 115.

† For examples of Illustrative Analogies, see Dr Whately's "Rhetoric," pp. 23, 28, 38; Dr Hampden's "Essay," pp. 194, 196, 201, 204;

Barton, "Analogy," p. 45; Dégérando, "Des Signes, etc." 247; Dr Campbell's "Rhetoric," II. 163, 176; Dr Thomas Brown's Lectures, pp. 223, 227, 290; Professor Lyall's "Intellect and Emotions," pp. 135, 147.

‡ Coleridge, "Aids to Reflection," p. 272.

acting his part, than the corresponding notions of invention, disposition, elocution, memory, and action. . . Other instances will offer, that whatever brings the intellect into contact with something that strikes the sense, assists the memory.”* It supplies, thirdly, an agreeable and useful variety of representation, by which truth is adapted to the different faculties of the same mind, or the peculiar tastes and tendencies of different minds; for as there are predominant intellectual tendencies in the teacher,—one being simply natural, another severely logical, and a third richly imaginative,—so there are corresponding aptitudes and tastes on the part of the taught, and the various methods of representation may bring the truth into contact with the minds of all.† While it explains and illustrates the meaning of what is taught, it may often contain also a latent proof, and is fitted, therefore, to convince the judgment, as well as to stimulate the imagination, and to gratify the taste. This is the case more especially in parallel instances, real or fictitious, such as are employed in Parables, where the same principle is exhibited, but only in a lower and a higher sphere.‡

(233.) If such be the benefits arising from the use of illustrative Analogy, in every other department of human knowledge, we can be at no loss to discover the reason why the use of symbols and of figurative language should hold a prominent place also in Religion. The truths of Theology are not so isolated from the other objects of thought as to be incapable of being expressed or represented by the same methods which are found useful with regard to them. There is even a peculiar necessity, arising from the very nature of the case, which renders such modes of expressing Religious truth as unavoidable as it is useful; for we cannot even conceive of God, and His attributes,—much less can we speak of Him,—otherwise than according to the Analogy of our own intellectual and moral consciousness.§ This fundamental fact, which lies deep in the constitution of our nature, explains at once

* Bacon (by Devey), pp. 213, 490.

† The three methods of representation are described by Sir William Hamilton, “Lectures on Metaphysics,” vol. II. 266.

NICOLE, “Pensées.” “Il y a des gens propres à trouver des vérités : d’autres qui sont propres à trouver des images aux vérités, comme des comparaisons : d’autres qui sont pro-

pres à trouver des vérités aux images : ces sont trois caractères différents d’esprit.”—P. 376.

‡ Whately’s “Rhetoric,” 112, 141, 271.

§ COUSIN on “Pascal.” “C’est à l’aide de la conscience et des élémens permanents qui la constitue, que, par une induction légitime, nous élevons l’homme à la connoissance des attri-

the origin and the abundant use of analogical, figurative, and metaphorical language in connection with the truths of Religion. For just as most of the terms which are employed to denote our own minds and their various faculties and operations, are derived by analogy from sensible objects, so most of the language which we use in speaking of God, of His perfections, and of our relations to Him, is derived from the analogy of our mental consciousness, or of mere human relations. This is a fact, account for it as we may, and whatever use may be made of it. Men cannot conceive of divine and spiritual things without the aid of certain natural analogies, nor speak of them intelligibly without the use of figurative and metaphorical language. "Such things can only be made known to us by an accommodation from the visible to the invisible, from the known to the unknown; and though, in such cases, the form is necessarily imperfect, and conveys an *inadequate* idea of the reality, it still is the *fittest representation* of the idea,—the nearest to the truth of things,—which it is possible for us in present circumstances to attain to."*

SECT. II.—ITS USE FOR CLASSIFICATION AND ARRANGEMENT.

(234.) The influence of Analogy on the formation of *general ideas* and *general terms*, formerly described, will prepare us for recognising it as the principle which regulates and determines all those primary judgments which give rise to orderly Classification, and ultimately to Scientific Arrangement, in every department of human knowledge. Our conceptions are formed from a comparison of individual objects, and a perception of certain points of resemblance between them; and every such conception may be said to contain the germ of Classification, and to involve a judgment founded on Comparison. In fact, every general Conception amounts in itself to an incipient Classification.

(235.) The use and value of Analogy in this respect can

but les plus cachés de Dieu. L'homme ne peut rien comprendre de Dieu dont il n'ait au moins *une ombre en lui-même*. Ce qu'il sent d'essentiel en lui, il le transporte, ou plutôt il le rend à Celui qui le lui a donné; et il ne peut sentir ni sa liberté, ni son intelligence, ni son amour, avec toutes leurs

imperfections et leurs limites, sans avoir une certitude invincible de la liberté, de l'intelligence, et de l'amour de Dieu, *sous la raison de l'Infinité*."—The French term *conscience* is equivalent to *consciousness* in English.

* Dr FAIRBAIRN, "Hermeneutical Manual," p. 95.

scarcely be overrated. For if we are indebted to it alike for our primary conceptions and our subsequent classifications, the whole structure of Philosophy may be said to depend upon it. The three great branches of Philosophy are—the knowledge of *genera and species* in the objects of contemporaneous nature,—the knowledge of *general laws* in the events of successive nature,—and the knowledge of the phenomena and faculties, which are revealed in the consciousness of our own minds. Not one of these would be attainable by man without the perception of Analogy. Is it not on the ground of their resemblance in one or more respects that we arrange the objects by which we are surrounded into groupes or classes, and designate these classes by general names? Is it not equally on the ground of their resemblance that we reduce the successive phenomena of Nature under general laws? * And what but Analogy leads to the classification of mental phenomena, and the recognition of psychological laws? “Every action and passion is not different from every other. On the contrary, they are *like*, and they are *unlike*. Those, therefore, that are *like*, we groupe or assort together in thought, and bestow on them a common name; nor are these groupes or assortments manifold; they are in fact few and simple.” . . . “The modifications, that is, the actions and passions, of the mind, all fall into a few resembling groupes, which we designate by a peculiar name.” . . . “We only classify certain modes, and conclude that similar modes indicate the same capacity of being modified. There is nothing in all this contrary to the most rigid rules of philosophizing; nay, it is the purest specimen of the Inductive philosophy.” †

(236.) If all this be true, the whole structure of Philosophy may be said to rest on the perception of Analogy; since, without its aid, we could neither attain the primary conceptions on which it depends, nor construct the classifications, and laws, in which it mainly consists. “If the liberty of arguing from a *similarity* of effects be once denied to us,” says Mr Jones, “*all* experimental philosophy will be in a manner useless.”

* DÉGÉRANDO, “Des Signes.” “La probabilité qui nous autorise à attendre un effet semblable de deux causes analogues, est précisément l’analogie de ces causes. . . . C’est là ce que nous appelons un *jugement d’analogie*. Et de même que l’analogie des causes nous

conduit à supposer la similitude des effets, l’analogie des effets nous aide aussi à remonter, par un raisonnement semblable, à la similitude des causes.” —II. 524.

† Sir William Hamilton, “Lectures on Metaphysics,” II. 3, 4.

(237.) The Objects of thought were probably classed, in the first instance, on a simple comparison of their most obvious, or more striking, features ; but at a later stage, when profounder analogies between them, depending on their essential nature, characteristic properties, or fundamental relations, came to be studied and ascertained, these were adopted as the basis of a new and more scientific arrangement. Classifications which had been founded on mere apparent resemblance gave place to others built on a real likeness, in some characteristic respect, between the things themselves. Thus in the science of Natural History, and Chemistry, the change has been marked and striking.* The benefit resulting from the more scientific method is not confined to the aid which it affords to the memory,—for some advantage of that kind might be derived from the simplest arrangement proceeding on mere apparent resemblance,—but it extends to the nature of the inductive inferences which are drawn from real and true analogies between the characteristic properties of the objects themselves ; for every Classification resting on this ground is strictly analogical, and affords a sure ground for Induction. And every one who duly considers, on the one hand, the benefit which accrues to science from a right method of Classification in every department of inquiry ; and, on the other hand, that every such Classification depends on comparison and the perception of resemblance, must see at once how largely the progress of human knowledge, throughout its whole range, is indebted to the principle of Analogy.

SECT. III.—ITS USE FOR SUGGESTION AND DISCOVERY.

(238.) Analogy is at once a prompter, and a guide, on the path of discovery ; it suggests, in the first instance, a feasible or even

* *M. Franck*, "De la Certitude." "Les divisions établies par les savants entre les êtres qui peuplent le monde extérieur ont d'autant plus de vérité, —sont d'autant plus naturelles et plus durables,—qu'elles reposent sur un principe plus rationnel, et négligent les qualités superficielles qui ne s'adressent qu'à nos sens. C'est par là qu'en histoire naturelle, par exemple, les classifications modernes ont tant de

supériorité sur les classifications anciennes." —P. 244. *M. JAVARI* "De la Certitude." "Il y a toujours dans l'intelligence de l'homme une certaine classification, aussi superficielle que vous voudrez, des animaux et des plantes ; mais qu'y trouvez-vous de la chimie, par exemple, tant qu'on se borne à percevoir les qualités purement sensibles des corps ?"—P. 133.

probable conjecture, and leads on, in the second, to its actual verification. Many striking examples might be adduced in proof of this statement. It was Analogy which first suggested to the mind of Newton some of his greatest discoveries. By analogy he connected the falling of an apple from a tree with the tendency of the earth and planets towards the central sun, and was led on to the detection of the law which regulates the movements of the heavenly bodies, and the establishment of the identity of terrestrial with celestial mechanics.—“It was, further, observed by Newton, that the diamond possessed a very high refractive power compared with its density. The same thing he knew to be true of combustible substances. Hence he conjectured that the diamond was combustible. He conjectured the same thing, and for the same reason, of water,—that is, that it contains a combustible element. *In both instances, he guessed right, reasoning from analogy.*”*

(239.) The doctrine of Final Causes, which proceeds on the principle of analogy, has also been a fruitful source of discovery. “Several remarkable physiological discoveries have been made in consequence of the habit of looking at final causes in animal structures. . . . Most discoveries in physical science are originally prompted and suggested by some previous conjecture. Nothing can be more fruitful in furnishing such conjectures than the habitual recourse to instances of adaptation to an end already known, whence the enlightened physiologist often receives the most valuable hints, and frames the most probable conjectures as to those which are as yet unknown. The value and force of such conjectures in general depends on the happy perception of *analogy*.”† The great discovery of the *circulation of the blood* was first suggested by analogy. “I remember,” says the Honourable Robert Boyle, “that when I asked our famous Harvey in the only discourse I had with him (which was but a little while before he died), what were the things which induced him to think of a circulation of the blood? he answered me,—that when he took notice that the valves in the veins of so many parts of the body were so placed that they gave free passage to the blood towards the heart, but opposed the passage of the venal blood the contrary way, he was invited to think that so provident a cause as nature had not

* Professor Haven, of Amherst, | † B. Powell, “Essays,” p. 73.
 “Mental Philosophy,” p. 197.

placed so many valves without design ; and no design seemed more probable than that, since the blood could not well, because of the interposing valves, be sent by the veins to the limbs, it should be sent through the arteries and return through the veins, whose valves did not oppose its course that way.”*

(240.) Analogy suggested to the reflective mind of Columbus the idea which led to the discovery of America, and to the minds of Adams and Le Verrier that which resulted in the discovery of a new planet. It is suggestive in regard alike to speculative and to practical objects ; for it was by speculating on “ the analogies of number and figure ” that Pythagoras was led to the discovery of his great theorem, the 47th Proposition of the First Book of Euclid ; † and it was by considering the action of the ball and socket joint in the human frame that George Stephenson was led to the adoption of a corresponding device for the improvement of the locomotive engine, ‡ while the same sort of joint has been applied for the comfort of the student in the convenient invention of the reading desk. Innumerable instances might be added : for “ nearly all the mechanical arts owe their origins to slender beginnings afforded by nature or accident. . . . And if mankind were desirous to search after useful things, they ought attentively, minutely, and on set purpose, to view the workmanship and particular operations of nature, and be continually examining and casting about which of them may be transferred to arts ; *for nature is the mirror of art.* ” §

(241.) Analogy is thus a light by which the inquirer is conducted from the known to the unknown,—from the familiar to the new,—from the near to the more remote. It is not only the spring of conjecture, but the ground also of expectation ; it is at once the prompter of hopeful inquiry, and a guide-post which indicates the path to be pursued ; it suggests the motives, and often supplies the means, of actual discovery. Genius, whether philosophical, poetic, or practical, mainly consists in the power of seizing new analogies, and divining, as if by intuition, the uses to which they may be applied. In the words of Archbishop Whately, “ It may be said almost without qualification that Wisdom con-

* Robert Boyle, Works, vol. IV. p. 539, folio edition.

† Field, “ Analogical Philosophy,” I. 277.

‡ Samuel Smiles, “ Life of George Stephenson,” p. 94.

§ Bacon, by Devey, p. 192.

sists in the ready and accurate perception of analogies.”* “This power of divination,” says Archbishop Thomson, “this sagacity, which is the mother of all science, we may call Anticipation. The intellect, *with a dog-like instinct, will not hunt until it has found the scent*. It must have some presage of the result before it will turn its energies to its attainment.”† This presage is suggested by the perception of analogy, and the reason is obvious,—it lies in the correlation which has been established between the laws of thought and the order of nature. For “there is a certain character or *style* in the operations of Divine wisdom,—something which everywhere announces, amidst an infinite variety of detail, an inimitable unity and harmony of design, and in the *perception of which, philosophical sagacity and genius seem chiefly to consist*. It is this which bestows a value so inestimable on the *Queries of Newton*. . . . Every subsequent step which has been gained in astronomical science has tended more and more to illustrate the sagacity of those views by which he was guided to his fortunate *anticipation* of the truth; as well as to confirm, upon a scale which continually grows in its magnitude, the justness of that magnificent conception of uniform design, which emboldened him to connect the *physics of the Earth*, with the hitherto unexplored *mysteries of the Heavens*.”‡

(242.) It is necessary, however, to distinguish between an *analogical indication*, such as gives rise to mere conjecture, and an *analogical inference*, which grasps the truth and is associated with belief:—for “a suggestive analogy” may not be “a scientific generalization.”§ The distinction between the two corresponds to that which was expressed by Bacon when he spoke of the *anticipation of the mind* and the *interpretation of nature*. “We are wont, for the sake of distinction, to call that human reasoning which we apply to nature the *anticipation* of nature (as being rash and premature), and that which is properly deduced from things the *interpretation* of nature.”|| An indication may exist where there is as yet no ground for induction: the former may give birth to a conjecture or hypothesis, but the latter only can convert an hypothesis into scientific truth. Yet a suggestive

* Dr WHATELY, “Rhetoric,” p. 104.

† THOMSON, “Laws of Thought,” p. 309.

‡ DUGALD STEWART, “Elements of Philosophy,” II. 418.

§ Isaac Taylor, “The World of Mind,” pp. 127, 321.

|| Bacon, by Devey, p. 387; see also pp. 188, 382, 477.

analogy may be eminently useful even where it is not absolutely conclusive ; for although Bacon has said “*hypotheses non fingo*,” it may be doubted whether any real or useful discovery has ever been made which was not preceded by some anticipation of the mind,—some conjectural supposition,—some preconception, which was first suggested by analogy, and thereafter verified by experience.*

(243.) But while it is admitted that “a suggestive analogy” may not be “a scientific generalization,” it should not be forgotten that analogy furnishes more than a mere *indication* ; it may *itself* be a ground of inference and, as such, a means of discovery. It is not only a *guide*, it is also an *evidence*. In some cases it may give rise only to conjecture or hypothesis, and this may be more or less probable according to the nature and number of the circumstances that are included in the comparison : but in other cases it is, in the words of Hartley, “a guide in the search after truth, and an *evidence for it in some degree*.”† It were a defective and one-sided view of the subject, to regard analogy as a mere *indication*, without recognising it also as being *in itself* a ground of *inference* : for “Analogy is of weight, in various degrees, towards determining our judgment and our practice ;” and “this general way of arguing is evidently natural, just, and conclusive ; for there is no man can make a question but that the sun will rise to-morrow, and be seen, where it is seen at all, in the figure of a circle, and not in that of a square.”‡

SECT. IV.—ITS USE FOR ARGUMENT AND PROOF.

(244.) Besides being a suggestive principle, and a guide to discovery, the perception of Analogy involves a judgment by which the resemblance of two or more objects is affirmed ; and this judgment gives rise to inferences which are founded upon it, so as to become a principle of reasoning, and a method of proof.

(245.) That it is capable of affording some kind of evidence is practically admitted by all men, whatever difficulty they may find in giving a philosophical explanation of it : for this can scarcely be denied by any one who reflects at all on the facts of his own familiar experience. He must be conscious that his judgment is

* DÉGÉRANDO, “*Histoire Critique*,”
Tome II. p. 218 ; III. 249, 271.

† Hartley “*On Man*,” p. 185.

‡ Butler’s *Analogy*. Introduction.

influenced, and even determined, in innumerable instances, by certain *likelihoods* or *probabilities*, arising from a comparison of different things, which must be resolved ultimately into the *likeness* that is discernible between them. But different opinions have been entertained in regard to the kind of evidence which it is capable of yielding, and the purposes to which it admits of being applied. Some have held that it is applicable only to the neutralizing of objections, or the removal of adverse presumptions; others have maintained that, besides serving this preliminary purpose, it affords a surplus of evidence, more or less, in favour of the truth. Even after its *evidential* character has been acknowledged, some have thought that it can amount to nothing more than a mere presumption, or at most to a lower degree of probability; others, that it is capable of rising to moral certainty, and of becoming a valid and conclusive proof.

(246.) This diversity of opinion has probably arisen, in a great measure, from the habit of looking at the subject in its most general aspect, and considering rather what is common to all cases of analogy, than what may possibly belong to some and not to others,—the habit of slumping them all together, merely because they pass under the same name, without discriminating aright between the different *species* of arguments which, as being *generically* alike, may be included under the same common designation. Yet if we take any other class of proofs, excepting such as are strictly demonstrative,—if we take the proofs, for example, arising from experience or from testimony,—do we not find, in each of them, the same varieties, the same degrees of comparative strength and weakness, which belong also to the proofs from analogy? And if it is universally admitted, notwithstanding, that in certain cases, and under well-known conditions, the evidence arising from experience and testimony amounts to a positive and conclusive proof, why may not the evidence which is supplied by analogy, or dependent upon it, be susceptible of similar degrees, rising from the lowest presumption up to the highest and most assured certainty?

(247.) Many able writers, overlooking, as it would seem, or at least failing to give due weight to, the difference between one analogical argument and another, have greatly underrated the validity and the value of this method of reasoning. Thus Dr Campbell speaks as if it were applicable only to the neutralizing

of objections: "Analogical evidence is generally more successful in silencing objections than in evincing truth. Though it rarely refutes, it frequently repels refutation ; like those weapons which, though they cannot kill the enemy, will ward his blows. . . . It must be allowed that analogical evidence is at best but a feeble support, and is hardly ever honoured with the name of a proof." And yet, with apparent inconsistency, he adds that, "The evidence of analogy is but a more indirect *experience*," and that, "where the analogies are numerous, and the subject admits not of evidence of another kind, it doth not want its *efficacy*."* He adds that "it belongs to the head of experience, and in some cases may have a certain degree of efficacy, but must not be dignified with the name of proof."

(248.) This doctrine rests on a somewhat arbitrary distinction between experience and analogy, which has the effect of circumscribing the latter within a very narrow compass, and excluding from its range a multitude of cases which properly belong to it. It is sufficiently illustrated by the examples which he has himself supplied. According to him the circulation of the blood is "experimentally discovered," it is a fact attested by direct experience; and so it is, for the "anticipation" suggested, as we have seen, by the analogy of final causes in other departments, has been verified by actual observation. But it has not been actually observed in every human body; yet he says "Nobody will doubt of this being a sufficient proof *from experience* that the blood circulates in every human body."—Now, on what principle is it extended beyond the cases which have been actually observed, if it be not on the ground of analogy between one human body and another? But it may be still further extended, and that too on the same ground; for he adds, "When we consider the great *similarity* which other animal bodies bear to the human body . . . it will appear sufficient experimental evidence of the circulation of the blood in brutes, especially in quadrupeds." This is held to be a weaker, but still a conclusive species, of direct "experimental evidence," although it rests, in the first instance, entirely on analogy, and even when it is verified by actual observation in particular cases, is subsequently extended also by means of analogy to all cases of the same, or of a similar, kind. "But," he

* Dr Campbell, "Philosophy of Rhetoric," I. 114, 120.

adds, "should I from the same experiment infer the circulation of the sap in vegetables, this would be called an argument *only from analogy*," "and would be weaker in proportion to the remoteness of the resemblance subsisting between that on which the argument is founded, and that concerning which we form the conclusion." The difference between the two cases is admitted; but that difference between the cases does not affect the principle of analogy which is applicable to both, nor does it warrant the arbitrary distinction by which all cases of perfect or very close resemblance are ranked under the head of *experience*, and all cases of less perfect or more remote resemblance are ranked under the head of *analogy*; for analogy comprehends all resemblances of whatever kind, and our reasoning is analogical when the inference depends on the similarity of two cases, so as to have no validity without it. In the case of the circulation of the sap in vegetables, it might be indicated, in the first instance, so as to become a matter of conjecture and anticipation, by the resemblance, in certain respects, between the structure of animal bodies and that of vegetable organisms: it was then a mere *suggestive analogy*, but one that was fitted to stimulate inquiry, to point out the path to discovery, and to impart a certain degree of verisimilitude to the hypothesis suggested by it; and when it came to be verified by actual observation in a few particular cases, it was forthwith extended to all cases of the same kind, but only on the ground, and by the aid, of analogy.

(249.) Similar remarks may be applied to the account which a distinguished writer has recently given of Analogy. "The cases," he says, "must not be of the same kind, but only of a *similar* one, otherwise the argument is a mere case of Example. Neither must the usual tests have been applied to prove that the known particulars invariably accompany the unknown, otherwise, as Mr Mill observes, we trench upon the ground of Induction."* What is this but to say that we must exclude from the head of Analogy all those cases in which the analogy is most exact and perfect, and in which it has been verified by actual observation? Might it not be well, rather, to consider whether there could be any inference from Example, or any reasoning by Induction itself, without the aid of Analogy, and whether our logical di-

* Archbishop Thomson, "Laws of Thought," p. 365.

visions and definitions can be correct when they degrade analogy below the level of other experimental proofs. Surely if Analogy does not, in all cases, amount to rigorous Induction, there can, at least, be no Induction without it: and whatever distinction may exist, in other respects, between Experience and Analogy, that which seeks to limit the former term to the mere facts of observation, must be purely arbitrary, since it excludes from this category those facts of consciousness,—those immediate perceptions of relation, resemblance, and diversity,—which are as well entitled to be ranked under the head of Experience as any other facts whatever. The great inconvenience of a nomenclature founded on such capricious distinctions will be practically felt in any attempt we might make to arrange the materials of our knowledge in accordance with them. For in reasoning from one example to all other cases of the same class, or drawing a general inference by induction from particular instances, is it not still true that, “if we had not the power of perceiving in the appearances around us, likeness and unlikeness, we could not consider objects as *distributed into classes at all*”?*

(250.) The author of one of the most recent works on Mental Philosophy speaks of Analogy as if it could in no case yield more than a probable conjecture, or serve any other purpose in argument than that of repelling objections. “It properly denotes any sort of resemblance, whether of relation or otherwise; and the argument from analogy is an argument from resemblance—an argument of an inductive nature, but not amounting to complete induction. . . . The chief value of analogy, as regards science, is as a guide to conjecture and experiment; and even a faint degree of analogical evidence may be of great service in this way, by directing further inquiries into that channel, and so conducting to eventual probability, or even certainty. . . . It must be confessed, however, that it is a species of reasoning likely to mislead in many cases. Its chief value lies, not in proving a position, but in rebutting objections; it is good, not for assault, but for defence. As thus used, it is a powerful weapon in the hands of a skilful master.”† Similar remarks occur in the writings of Dr Chalmers and Mr Albert Barnes, but as these are made with special reference to the

* Dr Whéwell, “Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences,” I. 452.

† Professor Haven of Amherst, “Mental Philosophy,” 196, 199.

effect of Analogy as an argument applied to Revealed truth, they are reserved for separate consideration. In the meantime, looking to the more general aspect of the question as embracing all our analogical reasonings on topics belonging to the sphere of our natural knowledge, Dr Fitzgerald was fully justified in saying that "In the common use of modern metaphysical writers, Analogy is used to express such arguments from resemblance as *fall short of full proof*, and, as such, is contradistinguished from *strict induction*."*

(251.) But there are weighty authorities on the other side. Mr Mill seems to have at once a more correct conception of the nature, and a more adequate sense of the value, of Analogy as a means of proof, than any of the writers to whom we have referred. "The word Analogy," he says, "as the name of a mode of reasoning, is generally taken for some kind of argument supposed to be of an *inductive nature*, but not amounting to a *complete induction*. It sometimes stands for arguments which may be examples of the *most rigid induction*. . . . If it be argued that a nation is most beneficially governed by an assembly elected by the people, from the admitted fact that other associations for a common purpose, such as joint-stock companies, are best managed by a committee chosen by the parties interested, this is an argument from analogy. Now, in an argument of this nature, there is no inherent inferiority of conclusiveness. Like other arguments from resemblance, it may amount to nothing, or it may be a perfect and conclusive induction. The circumstance in which the two cases resemble each other, may be capable of being shown to be the material circumstance;—to be that on which all the consequences, necessary to be taken into account in the particular discussion, depend. In the case in question, the resemblance is one of relation,—the *fundamentum relationis* being the management, by a few persons, of affairs in which a much greater number are interested along with them. Now, some may contend that this circumstance which is common to the two cases, and the various consequences which flow from it, have the chief share in determining all those effects which make up what we term good or bad administration. If they can establish this, their argument has the force of a rigid induction; if they cannot, they are said to have failed in *proving*

* Bishop Fitzgerald's Edition of "The Analogy," with Notes, p. ii.

the analogy between the two cases,—a mode of speech which implies that *when the analogy can be proved*, the argument founded upon it, *cannot be resisted*.”*

(252.) In like manner Mr Stewart,—speaking of the resemblance of individual objects which gives rise to a knowledge of *species*, and those more distant and refined similitudes which lead us to comprehend different species under one common *genus*,—says “In both instances, the logical process of thought is nearly, if not exactly, the same : but the common use of language has established a *verbal distinction* between them ; our most correct writers being accustomed to refer the evidence of our conclusions, in the one case, to Experience, and in the other, to Analogy.” But he adds, “The truth is that the difference between these two denominations of evidence, when they are accurately analysed, appears manifestly to be a difference, not in *kind*, but merely in *degree*. . . From this view of the subject, it appears how vague and undefined the metaphysical limits are which separate the evidence of Analogy from that of Experience ; and how much room is left for the operation of good sense and of habits of scientific research, in appreciating the justness of that authority which, in particular instances, the popular forms of speech may assign to either.”†

(253.) It is to be regretted that philosophical writers have not more generally adopted that view of Analogy which is so clearly stated by Mr Mill and Mr Stewart. They should have set themselves to the task of distinguishing between those cases in which it may afford a valid inductive proof, and those other cases in which it yields little or no positive evidence in favour even of a probable opinion. Instead of undertaking to state the necessary conditions of proof, or to construct a safe criterion, by which the argumentative value of every case of analogical reasoning might be tested and determined, they have contented themselves, for the most part, with drawing a line of demarcation between Induction and Analogy, and attempting, again, to distinguish each of these from the facts of mere Experience. But it can serve no good purpose to oppose Analogy to Induction, since the one is necessarily involved in the other, or to contrast either of them with Experience, since Experience includes the perception of analogy, not

* J. S. Mill, “Logic,” II. 96.

† Dugald Stewart, “Elements,” II. 404, 410.

less than the facts of observation. It were more philosophical to distinguish between different species of analogy, all possessing the same *generic* character as being founded on some perceived resemblance, but differing from each other in respect to the circumstances on which they severally depend, and consequently, also, in respect to the uses to which they may be fitly applied. Were this course consistently pursued, we should have no difficulty in discovering that, under certain conditions, similar to those which are applicable to the Inductive process itself, analogical reasoning may be strictly and rigorously conclusive; while, in other cases, where some of these conditions are wanting, it may only be equivalent to an incomplete or unverified induction, and yield no more than a probable opinion, or even a plausible conjecture. For "the weight of the evidence by Analogy admits of great variety, according to the particular nature of the subject to which it is applied; and, in every particular class of subjects, that weight must be determined by experience. For experience will teach us, with what degree of safety, conclusions have been drawn in each class, and therefore, with what degree of probability, they may be drawn in future."*

(254.) Every one is entitled of course to define the sense in which he uses the term "Analogy;" and if philosophers were generally agreed in employing it as a technical expression to denote a medium of probable reasoning which must always fall short of inductive certainty, little harm might arise, except such as has already arisen from the difference between the popular and the philosophical acceptation of *probability* itself, which has been a fertile source of mutual misunderstanding, and of much confusion of thought. But the current use of the term in this restricted sense, must not be allowed to pass unchallenged, if it be understood to imply that there are no cases of resemblance which may afford ground for a legitimate inductive inference; otherwise it may leave a false impression on many minds in regard to the validity and conclusiveness of certain arguments which have been employed in support of some of the most important parts of human knowledge. And it is the more necessary to examine this point with some care, because Analogy includes many distinct degrees of evidence: and from its being in many, perhaps in

* Gambier, "The Study of Moral Evidence," p. 68.

most, cases, productive only of probability, more or less strong, is often rashly supposed to be, in *no* case, capable of affording a conclusive proof, or of amounting to a moral certainty. It is as if one should say that, because testimony admits of every degree of weakness or strength, it could *never* be regarded as a valid and sufficient evidence.

(255.) Perhaps the most effective antidote to this error may be found in a careful and discriminating enumeration of the several distinct cases to which analogical reasoning has been applied, and a candid estimate of the precise effect which, in each instance of its application, it has been found adequate to produce. Such a survey of the entire domain of analogical reasoning would lead to the discovery of many cases in which it can only be fitly applied to the neutralizing of objections,—of many more in which it leads to a mere presumption, or more or less probable opinion ; but of not a few, also, in which it challenges belief, and amounts to a valid and conclusive proof. It might further enable us to determine in what cases, and under what conditions, analogical reasoning may pass into a process of real induction, and by what degrees probability may rise into moral certainty.

SECT. V.—DIFFERENT USES OF ANALOGICAL REASONING.

(256.) We begin with its lower, and will gradually rise to its higher Uses.

(257.) 1. Where it affords little or no positive proof, it is often sufficient to *neutralize objections* and to remove *adverse presumptions*. This is not, as we shall see, the only effect of it, nor could it have even this effect did it not rest on a ground that is capable of sustaining a higher inference ; but had it no other than a negative influence, and no other value than that of a defensive weapon, it would still possess great practical importance. For one of the most formidable obstacles to the progress of truth consists in certain mental prepossessions or prejudicate opinions, which are often so strong as to prevent inquiry, or to impart an unfavourable bias to the judgment, before the subject is considered on its merits.* If these prejudices can be overcome, and that

* "Prejudices against the Gospel," by Rev. Mr M'Laurin and Dr Inglis. Edited by the Author.

bias neutralized, the mind is placed in a condition in which it may judge of the evidence impartially, and receive its legitimate and proper impression.

(258.) This may often be effected by means of analogous cases, selected from the phenomena of nature and the facts of common experience. Should any one object, for example, to the doctrine of future punishment, on the ground of its supposed inconsistency with the goodness of God, the analogy of what we actually witness in the present life, in which penal evil is seen to be connected with sin under the Divine government, is sufficient to neutralize the objection, since it shows that punishment is not necessarily inconsistent with that attribute of the Divine nature. It is sufficient for this *at least*,—it is a full answer to the objection, in so far as it rests on that specific ground. Whether it may not also afford a surplus of evidence, amounting to a presumption in favour of the doctrine of future punishment, and awaken a well-founded anticipation of “a judgment to come,” is a further question, which is naturally suggested by the serious contemplation of our actual experience, and which becomes only the more solemn and urgent in proportion as our views of the Divine government become more profound and enlarged.

(259.) In like manner, should any one object to Miracles, on the ground that they imply an unlikely and incredible departure from the usual course of nature on the part of One whose works are perfect and whose will is unchangeable, the fact of Creation at the commencement of the present order of things, which is admitted by every Theist, and which must have been in its essential nature a stupendous miracle, may be appealed to as analogous, in certain respects, to the fresh interpositions of Divine power which are said to have ushered in a new economy or dispensation—in fact, a new creation,—in the moral world: and this would be sufficient, at the very least, to neutralize the objection, since, on the supposition of God’s existence, miracles are not impossible, and from the fact of Creation, we know that a miracle, the most stupendous that can be conceived, has been already wrought—a miracle whose standing monument in the works of Nature is ever before us, inscribed with legible characters of Omniscient wisdom and Almighty power.

(260.) And so, should the idea of a Divine Revelation be objected to, as if it were unreasonable to believe that the great God

would become the instructor of His creatures, the analogy of the *natural revelation* by which God imparts the knowledge of mere secular truth, and, at the same time, makes Himself known as the Revealer, is sufficient, not only to refute, but to rebuke such an objection, which could only spring from entire forgetfulness of the fact, that God, and God only, is the author and source of all the truth and knowledge which exist anywhere throughout the universe.

(261.) In these and similar instances, we see examples of what may be called the *negative power* of Analogy,—its power to repel objections, or to neutralize groundless presumptions, against the truth. But it may well occur to us to inquire,—Whence arises its power—even in this particular respect, and to this limited extent,—unless it be from such a resemblance between the cases compared as may possibly be found to afford also some measure of *positive* evidence? This is a question which has been seldom entertained or considered by those who have sought to limit its logical value by confining it to the purely negative effect of neutralizing objections; yet it is one which has a strong claim on their attention, since they can scarcely explain the reason of the negative influence which they ascribe to it, without tracing it to some *principle* that is common to the two cases; and that may be sufficient not only to neutralize an objection, but to yield also a surplus, less or more, of positive evidence in favour of certain inferences from the one to the other.—But reserving the full answer to this question, it is sufficient for our present purpose to say, that it is universally admitted to possess, at least, the power of neutralizing objections, and that, to this extent, it is alike legitimate and useful, in connection with many of the most important subjects of thought.

(262.) 2. The analogy which is perceived to exist between different cases exerts another influence on the mind of every thoughtful inquirer, which may be distinguished, in some respects, from its power to neutralize objections, and must be held to be additional to it:—it has the power of imparting an aspect of *verisimilitude* to truths which might otherwise seem strange, and even incredible. This use of it, although seldom distinctly marked, is nevertheless, *practically*, one of the highest importance and value. For when new truths, which are now for the first time presented to the mind, and which, as such, may seem strange and wonder-

ful, are seen to be analogous to older and more familiar truths with which it has been long acquainted, the resemblance serves to diminish, if it cannot altogether destroy, the sense of strangeness, and thus removes an obstacle to belief. The self-same principles which are involved in our previous knowledge, are recognised when they reappear, but only in a higher form, or on a grander scale, in the new truths which are now presented for our acceptance. They were exemplified in the one, they are equally exemplified in the other. Let the sameness or the similarity of these principles in both cases be clearly discerned, and the old truth will be recognised in the new lesson, and we are so far prepared to receive the one by our previous belief in the other. When the new lesson was first presented, it may have seemed *strange*,—so strange as to be all but incredible; when we begin, however, to compare it with some other truths previously known, we perceive a resemblance or correspondence between them, in one or more respects; we recognise a familiar principle in a new form of its manifestation; and thus, by the aid of analogy, it is seen to possess an aspect of verisimilitude sufficient, at least, to induce further inquiry, and is ultimately admitted, on the ground of its appropriate evidence, to a place among our most assured and cherished convictions. Thus, when the truths of Revelation appear as if they were remote and shadowy, or even strange and improbable, as they often do on account of their supernatural and transcendent character, there is no surer remedy for the painful scepticism which this aspect of them is apt to produce, than the serious and habitual consideration of those *natural analogies*, which may be discovered in the facts of our own experience, or in the other branches of our ascertained knowledge, and which serve at once to illustrate and to accredit the objects of faith by means of a common principle which is seen to be equally involved in both.

(263.) The state of mind to which this remedy is adapted, is well delineated in the history of the interesting, but mournful, experience of Blanco White. Speaking of his first impressions on reading Paley's *Evidences of Christianity*, he says, "His arguments appeared to me very strong; but I found an intrinsic incredibility in the facts of revealed history, which no general evidence seemed able to remove. I was, indeed, labouring under what I believe to be a very common error in this matter. . . . I expected that general evidence would remove the natural *inveri-*

similitude of miraculous events . . . that the imagination would not shrink from forms of things so *dissimilar* to its own representations of real objects. . . . Now the fact is that *probable* and *likely*, though used as synonymous in common language, are perfectly distinct in philosophy. The *probable* is that for the reality of which we can allege some reason ; the *likely*, that which bears on its face a semblance or analogy to what is classed in our minds under the predicament of existence. . . . *Likely* is the adjective of the phrase *like the truth*, ‘*simile vero.*’ *Likelihood*, in the case (of an early sceptic) becomes the strongest ground of unbelief : and *probability*, though it may convince the understanding, has but little influence over the imagination.”*

(264.) Whatever ground there may be for the distinction drawn by Blanco White between the *probable* and the *likely*, there can be no doubt that *verisimilitude*, when it is discerned in the light of familiar analogies, contributes largely to the practical impression which probable evidence makes on the mind, and may be justly said, if not to swell the amount, yet to enhance the persuasive power, of the proof. It has accordingly had a distinct place assigned to it in treatises on moral evidence and rhetoric ; and much of the skill both of the reasoner and the orator is directed to the object of imparting an appearance of likelihood, by means of well-known analogies, to propositions which might otherwise seem strange, and even incredible.

(265.) The first impression produced by new and strange doctrines is well portrayed by Joanna Bailey :—

“ I am as one who, in a misty dream,
Listens to things wild and fantastical,
Which no congruity or kindred bear
To preconceived impressions.”†

And another true poet has recognised the use of natural analogies as a means, both of enabling us to apprehend, and also of predisposing us to believe, the truths which are thus found to have their types in our familiar experience. “ The analogous facts which we know to be true, not only facilitate the apprehension of the facts revealed in Scripture, . . . but being, confessedly, not less incomprehensible, the certain knowledge of the one disposes us to the

* J. Blanco White, “ Internal Evidence against Catholicism,” p. 16. See also De Quincey, Works, I. 1743.

† MISS BAILEY, “ Plays on the Passions,” p. 169.

belief of the other. It removes at least all objections to the truth of the doctrine derived from the mysteriousness of the subject." *

(266.) 3. Analogy yields, in many cases, a *presumption or a probability* in favour of certain conclusions, such as admits of every variety of degree, and is often practically sufficient for the daily purposes of life. Did we act only on conclusions established by demonstrative evidence, or ascertained by strict inductive proof, we should be utterly unfit for the business of our ordinary avocations, as well as for the discharge of our most urgent duties. We are so situated that we must often form our judgments, and act according to them, on the ground of mere probability, and even on a balance of apparently conflicting evidence. We have no absolute assurance, arising either from inductive or demonstrative proof, in regard to many points, on which we are compelled, notwithstanding, not only to decide but to act,—to make up our minds as to the course which we should follow, and to adopt measures at the peril, it may be, of fortune and life. In such cases, we feel it to be our duty not to “halt between two opinions,” or to sist procedure until we can reach absolute certainty, but to regulate our conduct according to the highest apparent probability, and to incline to the course which seems to have a preponderance of considerations in its favour. It is only where there is no presumption, however slight, or no surplus probability, more or less, on either side, that we can be justified in suspending our judgment and desisting from action; and even in such a case, we are often compelled to decide and act, as it were, on a venture. We feel that we are responsible for whatever degree of light, be it less or more, we may enjoy or may have it in our power to acquire; and, in the common affairs of life, we act accordingly. The farmer, the merchant, the lawyer, the physician, the statesman,—each in his own department, proceeds every day on more or less probable evidence, and would regard any man as ludicrously eccentric, or hopelessly insane, who should either cavil at such a rule of conduct, or refuse in such circumstances to act at all. It is the clear perception, and the practical application, of this simple truth, that con-

* COLERIDGE, “Aids to Reflection,” p. 159. DÉGÉRANDO, “Histoire Critique,” II. 501, 504. “Qu'est-ce, en effet, pour nous qu'*expliquer* une chose? C'est le plus souvent *la lier à une image* qui nous soit naturelle et familière, et

qui permette ainsi à la pensée de la saisir *sans étonnement et sans repugnance*. . . . Les idées les plus étonnantes cessent de l'être, dès qu'on trouve un *intermédiaire* entre elles et nos perceptions accoutumées.”

stitutes one of the chief charms of Butler's "Analogy;" for his leading aphorism is thus stated—"TO US, PROBABILITY IS THE VERY GUIDE OF LIFE."

(267.) In estimating probabilities, we are guided mainly by the perception of Analogy. In some cases, the probability is slight,—so slight as to be scarcely appreciable,—because, either, there are few cases to which the new one can be compared, or they resemble it only in accidental and non-essential circumstances, while there are radical and important differences between them, such as may be held to weaken, if not to destroy, the analogy. In other cases, the probability is strong,—so strong as to warrant a confident expectation, or even a positive belief, because the cases compared agree in their most important and characteristic features, and are seen to resemble each other in several distinct respects. It may range, indeed, from the lowest presumption up to the highest degree of mere probable evidence, which is scarcely distinguishable from the moral certainty belonging to strict inductive proof.

(268.) There is a positive evidence, therefore, as well as a defensive power, in Analogy. In addition to the service which it renders in the way of neutralizing objections, and removing apparent strangeness, by imparting an aspect of verisimilitude to new truths, it is capable of yielding a certain amount of proof, sufficient, in many cases, to determine our judgment, and to direct our conduct. To this extent, its influence is generally acknowledged to be alike real and legitimate, although it is often unduly underrated. Mr Stewart, speaking of the restriction imposed by Dr Reid and Dr Campbell on the province and use of analogical reasoning, as if it extended only, or chiefly, to the refutation of objections, says, "I may be permitted to express my doubts, whether both of these ingenious writers have not somewhat underrated the importance of Analogy as a medium of proof, and as a source of new information. I acknowledge, at the same time, that between the positive and the negative applications of this species of evidence, there is an essential difference. When employed to refute an objection, it may often furnish an argument irresistibly and unanswerably convincing; when employed as a medium of proof, it can never authorize more than a plausible conjecture, inviting and encouraging further examination. In some instances, however, the probability resulting from a concurrence of different analogies

may rise so high, as to produce an effect on the belief scarcely distinguishable from moral certainty."* Analogy is here admitted to contain in it an element of positive evidence, for this is implied in its being the ground even of a *probable* conjecture :—what relation it bears to other proofs, by which that probable conjecture may be verified, so as to become a strictly inductive conclusion ;—and what *multiple* evidence may be afforded by "a concurrence of different analogies," are important questions which will demand our attention at a subsequent stage.

(269.) Sir William Hamilton has shown that an argument from analogy is certain in proportion, first, to the number of congruent observations ; secondly, to the number of congruent characters observed ; thirdly, to the importance of these characters and their essentiality to the objects ; and fourthly, to the certainty that the characters really belong to the objects, and that a partial correspondence exists. And speaking of Analogy and Induction as both falling under the head of Probable reasoning, as contradistinguished from Demonstrative, he concludes, that "*like Induction, Analogy can only pretend at best to a high degree of probability ; it may have a high degree of certainty, but it never reaches to necessity.*" "Induction and Analogy guarantee no perfect (*i.e.*, demonstrative) certainty, but only a high degree of probability (*i.e.*, moral certainty), while *all* probability rests at best upon Induction and Analogy, and nothing else."†

(270.) Dr Hampden, quoting the words of Mr Stewart, but speaking not so much of the general force of analogical evidence, as of its special application to Christian truth, observes that, "If it were only for its use in correcting our hasty anticipations concerning the truths of religion, by simply leading us into the right track of inquiry, it would deserve to be enrolled among the *strongest* confirmations of the direct proofs. But it has been already shown that it does much more than this ;—inasmuch as it is, in each single instance, in which an analogy is discernible between a doctrine of Scripture and a fact of Nature, a direct presumptive evidence of the Scriptural truth, and, in its cumulative application, is a very powerful argument to the Divine origin of the whole revelation."‡

* Dug. Stewart's "Elements," II. 425.

† Lectures on Logic, vol. IV. pp. 172, 174.

‡ Dr Hampden, "Essay on the Philosophical Evidence," p. 176.

(271.) Analogy, whether it is regarded as imparting an aspect of verisimilitude to a new doctrine which is seen to resemble one previously and more familiarly known, or as a source, also, of a certain amount of apparent probability in its favour, may be said to constitute the chief element of what has been fitly called *Congruity*. Bacon, when he enumerates different methods of proof, mentions that “by *congruity* ;” and Mr Devey explains it as equivalent to “analogical demonstration, or proof *a latere*, which consists in showing that the disputed attribute may be affirmed of several subjects analogical to the one proposed, and thence proceeds to draw the inference that such attribute enters also into the subject in question.”* It is placed in a somewhat different light, but represented as an important source of evidence, and means of conviction, by a more recent writer, when he says, “The very firmest of our convictions come to us” . . . “not in the way of a sequence of evidences, following each other as links in a chain ; but in the way of the *congruity* of evidences, meeting and collapsing in the conclusion. This is not what is called ‘cumulative proof,’ nor is it proof derived from the coincidence of facts. Those impressions which command the reason and the feelings in the most imperative manner, and which we find it impossible to resist, are the result of the meeting of *congruous elements* ; they are the product of causes which, though independent, are felt so to fit the one the other, that each, as soon as seen in combination, authenticates the other.” . . . “Those of our convictions upon which we are accustomed to act with the most unhesitating confidence, and to which we commend ourselves without fear, when life itself, or estate, is at risk, are not, or seldom are, those which we may obtain by processes of catenary deduction, or by a course of reasoning which, in a technical sense, is logical. . . . It is by the force of *congruous evidence*,—it is by the help of wind and tide together, that we launch upon the dangerous Atlantic of life, and cross it in confidence, and reach port in safety.” †

(272.) The distinction between such truths as are obtained “by processes of catenary deduction” or “proofs *in line*,” and those other truths which are acquired by means of “moral congruities,” intuitively perceived, or immediately discerned, on a simple comparison of one thing with another, where there is no

* Bacon's Lectures, by Devey, p. 210.

† Isaac Taylor, “Restoration of Belief,” pp. 102, 221.

lengthened process of reasoning at all, is most important, and will be found to throw much light on that portion of our knowledge which depends on the instant recognition of adaptations and analogies. But as yet we are only speaking of probable conclusions founded on these, not of strictly inductive inferences.

(273.) 4. Analogy affords in some cases a valid ground of inference, and produces the highest certainty of which the human mind is capable, except in the case of demonstrative or necessary truth.

(274.) Much as has been said of the supposed weakness of analogical proofs, we cannot see how the truth of this general statement can be denied without calling in question some of the most familiar facts of our mental experience. Apart from philosophy altogether, and looking merely to the actual beliefs of men in common life, may it not be affirmed with truth that many of our most assured convictions depend on the perception of Analogy? What can be more absolute and unwavering than our belief in the existence of our fellow-men possessing minds similar to our own? and yet what account can be given of the ground of this belief, which does not ascribe it to the manifestations, on their part, of life, intelligence, feeling, and activity similar to our own, which we are enabled to recognise and interpret only by the analogy of our own consciousness? What more undoubting than our anticipation of the orderly return of the seasons, of the regular alternation of day and night, of the stated flowing and ebbing of the tides, or of the periodic falling of dew and rain and snow? and yet what account can be given of the ground of this anticipation which does not ascribe it to the analogy of our past experience? If it be said, that the ground of such inferences is not the perception of analogy, but either the facts of experience, or some innate principle of reason, or both combined, we answer that the facts of experience, and the inherent laws of thought, are equally necessary to the result; but that neither the one nor the other, nor both combined, could be of any avail without the perception of Analogy, which, if it must not be regarded as the sole ground, may at least be described as the indispensable condition, of every inductive inference.

(275.) If we look at the subject, not in a popular, but in a purely scientific, point of view, it will be seen that *every* process of reasoning depends, to a large extent, on the perception of Ana-

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logy, and that, in many cases, it is itself a ground of inference and a source of proof.—When we use the term Reason in a comprehensive sense, it includes both *judgment* and *reasoning*. Judgment is an act, reasoning a process : the one immediate and intuitive, the other mediate and inferential. As all reasoning depends on the faculty of Comparison and the perception of relations of some kind, and as the relation of resemblance is one of the most prominent of these, it follows that Analogy must hold an important place, and enter largely as a constituent element of thought, both into our primary or intuitive judgments, and also into those processes of reasoning which are subsequently founded upon them.—“ In opposition to the views hitherto promulgated in regard to Comparison, I will show,” says Sir William Hamilton, “ that this faculty is at work in every, the simplest, act of mind ; and that, from the primary affirmation of existence in an original act of consciousness to the judgment contained in the conclusion of an act of reasoning, every operation is only an evolution of the same elementary process,—that there is a difference in the complexity, none in the nature of the act ; in short, that the various products of Analysis and Synthesis, of Abstraction and Generalization, are all merely the results of Comparison, and that the operations of Conception or Simple Apprehension, of Judgment, and of Reasoning are only acts of Comparison, in various applications and degrees.” * Comparison, considered as the faculty of relations in general, takes note of many besides that of *resemblance*, which regulates our analogical judgments and reasonings. There may be valid conclusions, therefore, which are founded on other relations ; and room is thus left for a variety of distinct proofs, arising from different sources, and resting on independent grounds ; while, such is the pervading influence of Analogy, that even in these, it may co-operate with other considerations, and contribute its own peculiar evidence, so as to constitute, in combination with them, the strongest kind of moral proof which it is possible to conceive or to desire.

(276.) This general statement may be tested, while its correctness will be verified, by applying it to the processes both of Deductive and Inductive reasoning.

(277.) That in every process of deduction, we are guided, and

* Sir William Hamilton, “ Lectures on Metaphysics,” II. 279.

to some extent, aided by analogy, must be evident to all. The simple analysis of the method of proving any proposition in Mathematics is sufficient to show that it proceeds on a comparison of quantities, and depends on the perception of proportion and analogy. If this be not the logical ground of the inference, it is at least an indispensable element in the process by which it is reached.

(278.) All deductive reasoning is founded on Definitions whose truth is hypothetically assumed, combined with the axiom of non-contradiction or identity, which is self-evident and intuitively certain. It may be affirmed that analogy underlies those primary judgments on which that axiom and these definitions depend. Every definition is the expression of a general conception, and this is a generalization from experience. The notion of a circle or of a triangle, which defines and distinguishes them respectively from all other figures, necessarily presupposes an act of comparison, and a perception of the resemblance of some figures and their difference from others. The common property which belongs to all circles and to all triangles, becomes their definition, and as this definition involves *class-identity* or *sameness*, there is room for the application of the principle of *non-contradiction*. This principle again,—which amounts to nothing more than the self-evident truth, that the same thing cannot be truly affirmed and denied in regard to the same subject,—has reference both to the identity which belongs to each individual object and which is involved in the very conception of it, and also to the identity or sameness which belongs to a class of objects, and which consists in their resemblance or analogy. The perception of what may be called *class-identity*, which is the fundamental condition of all deductive reasoning, depends on a comparison of different objects, which terminates in a judgment affirming sometimes *sameness*, sometimes *similarity*, sometimes *equality*. “If it were asked,” says Butler, “wherein consists similitude or equality? the answer should be, that all attempts to define, would only perplex, it. Yet there is no difficulty at all in ascertaining the idea. . . . Upon two triangles being compared, there arises to the mind the idea of similitude; upon twice two and four, the idea of equality. And these comparisons not only give us the ideas of similitude and equality, but also show us that two triangles *are alike*, and that twice two and four *are equal*.”*

* Butler's Essay on Identity, appended to the “Analogy,” p. 492. Bp. Halifax's Edition.

(279.) While the Definitions which lie at the foundation of all deductive reasoning must be traced up to primary judgments founded on the perception of analogy, without which there could be no notion of *class-identity*, and no room, therefore, for the application of the principle of non-contradiction, it is necessary to add that, even after Definitions have been thus framed, we must have recourse, at every successive step in a process of reasoning, to fresh comparisons, with a view to the discovery of additional points of affinity and resemblance. And if both the primary judgments and the subsequent process of inference depend on the perception of resemblance, may we not conclude that it is mainly under the guidance, and on the ground, of Analogy, that we arrive at demonstrative certainty even on the domain of pure science ?

(280.) It is also under the guidance of Analogy that we arrive at moral certainty by the process of Induction. Whatever laws of reason, and whatever facts of experience, may be involved in that process, none of them could become a ground of inference without the aid of Analogy. We could have no materials for the construction of science, were we confined to the mere knowledge of particular objects, and had we no power to compare them with one another, to ascertain their mutual relations, and to discern their resemblance or analogy. Were it not that Analogy underlies and bears up the whole process of Induction, the conclusions at which we arrive would seem to be out of all proportion to the premisses from which they are drawn. Our mere experience is limited and partial, our conclusions are universal. They can only be vindicated on the ground that they rest on the broad ground of Analogy. A resemblance between different objects in some essential and characteristic property becomes to us a sign, and is interpreted as such,—a sign which, like an algebraic symbol, represents every individual case to which the same properties belong, or to which the same conditions apply. The only difficulty that is practically felt in applying this principle consists in determining what are the essential properties of things, and distinguishing them from such as are merely accidental or apparent ; but, this difficulty once surmounted, the mind rises to the highest inductive certainty, and has no hesitation in expecting the *like* consequents from the *like* antecedents in every case in which the essential conditions have been ascertained, and the analogy is clearly discerned.

(281.) Take any specimen of strict Inductive reasoning, and

analyse it into its constituent elements,—let it be, for example, the favourite instance of the investigation of the causes on which Dew depends, as detailed by Dr Wells, and commented on by Herschel and Mill; and mark how largely it depends, at each stage of the process, on the perception of Analogy.* “Suppose dew were the phenomenon proposed, whose cause we would know. In the first place, we must separate dew from rain and the moisture of fogs, and limit the application of the term to what is really meant,—the spontaneous appearance of moisture on substances exposed in the open air when no rain or visible wet is falling.” Already, in this initial step of the process,—the formation of a general conception, or the definition of a general term,—there is necessarily involved the perception both of *resemblance* and of *difference*. “Now, here we have *analogous phenomena*—in the moisture which bedews a cold metal or stone when we breathe upon it; that which appears on a glass of water fresh from the well in hot weather; that which appears on the inside of windows when sudden rain or hail chills the external air; that which runs down our walls when, after a long frost, a warm moist thaw comes on: all these instances *agree in one point*—the coldness of the object dewed, in comparison with the air in contact with it. But, in the case of the night dew, is this a real cause,—is it a fact that the object dewed *is* colder than the air? . . . The experiment has been made, the question has been asked, and the answer has been invariably in the affirmative. Whenever an object contracts dew it *is* colder than the air.” And so partly by what Mr Mill calls the Method of Agreement, partly by the Method of Difference, partly by the Method of Concomitant Variations, all implying an exercise of Comparison, and depending on the perception of resemblance and difference, we advance step by step until we reach the strictly Inductive Conclusion that the cause of dew is “the cooling of the dewed surface by radiation faster than its heat can be restored to it by communication with the ground or by counter-radiation; so as to become colder than the air, and thereby to cause a condensation of its moisture.” Sir John Herschel characterizes this “theory of Dew, first developed by the late Dr Wells, as one of the most beautiful specimens of

* Sir John Herschel, “Discourse on Natural Philosophy,” p. 159. J. S. Mill, “Logic,” I. 490.

inductive experimental inquiry ;” and no one can fail to see how largely the perception of Analogy enters into the whole process from first to last, both as a means of suggestion and discovery, and also as a ground of inference and method of proof.

(282.) If in some cases Analogy may amount to conclusive proof and lead to absolute certainty, while, in others, it affords only a favourable presumption and a greater or less degree of probable evidence,—the question arises, whether there are any criteria or tests, by the application of which we may discriminate between the certain and the probable proofs, or between the probable proofs and the more doubtful indications? In other departments of evidence, such criteria have been sought and found ; we have canons of testimony, and canons of prophecy, and canons of experimental evidence : is it not possible, also, to construct a Canon of Analogy? Possibly it may be so, although Butler declines to say “how far the extent, compass, and force of analogical reasoning can be reduced to general heads and rules, and the whole be formed into a system.” But if it be true that the faculty of Comparison and the perception of Analogy are concerned in *all* reasoning,—in the Syllogistic method, in the Inductive process, and in the merely Presumptive conjectures of reason,—is not the Canon of Analogy provided already, to a large extent, in the treatises which have been devoted to the illustration of the three grand branches of Science? The Methods of Inductive, Syllogistic, and Moral reasoning are not superseded,—they are only explained and confirmed, by connecting them with the principle of Analogy on which each of them may be said equally to depend ; and all that is really valuable in any of them may still be a useful guide, or a salutary check, after Analogy has been restored to the position which rightfully belongs to it. For this term denotes a *principle* rather than a *method*,—a principle which underlies each method, and pervades every process, of reasoning. It may be necessary to determine in what cases, and on what conditions, Analogy will lead to doubtful, probable, or certain conclusions,—by what circumstances the evidence which it affords is enhanced or impaired,—and how far it may be applied, in each particular instance, either to the mere negative use of neutralizing objections, or to the more positive purposes of proof. But all this is equally necessary in regard to the ordinary methods of reasoning ; and it is already provided for, to a large extent, in those laws of

logical inference which experience combined with reflection has enabled Aristotle, Bacon, Kant, Reid, Mill, Whewell, Whately, De Morgan, and others to elaborate, and bequeath for the guidance of future students in every department of inquiry.

(283.) Perhaps no canon can be framed, so complete, as to comprehend every variety of analogical reasoning, or so definite, as to serve, like a mechanical rule, to determine every question, without the patient exercise of reflective thought. But the *certainly* of an analogical conclusion may be safely affirmed, when it exhibits one or more of the following marks. First, if the properties or relations of different objects are found, when compared, to be the *same*, in certain respects, or so *similar*, as to be fitly ranked under one common *genus*.* Secondly, when the judgment which we form respecting them is founded on those points in which their resemblance consists, and confined to these, so as not to go beyond the limit to which the analogy is known to extend. Thirdly, when one instance affords only a slight presumption, and a few additional instances are found to yield a growing probability, the proof may rise to absolute certainty by their frequent or constant repetition; as in the case of the alternation of day and night, the ebbing and flowing of the tides,—the invariable recurrence of which is ascribed to a Law of Nature. Fourthly, when the anticipations suggested by Analogy are verified by subsequent experience: as in the case of Newton's discoveries, or by the appearance of a comet at the predicted time. Fifthly, when there is not only a repetition of the same instances, and a constant verification of former inferences, but also a *concurrence of different analogies*, or a *confluence of distinct probabilities*, springing from various sources, but converging towards the same result,—for, in such a case, we have, as it were, the testimony of several independent witnesses, and their concurrence imparts a *multiple* force to the evidence; it is felt to be far stronger than what could arise from the mere *summation* of the individual probabilities, considered singly and apart, as separate testimonies. When one or more of these marks can be discerned in any inference founded on Analogy, it may be safely regarded as possessing the character of moral certainty.

* The Right Honourable Joseph Napier, Ex-Lord Chancellor of Ireland, "Lectures on Butler's Analogy," —a recent and valuable contributor to the literature of this subject.

(284.) Some of the most interesting and important questions respecting the evidence of Analogy will be found to have been considered and, to a large extent, settled, in connection, especially, with the theory of Induction. The question, for instance, as to the effect of a number of *concurring instances* has been discussed in connection with that theory. There are cases in which a single instance could create only a slight presumption, while a few additional instances might convert the presumption into a probability, and a few more would produce a conviction of absolute certainty, —and referring to such cases Butler says, “Thus a man’s having observed the ebb and flow of the tide to-day, affords some sort of presumption, though the lowest imaginable, that it may happen again to-morrow. But the observation of this event for so many days, and months, and ages together, as it has been observed by mankind, gives us a *full assurance* that it will.” This is an Inductive inference, such as presupposes a perception of Analogy ; and the precise logical effect of a concurrence of instances is as necessary to be determined, therefore, in treating of the general theory of Induction, as it is in treating the more special doctrine of Analogy. In like manner, the rules for the *verification* of Inductions correspond with, and may be said even to embrace, the cases in which anticipations suggested by Analogy are subsequently confirmed by Experience, as when Newton’s conjecture in regard to the combustibility of the diamond was converted into certainty by actual experiment. In these, and many other, examples, the close connection between the perception of Analogy and the process of Induction is too evident to be overlooked ; and it will be found that the Canons which are applicable to the one, are available also for the other. And should it still be thought, that a certain feeling of insecurity must ever attach to analogical reasoning, arising from the difficulty of determining its precise argumentative value in the various cases to which it is applied, may it not be sufficient to say, that the same remark applies, with equal force, to every other kind of evidence excepting such as is either purely intuitive or strictly demonstrative ;—that it applies to all kinds of Moral Evidence, whether arising from experience, or from testimony, or from example, or even from induction itself ;—and that, in regard to these, it is never held to afford the slightest ground either for denying the legitimacy of the proof, or for doubting the truth of the conclusion in which it terminates ?

CHAPTER VII.

ANALOGY ; ITS RELATION TO OTHER PROOFS.

(285.) Much of the prejudice with which many have regarded the evidence of Analogy seems to have arisen from some misconception concerning the place which belongs to it in relation to other proofs, and the precise office or function which is assigned to it, when it is applied in argument. That prejudice may perhaps be dissipated if we consider, in the first instance, its invariable connection with other sources of evidence in our common natural knowledge ; and thereafter inquire how far, and in what way, it may be applied, along with the more peculiar proofs of Revealed Religion, to the establishment or confirmation of its claims.

SECT. I.—ITS RELATION TO OTHER PROOFS IN OUR COMMON NATURAL KNOWLEDGE.

(286.) Reasoning from Analogy, so far from being exclusive of other sources of evidence, or incompatible with the concurrent use of other principles of reason, implies the necessity of both, and can have no foundation at all apart from them. The perception of Analogy depends, in all cases, on a comparison of different objects of thought. It necessarily presupposes some knowledge of each of these objects ; and this knowledge may have been derived from different sources, and acquired by the exercise of different faculties. Hence arises its necessary and invariable connection with other kinds of evidence.

(287.) It may be useful here to distinguish between the simple judgments of Analogy, and the inferences which are subsequently deduced from them by analogical reasoning. When any two objects of thought are compared with each other, there is an in-

tuitive perception of some points of resemblance, and of some other points of difference : and the judgment which affirms the resemblance in the one case, or the difference in the other, is simply expressive of that immediate and irresistible perception. It belongs to our conscious experience, and is as well entitled to be ranked under that head as is the knowledge we have of either of the two objects, considered individually and apart ; for a relation may be as real in itself, and as clearly discerned, as any object whatever. In affirming their likeness or resemblance, we pronounce what may be called a *simple judgment of analogy*, which is really as direct and intuitive as any other act of mental perception, but which depends, nevertheless, on Comparison, and takes cognizance not merely of individual objects, although these are necessarily presupposed, but of a certain relation as subsisting between them. Now even here,—in this simple, primitive judgment of Analogy, which affirms nothing more than a *likeness*, in certain respects, between two objects of thought, we cannot fail to see that, from the very nature of the case, it presupposes some knowledge of each of the terms of the comparison ; and, consequently, that it implies the previous exercise of those cognitive faculties, and the actual use of those means of information, by which alone such knowledge can be acquired. So far, therefore, from being exclusive of other sources of evidence, we find that, in its most primitive form, as a simple judgment of Analogy, it not only admits of, but requires, the concurrent use of such direct perceptions as are necessary to qualify us for instituting a comparison between different objects of thought.

(288.) But the primary judgments which merely affirm the existence of a likeness or analogy between two things, must be distinguished from the inferences which are subsequently deduced by a process of analogical reasoning. When the likeness of different objects is clearly perceived, we not only judge that they *are* like, but from this fact we deduce certain other conclusions which are, in the first instance, suggested by it, and afterwards confirmed and verified, sometimes by the frequent repetition of the same experience, at other times by the concurring force of several distinct proofs. For the mere perception of Analogy, without the aid of experience, and apart from other laws of thought, could only suggest a likelihood or give birth to a plausible hypothesis—a more or less probable presumption or con-
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ture,—while in combination with these, the likelihood rises into certainty, and the presumption is converted into proof.

(289.) If it be said that since its conclusiveness as a proof depends mainly on the facts of experience, and the laws of thought which come into operation along with it, the result should be ascribed to these, and not to analogy, which would be comparatively powerless without their aid, it is enough to say in reply, that neither experience nor reason could suffice without the perception of analogy,—that they are, at the very least, as dependent on it, as it is dependent on them,—and that in a complex process of thought in which various principles come into concurrent operation, the conclusion may be described as depending pre-eminently on some one or other of its constituent elements, provided it be not referred to that element *alone*, considered as exclusive of other proofs which may also contribute to the result.—It would be wrong to say that the axiom which affirms the invariable connection between like causes and effects, and the inferences which flow from that axiom when it is applied to particular cases, are purely and exclusively *analogical*,—for we are indebted to experience for our conception of the relation between cause and effect in general, as well as for our knowledge of every particular example of it; and yet the perception of analogy is implied in the very terms in which the axiom is expressed, and, without it, there could be no room for reasoning either from causes to their effects, or from effects to their causes. If analogy be not, in such cases, the sole ground, it is, at least, the indispensable condition, of all inference. It not only admits of being combined with other proofs, but may be said to require their aid, while it adds its own peculiar contribution to enhance the general force of the evidence. It is neither exclusive of other sources of information, nor incompatible with the concurrent operation of other laws of thought: on the contrary, it presupposes the one, and demands the other, as necessary to supply materials for its extended and effective application. It is a constituent element in that complex process of thought by which our various faculties co-operate, without collision and in mutual concert, in conducting us to true and certain knowledge. All reasoning rests ultimately on some previous *data*, from whatever sources these data may have been derived,—it consists in the comparison of different things, and depends on the perception of Analogy between them, which presupposes some

knowledge of each of the related terms,—and it is valid, only in so far as that analogy is of such a kind as to warrant the inference, which must be strictly confined within the limits to which the analogy is known to extend.

(290.) Analogical reasoning, therefore, may possess various kinds and degrees of evidence, and will be more or less trustworthy in proportion to the nature and number of those points of agreement on which the conclusion depends. When these points of agreement are not superficial or casual, but fundamental and constant,—when they belong to the essential nature, or the characteristic properties, of the objects compared,—when they are not few and rare, but numerous and frequent, so as to suggest the idea of uniform order or established law,—then the analogical inference possesses all the certainty of an inductive proof, just because the facts on which it ultimately rests have been distinctly apprehended and clearly ascertained. In other cases, where the points of agreement are fewer, or less fundamental, or more variable and doubtful, analogy may warrant nothing more than a mere presumption, or more or less probable conjecture, until we have an opportunity of testing or verifying the inference by actual experience, or some other kind of evidence. But it should be carefully observed, that this difference between the degrees of the evidence which is attainable in different cases, arises in no measure from any defect or imperfection in the principle of Analogy itself,—for that principle is ever the same, and possesses equal power in all the cases to which it can be applied. The difference arises entirely from the presence in some cases, and the absence in others, of that preliminary knowledge which is indispensable to the application of analogy, and for which we are dependent on other sources of information. Were our knowledge more perfect, the power of Analogy as an organ or instrument of reasoning would be proportionally enhanced ; and that it can only yield, in some cases, a bare presumption, or, at most, a probable opinion, is to be ascribed rather to the want of ascertained *data*, than to any inherent weakness in this method of reasoning. In proportion as reliable *data* are multiplied, by means of more accurate and extensive observation, in the same proportion will the principle of Analogy evince its expansive power by conducting us to wider and higher generalizations, and converting many a suggestive analogy into a valid inductive proof.

(291.) In respect to the place which it holds, and the functions which belong to it, in relation to other proofs, Analogy, considered as an organ or method of reasoning, may be compared to Mathematics, which takes cognizance only of the abstract relations of magnitude and figure, but which admits of being applied, with conclusive effect, to every department of material nature,—as for example in the mixed Sciences, which depend partly on mathematical laws, and partly on the facts of Experience. For just as Geometry is an instrument which is applicable to all magnitudes whatever, and is ever ready to be applied as soon as sufficient *data* have been obtained, so Analogy is an organ which may be employed in every case of ascertained resemblance, and whose use is limited only by the want of sufficient *data*, not by the weakness of its own inherent power.*

(292.) The relation which subsists between Analogy and other proofs might be illustrated, were it necessary, by many examples derived both from our common and our scientific knowledge. Some of the most universal and undoubted convictions of the popular mind rest partly on the evidence of experience, and partly on that of analogy. Every man expects the regular alternation of day and night, the periodic ebbing and flowing of the tide, and the orderly succession of the seasons, and this not from experience alone,—for experience relates only to the past,—but from experience combined with analogy, and perhaps some other law of thought, which leads us to refer the observed effect to an established law, and to conclude that so long as the arrangements of material nature remain unchanged, the same phenomena will continue to be reproduced. Every one believes in the existence of his fellow-men, partly from experience, which makes him acquainted with certain manifestations of life, intelligence, and voluntary activity, but partly also from analogy, for these manifestations are interpreted with reference to similar properties belonging to himself.—In all our scientific knowledge there is a similar combination of evidence derived from experience with evidence arising from analogy, or from other natural laws of thought. It is only by means of analogy that the particular facts of experience are co-ordinated and reduced to general laws; and both must often be combined with other laws of thought in order to account fully for the result-

* Lamourette, "Pensées," etc., pp. 368, 369.

ing inference. Mr Stewart seems to have been more alive to the importance of this view of the relation subsisting between analogy and other proofs, than most of our recent writers. For while he insists on the necessity of distinguishing between experience and analogy, and of the latter being verified by the former in all cases of strictly inductive proof, yet the relation between the two, and their mutual dependence, as distinct but concurrent influences in producing belief, are strongly and repeatedly marked.*

SECT. II.—ITS RELATION TO OTHER PROOFS IN OUR RELIGIOUS KNOWLEDGE.

(293.) The relation which subsists between Analogy and other proofs in our natural knowledge, whether common or scientific, prepares us to expect that it will be exemplified also both in Natural and Revealed Religion.

(294.) In Natural Religion, Analogy is involved, first of all, in the fundamental conception of *design*, on which the whole argument ultimately rests,—for that conception is a generalization from experience, and generalization necessarily involves comparison and the perception of resemblance. Were this important consideration duly attended to, we should have no difficulty in dealing with the objection which has been urged against the Theistic argument, that when it speaks of *design* as manifested in the works of nature, it involves a *petitio principii*. The impugner of that argument is manifestly shut up to one or other of these two alternatives,—either to affirm that we have no means of recognising by unequivocal marks the effects of design, or of moral, as distinguished from physical, causation;—or to deny that any such effects of intelligent, voluntary agency can be discerned in the works of nature. Should he choose the first alternative, which has been recently adopted by some writers, we are thrown back on first principles, and must re-examine the fundamental conception of design—its origin, its ground, and its distinctive marks—with the view of ascertaining how far it may be warrantably inferred from natural phenomena. The writers in question admit the existence of order, adaptation, and adjustment in nature, but refuse to

* D. Stewart, "Elements," vol. II. 240, 413, 416, 429, 460.

acknowledge these as proofs of design or of a designing mind; and they can only be met by showing that the works of nature exhibit, not less than the productions of human art, the characteristic marks of moral causation, and, in that respect, belong to the same *genus*. Analogy is involved, therefore, in the fundamental conception of design on which the whole argument ultimately rests; and it becomes only more prominent at every stage in the subsequent process of comparison between the works of nature and the productions of human art.

(295.) While analogy is involved both in the primary conception and the subsequent process of comparison, it is manifest, from the very nature of the case, that, so far from excluding other proofs, it requires to be combined with them, and can, indeed, have no existence and no validity apart from them. It cannot be discerned otherwise than by comparing two or more objects, and these objects are made known by perception, or by consciousness, or by testimony. The facts of experience must be combined with the perception of analogy, and subjected to other natural laws of thought, before we can draw any valid inference from them. This fact has sometimes been overlooked both by the opponents, and the advocates, of Natural Theology. Hence the one-sided and contradictory descriptions which have been given of the Theistic argument. On the one side it has been described as if it were "a mere analogy, which may amount to presumption, but never to proof;"* on the other, we are told that it is "not an analogical argument," properly so called.† Were the one statement intended merely to intimate that the argument depends to a large extent on the perception of analogy, and the other, that the conclusion does not rest on analogy alone, but on other facts and laws of thought which impart to it a strictly inductive character, the two combined would amount to a satisfactory explanation of the character of the proof.

(296.) A similar relation subsists between Analogy and other proofs in the case of Revealed Religion. It is necessary here to distinguish between two questions which are radically different, and which cannot be safely confounded. The first is—Why do you believe the statements and lessons which are contained in the

* Holyoake, "Trial of Theism," p. 14. | † Thompson, "Christian Theism," vol. I. p. 303.

Scriptures? and the proper answer to this question is, Because the Scriptures are the word of God; while the grand analogy which is applicable to this part of the subject is that which is indicated by the Apostle, "If we receive the witness of men, the witness of God is greater; and this is the witness of God which He has testified concerning His Son."* The second is, Why do you believe that the Scriptures are the word of God? and the proper answer to this question is, Because their Divine origin and authority are established by many "infallible proofs;" and many different analogies may be applicable to this other part of the subject.

(297.) The direct evidences of Revelation,—whether external or internal—whether depending on human testimony or the Divine attestations by which that testimony was ratified and confirmed,—whether it be the evidence of Miracle, of Prophecy, or of Type, may not only be combined with analogy, but could scarcely be conclusive without its aid. In judging of the mere human testimonies which constitute an indispensable part of the proof, we are guided by the analogy of our experience in regard to the trustworthiness of human witnesses; while in judging even of the Divine attestations, we are guided by a real, though perhaps unconscious comparison which discerns *both the analogy between these and certain other manifestations of the Divine perfections, and the contrast between them and any mere human manifestations of wisdom and power.* The evidence of miracles presupposes that perception of analogy which lies at the foundation of our belief in the existence of general laws, and the regularity of the ordinary course of nature; and properly consists in the *contrast* between certain events of an exceptional character and the known effects of mere natural agents. That contrast is so striking that we are led to regard these events as supernatural or superhuman, since they manifestly transcend the powers both of man and nature, and can find their only fit analogue in the stupendous miracle of creation, or some similar manifestation of Divine power. The evidence of prophecy, like that of the typical system in which it was visibly embodied, depends on a correspondence between two things which have no necessary connection, but which are seen to resemble each other, and, in their very resemblance, to

* 1 John v. 9. Tatham's "Chart and Scale," vol. II. pp. 27, 36, 38.

exhibit a manifestation of that omniscient wisdom, and provident forethought, which have analogous exemplifications in nature, but which exhibit a striking contrast to the short-sighted sagacity of man. It thus appears that analogy is involved, either as a constituent element, or as an indispensable condition, in all the evidences of Revealed Religion.

(298.) Analogy, besides being perfectly compatible with, and really involved in, the direct proofs of Revelation, affords a distinct contribution of its own, such as is a clear addition, to the sum of the general evidence. A very special and strong prejudice has been felt by many against its application in *proof* of Revealed Religion. Dr Chalmers, speaking of Butler's great work, states his opinion in the following terms: "It were well to estimate the precise argumentative force of his peculiar reasoning. Its main office we hold, then, is to repel objections against Christianity, not to supply or establish any substantive evidence in its favour. . . . To repel objections, in fact, is the great service which this Analogy has rendered to the cause of Revelation, and it is the only service which we seek for at its hands. It appears to us that they overrate the power of Analogy, who look to it for any very distinct or positive contribution to the Christian argument. . . . And yet we hold it, notwithstanding, to be a most powerful and efficient auxiliary in this warfare, though its office is mainly, if not altogether, a defensive one; for, although it should supply no proof, it may confer a mighty benefit on our cause by repelling all disproof. . . . This is the distinct and definite, and withal most valuable, service to which Analogy, we think, is fully competent, and which service, we further think, Butler has overtaken and finished. He has raised our question from the depth and the discredit to which infidels would have sunk it—far *beneath zero*, in the scale of evidence. He has at least brought it *up to zero*; and this is doing an immense deal, even though Analogy should utterly fail to place it by ever so little above this; and all further elevations can only be looked for from other quarters of reasoning and contemplation."*

(299.) This view seems to have originated in a deep-seated,

* Dr Chalmers, "Prelections on Butler's Analogy," Posthumous Works, IX. 7. A similar view occurs in Dr Campbell's "Philosophy of Rhetoric," I. 145; in Mr Barnes's "Essay on Science and Theology," 234; and Professor Haven's "Mental Philosophy," 199.

and, on the whole, a salutary jealousy of the possible encroachment of reason on the peculiar domain of Revelation ; and to have commended itself to the great mind of Dr Chalmers by its tendency to simplify the theory of the Christian evidence, and to draw a strong line of demarcation between its external or historical proofs, and all philosophical speculations respecting the contents or internal truths of Scripture. His leading object was, not to depreciate the evidence of Analogy, but to vindicate the sufficiency of the direct historical proofs ; and his great anxiety to establish the truth of Revelation by means of its peculiar supernatural attestations made him unwilling, apparently, to recognise Analogy as a source of evidence in its favour. But before committing ourselves to the adoption of a view which circumscribes within such narrow limits the possible use of Analogy in matters of faith, may it not be expedient to reconsider the precise state of the question,—to disembarass it from any misconceptions that may have come to be mixed up with it,—and to ascertain in what cases, if in any, and under what conditions, Analogy may be applied as a positive proof in support of the claims of Revealed Religion ?

(300.) The state of the question would be entirely misunderstood, were it conceived to be, Whether by means of Analogy, or by any other means whatever, we could either discover or prove, by the mere exercise of reason, the peculiar truths of Revelation ? No believer will return an affirmative answer to that question. The truth revealed in Scripture is neither discovered nor proved by reason apart from its proper evidence ; and it ultimately rests, as it can only be received, on the authority of the Revealer. It comes to us as a Divine testimony, and can only be received by faith—not faith without a reason, but faith which finds its own—its best,—its highest, reason, in the word of Him who can neither err nor deceive. But the question is—Whether Analogy may not be one of those proofs which go to establish the Divine authority of Scripture, and some also of the truths which it contains ? whether it may not contribute to swell the amount, and increase the strength of the evidence, by suggesting considerations which are felt to have some influence in determining our judgment, and which co-operate with many concurring proofs in convincing us that the Scriptures contain a revelation from God ? It is not denied that there are other proofs, and that these proofs are in-

dispensable ; but it is asked whether Analogy may not afford an evidence which is additional to the sum of these proofs ? When the question is thus stated, the believer will see that he need be as little jealous of Analogy as of any other branch of the Christian evidence,—less so, indeed, than of those *internal* marks which cannot be estimated without sitting in judgment, to some extent, on the very contents of Scripture : and he will be prepared to give its full natural influence to Analogy in this, as in every other, department of human thought, if it can be shown to contribute, in any degree, to the proof either of the general authority of Scripture, or of any of its particular truths.

(301.) It will be found useful, in some respects, to view the question in this double aspect of it. Two courses are open to us : we may either take the particular doctrines of Religion separately, and inquire what analogies are available for the establishment or illustration of each of them in detail ; or we may entertain the higher and more comprehensive question, whether the general characteristics of the two systems—the Natural and the Revealed—resemble each other ?—in other words, whether there may not be such an analogy between the Works of God and His Word, as may serve to prove the identity of their origin, and to show that the same God is the Author of both ?

(302.) There is ample room for each of these two lines of inquiry. For, when we examine the contents of Scripture, we find,—as we might have expected, indeed, on the supposition of a Divine Revelation adapted to our actual condition and wants,—that it includes two distinct classes of truths ; some which, besides their supernatural sanction by Revelation, have also a body of natural evidence, arising from facts which fall under our experience and observation, to which an appeal may be made in confirmation of our faith ; and others which must be received entirely on the authority of the Revealer, since they depend on the sovereign counsel of His will. The former are the *common* truths of religion and morals ; the latter are the *peculiar* doctrines of Revelation. For the illustration and proof of the one, we may appeal to the works of God, and to the experience of man ; for the belief of the other, we must depend, in the first instance, on the sole authority of God speaking to us in His Word. Now what relation, it may be asked, subsists between these two classes of truths, thus indissolubly connected with each other in Scrip-

ture? Are they connected by no other bond than that of the supreme authority which equally ratifies both? Is there no more intimate tie,—no internal affinity,—no perceptible analogy, between the two? Is there not an adaptation, a harmony, an agreement, such as might be expected to subsist between all the parts of a Scheme devised by the same omniscient Mind? And if there be, may we not find here, as in every other department of human thought, fit objects for the faculty of comparison, and fresh occasion for the perception and use of Analogy?

(303.) The accordance between the facts of our actual experience and the doctrines which are *common* to Natural and Revealed Religion, is too evident to be overlooked or denied: and the more *peculiar* truths of Revelation, depending as they do on the authority of the Revealer, admit, nevertheless, of being compared with those primary principles of all religion which possess a natural evidence of their own. This comparison between the Natural and the Revealed can scarcely fail, if it be fairly conducted, to bring into view many striking analogies between them, such as may yield a strong confirmatory support to our Christian faith. These peculiar doctrines cannot, indeed, be proved by analogy *alone*, any more than they could be discovered by the unaided light of reason; but it may still be of use both in confirming the truth of each of them individually, and, still more, in conducting us to that conviction of their Divine origin and authority, which constrains us to receive them all as “the true sayings of God.”

(304.) Take any one of the peculiar doctrines of Scripture,—the doctrine, for instance, of an atonement or satisfaction for sin,—it could not be proved by any natural analogy, for it relates to a fact or scheme which is dependent on the sovereign will of God; yet, when revealed, it may be found to be in exact accordance with other exemplifications of the great principles of God’s moral government, as these are brought under our observation in the ordinary course of His Providence. Now this analogy between the two, when it is clearly discerned, serves to connect the supernatural truth with our familiar experience,—to exhibit it as only the crowning manifestation—the culminating point, of a moral system whose foundations lie deep in the nature of God and also in the heart of man,—to divest it of that aspect of strangeness which would belong to it, were it viewed only by itself, apart from the ordinary principles of the Divine administration,—to bring it

out of its apparent isolation, by connecting it with a general system which is known to be in constant operation,—and to afford a practical verification of it by showing its accordance with moral laws which are immutable and eternal. Let any one attempt to conceive of Atonement or Satisfaction for sin, without the correlative ideas of sin, of law, of government, of judicial condemnation, and penal infliction: let him further reflect how largely his conceptions on these points are dependent on the analogies of his earthly experience;—how he conceives of sin under the familiar notion of a debt or a crime,—and of law, government, and punishment with reference to similar ordinances established amongst men,—and he will readily acknowledge that, without the aid of such analogies, he could scarcely understand the meaning of the doctrine at all, and still less feel the force of those solemn considerations which carry it home to his heart and conscience as the very truth of God.

(305.) The doctrine of Atonement is one specimen of the peculiar truths of Revelation, which could only be made known by an express declaration of the Divine will, but which, when revealed, may be illustrated and confirmed by analogous exemplifications of the same principles, occurring in our ordinary experience. Many other instances might be adduced to show that Analogy may have a legitimate and useful application even to such doctrines, considered individually and in detail,—that it may be said to supply the mould in which the whole language of Scripture is cast,—and that its aid cannot be rejected, nor its value disparaged, without the risk of serious injury to the scheme of Revealed truth. It were dangerous, indeed, to affirm that any one of the peculiar articles of faith, may be proved by the mere force of analogical reasoning, independently of the authority of Revelation, or even to attempt,—as Lamourette, we think, erred in attempting,*—to construct a semi-rationalistic proof of such doctrines as those of the Trinity and the Incarnation; but nothing of this kind is necessarily involved when, with reference to any doctrine which is clearly revealed, we make use of analogy merely to enable us to conceive of it aright, and to connect it with certain cognate and kindred truths of a more familiar kind, so as to educe from their resemblance some degree of evidence in confirmation of our faith.

* Lamourette, “*Pensées sur la Philosophie de la Foi; ou le Système du Christianisme Entrevu, dans son Analogie avec les Idées Naturelles de l’Entendement Humain. Démonstrations Evangeliques*, Tom. XIII. p. 330.

(306.) But there is another way in which Analogy may be applied to the proof of Revealed Religion. Instead of taking each particular doctrine by itself, and viewing it in connection with the special analogies which bear upon it, we may compare the two great systems of knowledge,—the Natural and the Revealed,—in respect of their general characteristics, and inquire whether there be not such a resemblance between the volume of Nature and the volume of Scripture as may warrant us in believing that God is the Author of both? The question, as thus stated, is a very comprehensive one; it may include all the special analogies to which we have already referred as applicable to the confirmation of particular doctrines, while it has a much wider range, and is directed to a higher object; it is designed to ascertain,—not merely the truth of this or that doctrine by means of analogies bearing on one point,—but the general truth of Scripture, by establishing its Divine origin and authority on the ground of its analogy to the constitution and course of Nature,—and thereby to prove *indirectly* the truth of every doctrine which it contains. It must be evident that, on the supposition of a Revelation from God,—and this may be hypothetically assumed,—it is in the highest degree reasonable to expect that His Word will bear some resemblance to His Works,—that the scheme unfolded in the one will have somewhat of the same Divine impress which is so legible in the scheme exhibited in the other;—that they must have some characteristics in common, arising from their origin in the counsels of the same Omniscient Mind,—that there may thus be room for a comparison between the two, and for the perception of such analogies as may subsist between the natural and the supernatural, when both are equally Divine,—and that these analogies may afford a positive proof of the claims of Revelation, such as is sufficient to establish first its authority, and then, through that medium, the truth of every doctrine which it contains.—When we pursue this line of thought, we institute an inquiry which is perfectly legitimate; while it differs, in some respects, from that by which we seek for a confirmation of particular doctrines by means of such analogies as are specially applicable to them: and we cannot help thinking that, while Butler reasons analogically on different doctrines considered separately and in detail, with the view, chiefly, of removing objections and neutralizing adverse presumptions, yet the main strength, and the really effective force,

of his argument resolves itself into a proof of the *common authorship of Nature and of Revelation*.—For, “if the dispensation of Providence we are under, considered as inhabitants of this world, and having a temporal interest to secure in it, be found, on examination, to be analogous to, and of a piece with, that further dispensation, which relates to us as designed for another world, in which we have an eternal interest, depending on our behaviour here: if both may be traced up to the same general laws, and appear to be carried on according to the same plan of administration; the fair presumption is, that *both proceed from one and the same Author*.”* “That there is such a thing as a ‘course of nature,’ none can deny. This, therefore, is the ground on which Butler takes his stand, and whereon he fixes a lever that shakes the strongholds of unbelief even to their foundations: for, on comparing this scheme of Nature with the scheme of Revelation, there is found a most singular correspondence between their several parts—such a correspondence as gives a *very strong reason for believing that the Author of one is the Author of both*.”†

(307.) We are fully persuaded that Dr Chalmers would have concurred in these general statements. For in many parts of his works he refers in eloquent terms to the harmony between the Works and the Word of God; and even in his *Prelections on Butler’s Analogy*, we find certain statements which seem to imply that this mode of reasoning might afford a positive proof, in each of the two ways indicated above. For, speaking, first, of certain natural analogies which have been applied in confirmation of particular doctrines, he makes special mention of those which suggest and point towards a future state of retribution, and then adds, “It is to be observed, that the considerations in which Butler here deals are such as *not merely serve to annul objections*, but to make out a *substantive proof in favour* of his doctrine; and, therefore, we venture to affirm, that every intelligent reader will feel as if, in this part of his work, he had firmer hold of a positive argument than generally throughout the volume.” So that here we have at least one instance—and why may there not be many more?—in which natural analogies are applicable in concurrence with other proofs to the establishment of a particular doctrine,

* Bishop Halifax, “Preface to Butler’s Analogy,” xxvii.

† Professor Blunt, in *Quarterly Review*, No. 85, May 1830, p. 184.

belonging both to Natural and Revealed Religion ; and a single example of this kind is conclusive, when the question at issue relates to the power of an organ or method of reasoning. In regard, again, to the *second* line of argument—that in which Analogy is applied, not to the proof of particular doctrines, but to the more general and comprehensive purpose of establishing the Divine origin and authority of Scripture,—Dr Chalmers waives the discussion of it in this connection ; showing, however, that it was present to his mind. “ In how far,” he says, “ such analogies may afford a presumption, that both Scripture and Nature, or both the Word and the World, have *the same Author*, we shall not inquire.” But this is really the most important and comprehensive form of the question ; it may be waived for a time, but it will inevitably present itself again ; and when it did recur to his large and sagacious mind, he gave utterance, in no equivocal terms, to the impression produced by the striking analogy between Nature, as the Work, and Scripture, as the Word, of God.

(308.) If these views be correct, the value of analogy, as a proof applicable to Revealed Religion, is greatly underrated, when the only function which is ascribed to it is that of neutralizing objections. It is of use for this end, but it is available for other and higher ends. It contributes, in each of the two ways which have been specified, to swell the amount of positive proof in favour of Revelation. In adopting a more restricted view of its application, Dr Chalmers seems to have been influenced chiefly by a desire to guard against the undue encroachment of Reason on the peculiar province of Scripture, and to shut us up to the acknowledgment of its sole and supreme authority, as attested by the credentials to which it appeals. But may it not be said that Analogy is one of these credentials, or rather that it underlies them all ? And in its application to the proof of Revealed Religion, can there be any real or serious danger of compromising the claims of Divine authority, or of subjecting the truth to the arrogance of mere human opinion, if it be habitually remembered that Analogy does not bring the doctrines of Scripture into comparison with the speculative theories or capricious fancies of reason, but *with the undeniable facts of nature and experience* ; that it properly consists in a resemblance between two great systems, which are equally independent of man’s opinion about them ; that it amounts, in short, to nothing more than a collation of the two volumes of

Nature and of Revelation, considered as the products of Divine wisdom,—the objects, but not the creations, of human knowledge,—the rule, as well as the ground, of all rational belief? An argument truly analogical has nothing in common with any *a priori* speculation, or with any mere preconception whether of the reason or the fancy: it is the very reverse of this, for in respect to each of the two terms of comparison, it is purely *a posteriori*,—the one being certain doctrines contained in Scripture, the other certain facts belonging to nature and experience. It founds on the resemblance which is seen to subsist between these two: and each of them being external to reason, and independent of it, there is no room either for conjectural speculation or the capricious exercise of fancy: reason is brought face to face with facts and their undeniable evidence, and by these alone its judgment must be determined.

(309.) Accordingly Dr Hampden has insisted with much reason on this important consideration,—that the argument from Analogy is not a proof *a priori*, directed to establish the claims of Revelation on the ground of its accordance with our preconceived opinions; but a proof derived from the comparison of the known contents of Scripture with the actual constitution and course of Nature, such as may serve to rectify our views of nature itself, and may even become the best corrective and antidote to that tendency which leads us to judge of Revelation rather according to what *we think* God ought to will and to do, than according to what *we see and know* God has actually willed and done.* In like manner, Dr Shuttleworth recognises the importance of this feature of analogical reasoning, as contrasted with abstract or fanciful speculation, when he speaks of “the old fallacy of dictating *imaginary* schemes of creation to Providence, instead of directing our judgment by what we know to be *actually* established.” “All that any exposition of the Christian evidences can presume to effect, is merely to show that Revelation accords, not with our abstract theories and capricious surmises of what we choose to assume that God’s creation *ought* to have been, but with what experience tells us that it *actually is*. . . . It signifies nothing, whether or not Providence, in its wisdom, might not have arranged things otherwise. Our reference is to man as we know him to be constituted, and to the existing order of things.”†

* Dr Hampden, “Philosophical Evidence,” p. iv.

† Dr Shuttleworth, “Consistency of Revelation,” pp. 33, 38, 41.

(310.) There is nothing *rationalistic*, therefore, in this method of proof,—unless, indeed, it be rationalistic, as some seem to suppose, to admit any exercise of reason, or any use of evidence, in matters of faith. No comparison is instituted between the doctrines of Scripture and the mere opinions of men ; two vast systems are brought together, and viewed in the light of their mutual relations,—both external and objective,—both anterior to individual reason and independent of it,—both consisting mainly of facts or founded upon them : the one the standard of Natural, the other of Revealed truth. These two are placed side by side and compared ; they are found to differ in some respects and to agree in others ; the points of resemblance between them are such as may be proved to involve principles which are common to both, although they are exemplified in different ways,—and they afford solid ground for reasoning from the one to the other, on the principle of Analogy. By this analogy we may be conducted to the conclusion that the Word, not less than the World, is the product of Divine wisdom. We compare what God is supposed to have *said*, not with what we *think*, but with what He has actually *done* ; and any legitimate argument founded on the analogy betwixt these two, is at the farthest possible remove from the presumptuous abuse of reason. Indeed the serious study of nature and experience, and the impartial application of natural analogies, may prove one of the most effective antidotes to all that is false and dangerous in Rationalism.

(311.) It cannot be denied that our Lord made frequent use of natural analogies in the course of His personal ministry. In His Parables, as well as in the Types of the Old Testament, Analogy is applied to the proof, not less than to the illustration, of Divine truth. In both there was the same principle involved in each of the related terms of a comparison, and this constituted the *fundamentum relationis*—the ground of an analogical inference. The illustrative power of analogous instances is universally admitted ; but, looking at our Lord's parables, who will venture to say that they serve only to illustrate, and can afford no element of proof ? Is their logical value duly estimated, when their force is supposed to be exhausted in answering objections, and neutralizing adverse presumptions ? Does not every one feel that there is a persuasive power in the principle which is common to the two cases,—of an earthly and a Christian steward,—of the prodigal

son and a penitent sinner,—of the Pharisee and every other self-righteous formalist,—of the good Samaritan and a truly benevolent man? There may be much room for the exercise of a wise discretion in selecting the strong points of the case, and applying them in argument; but this is equally necessary in expounding parables when they are regarded simply as illustrations, and can afford no reason for disowning their higher power as analogical proofs.—Our Lord made use of natural analogies, in confirmation of the truth which He taught with infallible authority; but who would ever dream of imputing to Him the spirit or the principles of modern Rationalism?

CHAPTER VIII.

ANALOGY ; HOW RELATED TO OTHER LAWS OF THOUGHT.

(312.) The origin of our belief in the mere relation of resemblance,—or in the fact that two distinct objects are similar to each other in some respects, although they differ in others,—needs no explanation, and can scarcely be said to admit of any, since it must be ascribed to a direct perception or intuition of reason. In regard to our simple judgments of analogy, there can be no difficulty in tracing them at once to a native power of the mind, since they belong to the primary facts of consciousness, and cannot be explained by anything that is more elementary or more evident than themselves. It is otherwise with analogical inferences, or those conclusions which are reached by a process of analogical reasoning. In regard to these, the question stated by Butler may be entertained ;—“ Whence it proceeds that *likeness* should beget that presumption, opinion, and full conviction, which the human mind is formed to receive from it, and which it does necessarily produce in every one ? ”

(313.) Butler raises this question, but makes no attempt to answer it ;—he speaks of it as belonging “ to the subject of Logic,” and “ to a part of that subject which has not yet been thoroughly considered.” Nor was it necessary for his immediate object to discuss the psychological origin of a belief, so spontaneous, natural, and universal : he might assume it as a fact, and appeal in confirmation of it to the consciousness of every reader.—Its reasonableness is not affected by the question whether it rests on an intuitive principle, or may be resolved into some other laws of thought. The laws which regulate the acquired perceptions of sight are surely as much a part of our frame as those which regulate any of our original perceptions ; and although they require for their development, a certain degree of experience and observation, the uniformity of the result shows that there is nothing

arbitrary nor accidental in their origin.* The dictates of Conscience are neither less natural nor less trustworthy, whether we ascribe them to a moral sense, considered as an ultimate fact in mental science, or attempt, with Sir James Macintosh, to resolve them into a combination of different elements.† We are born without teeth, but there is a natural provision for their production in due time, and their use is not dependent on their origin.—In like manner, the doctrine of Analogy is not affected by any difference of opinion respecting the psychological origin of those inferences which are invariably suggested by a clear perception of resemblance.

(314.) Still it may be useful to advert briefly to the different theories which have been proposed with the view of accounting for the beliefs which are thus generated.

(315.) Some, like Reid, Beattie, Oswald, and Tatham, ascribe them to an instinctive tendency, of which no other account can, or need, be given, than that it is an ultimate fact in our mental constitution. “Reasoning from analogy, when traced up to its source, will be found to terminate in a certain instinctive propensity, implanted in us by our Maker, which leads us to expect, that similar causes in similar circumstances do, or will probably, produce similar effects.” “The principle in which this branch of Logic has its foundation, is a native bent and propensity of the mind, strengthened by experience and confirmed by habit,—by which we are involuntarily led to expect that nature and truth are uniform and analogous throughout the universe,—that similar causes, of whatever kind, will, in similar circumstances, at all times produce similar effects,—or, if the causes cannot be known, that similar effects will explain, illustrate, and account for similar effects.”‡ Mr Stewart speaks less of instinctive tendencies, or of first principles considered as dogmatic axioms, than some of his predecessors in the Scottish School, and prefers to call them Laws of Thought, or Laws of Belief.§

(316.) Others, like Hume, Priestley, and James Mill, have ascribed these, as well as other, beliefs to the laws of association

* Stewart's Life of Reid (Hamilton's Ed.), 23.

† Dissertation, Encyclop. Britan., 400.

‡ Dr BEATTIE, “Essay on Truth,” p. 63. Dr TATHAM, “Chart and

Scale,” I. 52. See Dr Reid, “Essays,” II. 74; Dr Oswald's “Appeal,” I. 190.

§ D. Stewart's “Elements,” vol. II. 27, 48, 55, 93.

and habit. According to Hume, belief of every kind, is a mere feeling, and this feeling does not arise, in most cases, from any process of the understanding. It can only be ascribed to the laws of association, or, what he calls, "the three connecting principles of all ideas—the relations of resemblance, contiguity, and causation." With special reference to analogical inferences, he states the question thus—"As to past Experience, it can be allowed to give direct and certain information of those precise objects only, and that precise period of time, which fell under its cognizance: but why this experience should be extended to future times, and to other objects . . . this is the main question." "These two propositions are far from being the same—'I have found that such an object has always been attended with such an effect,' and 'I foresee that other objects which are, in appearance, similar, will be attended with similar effects.' I shall allow, if you please, that the one proposition may justly be inferred from the other: I know, in fact, that it always is inferred. But if you insist that the inference is made by a chain of reasoning, I desire you to produce that reasoning." And he answers the question thus raised, by ascribing the inference to Habit,—that is, the habitual association of certain ideas in the mind, without pretending, however, "to have given the ultimate reason of such a propensity."* Mr Mill illustrates the same views in his chapter on "Belief,"† and Dr Priestley in his *Strictures on Reid, Beattie, and Oswald*.‡

(317.) It is an obvious reflection, which occurred to Dégérando and Bartholmèss, that when belief is thus reduced to the laws of association and habit, these laws are still left unexplained; and accordingly other writers of the Sensational or Materialistic School have attempted to carry the explanation further back, by describing *habit* itself as a mere mechanical tendency, and all our ideas as simply "transformed sensations,"§ leaving as much in the dark as ever the origin of that "mechanism," and the law of this "transformation." Coleridge, again, founding on his favourite distinc-

* Hume, "Essays," II. 33, 44, 55.

† James Mill, "Analysis," I. 254, 277.

‡ See Priestley's work, and Dr Campbell's remarks on it, "Rhetoric," I. 93; also MORELL, "History of Philosophy," I. 280, 315. Dégérando, "Histoire Comparée," I. 463, 467; III.

482; "Des Signes," I. 61, 67, 84. Bartholmèss, "Histoire Critique," I. 140, 276; and "Huet, ou le Scepticisme Theologique," 201.

§ Condillac, "Traité des Sensations," I. 31, 34; II. 255. "Système de la Nature," I. 147, 149. Morell, "History," I. 139.

tion between the Understanding and Reason, resolves Analogy into a law of the Imagination, such as is capable of affording a presumption, while experience supplies the proof, in regard to matters of fact; and reason supersedes the process by substituting for the inductive inference a necessary or demonstrable truth.* Sir William Hamilton inquires how far our analogical inferences may be explained by connecting them with "that love of unity—that tendency of the mind to generalize its knowledge" which "leads us to anticipate in nature a corresponding uniformity:" and concludes that "all scientific induction is founded on the presumption that nature is uniform in her operations,—a principle which we suppose in all our inductions, but which cannot be itself a product of induction. It is, therefore, interpolated in the inductive reasoning by the mind itself."† He adds in another place that "the principle by which in either case (that is, in Induction or Analogy) we are disposed to extend our inferences beyond the limits of our experience, is a natural or ultimate principle of Intelligence, and may be called the principle of Logical, or Philosophical, Presumption."‡

(318.) On a review of these various theories, it may be difficult to determine how much is due to an instinctive intellectual tendency,—how much to the laws of association, of which the perception of Analogy is one of the most important,—and how much to the powerful influence of habit, for there can be no doubt that "custom," as Montaigne says, "makes things credible,"§ and that, as Pascal adds, it has "a great effect on faith." But evidently we cannot account for the effect of analogy on our beliefs, without ascribing it to certain laws of thought, whatever they be, which are connatural to the mind, and inherent in its constitution. One may connect the perception of analogy with the principle of causality,—another with an instinctive presumption of the constancy of nature,—another with the laws of association and habit;—but under these or other names they all equally recognise certain laws of thought which come into spontaneous operation, and which, severally or conjointly, determine many of our strongest beliefs. And so far as the validity of these beliefs is concerned,

* Coleridge, "Aids to Reflection," p. 181.

† Sir William Hamilton, "Lectures on Metaphysics," I. 70, 103.

‡ Lectures on Logic, vol. IV. p. 165.

§ Montaigne, "Essays," I. 201.

it is of little consequence whether we can resolve them into one primary principle acting independently by itself, or into several laws acting harmoniously together ; whether we can reach a final and perfect analysis, or must rest content with a proximate explanation.—Sir William Hamilton, referring to the censure which had been cast by some on Reid and Stewart for unduly multiplying first principles, offers a sufficient vindication of them when he says that “they did not offer a final analysis, but only a provisional classification,” such as Chemistry, and every other science, in its early progress, is compelled to adopt.*—And whatever may be said of the influence of association and habit in determining our analogical judgments, we must still admit, with Mr Grinfield, that “it is an original law of our nature that *likeness* on subjects of this kind should produce a presumption of their being so far of a kindred nature as to admit of their being compared together, so far as they seem alike, and of our arguing from the one to the other. This law, I apprehend, is very similar in its nature and application to that rule of philosophy—that ‘when effects are the same, we may account for them from similar causes,’—and *perhaps it may be ultimately resolved into one general principle.*”†

(319.) Considering that the perception of Analogy is connected with the simultaneous operation of other principles of reason—such as the principle of causality,—there can be no difficulty in seeing that it may become the occasion, and even the ground, of inductive inference. And whether the process of analogical reasoning must be traced up to a primary law of thought, or may be accounted for by ascribing it to the simultaneous operation of several distinct laws, it is undeniable that, in either case, *likeness* comes to be regarded as a *sign*, which is offered for our interpretation ; a sign which we are so constituted as to be able both to discern and to construe, and which is fitted to be at once an index and a guide in the investigation of truth. If this be the right view of it, we must assign it a place as one among the various *signs* on which all our knowledge is dependent ; and this will serve to divest it of its seeming singularity, and to reduce it to a class or category which comprehends many other instances of a similar kind. If it be a natural sign or indication, designed and fitted

* Sir William Hamilton, “Lectures,” II. 364.

† Grinfield’s “Vindiciæ Analogicæ,” P. I. p. 25.

for our instruction both in secular and spiritual knowledge, it would be as unreasonable to ask why the particular relation of resemblance was selected, or to question the validity of those inferences to which the perception of it invariably leads, as it must be, in any other case, to doubt the wisdom of our intellectual constitution, or the trustworthiness of our natural faculties. If it seems strange or unaccountable that Analogy should exert so much influence over our trains of thought, and should even be regarded, in some cases, as a ground of inference and a reason for belief, this can only arise from an inadequate view of the manifold uses of SIGNS in every department of human knowledge.

(320.) For cases of Analogy are far from being the only instances in which we are left to depend for our knowledge on the presentation of a Sign, and the intuitive perception of its import. It is by means of similar indications that all our knowledge is acquired. What is sensation but a sign to us of the presence and properties of external objects? "Strictly speaking, every sensation is but the sign of the thing it represents, so that sensation is the natural universal language of sensible beings, by which knowledge is received and communicated.* It is a question with Dégérando whether the objects of sensation, or our sensations themselves, should be regarded as signs; † but, on either supposition, the intervention of a sign is indispensable to our first perceptions. What, again, is consciousness itself but a sign or index of mental phenomena? "En effet," says Cousin, "la conscience est le *signe* du moi, c'est-à-dire de ce qu'il y a de plus déterminé : l'être qui dit *moi*, se distingue essentiellement de toute autre ; c'est là qu'est pour nous le type de l'individualité." ‡ What are all external phenomena but signs by which we acquire the knowledge of substances and their properties,—and especially what are effects but signs, or sensible tokens, of their causes? "The being of things imperceptible to sense," says Bishop Berkeley, "may be collected from effects and signs and sensible tokens." "In a strict sense, I do not see Alciphron—that is, that individual thinking thing, but only such visible signs and tokens as suggest and infer the being of that invisible thinking principle or soul." § What is

* Field, "Analogical Philosophy," I. 79.

† Dégérando, "Des Signes," I. 27, 63, 115.

‡ "Histoire de la Philosophie Moderne," Tom. I. Leçon 9.

§ "Minute Philosopher," I. 385, 387.

language but a sign of thought,—a mirror in which thought is reflected,—a means by which one invisible mind can communicate with another? “It is frequent for men to say—they see words, and notions, and things, in reading a book; whereas in strictness they *see* only the characters which suggest words, notions, and things.” “Men, not being able immediately to communicate their ideas to one another, are obliged to make use of sensible signs or words, the use of which is to raise those ideas in the hearer, which are in the mind of the speaker; and if they fail of this end, they serve to no purpose.”* What is testimony but a sign, whose import must be interpreted, and its value ascertained, by suitable tests? “Of Signs, there are some which from a certain effect or phenomenon infer the *cause* of it; and others which, in like manner, infer some *condition* which is not the cause. Of these last, one species is the argument from testimony: the premiss being the existence of the testimony,—the conclusion the truth of what is attested,—which is considered as a *condition* of the testimony having been given; since it is evident that so far only as this is allowed, can the argument have any force.”† What is a general conception but a sign—a sort of intellectual diagram—which stands for and represents all the particular objects that are comprehended under it? “An idea which, considered in itself, is particular, becomes general, by being made to represent or stand for all other particular ideas of the same sort. . . . Thus a line represents all particular lines whatever, and what is demonstrated of it, is demonstrated of all lines.”‡

(321.) As we are thus dependent on Signs for every part of our secular knowledge, we are equally dependent on them in Religion. For what is the adjustment of parts in any organized structure, or the adaptation of means to ends in any practical process, but a sign of intelligent contrivance, of which we find the *analogue* in our own breast, and which we are thus enabled to interpret? § What is a miracle but a sign of immediate Divine interposition, the more striking by reason of its being uncommon,—and what is prophecy and its fulfilment but a sign of superhuman wisdom? What are the words of Scripture itself, but the signs

* Berkeley “Minute Philosopher,” I. 393.

† Whately, “Rhetoric,” p. 62.

‡ Berkeley, “Works,” I. 78.

§ Berkeley, “Works,” I. 393, 395. Field, “Analogical Philosophy,” II. 324, 328. “Il faut en nous,” says Cousin, “quelque chose qui y soit analogue.”

of God's thoughts? And what is a sacrament but a sign which makes sense itself auxiliary to faith,—a sign so expressive that, in one aspect, it is commemorative of a past event,—in another, symbolical or significant of spiritual truth,—and in another, typical or prophetic of future objects of hope?

(322.) It thus appears that our whole knowledge, secular and spiritual, is left to depend on the perception and interpretation of Signs; and hence the great importance which belongs to them in the philosophy of mind. "I am inclined to think," says Berkeley, "the doctrine of Signs a point of great importance and general extent, which, if duly considered, would cast no small light upon things, and afford a just and genuine solution of many difficulties."* The aptitude of the human mind for the perception and interpretation of Signs is evinced by universal experience, and especially by the history both of natural and artificial language.† And hence, in the ordinary processes of inductive reasoning, arguments are drawn from *sign* as well as from *example*, and are held to be equally legitimate and conclusive.‡ Of these Signs, *likeness* is one of the most important,—it is an index which points, and a guide which conducts, to general conclusions from particular facts.

(323.) If it be so, what a simple, yet effective, provision is thus made for the rapid extension and indefinite enlargement of human knowledge! Had we no power of comparing different objects of thought, and discerning their resemblance in respect of one or more of their properties or relations, our knowledge must have been limited to particular things, and no amount of experience could have given birth to science. But when their several properties and relations are clearly discerned, and those which belong to one object are found, on comparison, to correspond with those belonging to another, our knowledge, if it becomes more abstract, becomes also more general, and has a tendency to rise from one conclusion to another still more comprehensive, and so on in a series of endless progression. One generalization becomes only the stepping-stone by which we rise to a higher; and that again is a fresh starting-point for further discovery. The whole structure of our powers seems to have been designed, as it is ad-

* Berkeley, "Works," I. 511.

† Reid's "Works," by Hamilton, 117.

‡ Whately, "Rhetoric," 54.

*likeness
example
index
guide*

mirably fitted, *to evolve general conclusions out of particular facts, and permanent truths out of transient phenomena.* The process of abstraction and generalization contributes largely to this result ; and the perception of analogy exerts a powerful influence in the same direction. And when these are combined with the laws of association and habit, which regulate the succession of our thoughts, and link similar objects together so as that the presence of the one instantly suggests the idea of the other, we can be at no loss to see how “likeness,” considered as a Sign, may beget a sense of “likelihood” or “probability,” or to explain the Final Cause of this part of our mental constitution. And this is enough for our present purpose. For it must never be forgotten that the explanation of any psychological fact, however correct, must ultimately terminate in a law of which no other account can be given than that such is the constitution of our nature, or that such is the will of our Creator. “Here, then,” as Butler says on a kindred topic, “we can go no further. For it is ridiculous to attempt to prove the truth of those perceptions, whose truth we can no otherwise prove, than by other perceptions of exactly the same kind with them, and which there is just the same ground to suspect ; or to attempt to prove the truth of our faculties, which can no otherwise be proved, than by the use or means of those very suspected faculties themselves.” *

* Butler, “Essay on Identity,” p. 499.

CHAPTER IX.

ANALOGY ; IS IT A SAFE GUIDE ?

(324.) The illustrative power of Analogy,—the charm and beauty of its poetical applications,—and its peculiar effectiveness as an instrument of rhetorical discourse adapted to the purposes of popular instruction, will be readily admitted by many who are conscious, notwithstanding, of a vague but deep-seated feeling of suspicion or distrust when it is employed as a guide to truth, or a ground of inference. It may be admired as an ornament of style, while, as a process of thought, it is supposed to belong rather to the domain of the imagination than to that of judgment or reason. If a sound argument is expressed in analogical terms, it is often thought sufficient to say in reply that the language is figurative or metaphorical, as if such terms were incapable of representing anything that could serve the purposes of proof. But if it be true, as we have attempted to show, that Analogy is largely concerned in all our processes of thought,—that it presides over and determines many of the most familiar convictions of the popular mind,—that it is involved in scientific induction itself, and also in that similitude of ratios and proportions on which the conclusions of Geometry and Arithmetic depend,—there is surely enough in these considerations to show that our distrust in its guidance may spring from a groundless prejudice, and that it becomes us to reconsider the whole question, with a view to ascertain in what cases, and under what conditions, Analogy may be a sure ground of inference, and a safe guide to truth.

(325.) The prejudice to which we have referred often exists as a latent feeling, where it is not avowed as a formal objection. But were it expressed in articulate terms, it would probably assume one or other of two distinct forms—either that whatever part of our knowledge depends on the perception of Analogy must necessarily be, in its own nature, indistinct and imperfect,—and

especially that some peculiar defect attaches to our analogical conceptions on the subject of Religion,—or that the whole method of reasoning from Analogy is uncertain and precarious by reason of the numberless fallacies by which it has been discredited—in other words, by the multitude of fanciful and false resemblances which have been applied in argument to the establishment of the most contradictory conclusions. There is a radical difference between these two objections, although they are often blended together; the former relates to the nature of our analogical knowledge,—the latter to the validity of our analogical reasonings. To do justice to either, they must be considered apart.

SECT. I.—THE ALLEGED DEFECTS OF ANALOGICAL KNOWLEDGE.

(326.) That large portion of our knowledge which depends on the perception of Analogy, and which cannot be expressed in other than analogical terms, has been supposed to be radically defective, and its comparative imperfection has been characterized by several disparaging epithets.—Sometimes it has been described as merely *relative*, and contrasted with direct or absolute knowledge. But what is the precise meaning of this epithet as so applied? Does it mean that our analogical knowledge depends on a mere *relation*,—the relation of resemblance; and that for this reason it is of inferior value or of doubtful certainty? Assuredly not; for the relations of objects are as real, and as intuitively discerned, as the objects themselves; and the perception of analogy presupposes some direct knowledge of each of the related terms,—so that it rests ultimately on an experimental basis—the observation of facts. Or does it mean that our analogical knowledge is *relative*, as having itself a relation to the percipient mind,—a necessary dependence on our mental faculties; and that for this reason we can never be assured that, however apparently true to us, it is actually and absolutely true in its own nature? In *this* sense, *all* our knowledge is relative,—not our analogical perceptions and inferences merely, but even our most direct intuitions of sense and consciousness, and the evidence of demonstration itself. The philosophy of the Absolute, were it possible to construct such a science, could claim no firmer foundation; for all

knowledge depends on the correlation of the *subject* and *object* of thought, and becomes impossible in the absence of either of the two factors. There may be *necessary* truths,—such as are conceived to have a universal validity, to be immutable and eternal, and to be independent of the constitution of our minds ;—but *as they are discerned by us*, our knowledge even of these truths is, in this sense, *relative*. There may be a difference, in other respects, between necessary and contingent truths ; but there can be none in this ; for in so far as they are objects of knowledge, they are all alike *relative to our faculty of knowing*.

(327.) Our analogical knowledge has sometimes been described, again, as if it were merely *imaginary* or *figurative*, and contrasted with that which is *real* and *true*. This description is applied to it chiefly because it can only be expressed by symbols or metaphors, or by employing one thing to represent another. But figurative and even metaphorical language, although suggested by the imagination, may be expressive of thoughts which relate to actual realities. Analogy is founded on a *real* resemblance subsisting between two or more objects which are actually known and distinctly conceived : and when one of these is made the symbol or type of another, it may be safely affirmed that our knowledge is as clear, distinct, real, and true, as any notion can be which the human mind is able to acquire. Do we conceive of the intellectual and moral qualities of our fellow-men by the analogy of our own conscious experience, as intelligent and responsible beings ? Are the facts of our own mental consciousness the analogue according to which we frame our conceptions of life, intelligence, volition, desire, affection, and passion, as they exist in other men ? Then our knowledge of these properties, as existing in them, although it be analogical, is just as clear and distinct, as true and certain, as are the conceptions which we form of our own. If we have a distinct conception derived from our own experience of a living, self-conscious, active, and responsible being, and if we see sufficient reason, arising also from experience, to transfer that conception, on the ground of analogous manifestations and effects, to a multitude of similar beings around us, the conception, thus transferred, retains all its original clearness and certainty, and is neither less distinct nor less real, than when it was first formed with reference to the properties of our own minds. It is applied to new objects, but it is in no respect muti-

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lated or changed. If it was a correct conception of something in our own nature, it is also an exact image of a corresponding property in theirs. It may be, in some cases, an inadequate representation ; but it is the only one we can have, and, so far as it goes, it is faithful and true. It is the only means by which we can represent to ourselves, or express to others, the properties which experience teaches us to ascribe to our fellow-men.

(328.) In like manner our conceptions of the communicable attributes of God are framed according to the analogy of similar properties in ourselves and our fellow-men. But a peculiar defect has been supposed to attach to our religious knowledge, for this very reason, because we can form no other than analogical conceptions of His perfections—and can, therefore, have no true and proper knowledge of His real character, such as alone could render Him a fit object of reverence, trust, affection, and worship. Were it affirmed merely that Analogy can never enable us to form a full, adequate, or perfect knowledge of God as He is, so far from rejecting, we would cordially receive, the statement in that sense, as containing an important truth of which we cannot be too frequently or too faithfully reminded ; for it is a truth that the Divine perfections, although they may be clearly apprehended, are, and ever must be, incomprehensible by any finite intelligence, and that neither man, nor angel, nor seraph can have an exhaustive knowledge of God. Or were it affirmed merely that, imperfect as the idea of the Divine perfections must be in the case of every created mind, it is peculiarly so in the case of man by reason of his present state as a creature subject to the conditions of sense, and dependent, for a large part of his knowledge as well as for the power of expressing it, on sensible experience, we should willingly admit the statement, in so far as it implies simply the inferiority of our present knowledge as compared with that which we hope to enjoy hereafter ; for “now we see through a glass darkly, but then face to face :” “now we know in part—but when that which is perfect is come, that which is in part shall be done away.”

(329.) But it is in neither of these senses that the objection is urged. It is founded on the supposition, and designed to convey the impression, that our religious knowledge, simply because it is to a large extent analogical, must necessarily be,—not merely inadequate, as falling short of a full comprehension of its infinite

object, nor relatively imperfect as compared with the clearer vision which is reserved for us hereafter,—but incompetent to give us any just or correct conceptions of the Divine attributes such as they really are. It was long ago said by Spinoza,—the real founder both of Theological and Exegetical Rationalism in modern Europe,—that there is no real analogy between human and Divine intelligence, such as could enable us to form a correct, not to say adequate, conception of the one from our conscious experience of the other,—that there is nothing in God which corresponds with what we call the will in man,—that we have no right to ascribe to Him a real personality, or to regard Him either as our Lawgiver or as our King.* Some, again, have taught, as Bolingbroke did, that we might form a distinct and true conception of His intellectual attributes from the analogous powers of our own minds, but could not with equal certainty arrive at any conclusion respecting His Moral perfections.† While, strange as it may seem, some Christian divines, such as King, Whately, and Copleston, speaking not merely of the conceptions which we may form of God and His attributes from the mere light of nature, but of those which we are taught to entertain by Revelation itself, have affirmed that there may be no real resemblance between His perfections and the human properties by which they are analogically expressed in the language of Scripture.‡

(330.) While our conceptions of the *communicable* attributes of God are framed according to the analogy of similar properties in ourselves, we can only conceive of such as are *incommunicable* in the light, not of *analogy*, but of *contrast*. His absolute perfection, as a Being infinite, eternal, and unchangeable in His nature and in all His attributes, is contrasted with our own imperfection as finite, created, dependent, mutable beings;—and the conceptions which we thus form of Him are expressed either by negative terms—such as infinite, immutable, infallible,—which imply that He is not subject, as we are, to limitation, and change, and error; or by absolute terms such as Omnipotence, Omnipresence, Omniscience, which affirm the plenitude of His perfections as contrasted with all creature limitation or defect.

* SAISSET, "Œuvres de Spinoza," Preface, xxxvii., lxiii., lxv., lxxiv. SPINOZA, "Tractatus Theologico-Politicus," 121, 144, 319.

† Warburton, "Divine Legation," I. 168, 331.

‡ Supra, "Introduction," Sec. II. pp. 7–20.

(331.) If this be a correct view of the manner in which we conceive of the Divine perfections, it follows that we may have as clear and as true a knowledge of the communicable attributes as we have of those properties in our own souls to which they are analogous; and also as clear and as true a knowledge of the incommunicable attributes as we have of those limitations and defects in our own nature which can have no place in His. Such a knowledge of God is not perfect or absolute, for Omniscience only can know Him adequately, and no created mind can comprehend Him; but it is a real and a true knowledge notwithstanding, and sufficient to make Him the object of reverence, affection, and trust, while it imposes on us the duty of religious worship and obedience.

SECT. II.—TRUE AND FALSE ANALOGIES.

(332.) Analogy has been supposed to be an unsafe guide to truth, not only because our analogical conceptions are indistinct and imperfect, but also because they afford only a precarious ground of inference. We are told that it must always be an uncertain, and may often prove a dangerous, guide,—since it seldom happens that plausible analogies are not found on both sides of the same question, and applied in proof of the most opposite conclusions, while fallacious or false analogies have always been the prolific source, and permanent support, of error. Such an objection serves only to show that in this, as in every other application of his powers, man is liable to mistake the semblance, for the substance, of truth; and that here, as everywhere else, he is called to the exercise of patient, discriminating thought. In no department of inquiry is he exempt from error, or infallible in judgment. There are illusions of sense, and tricks of memory,—rash inferences from experience,—imperfect inductions hastily formed from partial data—and erroneous conclusions deduced sometimes from doubtful, at other times from true, premisses; and as these are not held sufficient to discredit the natural functions of sense, memory, and reason, so any fallacies that may spring from the perception of resemblance, real or apparent, should not be allowed to diminish our confidence in the legitimate use of Analogy.

(333.) Should it be thought that some peculiar defect attaches to our analogical reasonings, such as does not belong, at least in

an equal degree, to those mental processes which are guided solely by experience and reason, and that there is greater difficulty in discriminating between true and false analogies than there is in distinguishing truth from error in other cases, we are persuaded that such an opinion is entirely groundless. It should never be forgotten that Experience is used in two distinct senses ; in a restricted sense, to denote mere *sensible experience* which supplies only the knowledge of particular objects or facts ; and in a more comprehensive sense, to denote a higher *rational experience* which takes cognizance of the relations, of these objects and facts, and through these rises to the general truths of science. One of these relations is resemblance ; and reason, so far from being exclusive, or independent, of the perception of Analogy, is in fact subject to it, and regulated by its influence, as one of its own fundamental laws ; insomuch that some writers have represented experience and analogy as its two constituent elements, or co-ordinate factors—"La raison, qui est Experience et Analogie."*

(334.) An exercise of comparison and a perception of analogy are involved in every process of reasoning ; and when the reasoning is fallacious, the error is often set down to the account of Analogy, when it ought to be ascribed to a want of experience, or to a defect of judgment. For partial experience, or imperfect observation, or inconsequent reasoning, may lead us either to found on false analogies, or to deduce erroneous conclusions from such as are true. Any one whose attention has not been specially turned to the subject, will be surprised to discover, on a careful analysis of any standard work—such as the Critical and Historical Essays of Macaulay—how largely analogy enters into all our reasonings, on the side both of truth and error ; and this fact, which should only impress us with a sense of its reality and importance as a natural law of thought, has been perverted into a charge against it, as if it could not be a trustworthy guide to truth, when it is so often associated with error. But instead of renouncing its guidance, or viewing it with suspicion and distrust, should we not rather seek to discriminate between true and false analogies,—to ascertain, if that be possible, some characteristic marks by which they may be distinguished,—and to lay down such rules as experience may enable us to frame in regard to their right and legi-

* M. de Bonald, "Recherches Philosophiques," II. 219.

timate application ;—rules which, like those of logic in general, may be useful, although they can never supersede the exercise of a discriminating judgment, or the necessity of sound common sense.

(335.) There exists in the human mind an aptitude to discern, and a disposition to imagine, similitudes between different things, such as may give rise to hasty generalizations and erroneous judgments, unless we are careful to mark the precise nature of the analogy in every particular case, and the legitimate uses to which it may be applied. But there is much truth in the statement of Mr Stewart, that when a person reasons confidently from analogy, without attending to all the circumstances of the case, “it cannot be justly said that analogy is a deceitful guide, but that he does not know how to apply analogy to its proper purpose.” *

(336.) Some analogies are true, sound, and useful : others are false, incomplete, fanciful, and even foolish ;—and the latter may easily be turned into ridicule, so as to discredit every kind of analogical reasoning. But this is no more than may be said of the process of Induction itself, which the genius of Macaulay could caricature by simply adducing some ludicrous examples of it.† Innumerable instances of fanciful and foolish analogies, founded on some superficial or merely imaginary resemblance, and misapplied as proofs while they were scarcely fit to be used as illustrations, will occur spontaneously to the mind of every reader.‡ Were the fallacy always as evident as it is in these instances, there might be little need for any rules or cautions in regard to the right use of analogy,—but as the error is often more latent, while it is only the more dangerous in proportion as it is less easily discerned, it may be useful to offer a few practical suggestions upon the subject.

(337.) Before applying any analogy in the way of argument or proof, we must ascertain, in the first instance, the fact of a real resemblance, of some kind, between two or more objects of thought, each of which is clearly conceived by us. Analogy being founded on the relation of resemblance, we must have some knowledge of each of the related terms,—and this is equally necessary where both are existing objects or actual facts, and where one of

* Stewart, “Elements,” II. 414.

† Macaulay’s *Essays*, II. 404.

‡ “*Essays on Universal Analogy*.”

Tupper, “*Probability an Aid to Faith*.”
“*The Doctor*,” by Southey, in one vol., p. 848.

the two, as in the case of a parable or apologue, is only imaginary or supposititious. In either case we must have a clear and correct conception of each term of the comparison, in order to discern the resemblance between the two. And this first caution is the more necessary, because it will be found that error often arises from supposing a resemblance, where no resemblance exists, just as in reasoning from experience, we often assume a fact without sufficient evidence of its reality. The chief causes of error in analogical reasoning are the same which mislead us in our judgments on matters of fact;* and hence the necessity of forming distinct conceptions of the facts or analogies which lie at the foundation of all inference.

(338.) It is not enough to ascertain that a real resemblance of some kind exists between two or more objects of thought,—we must further consider *the nature of that resemblance*,—or in what respects these objects are similar or analogous to one another. Several particular points must be examined in this connection;—we must mark wherein the resemblance properly consists,—for resemblance in some respects may consist with great diversity in others;—we must define its extent and limits, for it may be greater or less, exact or imperfect;—and, above all, we must ascertain its nature, or rather the nature of the properties and relations on which it depends; for it may be real or apparent only, radical or superficial, essential or accidental; and the character of the analogy, as depending on these and similar considerations, must determine the use which should be made of it, whether for illustration or proof, and the nature of the conclusions which should be deduced from it.

(339.) In reasoning from Analogy, just as in the process of Induction, the inference may extend far beyond the particular instances which have been actually observed, but must not exceed the limits within which the resemblance really exists. In reasoning, for example, from the anatomy of one species to that of another, our conclusions extend beyond the individual specimens which have actually undergone dissection, but must not extend beyond the analogy, or ignore the differences, which may subsist between one species and another.

(340.) In reasoning from Analogy, just as in the process of

* Dégérando, "Des Signes," IV. 122. Field, "Analogical Philos.," I. 200.

Induction, we must have regard to all the known circumstances of each particular case, and especially to the laws or conditions by which it is liable to be affected :—for we can only infer similar effects from similar causes, and any variation in the cause may be expected to occasion a corresponding variation in the effect. Serious error may arise if we overlook any of the conditions on which the result depends.

(341.) False analogies may be best corrected or neutralized by such as are true, just as fallacies of sense are corrected by sense, and fallacies of reason by reason.* The substitution of a true for a false analogy has often a powerful effect in producing a conviction of the truth ; especially if it can be shown that the latter holds good, where the latter fails, in that precise point of resemblance on which the argument mainly depends.

(342.) If we would guard effectually against the danger of error in reasoning from Analogy, we must carefully distinguish, in the first instance, between illustrative and inductive analogies ; and then, in the second instance, we must deal with the latter according to the rules and cautions which have been found necessary and useful with reference to the process of inductive inference.—Many superficial resemblances may be employed as illustrations, which cannot be applied as proofs. When the tumults of the people are compared to the agitations of a stormy sea, or the swelling waves to rolling mountains ;—when a ship is said to plough the deep, or a swallow described as the herald of summer ;—there is a resemblance in some respects between two things which are otherwise widely different, but it is not of such a nature as to warrant any inference from the one to the other.—It is apparent rather than real ; or, in so far as it is real, it depends on superficial or accidental circumstances, not on the essential properties or natural laws of the objects compared. But when we reason from similar effects to similar causes, or from a resemblance between the essential properties of different things, the perception of Analogy is combined with other laws of thought,—such as the principle of causality or of the uniformity and constancy of nature, —which are all equally involved in a process of induction ; and in this case the ordinary rules of Induction will be found applicable to the right use of Analogy.—For as it is certain, on the one

* Glassford's " Essay on the Principles of Evidence," 20.

hand, that all induction depends on the perception of Analogy, and could not advance a step without its aid, so it is equally certain, on the other, that the *mere* perception of Analogy without the concurrent operation of some other principles of reason could afford no valid ground for inductive inference. The method of Induction "derives its whole force from the discovery of sound and well-framed analogies;"* and it can only be vindicated on the supposition that we are capable, not only of perceiving resemblances, but also of distinguishing between real or radical resemblances and such as are merely apparent or superficial. By induction we draw a general conclusion from particular data on the ground of analogy, and this involves the assumption of the uniformity or constancy of nature. The difficulty of accounting for such conclusions from such data does not meet us at that step of the process which depends on the mere perception of resemblance, but comes into view when that resemblance is converted into an *inductive analogy* by the simultaneous action of certain other laws of thought. The chief objections, therefore, which are urged against analogical reasoning, in so far as they involve any real difficulty, will be found applicable to it, not as it is *analogical*, but as it is *inductive*: they bear on the assumption which is involved in the general inference, not on the analogy to which that assumption is applied; and they can only be conclusive against it on the supposition that they are fatal to the inductive process itself.

(343.) As the human mind is prone to form hasty generalizations, and as these are invariably founded on the resemblance, real or apparent, which is discerned between different things, there is ample room, and urgent need also, for the exercise of care and caution, both in ascertaining the actual existence and the real nature of the analogies on which we found, and in framing our inductive conclusions so that they shall not go beyond the precise point to which these analogies are known to extend. Induction proceeds on the supposition that different objects may be analogous in their essential properties or known laws, as well as in their superficial appearance or circumstantial accidents; and that we have the means of distinguishing between these different kinds of resemblance. To ascertain the existence and the nature

* Rev. Baden Powell's "Essays," p. 18.

of the analogy on which we mean to found is the first and most indispensable step in every process of analogical reasoning ; and if this preliminary operation be carelessly conducted, or imperfectly performed, the argument will be vitiated at its source, not from any want of power in the principle of Analogy, but from the want of due care in selecting such resemblances as are applicable in the way of proof. Many of the worst fallacies must be ascribed to a failure in this initial step ; and they are only the more dangerous in proportion to their apparent plausibility.

SECT. III.—ILLUSTRATIVE CASES.

(344.) The sources of error in analogical reasoning, and the conditions on which its validity depends, may be best explained by means of a few ILLUSTRATIVE CASES.

(345.) We may take a case in which it has been supposed that Analogy would naturally and inevitably lead the mind to an erroneous conclusion ;—the case of the King of Siam, mentioned by Locke, and referred to by Hume and Butler*—who “naturally concluded, in the way of analogy, that there was no such thing as water’s becoming hard, because he had always observed it to be fluid and yielding.” The fallacy here arose from his ignorance of the conditions on which the fluidity of water depends, and the undue extension of his conclusion beyond the limits of his experience. He reasoned soundly from analogy in counting on the constant fluidity of water *in the same temperature* in which he had been accustomed to observe it ; but he erred in extending his conclusion beyond these limits, and denying the possibility of ice in *any* circumstances. And how might his error have been most effectually neutralized ? Had his informant, instead of challenging belief on the mere ground of his unsupported testimony, pointed to the familiar fact of melted lead or wax gradually becoming a hard and solid mass simply by cooling, and explained the analogy between the two cases as depending equally on the same natural law, would it not have served to neutralize the adverse presumption arising from the king’s experience, and to impart such a verisimilitude to his statement as would render it easily credible ?

* Locke’s “Essay,” Book IV. c. 15, | “Essays,” II. p. 130. Butler, Intro-
on Probability, VIII. p. 152. Hume’s | duction, Halifax’s Edition, p. xlix.

(346.) We may take another case in which the sequences are uniform within given limits, but at a certain point come under the operation of a different law, and exhibit, therefore, unexpected results. There are numerous instances in nature of *variation for special ends*, and we may select as an example the laws which regulate the maximum density of water. The general rule is that water contracts as it cools, grows heavier, and sinks to the bottom ; and this it does invariably till it reaches a temperature of about 40° F.; but just before it passes into the solid form of ice, it begins to expand instead of contracting, and remains on the surface which is frozen, while the water below continues fluid.* This has been generally and justly regarded as a beneficent provision, and a proof of Divine wisdom in the constitution of nature, not, as Professor Powell seems to have imagined, because it was supposed to be an “anomaly” subject to no law and “traceable to no physical cause,” but because the law, whatever it be, is, in the words of Mr Babbage, “intermittent,” and the variation, which is regular and constant, is evidently subservient to useful practical ends. It is well illustrated by the “calculating engine,” which is so constructed as to give off the series of natural numbers up to one hundred million, but beyond that point, the series of triangular numbers each multiplied by ten thousand : and this by a simple mechanical contrivance such as Mr Babbage has explained.† There is a natural law in the one case, and a mechanical invention, depending also on natural laws, in the other ; but in both there is a manifest proof of design acting with a view to special ends. We refer to them at present merely as instructive examples of the limits within which analogical reasoning must be confined, and of the way in which the errors to which it may possibly give rise should be corrected by experience. Had we observed only the fact that water contracts as it cools, we might possibly have been led to conclude that it would become heavier in proportion as the temperature continued to decrease, and to expect that a river or lake would freeze first at the bottom, so as to become one solid mass of ice. Had we sat at the wheel of the calculating engine, and observed that it gave off a series of natural numbers up to 100, thence to 1000, thence to 100,000, thence to 1,000,000,

* Thompson's "Christian Theism,"
II. p. 22. Baden Powell's "Essays,"
pp. 94, 154.

† Babbage, "Ninth Bridgewater
Treatise," p. 34.

and thence to 100,000,000, we should have had no doubt that the same series would be continued beyond that point. In either case we should have erred, and that, too, for the same reason,—our ignorance of some of the laws on which the ultimate results depend, and our disposition to extend our conclusion beyond the limits within which alone it is legitimate and safe.—In both cases, the principle which leads us to expect the same results in the same circumstances is confirmed; but in both, also, we are reminded that the result is liable to be modified by any variation in the conditions on which it depends, and that our conclusion must be limited to cases which are, and continue to be, strictly analogous to each other, in so far as these conditions are concerned.

(347.) The principle, whatever it be, which leads us to count upon the general constancy of Nature and the uniform operation of her laws, is accredited and confirmed by our actual experience; but it might lead us into serious error were it supposed to involve or to sanction the assumption that the constitution and course of nature have been just as they are from all eternity, and that from this hour onward they must continue the same for ever. Were nature considered as a mere physical machine, it might still be subject, for aught we know, to a law of periodical variation or change, similar to that of Babbage's engine,—and such a law might give rise to new and unexpected results at variance with all the analogies of our present experience. And if this be conceivable on the low supposition of nature being subject only to mechanical laws, it is surely infinitely less certain that it must remain for ever the same, when it is regarded as the product of a designing Cause, and subject to the control of the same omniscient wisdom and almighty power, by which it was originally established, and is still constantly maintained. In such a case the analogy of our past experience cannot give us any absolute certainty in regard to the future: it may warrant a reasonable presumption or expectation, such as is sufficient to encourage industry, and to guide us in the conduct of life; but such, also, as must ever be subject to the condition, "If the Lord will," and compatible with the supposition of a possible interruption, or even termination, of the present order of nature. Analogy is misapplied when it is employed to disprove either past or future revolutions in the state of the natural world,—not because it affords no presumption in favour of similar effects from like causes,—but be-

cause we cannot know all the causes that may come into operation, and among these the determinations of that Supreme Will to which all created things are subject. The error in this case arises from overlooking some of the most momentous conditions on which the result depends.

(348.) Analogy has been erroneously applied to disprove the credibility of Miracles, and the cases to which we have just referred may suggest a sufficient exposure of the fallacy which is involved in such arguments. Hume, Bentham, Comte, Strauss, and Powell, have all equally, although in different ways, appealed to the analogies of our actual experience as sufficient to discredit the miraculous facts of Christianity. Sometimes any supernatural occurrence has been declared to be impossible; at other times, any amount of testimony has been said to be inadequate to establish it, supposing it were possible, and even real. The first of these statements is tenable only on the principles of Atheism; for God's existence being admitted, miracles are not impossible to His almighty power, and are even rendered credible by the stupendous fact of creation,—for creation and miracles are strictly analogous. The second is tenable only on the supposition that some events, admitted to be possible, could not be so attested, even if they actually occurred, as to render them worthy of credit in after times,—a supposition which derives all its apparent plausibility from the analogy of our actual experience, partially conceived, and flagrantly misapplied. In this view of it, two distinct sets of analogies are applicable to the question;—one set derived from our experience of the regular operation of physical laws, another from our experience of the laws of human nature, which regulate, in all other cases, our belief in testimony; and in the ultimate issue, the alternative which is presented for our decision is simply this—Which would be the greater miracle,—the occurrence of such an event, or the falsehood of such a testimony?

(349.) In all the cases hitherto adduced the same fallacy may be detected,—namely, that which arises from extending analogy beyond the range of its legitimate application, and making our actual experience the measure and test of what is possible in other, and, it may be, very different circumstances. In many other cases error has arisen from analogical reasoning in consequence of a mistaken view of the real circumstances of the case. It has been said, for instance, by many, and even by so wise a man as Locke,

that as water cannot rise above the level of its source, so faith, depending as it does on human testimony, can never amount to more than mere human opinion. It would not be easy to show that there is any real analogy between the movement of water and the transmission of truth, or any such resemblance between the laws by which they are respectively regulated as should warrant us in reasoning from the one to the other. It cannot, therefore, afford an analogical argument ; it can only be employed as an illustration of the author's meaning : and even as an illustration, it is defective, since it proceeds on a false assumption. Human testimony is not the *source* of truth in any case, still less is it the source of Divine truth ; it is the mere conduit or channel of conveyance through which truth is transmitted. It is the pipe which contains the water and keeps it together, not the spring from which it flows. The source of Revealed truth is in the mind of God, and human testimony is only the medium through which it is conveyed to the mind of man. If we can trace it up to that source, we may receive it, not as "the witness of man," but as the "witness of God;" and resting on the infallible authority of the Revealer, we may have, not a human opinion merely, but a Divine faith. Notwithstanding its mediate transmission, there may be sufficient evidence of its supernatural origin ; and on the strength of that evidence we may rest upon it, not as "the word of man, but as it is in truth, the word of the living God." Faith is distinguished into two kinds, and described as *human* or *Divine*, according to the testimony or authority on which the truth is received : it is said to be a human faith when it rests on the mere testimony of man, and a Divine faith when it rests on the authority of God. And our faith in the truths of Scripture is Divine—in the only sense in which that description is applicable to faith at all—as soon as we rise to the source from which they flow, and receive them as lessons taught by Him who can neither err nor deceive. Human testimony is instrumentally employed, but only as a means of leading us up to that which is Divine, just as a stream may guide us upward to its source.*

(350.) Many errors have arisen from the supposed analogy between Civil and Ecclesiastical government. That there is some

* Haliburton "Reason of Faith," "Chart," I. 213. Perrone, "Prælec." in reply to Locke. Dr Tatham, II. 171.

must follow

resemblance between the two is implied in the mere fact that the term *government* is justly applied to both; but we cannot reason from the one to the other without taking into account also the points of difference. Our Lord tells us that the kingdom which He came to establish is, in some important respects, diverse from all other kingdoms: "My kingdom is not of this world, for if it were of this world, then would my servants fight." "The kings of the Gentiles exercise Lordship over them, and they that exercise authority upon them are called benefactors; but ye shall not be so: he that is greatest among you let him be as the younger, and he that is chief as he that doth serve." And founding on this character of Christ's kingdom, the apostle adds—"The weapons of our warfare are not carnal, but spiritual;" "Feed the flock of God, . . . not as being lords over God's heritage, but being ensamples to the flock." Now if we reason on the general analogy between Civil and Ecclesiastical government, without regard to the peculiar nature of the latter as thus contradistinguished from the former, we shall be betrayed into dangerous errors. All the arguments in favour of coercion or persecution in matters of faith spring from this source, and most of those which have been adduced in support of the peculiar and exclusive claims of the Church of Rome. It has been gravely argued, for instance, that there must be a supreme Judge and a final court of appeal, in questions of religion, just as there is a judge and court whose decisions are final in civil affairs; and that the Christian Church, being one and indivisible, must have everywhere the same catholic organization, and the same Sovereign Head. The argument is sound and valid in so far as it rests on the general analogy of government, that being common both to civil and ecclesiastical affairs; and it might warrant the conclusion that, as every state must have a magistracy whose judgment is final within that community, so in every ecclesiastical society there must be lodged somewhere a similar power whose authority is acknowledged within its own pale, and sufficient to preserve order by the correction of offenders, and their exclusion, if need be, from its communion. But when the analogy is extended beyond these limits;—when it is alleged that there must be a supreme living Judge, and a final court of appeal, not only in every particular Church, but in the Church universal;—that all the Churches in Christendom must be organized alike, and governed by the same

laws, and subject to one earthly head, the conclusion is not supported by the analogy even of Civil government ; since, in point of fact, there is no such Judge or Court on earth in civil things. There is a supreme power in each nation, just as there is a governing authority in each particular Church, whose judgment is final within their respective limits : but there is no universal Umpire having power to decide international questions,—there is no arbiter but force,—the sceptre must give place to the sword. The analogy fails, not because there is no resemblance between Civil and Ecclesiastical government, but because there is no supreme living Judge even in temporal things.—And if it be said the Church is one, and can only have one Head, the answer is obvious, that the race also is one ; and yet, notwithstanding its unity, it contains many distinct nationalities, which are independent of each other, while each of them is governed by a power which is supreme within its own domain.—And as there are thus many earthly states which have no common earthly Head, and no bond of connection except the possession of the same human nature, but are subject to God only, so there may be many visible churches, which acknowledge no sovereign authority except Christ the Lord, and which have no bond of connection except the possession of the same Christian faith. If there be no other supreme Head of universal humanity, why should there be any other supreme Head of the Catholic Church, than the Lord Himself ? And if He be the Head both of Church and State, then His revealed will must regulate our conceptions both of the powers which belong to each, and of the relations which subsist between the two ; for while we are clearly taught in Scripture that a government has been established in both, and that their several jurisdictions are independent and co-ordinate, we are also taught that the power of the sword, which has been conferred on the one, has been withheld from the other,—that in each of the two authority can only be lawfully exercised within certain prescribed limits,—and that it may be both real and effectual for its designed end, without being either infallible, on the one hand, or universal, on the other.

(351.) Many other examples of fallacious reasoning from analogy might be adduced ; but the specimens which have been selected may suffice for the purpose of showing that error is inevitable unless due attention be paid to the rules and cautions which

have been stated; and yet that we have generally the means of detecting the fallacy in its source, if these rules be duly applied. This is enough to vindicate analogical reasoning from the charge of being *peculiarly* liable to error, since it is as much as can be said of any process of reasoning whatever. But its noblest vindication may be found in the vast multitude of sound, legitimate, and conclusive analogies which may be collected in every department of human knowledge.

(352.) It may be useful to offer a few specimens both of such analogies as are strictly inductive, and also of such as are merely suggestive of truths of which they afford no scientific proof, but yield a greater or less degree of probability in their favour. By comparing the two we may be enabled to discern more clearly the precise nature of the distinction between them,—to ascertain the circumstances on which their respective degrees of evidence depend,—and to see how, in the progress of inquiry, that which was at first only a presumption or a probability may be converted into an inductive proof.

(353.) The fact that water freezes, and passes from a fluid to a solid state, at a certain temperature, leads us to expect that the same cause will produce the same effect everywhere and at all times, if there has been no change in any of the conditions on which its action depends. The same cause—a temperature of 32°—will convert water into ice, under the ordinary pressure of the atmosphere; but if that pressure be considerably increased or diminished, one of the conditions is changed, and there may be a corresponding change in the result. This is an example of strict inductive inference; we ascertain, in the first instance, the cause of a particular effect, and we extend the conclusion on the ground of analogy, amounting in this case to exact resemblance or *generic sameness*, to millions of occurrences which have never fallen within the range of our actual observation. We have no experience of the future; but we have experience of a cause which has produced a certain effect in times past, and, as Priestley has said, “that time *was* once future,”* so that if we have a true perception of the cause, the element of time may be eliminated as a non-essential condition of the effect. But there are other liquids besides water,—and the fact that this one fluid is converted into a solid mass by

* Priestley's “Examination of Reid,” 85.

a certain temperature, suggests the idea that these too may be congealed by cold. This idea is suggested by analogy, as all substances which are classed as liquids are, in that one respect, generically alike. It would not warrant the expectation, as in the previous case, that the same temperature would invariably produce the same effect as it does on water,—for the constitution of each substance must be taken into account. But as liquidity is proved, in one case, to depend on temperature, it is probable, on the ground of analogy, that other liquids may be affected in a similar way ; and when the expectation thus awakened is verified by experience, in the case of alcohol, melted lead, quicksilver, and many more, the analogical probability is converted into an inductive inference, and this is extended, with unwavering confidence, to all cases belonging to the same genus, on the ground of their exact resemblance.

(354.) Some substances, again, which have been observed in a solid or in a liquid state, are known also to exist in the form of a visible vapour or of an invisible gas. Heat converts water at a boiling temperature into steam ; and chemistry can separate one of its constituents in the form of hydrogen gas. These effects are invariably produced by the same causes, and may be securely reckoned on while the necessary conditions remain unchanged. Analogy suggests that heat may have similar effects on other substances similarly constituted ; but the differences must be marked as well as the resemblances, and the conclusion must be limited to the precise point to which the analogy is known to extend. But when it is found that, in a vast variety of cases, the analogy holds good, we are led up to one of the widest generalizations of Science, which teaches us to regard the solid, liquid, or gaseous state of matter as depending on a greater or less degree of heat.

(355.) When Watt observed the lid of a tea-kettle moved from its place by the vapour of boiling water, experience proved that steam is an elastic force, and analogy suggested that it might be applied as a mechanical power. When Franklin observed the resemblance between the sparks which are elicited by the friction of certain substances, and the flashes of lightning in the sky, Analogy suggested the conjecture that they might be of the same nature ; and when this analogical conjecture was verified by his bold but successful experiment, it was converted at once into an inductive truth. When Harvey, guided, as he tells us, by the analogy of

Final Causes in other instances, conjectured from the structure of the valves which he observed in the veins and arteries, that they might have been intended to facilitate the transmission of blood to the extremities and its return again to the heart, his probable opinion passed into an inductive certainty when it was verified by observation in one or two particular cases, and was announced as a general law in regard to the whole human race, whose constitution is generically the same. Had he proceeded to reason from the case of man to the case of other warm-blooded animals, he would have reasoned, in the first instance, analogically, but surely not without a high degree of probability; and that probability would have risen into certainty as one case after another was found to fall under the same general law. Had he proceeded still further to reason from the circulation of the blood in animals to the circulation of the sap in plants and trees, he would have been still advancing under the conduct of Analogy as a guide to truth; and if he neither allowed "his analogies to overlook differences, nor his distinctions to set aside resemblances,"* he might have shown, on sure inductive grounds, that a similar law pervades both the animal and the vegetable kingdoms. When Newton observed an apple falling to the earth, he perceived the effect of a power—what he knew not—but which would operate in the same way in all analogous cases. Might it not be the same, or at least a similar power, which determined the movements of the heavenly bodies? The suggestion was followed up by inquiry, and inquiry resulted in the discovery that the power in both cases is precisely the same. The analogy of terrestrial gravitation, was found to explain and establish the theory of celestial mechanics.

(356.) The few examples which have been adduced may be sufficient as specimens of sound analogical arguments, and as illustrations of the kind and degree of probability which may attach to the conclusions deduced from them. But every one who reflects on his own experience, and considers in how many instances his convictions and his conduct are determined by the perception of Analogy, even when it is never reduced to the form of a regular argument, will be at no loss to find a multitude of other examples in the most familiar facts of consciousness.

* Dr M'Cosh, "Intuitions," 488.

CHAPTER X.

ANALOGY ; ITS PECULIAR CHARM.

(357.) In considering the general Doctrine of Analogy we have been unavoidably led into some discussions of an abstruse and metaphysical kind, such as may have little interest for those who are not in the habit of analysing the process of thought, or investigating the principles and laws by which it is governed. But fortunately the exercise of our faculties depends on their own spontaneous activity, not on the reflective philosophy which seeks to analyse or explain them. Men reasoned vigorously before there was any science of Logic, and discerned beauty in colour, and form, and proportion, while as yet they were ignorant of the principles of Taste, or the rules of *Æsthetics*. And so it will be found that the perception of Analogy, and the inferences which flow from it, are independent of the philosophical explanation of them; they come into exercise spontaneously in every healthy mind; and reflection has no other function in regard to them than that of ascertaining the facts which consciousness reveals,—of arranging them into distinct classes,—and co-ordinating them under general laws.

(358.) When we speak of the peculiar charm of Analogy as a subject of study, we refer to the pleasure and instruction which may be derived from the practical habit of marking analogies in whatever department they may be discerned, and of following out the trains of thought which they never fail to suggest. This is a habit of mind which may become a perennial source of profitable reflection, and which is highly favourable to progress in every walk of inquiry.

(359.) Considered, in the first instance, in its most general aspect, as extending to all the different branches of our common natural knowledge, the habit of marking analogies, and tracing them out through all their legitimate consequences and manifold

applications, will be found to exert a marvellous power in quickening the activity of thought,—in imparting variety, vividness, and freshness to our conceptions,—and in storing the mind with rich materials which may be usefully applied either in the way of proof or of illustration. It is this habit, more than any other, which distinguishes the man of genius—the philosopher not less than the poet—from the ordinary observers of nature or students of history. It is a fertile source of suggestion and discovery ; while it is distinguished from mere flights of fancy or reveries of imagination, by being connected at every step with the observation of *facts*, and the *relations* which subsist between them.

(360.) It is an important feature of Analogy that it is so closely connected with experience and observation. It presupposes some knowledge of two or more objects of thought, essentially distinct,—involves an act of comparison between them,—and implies a perception of resemblance in certain specific respects. All this requires accurate attention to these objects, whether they be actual or ideal ; and when one or other, and in some cases each, of the related terms is a matter of fact, it requires repeated and discriminating observation. We are thus kept within the region of experience, even when our conclusions transcend its particular informations, and are compelled to revert to it at every successive step. The perception of resemblance is the stimulus and guide of thought, but it is not independent of experience. By the aid of Analogy we rise from particular to general truths, from what was already known to what was hitherto unknown ;—but to convert the conception which is thus suggested into a conviction of its truth,—to transform a seeming resemblance into a fruitful analogy,—we must descend, in every instance, to the study of the objects before us, and find our materials there. But this process once begun, there is no assignable limit to it. For no sooner is a new truth ascertained by this means, than it becomes in its turn suggestive of new analogies, and leads up to still higher generalizations. It will be found to have relations to other truths of a more comprehensive kind, while for their verification we must have recourse again to a careful consideration of the objects which are conceived to be so related. And thus one truth after another, in an endless series, is suggested by Analogy, and verified by successive appeals to fact. So that Reason, acting under the law of Analogy, may be fitly compared to “a tree yielding fruit after his

kind, whose seed is in itself, upon the earth,"—or rather to the banyan-tree, which sends forth its shoots and boughs towards heaven, while one branch after another returns again to the earth whence it sprung, and, taking root there, finds fresh nourishment for further growth, and indefinite expansion.

(361.) The fruitfulness of the principle, and the manifold variety of its applications, are not its only charm: to a reflecting mind, it has an additional and very strong attraction arising from its close connection with the familiar objects and events of everyday life. The facts with which it deals fall within the range of our personal observation, and are constantly presenting themselves in the ordinary course of experience. Every object in nature, and every event in time, may afford occasion for the exercise of comparison, and may suggest new analogies. Analogy is discernible everywhere around us. We cannot look, without seeing it, we cannot think, without being conscious of its presence. It is embodied, as it were, and visibly manifested in facts so palpable that they cannot be overlooked, yet so significant that every one of them is to us a sign or symbol of truth. It admits of innumerable developments ever fresh and new. Like the Inductive principle with which it is closely allied, it is applicable to every department of inquiry, and in each of them it deals with facts which belong to the common experience, and enter into the actual life, of men.

(362.) The study of natural analogies, while it is closely connected with Inductive reasoning, and fitted to stimulate the intellectual faculties into healthful exercise, possesses an additional charm in its powerful influence on the Imagination. The mind is not a mere reasoning machine, nor are any of its powers fully developed except when they all act in harmonious concert. Truth addresses itself to the whole man; to his senses, his intellect, his imagination, his sensibilities, his taste, and his conscience; and that truth is the most powerful which calls the greatest number of his faculties into action. The Imagination is one of the most useful auxiliaries of reason,—the most active, perhaps, in purveying and preparing the materials of thought. Whatever serves to call it into exercise, imparts a fresh and powerful impulse to intellectual activity. The perception of analogies has this effect, and even the perception of mere similitudes, however superficial or fanciful. The study of analogies affords, therefore, a constant

and pleasing stimulus to the Imagination ; and when striking points of resemblance are clearly discerned, the mind, following its native bent, will advance either towards philosophical discovery by some happy and comprehensive generalization, or towards the ideal representation of truth in works of poetry and art.

(363.) Considered, again, in its more special application to Religion, Natural and Revealed, Analogy, besides possessing the same charms which belong to it in every other department, has this additional recommendation, that it constitutes a bond of union between the Works and the Word of God ; that it connects the natural manifestation, with the supernatural Revelation, of Truth, —and that, by making “earthly things” symbols of “heavenly things,” it gives us the clearest conceptions which we are capable of forming of truths which might otherwise be inaccessible to our faculties, and makes the familiar objects and relations of everyday life suggestive of spiritual and unseen realities. It imparts, as it were, a sacramental character to Nature, by which it becomes a visible symbol of the supernatural, and thus makes what is exhibited to the senses subservient to the exercise of Faith. This is the great charm of Butler’s “Analogy ;” that it brings the truths of Religion into close connection with the facts of common experience, or the incidents of everyday life ; and, above all, that it teaches us to compare the one with the other, in the expectation that we shall find a correspondence or harmony between the two. The principle which Butler lays down is far more extensive than his actual application of it. It is not so much the constituent contents of his book,—or the conclusiveness of his arguments on this or that particular topic,—or even the whole series of his inferences and deductions considered as a defence of religious truth, that have rendered it so eminently useful to thoughtful minds for several generations ; it is rather the radical principle which underlies his whole reasoning,—the vital and prolific germ of his whole process of thought. Let that principle be clearly apprehended and firmly grasped by any mind,—let that germ take root and grow, and it will soon evince its own power, and make it evident that, just as a living organism can assimilate the most heterogeneous elements, and convert them into healthful nourishment, so this vital principle can find spiritual aliment in every object around it. Let the habit be once formed of marking resemblances, and discriminating between one kind of analogies and another,

in connection with the truths of Natural and Revealed Religion, and the principle will come into play spontaneously in a thousand instances, which find no place in the pages of Butler. Every one who has got hold of the leading principle, feels that he is comparatively independent of the particular arguments, of the "Analogy,"—that he is free to reject some of these, and to modify others;—while, with Nature around him, and the Bible in his hands, he can discover other points of resemblance of which Butler makes no mention. That principle will suggest answers to some difficulties which he has not discussed, and give rise to trains of thought which he has not pursued. It will thus become, in each man's own breast, a potent, because ever present and ever active, witness for Truth, and auxiliary to Faith.

(364.) When the principle of Analogy is once understood, the evidence arising from it is so striking and forcible,—it springs up from so many sources around us in the daily walks of life,—it depends on facts so familiar, so palpable, so patent to the observation of all, that no effort should be spared to bring it home to the understanding of all thinking men, whether they be philosophers or peasants. We cannot but regard it as a strong proof of the wide difference between British and German habits of thought, that a man so able and accomplished as Dr Tholuck unquestionably is, should have objected to the "Analogy" on this very ground, and given utterance to the complaint that "here we find ourself in the region of a commonplace, jejune reflection upon man's everyday passive experience," and that "the perpetual going afoot makes one weary, especially over sand." "This is only a symptom," as Dr Fitzgerald has said, "of that diseased preference of speculative to practical proof, which is a prevailing weakness in the mind of Germany." But that weakness has begun to appear even in the country of Butler, having been imported, with much else that is still more questionable, by men who seem to be impatient alike of the method of induction, and of the authority of Revelation, in matters of faith.* Butler is even classed among Rationalists, because he seeks to interpret the Book of Nature and Providence as well as the Record of Revelation, and to illustrate the analogy between the two. A profounder philosophy would have led them to see that there is no Rationalism,

* Essays and Reviews, Mark Pattison, B.D., p. 293.

in the invidious sense of the term, in the exercise of reason with reference to either of the two, provided the authority of each, in its own province, is duly recognised. So far from deferring to such groundless criticism, we regard it as one of Butler's highest distinctions, that he had the sagacity to connect the defence of Religion with the facts of our common experience. And we are fortified in this view by the opinion of an accomplished Layman who, speaking of the French apologists, puts the question, why the writings of Bossuet and Pascal on the Christian Evidences still continue to be frequently reprinted and eagerly read, while a multitude of more recent works are found to have little interest, and no perceptible influence on public opinion ; and answers the question by ascribing the difference, not so much to the superior talent and genius of the men, as to the sagacity with which they selected topics the best adapted to the actual wants of society, and which came home to the bosoms and business of men in the walks of common life. Instead of entrenching themselves behind abstract reasonings, and trusting in the subtlety of scholastic disputation, they adopted a practical method, and made their appeal to undeniable facts of experience or of consciousness, urging them home as proofs either of the *analogy* between Nature and Revelation, or of the *adaptation* of the latter to the actual and most urgent wants of men.* And such a work pre-eminently is the "Analogy" of Bishop Butler, since it derives its chief charm from the comparison which it leads us to institute between the facts of common experience and the lessons of Religion.

(365.) But how should the lesson of Analogy be taught, so as to become in each man's breast a living germ of thought, and grow into a habit of religious reflection ? Not by mere logical definition,—not by any process of abstract reasoning,—not even by a series of well-selected examples illustrative of the general principle,—but chiefly, by the exercise of each man's own mind on the Truths of Religion, viewed in connection, and in comparison, with the facts of Experience. One or two instances, clearly discerned and intelligently applied by himself, will be of more practical avail than a hundred examples presented on paper, and read, but not followed up by reflection. Let him take one analogy at a time, and having clearly apprehended its meaning, let him carry it out

* President Riambourg, "Rationalisme et Tradition." The closing chapter.

to the broad field of nature or the experience of common life ; let him observe and compare everything which has any relation to it in the facts by which he is surrounded : he will soon acquire what has been finely called “ an educated eye ”—

“ An eye practised like a blind man’s touch,”—

he will feel that he has now a range of vision as well as a quickness of perception to which he was formerly a stranger ;—fresh evidence will spring up around him as he advances, and confirmatory proofs will present themselves spontaneously, where they were least expected ; and as he gradually acquires a firmer hold and a freer use of the principle, he will find that it admits of endless application. For this reason, let reading and reflection alternate with observation : let every successive example be tested by experience : let no step be taken in advance, until solid footing has been found at every stage ; for it is better to spend a week in maturely weighing and thoroughly mastering one sound analogy, than to distract his mind by a superficial consideration of many. Take each by itself, and it will be a “ light to our feet and a lamp to our path ”—take a multitude together, and, like cross-lights in a room, one train of thought will be confusedly mixed with another. But having ascertained several sound analogies, we may combine them into a cumulative proof, whose united force will be felt to be irresistible.

(366.) The proofs which are derived from this source are far from being useful only to philosophical minds. We greatly err, if we imagine that our young men, our artisans, our tradesmen, our peasantry, are incapable of appreciating the evidence of Analogy, or of deriving substantial benefit from it. Bishop Heber has truly said that it is not the *intellect*, but the *vocabulary*, of the common people that is deficient : and we might appeal, in confirmation of his remark, to the spontaneous response which they render to the soundest reasoning, and even to the finest imagery, as often as these are presented to them, in our public meetings, in plain, manly, Saxon English. The unlearned man is often as profoundly reflective as his more lettered neighbour. And surely when the general diffusion of education, and the circulation of a popular literature, is likely to expose his hereditary beliefs to new and formidable assaults, it is well to fortify his faith by a principle so familiar, and so wide in its application, as is THE ANALOGY BETWEEN THE WORKS AND THE WORD OF GOD.

PART II.



SOURCES OF ANALOGY IN MATTERS OF FAITH.

SOURCES OF ANALOGY IN MATTERS OF FAITH.

(367.) Having offered some illustration of the general doctrine of Analogy, in its manifold relations to the whole system of human knowledge, we are now prepared to investigate more particularly the sources of Analogy in matters of Faith.

(368.) The comprehensive title of Butler's work—"The Analogy of Religion, Natural and Revealed, to the Constitution and Course of Nature,"—is wide enough to include all the analogies of whatever kind which subsist between the two great volumes—the Works and the Word of God. In applying his general principle, Butler refers to a multitude of facts, falling within the range of our actual experience, which are attested by consciousness or observation. These facts are judiciously selected, and applied with much discrimination to illustrate the analogy which they bear to cognate topics in Theology: but no attempt is made to classify them, or to trace them to their respective sources; and no use is made of those internal analogies which may be discovered between the constituent parts of Revelation itself. The question naturally arises whether it might not be possible, and if it be possible, whether it might not be useful, to arrange the facts in distinct classes, according to their specific nature, or the special sources from which they are respectively derived, so as to indicate the different lines of thought which may be most profitably pursued, and furnish reflecting minds with a guide to direct them in prosecuting the study for themselves? It will be found that the facts which supply the materials for analogical reasoning lie, like geological formations, in distinct strata, or run, like the precious metals, into veins; that they belong to different classes which can be specified under separate heads; and that, if we cannot

hope to reach a final or exhaustive classification in the present defective state of our knowledge, we may yet succeed in making such a provisional distribution of them as will hold good as far as it goes, and may be practically useful in giving distinct and definite views of various kinds of analogies which may be applied to matters of Faith.

(369.) When the land-surveyor points to a seam of coal or limestone, or to a vein of precious metal, the skill and labour of the miner receive a definite direction, and are not wasted on random efforts ;—and a deep mine is often discovered by means of a slight cropping out at the surface, which indicates to an educated eye what is hid as yet from actual observation in the bowels of the earth. In like manner, if we select a few obvious analogies, such as present themselves spontaneously to every mind, and examine them attentively, with a view to discover the nature of the circumstances on which they severally depend, and the different sources from which they arise, we may find that they indicate distinct veins of thought which might be profitably explored. It is one thing to open the vein,—it is another to work the mine ; and every student must work it for himself by the patient study of Nature and of Scripture ; but he may be guided in doing so, if he be furnished beforehand with a distinct specification of those lines of thought which may lead to the discovery of sound analogies in matters of Faith. Our brief account of the Sources of such analogies is not offered as an exhaustive or complete analysis of the subject, but rather as a Gnomon, which may serve to indicate its more prominent features,—or as a finger-post, pointing to the different directions in which it may be most successfully studied.

(370.) It is the more necessary to discriminate between analogies derived from different sources, because more than one,—and these founded on distinct considerations,—are often available in the treatment of the same question, especially when it relates to a complex subject which may be considered in a variety of aspects and relations. Unless we trace the analogy which we mean to employ to the special ground on which it depends, and assign it to the class to which it properly belongs, we shall be in danger of mistaking the precise point on which the comparison hinges, and involving ourselves in great confusion of thought. But if we trace every analogy to its real source, and assign it to

its proper class, we shall not only obtain a clear and distinct view of the precise point of resemblance on which its argumentative force depends, but we shall be entitled also to regard it as only a specimen of many more which may yet be found in the same mine, and encouraged to proceed in quest of further discoveries in the same direction.

(371.) In treating generally of the Sources of Analogy in matters of Faith, it is important to remark that Butler's treatise directs our attention chiefly, if not exclusively, to *natural analogies*, or such as are derived from "the constitution and course of nature;" and takes little or no note of *Scriptural analogies*, or such as may be equally found in the constituent truths, or consecutive parts, of a progressive Revelation. Yet in treating of the Divine origin of the scheme which Scripture unfolds, these last may afford some of the most convincing proofs; and they may be legitimately and effectively applied in argument, since they are instantly discerned on a comparison of one part of Scripture with another, and are of such a nature as to lay a solid foundation for the belief, that a scheme so constructed could proceed only from an omniscient Mind. To be complete, the argument from Analogy must be extended, so as to include sound analogies from whatever source they may be derived.

(372.) Our present inquiry, while it embraces all sound analogies from whatever source they may be derived, is confined to such as may be applied in argument, whether for the defence or the confirmation of Religious truth. Illustrative analogies, which may be most effectively employed in the explanation and enforcement of the doctrines and duties of religion, are left out of view, excepting such of them as contain and cover a real, but latent, proof; for any attempt to classify such analogies, otherwise than as figures of speech, or to trace them to all their possible sources, might be found to involve the impracticable task of assigning limits to the Imagination itself. We undertake a much more manageable problem, when we propose to inquire in what quarters such analogies may be found as are fitted to neutralize objections against the evidences or truths of Religion,—to impart a character of verisimilitude to its claims,—and to supply an auxiliary proof, in corroboration of its more direct credentials.

(373.) Such analogies may evidently be derived from many distinct sources, according to the various aspects in which Re-

ligion may be contemplated. If it be contemplated in its speculative aspect, as *a branch of knowledge*, the analogies which are applicable to it in this view must be derived from the laws of our cognitive faculties, and the manifestations by which truth of any kind is made known. If it be contemplated in its practical aspect as *a rule of life*, requiring a state of mind and heart, and a corresponding course of conduct, towards God, befitting the perfections of His nature and the relations which He sustains towards us, the analogies which are applicable to it in this view must be derived from the laws of our moral nature, and those natural human relations which resemble our relations to God. If it be contemplated in its objective aspect as *a scheme or system of truth*, the analogies which are applicable to it in this view may evidently be derived from two distinct and independent sources,—either from a comparison of its lessons with the facts of experience, that is, with what we know of “the constitution and course of nature,”—or from a comparison of its own constituent parts, and the relation which they bear to one another.

(374.) Some such division as this might be adopted, were it proposed to construct a systematic treatise on the subject. Several valuable suggestions have been offered by recent writers towards a right arrangement and classification of analogies. Mr Mansel has shown that they may be found either in the *laws of thought*, or in the *manifestations of truth*; that all our knowledge is composed of two distinct elements, the matter and the form, the one supplied from without, the other imposed from within; and that it is important to mark, in every case, whether an objection is directed against the one or the other, since if it be directed against the laws of thought, it is not valid against religion unless it be valid against all our knowledge.* Mr Rogers has enumerated with discriminating sagacity, several distinct sources of analogies in matters of faith; he finds them in the fundamental laws of man's development, which require an influence *ab extra*,—in the relation in which he stands to the external world,—in the dependence of the individual on social culture,—in the dependence of the species on progressive development,—in the use of books and records in every other department of knowledge.† These suggestions relate

* Mansel, “Limits of Religious Thought,” pp. 144, 167.

† H. Rogers, “Eclipse of Faith,” pp. 284–302.—A valuable section.

to religion considered chiefly in its first aspect, as a branch of knowledge; and this is unquestionably the aspect of it which is most liable to be assailed by the sceptic. But the other aspects of it are also important, and should be comprehended in any full discussion of the subject.

(375.) We have already said that analogies derived from several distinct sources are often applicable to the same topic on account of its various aspects and relations; and practically it will be found difficult to adhere to any formal division in expounding the subject in detail. For this reason we propose to illustrate the various distinct sources of analogy in matters of faith by a *series of specimens* derived from each of them, so as merely to indicate some lines of thought which may be profitably pursued.

CHAPTER I.

ANALOGY IN RESPECT TO THE LAWS AND CONDITIONS OF
THOUGHT.

(376.) There is an obvious and striking analogy between the different branches of our common secular knowledge. That knowledge relates to a great variety of objects, and is conveyed to us through many different channels. Yet, while the truths, which are comprehended under it, are different in themselves, as well as perceived by distinct faculties, and derived from independent sources, they are not only perfectly harmonious, but, in some important respects, analogous to one another. Many obvious analogies between the different branches of our mere secular knowledge might be specified. There is an analogy, for instance, between sense and consciousness, or, as they have been justly called, the “external” and the “internal” sense: in both there is a direct perception of their objects, and in both, also, an intuitive and irresistible belief of what they severally attest. There is a similar analogy between instinct and reason; for the law of instinct, which determines the appetites and habits of every animal, is strictly analogous to those laws which are imposed on reason itself, and which are as natural and as irresistible as any instinct whatever. Accordingly we find that all the branches of our mere secular knowledge, different as they are in other respects, are analogous to each other in this, that they severally depend on the same laws of thought. Every branch of science,—optics, acoustics, mechanics, astronomy, chemistry—is equally dependent on these laws. They have, therefore, many features of resemblance as well as of diversity, and are connected with each other by the bond of analogy. And this fact affords a reasonable presumption in favour of a similar connection between our common and our religious knowledge.

(377.) The analogy between all the branches of human knowledge has its root in the fundamental laws of thought, and must not be confounded with any superficial or fanciful resemblance. Looking at knowledge on its *subjective* side, or what is contributed to it by the mind itself, in the exercise of its natural faculties, we find in the uniform operation of the same mental laws, whatever may be the various objects of thought, a solid foundation for analogy between all its different branches. As these laws are the same in every case, and at all times, they may seem to exhibit identity, rather than analogy: but while the laws of thought are the same, the objects to which they are applied are different; and the different branches of knowledge are, on that account, properly described as analogous.

(378.) Were the question proposed,—How is knowledge of any kind possible? we should probably feel ourselves at a loss to answer it *a priori*, or otherwise than by falling back on our actual experience of the manner in which it is acquired. How the mind of man can become conversant with an external universe, and enter into intelligent and intelligible communication with living beings around him, might well be regarded as an insoluble problem, were it not solved to our hand by our familiar experience.

(379.) The first and most fundamental law is that which requires, in order to the acquisition of knowledge of any kind, a due correlation between the *subject* and the *object* of thought. There must be, in the first instance, a thinking subject,—a percipient mind,—endowed with faculties capable of acquiring knowledge; there must be, in the second instance, an object of thought, something presented or manifested to the mind, and capable of being apprehended by it; and there must be, in the third instance, an established relation between the subject and object of thought, such as that the one shall be duly adapted to the other, and brought into actual communication with it, or as Lord Herbert expresses it—"Conditio prima est, ut intra nostram stet Analogiam."* It is with the mind as with the eye. There can be no vision unless there be an eye to see,—an object to be seen,—and such a relation between the two as that the one is suitably presented to the other, so as to be actually visible. These three are all equally indispensable, as distinct and co-ordinate factors or conditions of

* Herbert, "De Veritate," p. 13.

human knowledge; and they must be recognised, therefore, in every one of its legitimate branches. It follows that there is one constant quantity, which remains ever the same, whatever may be the object of thought,—namely, the thinking mind, with its natural faculties and invariable laws; and this lays a solid foundation for analogy between all the branches of our natural knowledge. The objects of thought may be different, the laws of thought are ever the same; and so far as the different branches of knowledge depend on these laws, they must be, in this respect, analogous to one another. The *object* of thought, again, is not constant, but variable: it may be a person or a relation, a substance or a property, a datum of sense or of consciousness; it depends on a multitude of different manifestations, and these give rise to the various distinct branches of knowledge.

(380.) As an object of thought is not less indispensable than a thinking mind, so it seems to be a fundamental law of man's development, that his intelligence is first quickened *from without*. His consciousness itself is evoked by sensation. His mental faculties are first called into action through the medium of his material organs. The whole process of thinking and knowing originates *in an external, natural revelation*. It might have been otherwise, and perhaps in the case of pure spirits, thought may be conceived to originate in their own mental activity; but unquestionably this is not the constitution of man. He is dependent from his birth on the impressions which are made on his mind through the senses for the first elements of thought—and without these, his power of thinking would never become self-conscious or active. This law of human development may be recognised without admitting, as Condillac taught, that all our ideas are only “sensations transformed;” for the impulse thus received from without awakens a dormant power within, and that power, now revealed in the clear light of consciousness, opens up a new world of thought, and supplies a new source of ideas, which cannot be accounted for by mere sensation, and still less by any law of “transformation” which it is possible to conceive. All the branches of our common natural knowledge—including even the strictly demonstrative sciences of number and magnitude, fall under this fundamental law; for a certain measure of experience is necessarily involved in the conceptions on which they respectively depend; and in this respect, they are all analogous to one another:—while the same

analogy will be found to have an important application also to the theory of our religious knowledge.

(381.) This fundamental source of analogy in matters of Faith is one of much greater importance than it may seem to be at first sight. It supplies an argument which may be applied with powerful effect to counteract the most common form of Scepticism,—that *partial* form of it which calls in question the intellectual laws which are equally concerned in our religious and common knowledge; for it shows that the same or similar doubts might be raised, for like reasons, in regard to other truths which are most familiarly known, and most firmly believed. The theory of universal Scepticism is absurd, and cannot even *affirm* itself without committing suicide;* but a partial form of it, confined only to our religious knowledge, is often based on a denial of the validity of those laws of thought which are equally implicated in the various branches of our common secular knowledge. Sir James Macintosh, commenting on the scepticism of Hume, refers to this source of analogy as affording an antidote to the evil which must arise from any attempt to dissever our religious knowledge from the common laws of human intelligence, or to assail Religion on grounds which are equally applicable to every other kind of truth.† “A system of universal scepticism can never be more than an intellectual amusement, an exercise of subtilty. . . . As those dictates of experience which regulate conduct must be the objects of belief, all objections which attack them in common with the principles of reasoning must be utterly ineffectual. Whatever attacks every principle of belief can destroy none. As long as the foundations of knowledge are allowed to remain on the same level (be it called of certainty or uncertainty) with the maxims of life, the whole system of human conviction must continue undisturbed. . . . Universal scepticism involves a contradiction in terms. *It is a belief that there can be no belief.* No man can be allowed to be an opponent in reasoning, who does not set out with admitting all the principles, without the admission of which it is impossible to reason.” Mr Mansel, in like manner, lays down two “general principles”—“First, that there is no rational difficulty in Christian Theology which has not its corresponding difficulty in human

* Sextus Empiricus, Crousaz, “Examen du Pyrrhonisme.” Rennel on Scepticism.

† Preliminary Dissertation, p. 353.

This is repeated

It is a belief that we cannot

have a belief that we cannot

Philosophy; and secondly, that therefore we may reasonably conclude that the stumblingblocks which the rationalist professes to find in the doctrines of revealed religion arise, not from defects *peculiar* to revelation, but from the laws and limits of human thought in general.* "I am persuaded," says Dr Reid, "that absolute scepticism is not more destructive of the faith of a Christian, than of the science of a philosopher, and of the prudence of a man of common understanding."†

(382.) Analogies derived from this source may be applied to vindicate many principles and processes of thought which are necessarily involved in our religious knowledge. In so far as Religion depends on any direct or immediate intuition of reason,—such as the perception of resemblance and difference, or the principle of causality,—it should surely be enough to neutralize any objection against it which may be founded on the supposed invalidity of these intuitions, if we can show that the very same laws of reason are involved in every branch of our most certain natural knowledge. In so far, again, as Religion depends on any process of reasoning, by which we reach our conclusion, not by direct intuition, but by an intermediate proof, it should surely be enough to satisfy the most sceptical mind, if we can show that the proof is valid according to those logical laws, which are recognised in every other department of inquiry. Some writers, indeed, have recently shown a disposition to depreciate what has been called a "logical Theology,"‡ while others have boldly affirmed that propositions which are logically contradictory, may nevertheless be equally true; § as if they wished to revive the exploded notion that what is true in Philosophy may be false in Theology, and *vice versa*; || but in doing so, they are justly chargeable with holding, either that the laws of logic are not universally applicable to all the branches of human knowledge, or that the truths of religion form an exceptional class, and are excluded from the ordinary operations of human intelligence. It becomes us to remember that these truths are presented to the same mind which takes

* Bampton Lectures, pp. 167, 170.

† Reid's "Inquiry," Dedication, p. vii.

‡ Isaac Taylor, "Logic of Theology." Morell, "Philosophy of Religion."

§ Mozley on "Augustinian Predestination," pp. 26, 27.

|| Dr Wiseman opposes this view, "Lectures on the Connection between Science and Religion," pp. 2, 3; and also Javari, "De la Certitude," p. 366.

cognizance of all other truth,—that to be of any practical use, they must be known, and to be known, they must be dealt with by the same faculties, and according to the same laws, which regulate our knowledge in other cases,—that these faculties and laws come into spontaneous and active operation as soon as any object is presented to our thoughts so as to engage our attention, insomuch that it is not with us a matter of option, but of necessity, that we should be governed by them,—and that it is not only unreasonable, but impossible to believe two contradictory propositions, when they are clearly seen to be contradictory. So far the natural laws, whether of intuitive reason or of inferential reasoning, must be held to apply equally to our religious and our common knowledge; and in this fundamental fact we have one source of Analogy in matters of Faith.

(383.) But in applying analogies derived from this source, it is peculiarly necessary to bear in mind the precise point of resemblance between our natural and religious knowledge on which our argument depends, and to ascertain the exact extent and limits of that resemblance itself,—lest in seeking to vindicate the legitimate use of reason in matters of Faith, we should be led insensibly to exaggerate its powers, and to erect it into a supreme test and arbiter of all truth. There is a danger on this side which should be carefully guarded against; and which can only be successfully avoided by the habitual recognition of the fact, that all our knowledge depends on two factors—the subjective and the objective; and that, while its different branches are analogous to each other in respect of the mental conditions and laws to which they are subject, they may be widely different in respect of the manifestations by which truth is presented to the mind, and of the media or channels through which it is conveyed. The same laws of thought may be applicable to all the parts of our knowledge, and this may constitute a real analogy between them; while neither this analogy, nor any other, can warrant us in rejecting any truths merely because they cannot be discovered, nor even proved, by reason alone,—provided they come to us attested by an authority such as reason itself must acknowledge to be sufficient to establish their claims on our belief. There are obviously many truths which cannot be proved by our reason, or our individual experience, but which can only be learned from the teaching of others: there may be other truths which are only partially made known, and which,

in their amplitude and fulness, transcend the limits of our faculties ; and if, on the plea that all the branches of our knowledge are analogous to each other in respect of its conditions and laws, we reject these truths, or regard them as incredible, we shall be justly chargeable with stretching this analogy beyond its legitimate application ; while we overlook *other* analogies which abundantly warrant our reception of truth on trustworthy authority, and the belief of whatever we can learn and know on subjects which cannot be fully comprehended.

CHAPTER II.

ANALOGY IN RESPECT TO THE MANIFESTATIONS OF TRUTH.

(384.) There is an obvious and striking analogy between our secular and our religious knowledge. Our secular knowledge denotes all that we know of the constitution and course of nature,—all that we can learn, by the exercise of our natural faculties, concerning those things which are seen and temporal,—all that we are in the habit of deducing from that source, and applying to the regulation of our conduct with a view to our interests in the present life. Our religious knowledge denotes all that we can learn and know of God, of His character and will, of our relation to Him, and our prospects under His government, whether from the lessons of Nature or Revelation.

(385.) The analogy between the two depends partly on the common laws and conditions of Thought to which we have already referred, but partly also on *similar manifestations* of Truth. These manifestations are, in either case, of various kinds; yet different as they are, there is a certain affinity or correspondence between them; and on comparing them with one another, we must take into account both the points of difference and the points of resemblance. The points of difference give rise to the distinction between the various branches of knowledge, and the points of resemblance constitute, notwithstanding that difference, a real analogy between them. That analogy exists on the *objective*, not less than on the *subjective*, side of our knowledge; and it may be considered, therefore, with reference either to the laws and conditions of thought, or to the manifestations by which truth is presented to the mind.

(386.) It is by the concurrence of these two factors that both our secular and our religious knowledge is acquired; and, on the supposition of suitable manifestations being presented to the mind, there is no greater difficulty in accounting for the origin of those

ideas which religion involves, than there is in accounting for the origin of such as are involved in our common natural knowledge. The only real difficulty lies in explaining the acquisition of any kind of knowledge whatever. There is this difference, indeed, between the two kinds of knowledge, that the ideas which are involved in the one are so self-evident, so familiar, and so universally admitted that few, except the professed students of psychology, ever think of inquiring into their origin at all; while those which belong to the other have become, for obvious reasons, the subject of controversial discussion and of sceptical criticism. But the same criticism, applied to the first elements of our common natural knowledge, would be equally destructive of our belief in many familiar truths, were it not counteracted and neutralized by the healthy action of spontaneous thought in every soundly constituted mind. It may be safely affirmed, for instance, that our belief in the reality of an external world, and in the existence of our fellow-men, is attended with difficulties, similar in kind, and not inferior in degree, to those which are urged against our belief in the existence of a living personal God,—whether regard be had to the mental laws, or the objective manifestations, on which belief, in either case, ultimately depends. For this reason we have long thought it a providential circumstance, that the evidence of the existence of an external world came under discussion, in the Scottish School of Psychology, at an early period; as the history of that controversy is, perhaps, the best preparation for the study of the question respecting the origin and foundation of our religious knowledge.

(387.) What are the means by which the objects of our common natural knowledge are presented to the mind? It has no innate ideas, and no capacity of creating any ideas, without being quickened into activity by some external communication. But it is united with a material organism which connects it with the natural world; and that organism is furnished with several distinct senses which are so many inlets for the first materials of our knowledge. Bunyan describes the town of MANSOUL as having “five gates; Ear-gate, Eye-gate, Mouth-gate, Nose-gate, and Feel-gate;” and these have been strikingly illustrated by Dr George Wilson as “The Five Gateways of Knowledge.” We are all familiar with these organs of sense, and feel how entirely dependent we are upon them for a large part of our most certain and useful know-

ledge ; yet how mysterious and inexplicable the process by which external objects reveal themselves to the mind through these channels ! We can trace the process up to a certain point—but then we are arrested by an insuperable barrier, and must confess our utter inability to explain the ultimate result. Our sense-perception seems to be direct and immediate, for we have only to open our eyes in the light to see the objects by which we are surrounded ; and yet, says Dr Reid,* “There are certain means and instruments which, by the appointment of nature, must intervene between the object and our perception of it ; and by these our perceptions are limited and regulated. First, if the object is not in contact with the organ of sense, there must be some medium which passes between them. Thus, in vision, the rays of light ; in hearing, the vibrations of elastic air ; in smelling, the effluvia of the body smelled, must pass from the object to the organ ; otherwise we have no perception. Secondly, there must be some action or impression upon the organ of sense, either by the immediate application of the object, or by the medium that goes between them. Thirdly, the nerves which go from the brain to the organ, must receive some impression by means of that which was made upon the organ ; and probably, by means of the nerves, some impression must be made upon the brain. Fourthly, the impression made upon the organ, nerves, and brain is followed by a sensation. And last of all, this sensation is followed by the perception of the object. Thus our perception of objects is the result of a train of operations, some of which affect the body only, others affect the mind. We know very little of the nature of some of these operations ; we know not at all how they are connected together, or in what way they contribute to that perception which is the result of the whole ; but, by the laws of our constitution, we perceive objects in this, and in no other way.”

(388.) Such are some of the conditions of those external manifestations on which our whole sensible knowledge depends ; and, when duly considered, they suggest several lessons which will be found applicable to important uses in connection with the higher departments of human thought. It will be observed that while the several senses are widely different from each other, and

* Dr Reid's "Inquiry," p. 317. Bossuet, "De la Connoissance de Dieu et de Soi-même," pp. 45, 88-194.

to a large extent mutually independent, yet they are also *analogous*, as being subject to the same conditions and laws, such as those which have been specified; while several of them often co-operate together, in completing our information in regard to external objects; and this fact suggests the idea that a similar analogy, and a similar co-operation also, may subsist between those other powers which are concerned in the production of our higher knowledge. It can hardly fail, also, to occur to a reflecting mind that the whole of our sensible knowledge is acquired by what might seem, *a priori*, to be most unlikely means,—by rays of light, or vibrations of air, or subtle and evanescent effluvia, acting on organs and nerves, having no apparent aptitude to produce the mental effects which are ascribed to them; and further, that in this remarkable instance, our certain knowledge and spontaneous belief are not in the least dependent on the philosophical explanation of the process by which they are acquired. The older scepticism assailed the testimony of our senses, but without effect, simply because the laws of human nature are stronger than any power that would attempt to overcome them; and yet no argument against the validity of our higher knowledge, founded on the manifestations on which it depends, can be more specious than that which might be directed against all the informations of Sense.* These and similar lessons, suggested by the simplest rudiments of our natural knowledge, may serve a useful purpose, if they teach us to prejudge no question as to the mode in which a still higher knowledge may be imparted, and to keep our minds open for every manifestation of truth, through whatever medium it may be conveyed.

(389.) Looking still at our common natural knowledge, we advance a step further, and observe that the objects of thought are not all presented by manifestations from without, but many of them arise spontaneously from within, and are revealed in the light of our own consciousness. Sensation itself, although dependent on material means and instruments, is a mental impression, and sense-perception is a mental act, of which we are conscious. This consciousness extends to every operation of our minds, and reveals to us a new world of thought. Its first informations may be derived from the outer world through the medium of sense;

* Dr George Wilson, "The Five Gateways of Knowledge," p. 17.

but it is no sooner quickened into activity, than the mind begins to operate according to its own laws, and to become conscious of its own operations, as well as of the impressions which have been made upon it from without. Here is a *new method of manifestation*,—*the mind reveals itself by its own self-conscious activity*; it takes cognizance of a new class of facts, and these facts are manifestations of mental laws.—First by the spontaneous activity of our powers, and afterwards by the exercise of reflective thought, we become acquainted with the various parts of our mental constitution,—the Intellectual, the Moral, the Emotional, the *Æsthetic*.

(390.) All these are so many internal revelations, and they are just as real as are the revelations of sense. They are immediate, also, and self-evident,—certainly not less so than those of external perception. We can be more absolutely assured of nothing than of the data of consciousness. The intuitions of reason, and conscience, and taste are as certain as any demonstration; for, in the words of Edward Irving, “the best of all demonstrations is that which least needs to be demonstrated.” They are first principles which lie at the foundation of all reasoning.—But these internal revelations, real, self-evident, and valid as they are, make known nothing more than what is involved in consciousness; and are far from rendering the mind independent of external teaching, or self-sufficient for its own instruction. On the contrary, it can know nothing except of its own operations, even after it has been quickened into activity by the informations of the senses, otherwise than by some external manifestation or by some communications from other minds, equal, or superior, to itself.—

(391.) Were the individual mind isolated and solitary, it would remain comparatively dormant. Its development would be slow indeed, unless it were brought somehow into communication with other minds, so as to enjoy the mutual interchange of thought. The individual is dependent on human converse for by far the largest amount of his knowledge, and the species at large is dependent on traditional instruction. Here is another kind of manifestation distinct from, and additional to those already noticed—a manifestation by which the thoughts of other minds are presented to ours, and their knowledge imparted to us, so as at once to quicken our faculties into higher activity, and to enlarge the sphere of their exercise. How amazing the fact that such a manifestation is possible, and how marvellous, were it not so

familiar that we seldom think of it, the means by which it is effected! The medium of the communication of thought from mind to mind is *language*;—the natural language of signs and gestures and imitative sounds, or the conventional language of articulate speech. Familiar as it has become by daily and universal custom, no one can seriously reflect on it without regarding it as one of the greatest marvels in Nature.—That the tongue, acting on the lips and palate, should occasion successive vibrations in the air which become articulate sounds,—that these vibrations should be propagated, often to a considerable distance, through an elastic medium without losing their distinctive character,—that they should enter the orifice, and strike the drum of the ear, so as to affect the nerves which connect it with the brain,—that they should thus be conveyed to that central organ, and be instantly recognised by the mind, not as articulate sounds merely, but as *intelligible signs*,—as vocal expressions of thought and feeling,—as significant revelations to us of what other minds have known and uttered,—surely this natural manifestation, with which all are familiar, is sufficiently wonderful to make any other mode of revelation credible that is attested by sufficient evidence.* The sluggish mind needs to be aroused to the consideration of these common facts, but, when they are duly considered, they exhibit *analogies* which may be powerfully applied to matters of Faith.

(392.) For how do these articulate sounds become intelligible to us, and in what way are we qualified for the interpretation of them? It is not enough to reply that we have been taught the language, and that we understand the import of the signs. The question goes further back—How were we capable of *being taught* by others, or of coming to any common understanding with them in regard to the meaning of these signs? Supposing language to be purely conventional, what is the ultimate ground and reason of our capacity to understand it, and to derive instruction from it? Is it not the possession on our part of mental faculties similar to those of our fellow-men? And is it not from the *analogy* of our own conscious experience that we possess the power of interpreting their speech? We cannot make our language intelligible to the rocks of the field or the trees of the forest: why? because

* Lord Brougham, in his Introduction to Paley's "Natural Theology," and De Bonald, in his "Recherches Philosophiques," have some instructive remarks on the marvellous nature of Language.

they are utterly destitute of intelligence. In a limited degree we can hold communication, by sounds and gestures, with some of the inferior animals, but we cannot teach them any of the higher branches of knowledge: why? because they have, in the one case, and want, in the other, those faculties which are necessary to make them fit recipients of instruction. We cannot communicate a knowledge of light and colour to a man born blind: why? because he has never experienced the sensation which alone could enable him to understand the sign by which it is expressed. We can teach a language even to little children, and, as they advance in years, we can instruct them in everything which language can express: why? because in their Sentient, Intellectual, Moral, Emotional, and *Æsthetical* nature, they have faculties which enable them to interpret, *according to the Analogy of their own consciousness*, the language of their fellow-men.

(393.) It thus appears that, for our common natural knowledge, we are dependent, to a large extent, on the communication of thought from one mind to another,—that this communication is made through the medium of Signs,—and that we are enabled to interpret these signs, and to attach an intelligible meaning to them, only by the analogy of our own conscious experience. Hence the transcendent importance, in connection with this part of our subject, of those facts which are revealed in consciousness; for it is only by means of these that we are qualified to hold intelligent converse with other minds, and to interpret the language in which their thoughts are conveyed to us. They speak to us of light, and we understand them, for we have seen it: they speak to us of music, and we understand them, for we have listened to it: they speak to us of duty, and we understand them, for we are conscious of a law within: they speak to us of pleasure and pain, of joy and sorrow, of hope and fear, and we understand them, for we have experienced each of these feelings. The objects denoted by these simple terms need no definition, and cannot indeed be defined; they are sufficiently explained by a tacit reference to every man's personal experience. Hence it appears, that it is not only in matters of Faith that we are obliged to conceive of objects, and to interpret the signs by which they are represented, according to the analogy of our own conscious experience, but that the same law is applicable to a large part of our common natural knowledge,—to the whole of that knowledge which depends on

the communication of mind with mind through the medium of intelligible language.

(394.) Passing on now to the consideration of our Religious knowledge,—Natural and Revealed,—are we not prepared to see that it is strictly analogous to our common secular knowledge, in respect of the *manifestations* on which it depends? These manifestations are, in some respects, identical with those to which we have hitherto referred; in others, they are different, but not so different as to have no resemblance to them. Our Religious knowledge presupposes the *same* manifestations of sense, and of consciousness, by which we become acquainted with the outer world of nature, and the inner world of mind; but, these data being presupposed, it requires nothing more for its establishment and vindication than such *other* manifestations as are strictly analogous to those, by which we ascertain the existence of our fellow-men, and are enabled to interpret any expression of their mind and will.

(395.) Our common and our Religious knowledge are strictly analogous in this respect, that both are equally dependent on an objective manifestation of some kind. There is no knowledge, in either instance, without an actual presentation of truth to our percipient faculties. Neither in the domain of natural, nor in the domain of religious thought, is knowledge possible without some manifestation, such as the mind can apprehend and interpret. The manifestations may be different in different cases, but the law which requires a manifestation in all cases is invariably the same. When the object of thought is presented to the mind from without, as in the case of sense-perception or external testimony, we see at once that the manifestation is one thing, and the perception of it is another; but when the object of thought is suggested by the mind itself, as in the case of those facts which are revealed in the light of consciousness, the manifestation and the perception may seem to be combined, and the distinction between them may be apt to be overlooked. Yet there is a real distinction notwithstanding; for consciousness reveals as objects of thought the operations of our own minds,—and thus makes us acquainted with a class of facts of which, without its aid, we must have remained in utter ignorance. The operations of the mind are a manifestation to the internal sense of its native powers and faculties, just as the effects of material substances are a manifestation, through the external senses, of their peculiar properties and laws.

The law which requires an objective manifestation as well as a subjective capacity, in order to the acquisition of knowledge, extends to Religion as well as to every other department of human thought; and therefore we must find the materials of our religious knowledge either in the operations of our own minds, or in the informations derived from external nature, or in the communications which reach us from other intelligent beings,—these being the three sources from which, severally or conjointly, all our religious knowledge must be derived. But some manifestation of truth there must be, just as in our common natural knowledge; and this is the first point of analogy between the two.

(396.) But, further, the special manifestations on which our religious knowledge depends, or the media through which it is acquired, are analogous to those which are employed in conveying to us the different portions of our common secular knowledge. This is true in regard alike to the truths of Natural and of Revealed Religion. They depend on distinct kinds of manifestation, and differ, in some respects, from those by which we acquire our common secular knowledge; but they are not so heterogeneous as to have no resemblance to them. On the contrary, there is an evident analogy, in the case of Natural Religion, between the manifestations of human and Divine Intelligence; and, in the case of Revealed Religion, between the communication of thought from one human mind to another, through the medium of language, and the revelation by which God imparts to His creatures a knowledge of His mind and will.

(397.) To place these points of analogy before us in a clear and steady light, we should first of all consider what is *common* to our secular and our religious knowledge, as being equally presupposed in both; and then inquire what there is that is *special* or *peculiar* in our religious knowledge, in so far as regards the manifestations on which it depends.

(398.) It is evident that all the informations both of sense and of consciousness,—all the the natural revelations which make known to us the outer world of matter and the inner world of mind,—are common to both branches of our knowledge. It follows that any objection which is founded on the alleged invalidity of these informations has no peculiar or exclusive force as directed against our religious belief, but is equally applicable to our common secular knowledge, and must issue, if consistently followed out to

its legitimate consequences, in universal scepticism. The mind acting, according to its peculiar laws, acquires a knowledge of living, personal, intelligent, and voluntary agency, as contradistinguished from that which is merely physical or mechanical; and this knowledge, derived from its own consciousness, is sufficient, when carried out and applied to the phenomena of the external world, to enable it to ascertain unerringly, by certain characteristic marks, the existence of other minds similar to itself, and qualifies it even to enter into intelligent communication with them, so as greatly to enlarge the sphere of its own knowledge. It discovers other living beings, and holds converse with them.

(399.) What, then, are the *special* manifestations on which our religious knowledge depends? Are they not strictly analogous to those by which we are enabled to discover the existence of other living and intelligent beings, and to receive instruction from them? In the case of Natural Religion, they are marks of intelligence and design in the works of nature precisely analogous, but unspeakably superior, to those which appear in the works of man; and in the case of Revealed Religion, they are articulate utterances of Divine truth, which are conveyed in human language, and adapted to our natural modes of conceiving and expressing religious ideas by the aid of analogy and metaphor, but which are designed and fitted to make known many things which were undiscoverable by the mere light of nature, and which must ever rest on the sole authority of the Revealer. In either instance, the method of manifestation is strictly analogous to that by which we acquire a large part of our common secular knowledge. It may be specifically different, but it is generically the same; and after all due allowance is made for the difference, there is still a real and radical analogy, *in this respect*, between our common and our religious knowledge.

CHAPTER III.

ANALOGY; IN RESPECT TO THE EXTENT AND LIMITS
OF KNOWLEDGE.

(400.) The extent and the limits of our knowledge in every department of human inquiry depend on two distinct conditions; the first is, the capacity of our intellectual faculties, which, however exalted in their nature and however active in their exercise, are still finite and limited; the second is, the kind of manifestation, or the measure of light, which is vouchsafed to them.

(401.) It is of considerable importance, with a view to a right understanding of the subject, that we should both mark the distinction between these two conditions, and also bear in mind that, although different, they are equally necessary to explain the limitation of our knowledge. There is both an internal and an external cause to which that limitation must be ascribed.

(402.) The mind is furnished with only a limited number of senses communicating with the external world, and it is endowed also with a limited power of intellectual perception. In regard to the external world, it can know nothing except what is conveyed to it through the "five gateways of knowledge,"—had it been furnished with a few additional senses, other properties of matter, besides those which are now known to us, might have been revealed. In like manner, there may be, and probably are, other *relations* subsisting between the data of sense and consciousness than those which, with our limited powers of intellectual perception, we are able to discern. What those other properties of matter, and what these other relations between the objects of thought may be, we are utterly unable to conceive, simply because our conceptions are circumscribed within the range of our actual experience. But even in regard to those objects and relations which are revealed by sense or consciousness, our knowledge is limited; it is not full and complete as that of an Omniscient Mind

must be, but partial and defective,—clear, and certain, and useful, so far as it goes, but inadequate to afford a perfect explanation of any one object of thought. The sphere of our natural knowledge may be compared to the midnight sky, in which certain luminous points are clearly visible, but surrounded by a wide margin of shade. “*Omnia exeunt in mysterium.*” All knowledge runs into mystery. If this be true of all the objects of our common natural knowledge, it is emphatically true of certain ideas which spring up spontaneously in the mind, and are clearly revealed as constituent elements of our consciousness,—such as the ideas of infinity and eternity,—which we cannot but *apprehend*, and yet can as little *comprehend*; ideas which take possession of us irresistibly, and cannot be banished by any effort of reason or will, but which far transcend our highest conceptions, and are too profound to be fathomed by human thought.*

(403.) But the finite nature of our faculties is not the only cause of the limitation of our knowledge. We are not less dependent on external manifestations, than on internal capacities, for the extent to which we can become cognizant of truth. Our means of information, as well as our mental powers, must be taken into account. The extent and limits of human knowledge cannot be determined by a mere criticism of the powers of reason, without reference to the kind and amount of objective truth which is brought within their range, and the nature and method of that instruction which is bestowed upon them. Man is a scholar, and whatever his native powers may be, he is dependent on external teaching. His knowledge, therefore, will be more or less limited in proportion to the number and value of his external advantages. A child who belongs to a society in an advanced state of civilisation is the heir of the accumulated intellectual wealth of past ages, and is placed in a very different position from that of the savage who is reared by parents, and surrounded by companions, as ignorant as himself. The Hottentot and the Esquimaux may possess the same mental powers with the cultivated European,—but how limited is their knowledge in comparison with his! and to what other cause can the difference between them be ascribed than to the absence, in the one case, and the presence, in the other, of that external teaching on which, notwithstanding its inherent

* Rev. H. Calderwood, “The Philosophy of the Infinite,” pp. 12, 13.

capacities, the human mind is dependent for its education and development? And even in an advanced state of civilisation, whole communities are largely indebted for the extent of their knowledge to the labours and discoveries of a few gifted minds, who are raised up, in the ordinary course of nature, to be the instructors and benefactors of their fellow-men.

(404.) The same conditions are imposed on our religious knowledge. Its extent is determined, and its limits prescribed, by the same laws. It is strictly analogous to our common secular knowledge, both in respect to the mental capacities, and the external manifestations, on which it depends. But when we take into account the transcendent nature of those truths with which it is conversant,—truths which relate to the being, perfections, and government of God, His relations to the universe at large, and especially to His intelligent and responsible creatures, His dispensations in providence, His works of redemption and grace, His eternal purposes, and their final issues in a state of everlasting retribution,—we may well expect to find that they are more incomprehensible than the objects of our common knowledge, and that they are surrounded with mysteries which the light of revelation itself may not enable us to solve.

(405.) Our Religious knowledge is limited first by the finitude of our own minds. From the nature of the case, a finite understanding cannot *comprehend* an infinite Object,—it may know something of God (*τὸ γνωστὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ*),—it may form some conception of His perfections as they are manifested in His works or revealed in His word,—it may apprehend some of the relations which He bears to His intelligent creatures, and the duties which these relations involve,—it may learn many lessons respecting Him, and these lessons may be sufficient for the ends of practical religion;—but God is, and ever must be, incomprehensible even by the highest of created minds. Seraphic intelligence, acting throughout eternal ages, could not measure the Divine immensity. “Who can by searching find out God? who can find out the Eternal unto perfection?” And as God is incomprehensible, so are all His perfections, His purposes, His dispensations. Our religious knowledge, indeed, is capable of growth and expansion, and it is impossible to assign any limits to its progress, or to say to it, “Hitherto shalt thou come and no further;” but it must ever recognise in Him who “dwells in light which is inaccessible and

full of glory" an object of adoring thought which it cannot fully comprehend, and acknowledge the infinite difference between every created spirit and the Omniscient Mind.

(406.) Our Religious knowledge is limited, not only by the finitude of our faculties, but also by the manifestations which are vouchsafed to us. Angels and seraphim may enjoy such manifestations as have never been bestowed on man. The spirits of just men made perfect, admitted into the holiest of all, may enjoy new manifestations such as "eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, nor hath it entered into the mind of man to conceive." Even in the present state very different kinds and measures of Divine manifestation have been given to men in different countries and at different times ;—some have been left to the mere light of nature and the faint glimmerings of tradition ; others have been favoured with revealed manifestations, but in various degrees,—under the Patriarchal, the Mosaic, the Prophetical, and the Christian dispensations ;—and whatever the native powers of their minds might be, their religious knowledge was necessarily limited by the measure of light which was vouchsafed to them. Such knowledge is possible only so far as God is pleased to make Himself known. There is no reason to suppose that the finitude of our faculties is the *only* limitation to which we are subject,—on the contrary, there is every reason to believe that our faculties are capable of receiving instruction in regard to many truths, which remain unknown, only because they have not been revealed, and that in considering the "Limits of Religious Thought,"* we must take into account the measure of Divine manifestation, not less than the capacity of the human mind.

(407.) The analogy which subsists between our common and our Religious knowledge in respect of its extent and limits is specially applicable to the defence of the Mysteries of faith, and it will be applied to that end in a subsequent chapter.† The whole analogy of our experience is fitted to teach us that *partial* knowledge may be both true and useful, so far as it goes,—that although inadequate for the construction of a complete system of speculative

* Mr Mansel discusses this subject in his Bampton Lectures for 1858, with reference chiefly to the subjective limit arising from the laws and conditions of human thought. For some remarks on the other aspect of it, see the

British and Foreign Evangelical Review, No. XXVIII. pp. 256, 430, etc. See also Dr Young's Criticism on the Bampton Lecture entitled "The Province of Reason."

† *Infra*, Part III. C. VI.

thought, it may be sufficient for all the practical purposes of life,—that it imposes an obligation to act according to the measure of light which it affords,—and that while it is fitted to encourage *diligence* in the use of means, it is fitted also to impress us with a sense of our *dependence*. Such knowledge, being incomplete and imperfect, must not only leave ample room for Mysteries in every department of thought, but may also give occasion to some apparent and even real difficulties which, with our present faculties, and in the absence of fuller information, we may be utterly unable to solve. There are, accordingly, some outstanding difficulties and insoluble problems in every branch of our natural, as well as of our Religious, knowledge; and this is only an additional point of analogy between the two.

(408.) They are analogous also in respect to the Metaphysical questions which may be raised concerning the first principles or radical elements on which they severally depend. Many who have urged Metaphysical difficulties as an objection to the theory of our Religious faith, seem to have been unmindful of the fact, that the same objection is equally applicable to every branch of our common natural knowledge. For every science has its own metaphysics, and these are not less abstruse than those of Religion. The three great objects of Ontology—the soul—the world—and God, have each given rise to the same kind of Metaphysical speculation.* In every particular department of our scientific, or even of our common natural knowledge, similar questions might be, and have been, raised. What is more certain than our personal existence, yet what is more difficult than to explain our personal identity? The sciences of number and magnitude are demonstrative, yet the metaphysics of each of these has been made matter of keen controversial discussion! The elementary ideas of force and motion which lie at the foundation of Mechanics, and the first principles which lie at the foundation of Ethics, have shared a similar fate. And universally we may affirm with Sir William Hamilton, that “NO DIFFICULTY (of this kind) EMERGES IN THEOLOGY, WHICH HAD NOT PREVIOUSLY EMERGED IN PHILOSOPHY.”

(409.) Yet in spite of these Metaphysical difficulties, the mind holds fast its natural knowledge, and is prepared to act upon it as

* See British and Foreign Evangelical Review, No. XXVIII. p. 486.

occasion requires. The reason is evident,—its natural beliefs are independent of the philosophical explanation of them,—they are the products of spontaneous thought, and prior to its reflective exercise ; and should Philosophy never succeed in solving every question which may be raised concerning them, the failure of Philosophy will not affect the force of Nature. Metaphysical difficulties will disappear, or be little felt as a hindrance, in proportion as we advance in the pursuit of sound knowledge ; and the advice of Lagrange to his students when they stumbled on the threshold of the Differential Calculus from their inability to comprehend some of the principles on which it is founded, may be addressed to students in every other department—“ *Allez en avant —la foi vous viendra.*”*

* Fraser's Magazine, No. XLVI. p. 6.

CHAPTER IV.

ANALOGY IN RESPECT TO THOUGHT AND LANGUAGE.

(410.) Attempts have sometimes been made to throw doubt and discredit on our religious knowledge as if it must be peculiarly defective for this special reason, that it is, to a large extent, analogical, and can only be expressed in figurative or metaphorical terms. It should be enough to obviate this objection, if it can be shown that it depends on the same manner of forming and expressing our conceptions, which is natural and common in relation to other objects of thought belonging to our ordinary experience.

(411.) Some account has been already given of the influence of Analogy on the formation of our ideas, and the various modes of representing and expressing them ;* but it may be useful now to mark the resemblance between our common and religious knowledge in this respect, as one of the distinct sources of Analogy in matters of Faith.

(412.) All our conceptions are formed under certain conditions, and according to certain laws. "Not only what man can know," says Mr Stewart, "but what he can *conceive*, depends upon what he has experienced." We form a conception of knowledge, will, personality, love and hatred, pleasure and pain, joy and sorrow, from data which are directly presented in our individual consciousness, and are thus, and thus only, qualified to conceive of the same properties as belonging to our fellow-men, when they exhibit what we know, from our personal experience, to be their natural signs or manifestations. Analogy is to be regarded, therefore, as an indispensable *means of conceiving*, not less than as a ground of judgment and reasoning ; and as such it is included by Gassendi among the means by which our conceptions

* Supra, Part I. C. IV.

are formed.* It follows that "like can only be known by like"†—and that whatever is thus conceived must have its *analogue* in our own minds. This general principle explains the reason why a blind man can have no true conception of light and colour: he must have the sense of sight and the experience of actual vision, otherwise he is incapable of forming even an analogical conception of either. Without these the indispensable medium is absent,—the analogue is wanting. In like manner, an intellectual nature is essential to the conception of intelligence,—a moral nature to the conception of moral truth,—an emotional nature to the conception of feeling and sentiment,—an æsthetic nature to the perception of beauty, harmony, and proportion,—and may we not add, a renewed and regenerated nature to the spiritual discernment of spiritual truth?

(413.) This general principle is applicable both to our common and to our religious knowledge. We have no direct perception of other minds; and it is only through the properties of which we are conscious in our own, that we conceive of similar properties as belonging to them. In like manner, we have no direct perception of God, but we conceive of His attributes as similar,—although infinitely superior,—to certain properties of our own nature, when these attributes are manifested to us in His works, or revealed to us in His word. We have no other means of conceiving of them at all, and could not even be instructed concerning them without reference to similar properties in our own minds. If the same general principle be thus applicable equally to our common and our religious knowledge, then the one is strictly analogous to the other *in this respect*; and any objection founded on the mediate or analogical character of our conceptions in matters of Faith, may be conclusively met and answered by the fact that, were it valid, it would be equally conclusive against some of the most undoubted truths of experience.

(414.) In attempting to express such analogical conceptions, we are naturally led to make use of figurative and metaphorical terms. There is, indeed, no other way in which we can so easily make them intelligible to other minds. But this is equally true of those conceptions which relate to human, and those which relate to Divine,

* Dégérando, "Histoire Comparée," vol. I. p. 305.

† "Le semblable ne peut être connu que par le semblable." Ibid. p. 100.

things. We find, for instance, that almost every expression which has been applied to denote the objects of our purely intellectual consciousness has been derived from our *sensible* experience, and must have been, therefore, originally figurative.* The terms which are in common use to express our own mental states and operations, or those of our fellow-men, are all either analogical, as being founded on the relation of resemblance, or metaphorical, as being founded on some other relation.—There is no way, indeed, in which men can express their conceptions of the properties and operations of the human mind, otherwise than by analogical terms derived from their sensible experience. Now if this be the law which determines and regulates the expression of our conceptions in regard to human things, can it be surprising that the same law should be equally operative in regard to the expression of our conceptions of Divine things? or that when we speak familiarly of the eye as a figurative representation of mere human intelligence, or of the arm as a figurative representation of mere human energy, we should also speak of the Eye of God as denoting His omniscient knowledge, or the right arm of God as denoting His almighty power?

(415.) The analogy which subsists between our natural and our religious knowledge, in this respect, may be applied, not only to vindicate the analogical conceptions which we form of God and of Divine things, and the figurative or metaphorical language in which these conceptions are expressed, but to illustrate some other topics which have an important application to Theology. It serves to explain the reason of the different views which different men entertain in regard to the same truths, according to the state of their own minds and hearts. We see the principle exemplified in everyday life, in the judgments which men pronounce on moral subjects, and especially on the motives and conduct of their neighbours. These judgments are to a large extent determined by their own moral character. Moral truth cannot be duly appreciated without sound moral feelings. A selfish man can scarcely conceive of disinterested generosity, nor a base spirit of exalted worth, nor a sensualist of mental purity, nor a coward of

* Dr Blair, "Lectures on Rhetoric," vol. I. pp. 91, 100. Sir Wm. Hamilton, "Lectures on Metaphysics," I. p. 135. Dégérando, "Histoire Com-
parée," I. p. 81. Berkeley's "Minute Phil., p. 456. Whately, "Rhetoric," p. 271. Field, "Analogical Philosophy," I. 71.

manly courage. There must be something similar in our own breasts before we can really understand what is great, and generous, and good. The same principle is applicable to our religious knowledge. Spiritual things can only be discerned by spiritual men. For this reason, that which is "foolishness" to "the natural man," appears as the "wisdom of God" to the renewed mind. The necessity of a subjective spiritual change, as well as of an objective Divine manifestation, thus becomes apparent;—and we know no stronger argument, apart from the express authority of Scripture, in favour of the indispensable need of regeneration than that which may be founded on the law which connects our conceptions with the analogy of our own conscious experience. This is what Müller calls "the moral conditionality of knowledge,"* and it is ably illustrated by a recent writer. "In order to a living knowledge of this or that object, there must be in the knowing subject a distinct sense, sensibility, or capacity of feeling,—in a word, a distinct form of life, corresponding in its nature to the nature of the object known. This principle admits of indefinite illustration,—its operation is co-extensive with the operations of our faculty of knowledge. . . . And if in the spiritual kingdom, as in the natural, it be true that living knowledge is only to the living soul—*like knows like*,—then it will necessarily follow that the natural man, being *not* spiritual, cannot have a living knowledge of that which is spiritual,"—"since in order to *know*, we must *be*, therefore the living God in His living truth can be spiritually discerned only by the God-born."†

* Müller, "The Christian Doctrine of Sin," vol. I. p. 188, etc.

† Rev. Jas. Macgregor, "Vindication of Natural Theology," pp. 24, 25.

CHAPTER V.

ANALOGY IN RESPECT TO EVIDENCE.

(416.) The term—*Evidence*—is one of those figurative expressions, derived from our sensible experience, which are applied to denote the objects of our intellectual consciousness. It is taken from the sense of sight, and employed analogically, to designate that, whatever it be, by which truth is made known to the mind. It cannot be defined, since there is no simpler idea into which it can be resolved ; it can only be described by figurative terms, or exemplified by illustrative instances, while its proper significance must be interpreted by every man's personal experience.

(417.) There is no natural analogy by which Truth, or its evidence, has been more generally, or can be more vividly, represented, than that of the element of Light,—both as it comes to us direct in streaming rays from its celestial source, and as it is reflected from the objects on which it falls, serving at once to make them visible, and to present them to the eye in every hue of colour and of beauty. The untutored peasant, ignorant as he may be of the laws of light and the theory of vision, knows, not less than the philosopher, the effect of Light in revealing objects which must have remained invisible without it ; and is thus prepared, by his familiar sensible experience, to understand those figurative expressions by which Truth, or its evidence, is represented under that emblematic term. He has no difficulty in conceiving, that truth is to the mind what light is to the eye ; nor in understanding the statement of the sacred writers when, without any formal definition of truth or any philosophical discussion of evidence, they say, in language admirably adapted to the popular mind, that “ Whatsoever doth make manifest is light.”

(418.) This element is one of the most marvellous and beneficent agents in nature ; it is also one of the most beautiful and instructive emblems of truth. It is by evidence of some kind that any truth is known, just as it is by light of some kind that any

object is seen. But in knowing, as in seeing, our attention may be fixed on the thing revealed, while we give little heed to that by which alone it can be discerned. There are few who ever reflect on the nature of the evidence by which their convictions are, nevertheless, determined. We think we see the objects of sight, when, in point of fact, we see them only by means of the light in which they are revealed, and through the medium of a picture which that light forms on the retina of the eye. The analogy between light and evidence is so close and exact, that it extends far beyond the more general resemblance to which we have referred, and might be exhibited in many distinct aspects. For example, as a ray of light, passing through a prism, is divided into a beautiful variety of shades and colours, and is again recomposed by lenses, and forms a miniature picture of the object, so a ray of truth* falling upon the human mind, is analysed by some of its faculties, and thrown into new forms by others, so as to give birth to the whole system of our abstract and concrete knowledge. Light again is often best seen, not in its direct emanations, but in its reflection from the objects on which it falls,—the eye which gazes on the sun being blinded by excess of brightness, while it is refreshed and gladdened by the verdant foliage of the earth, or the roseate clouds of heaven; and so, truth is often best studied in its reflex manifestations,—for instance, the laws of thought in the mirror of language, or the laws of taste in the arts of painting and sculpture, or the laws of imagination in the products of poetry.†

(419.) There is this difference, however, between light and evidence, that the former is presented only to one organ or faculty, while the latter may reach us through various channels, and be apprehended and appreciated by different powers. If we examine our common secular knowledge, we find that it relates to a multitude of distinct objects, and depends on many kinds of evidence. There is the evidence of sense, conveyed to us through different organs; and each organ has its own peculiar and exclusive function,—a monopoly, so to speak, of that kind of evidence which it,

* Webster's Elements of Physics, p. 338. Tatham, "Chart and Scale," I. pp. 9, 316.

† "Le vérité est comme un rayon de soleil. Si nous fixons les yeux sur elle, elle nous éblouit et nous aveugle ;

mais si nous ne considérons que les objets qu'elle nous rend sensibles, elle éclaire à la fois notre esprit et réchauffe notre cœur." Bernardin de Saint-Pierre, quoted by Franck, "De la Certitude," p. 55.

and it only, can supply. There is the evidence of consciousness or the internal sense, which reveals the successive states and operations of our own minds ;—and makes known to us their intellectual perceptions and processes, their moral sentiments, their instincts, and appetites and passions. There is the evidence of memory, which bears witness to the past, and connects our present with our former experience. There is the evidence of testimony, by which we receive information from others in regard to many things which have never fallen under our personal observation. All these various kinds of evidence are concerned in our common secular knowledge, and it is by their combined influence that our minds are enlightened and informed.*

(420.) Some lessons are naturally suggested by the nature and the number of these natural sources of knowledge, which admit of a useful application to the evidences of Religion. We are taught, first of all, that there is an evidence which is proper to every different kind of truth, and which can only be perceived by the faculty to which it is adapted ;—the eye can give no knowledge of audible sounds, nor the ear of visible objects ; sense cannot give the perceptions of reason, nor reason the perceptions of sense ; our moral sentiments and our emotional feelings have also an evidence which is peculiar to themselves. It follows, that we are not entitled to demand the same kind of evidence for different kinds of truth, or to exalt one kind of evidence to the disparagement of another ; it is enough if the evidence be proper to the object of thought, and adapted to the faculty by which it is perceived. There is a wide difference between the evidence of sense and the perceptions of reason,—between the witness of memory and the testimony of men ; yet, different as they are, they may be all equally certain, and they are all indispensably necessary to the scheme of our natural knowledge. We learn also, on a simple comparison of the various kinds of natural evidence, that there is room for several distinctions between the different parts of our common knowledge, while yet there is no reason to suppose that these distinctions affect either its trustworthiness or its usefulness. There is room, for instance, for the distinction between our *mediate* and *immediate* knowledge,—for some truths are self-evident, others can only be known by means of comparison and reasoning.

* Dr Beattie's Essay on Truth, Part I. c. ii. sects. 1-9.

There is room, also, for the distinction between *different kinds of certainty*; there is an intuitive and demonstrative certainty in those truths the denial of which would involve a contradiction, and there is an inductive or moral certainty in those other truths which are proved by experience, but cannot be demonstrated by reason. The mere fact that these distinctions, and many more which might be mentioned,—such as that between the phenomenal and the real, or the relative and the absolute,—are all equally applicable to our common secular knowledge, and yet have no effect in diminishing the confidence with which we receive and act upon it, should prepare us to expect that the peculiar evidence of Religion may be analogous, in these respects, to that of other truths, and yet be perfectly sufficient to lay a firm foundation for faith, and to impose an obligation to a religious life.

(421.) We may compare, in the first instance, the evidence of our common secular knowledge with that of Natural Religion, and inquire what analogy subsists between the two. Here a preliminary question arises,—Whether Natural Religion belongs to our *mediate* or our *immediate* knowledge? and along with this the cognate, but distinct, question, Whether it rests on *intuitive and demonstrative* evidence, or on that which is *inductive and moral*? On either supposition, there might be an analogy between the evidence of our secular knowledge and that of Natural Religion: but manifestly the analogy must be of a different kind according as one or other of these alternatives is chosen. If we suppose Natural Religion to belong to our *immediate* knowledge, and to depend on *intuitive and demonstrative* evidence, it can only be analogous to such sciences as Mathematics, in which certain intuitive truths are assumed, and other truths are deduced from these by a process of rigorous logic. If we suppose, on the other hand, that Natural Religion belongs to our *mediate* knowledge, and depends on inductive and moral evidence, it may be analogous to such branches of our secular knowledge as stand connected chiefly with the facts of experience and observation. Some writers have proceeded exclusively on the first supposition, and have attempted to construct an *a priori* demonstration of the existence and attributes of God: * others have proceeded, perhaps too exclusively, on

* M. Bouchitté “Histoire des Preuves de l'Existence de Dieu;” Memoires | de l'Academie Royale, Tom. I. 395.
Dr Samuel Clarke—“Demonstration

the second supposition, and have sought merely to illustrate the *a posteriori* evidence derived from the marks of design, power, and goodness in the works of Nature. We are disposed to think that Natural Religion resembles, most of all, those *mixed sciences* in which *a priori* principles of reason are applied to *a posteriori* facts of experience, and that it cannot be satisfactorily proved without the aid of both. If this belief be correct, there will be some analogy between Natural Religion and those sciences which rest on intuition and demonstration; while there will also be some analogy between it, and those other sciences which rest on inductive and moral grounds.

(422.) There seems to be no more reason to believe that we have an *immediate and intuitive*, than that we have an *innate*, knowledge of God. It is an acquisition, and such an acquisition as depends on experience and observation, as well as on reason. In this respect it is analogous to our common secular knowledge, for experience of some kind—sensible, intellectual, moral, or emotional—supplies the first materials of thought, and thereby calls into exercise those rational powers by which we construct any branch of science. In so far as Natural Theology involves necessary truths or perceptions of reason, it is strictly analogous to those branches of our common knowledge which depend on intuitive or demonstrative evidence; and in so far as it rests on the data of experience and observation it is analogous to that large portion of our knowledge in which rational principles are combined with matters of fact.* The facts to which Natural Theology appeals are generally described as the *a posteriori* evidence; but the force of that evidence will not be felt, nor can its validity be established, unless it is viewed in connection with those principles of reason, or laws of thought, which are also involved in the process of inference. In this respect it resembles every *mixed science*, in which rational principles are combined with facts of experience. In all

of the Being and Attributes of God." Mr Lowman—"Argument to prove the Unity and Perfections of God *a priori*" (Cabinet Library, No. 1). Mr Gillespie—"The Necessary Existence of the Deity" Rev. A. Duncan, Midcalder, "Essay on Proofs of Existence of God." (Family Library, vol. I.)

* Condillâc describes all science as consisting "dans la combinaison des *vérités de fait* avec les *vérités rationnelles*;" and carrying out this idea he compares one science with another, and thereby, as Dégérando says, "il découvre l'*analogie secrète* de nos connoissances."—*Histoire Comparée*, vol. I. 342.

such cases, there is a union of *a priori* and *a posteriori* elements; and the analogy may be marked with respect to both.

(423.) The evidence of the first truth of Natural Religion—the existence of God—may be brought into comparison in this way with each of the other three branches of Ontology—namely the evidence of the existence of our own minds,—of the existence of an external material world,—and of the existence of our fellow-men. These belong to our common secular knowledge, but will be found to be strictly analogous in many respects to the evidence of Natural Theology. All the “branches of Ontology depend ultimately on the same principles and laws of thought; and the course of speculation with reference to any one of them gives us the benefit of experience in dealing with any other. Let the common dependence of all these problems on the same principles of reason be clearly discerned, and their evident analogy in this respect will satisfy any mind, that is sufficiently comprehensive to grasp the whole subject, and sufficiently candid to deal with every portion of it in the same way.”*

(424.) We have adverted in the first instance to the analogy between the evidence of Natural Religion and that of our common secular knowledge; it is necessary now to advance a step further, and to inquire whether there be any analogy between the evidence of Natural, and that of Revealed Religion?

(425.) At first sight there may seem to be little resemblance between the two. A supernatural Revelation can only establish its Divine origin and authority by some kind of supernatural evidence, such as Miracles performed, and Prophecies fulfilled; and what comparison, it may be asked, can be instituted between such proofs and any kind of natural evidence, when their very peculiarity consists in their being *out of all analogy with our common experience*? More particularly, how can the evidence of Natural Religion, which depends on the established constitution and ordinary course of nature, be analogous in any respect to that of Revealed Religion, which appeals to interpositions involving a departure from its settled order?

(426.) This question is a very natural one; and it well deserves, while it will amply repay, our careful consideration. We cannot do justice to it without distinguishing betwixt the different

* British and Foreign Ev. Review, No. XXVIII. p. 486.

kinds of evidence which are involved in the complex proof of Revelation, and comparing each of them with its own proper analogue in other branches of knowledge.¹ We must distinguish, first of all, between that evidence which is *common* to Revealed Religion and many other systems of truth and that evidence which is *peculiar* to itself alone; for example, the human testimonies to which it appeals must be distinguished, although they cannot be separated, from the Divine attestations by which these testimonies are said to have been ratified and confirmed; and the former must be compared with the evidence of human testimonies in other cases, while the latter can find their only fit analogue in some other method of Divine manifestation. And having made this fundamental distinction, the general position which we are prepared to lay down and defend may be thus stated,—That in so far as the evidence is common to Revealed Religion and other branches of our natural knowledge, it is strictly analogous to those historical proofs on which a large portion of that knowledge is based; and that in so far as it is peculiar to Revealed Religion, it is strictly analogous to those Divine manifestations on which the evidence of Natural Religion depends.

(427.) This is the general position, but its full meaning may not be apparent without some further explanation. Divines usually draw a distinction between what has been called a *human* faith and a *Divine* faith. By a human faith they mean a belief resting on human testimony or authority; by a Divine faith a belief resting on a higher testimony—the witness of God Himself.—The distinction is generally applied only to Christian belief; but it is really applicable with reference both to Natural and Revealed Religion. A man may have a mere human faith in the first article of Natural Religion, when he believes in the existence of God merely because that truth has been instilled into his mind by parental instruction and the testimony or tradition of his fellow-men,—but without reflecting upon it, or seeing in nature the Divine evidence by which God bears witness to Himself as the Creator and Governor of the world. In like manner, he may have a mere human faith in Revealed Religion, resting on the testimony of man, and not on the authority of God.* In

* Dr John Edwards, "Survey of the Dispensations and Methods of Religion," II. pp. 457, 529, 534.

Scripture human testimony is largely employed,—the testimony of witnesses who are to be judged of according to the ordinary rules and tests of historical evidence; and it is of such a kind as to lay a firm foundation, in the first instance, for the highest kind of moral certainty which such evidence can possibly produce. But our faith is not left to rest on human testimony alone—that testimony is itself attested by a Divine seal—for “the great salvation which at the first began to be spoken by the Lord” “was confirmed unto us by them that heard Him,”—here is the testimony of human witnesses; but it is added, “*God also bearing them witness both with signs and wonders and divers miracles, and gifts of the Holy Ghost.*” And so “they went forth and preached the word everywhere, the Lord working with them, and *confirming the word with signs following;*” and they spoke “boldly in the Lord, who gave *testimony unto the word of His grace*, and granted signs and wonders to be done by their hands.”* Human testimony, thus divinely attested, becomes the Word of God, and lays a ground for Divine faith.

(428.) Human testimony, therefore, being a constituent part of the evidence on which Revelation depends, there is room for a comparison between that testimony, and those historical proofs on which a large portion of our common natural knowledge is based. The one is strictly analogous to the other; it rests on the same fundamental principles, is governed by the same natural laws, and is subject to the same critical tests. In every instance in which its truthfulness can be ascertained, testimony is neither more nor less than experience at second hand,—it makes the experience of others available for our benefit,—it makes known to us the facts which they witnessed,—and the evidence lies in the facts themselves, not in the method by which we become acquainted with them. Testimony itself is to be regarded, in all cases, simply as a fact to be accounted for; and there are certain tests of its truth and marks of its falsehood which our own experience enables us to discover and apply. This human branch of the evidence has been admirably illustrated by Lardner, Paley, and a host of writers on the historical proofs of Revelation; and it might be shown to be strictly *analogous* to the highest and best evidence of the same kind.†

* Heb. ii. 4; Mark xvi. 20; Acts xiv. 3.

† See Bentham's “Rationale of Evi-

dence,” or the French Abridgment of it, “*Les Preuves Judiciaires*,” by Dumont.

(429.) It has one peculiarity,—it is superior to any kind of historical evidence which has ever been offered to the world. It cannot be fitly compared to the evidence of individual men or private witnesses ; it includes this, but it contains much more. It resembles rather the evidence of the public records and recognised laws of kingdoms and commonwealths, which have been sanctioned by authority,—administered by official functionaries or office-bearers,—associated with national customs and observances,—and intimately connected with the dearest interests—the life, the property, the temporal welfare—of every member of the community. Such records and laws are held to be sufficiently evident when they come down to us with a notorious public attestation, and are seen to be embodied, as it were, and visibly manifested in their effects. Were any question to arise in regard to the authenticity of the Pandects of Justinian, or of the Magna Charta of England, an appeal might be made,—not only to the testimonies which learned men may be able to find in the archives of the past, but also to the visible effects of these great documents as exhibited in the institutions, the customs, and manners of the Roman Empire and the British Kingdom.—But the Bible has characters which are peculiar to itself alone. It must be viewed in two distinct aspects: it is a record of God's dealings with His Church, and, as such, it comprehends both what He *said* in revealing His mind and will, and what He *did* in confirmation of His word ; it is also a record of the history of His Church, and, as such, it narrates the circumstances in which that society arose, its successive states, its diversified experience, the testimony which it maintained, and the ordinances which it observed. Considered in this double aspect, the sacred record contains within itself an effectual provision for combining both a Divine and a human evidence ; for what God *said* to His Church, and what He *did* in confirmation of His word, are recorded along with the concurring witness of the Church herself, when she professed her faith, and gave forth, in her public worship and standing ordinances, a practical testimony of her faith—the testimony of millions of witnesses to the truth of what they believed. There was a revelation from heaven, but there was also a response from the earth. The same Scriptures which contain the revelation, and record the supernatural events by which it was attested as Divine, narrate also the history of its having been believed and acted on, in consequence of these

attestations from the time when they were vouchsafed ; and the *mere reception* of such a record as the recognised law of a great visible community, when their temporal interests were liable to be affected for good or for evil by their reception or rejection of its authority, may be justly regarded as a conclusive proof of its historical truth, and, consequently, of its Divine authority.

(430.) Looking, then, in the first instance, only to the human testimonies which form part of the evidence of Revealed Religion, we find that they are strictly analogous to those historical proofs on which a large portion of our natural knowledge entirely depends. We are guided by the analogy of our experience in judging of the evidences both of Natural and Revealed Religion. The facts on which they severally rest are different, but the question as to their cause or origin is substantially the same, and amounts in substance to this—What conclusion in regard to them is least at variance with the analogy of our experience in similar cases? It is thus stated by Dr Priestley—with reference to both. “The question is—How are these facts to be accounted for? and that answer is most satisfactory which is least contrary to natural analogy, and consequently to probability.” “When I say that there is a God, I mean that there is an intelligent Author of Nature, and I maintain that it is most agreeable to natural analogy to admit this; because marks of design, which we universally consider as indications of mind, are as conspicuous in the works of nature, as in those of art.” “The evidence of testimony is ultimately the same with this, being reducible to the method of judging from known and even present experiences. For the reason why we are influenced by it, and act upon it in any particular case, is that, from our knowledge of human nature, we have found that, so circumstanced, it never has deceived us; so that human nature must be changed before such testimony could be fallacious.”*

(431.) We cannot seriously consider the facts which consti-

* Dr Priestley's Works, vol. XXI. pp. 89, 180. So also Houtteville : “Parce que je sçais qu'il y a dans le cœur des hommes une fond si ressemblant, qu'ils se gouvernent en général par les mêmes vûes et les mêmes motifs; parce que l'Experience, le

plus instructif de tous les secours, m'apprend que les causes, mêmes libres, posées en des circonstances pareilles, produisent des effets pareils, je tire les mêmes conclusions quand je vois les mêmes circonstances.”—“La Religion Prouvée par les Faits,” p. 9.

tute the evidence of Revealed Religion without feeling that we are *shut up to the admission of a miracle on one side or other*; a miracle in the events, or a miracle in the testimonies. For there are laws of human nature which are as stable and as certain as are the laws of the material world, and which enable us to construct and apply a sure criterion of testimony in regard to matters of fact. These laws must have been violated, on a large scale and in innumerable instances, on the supposition that the miraculous events which have been attested by so many witnesses were not real occurrences; and any such violation of these laws would itself be a miracle. For “the proof that such miracles have been wrought is *such* testimony as cannot be denied without admitting miracles as great,—namely, that numbers of persons, the best qualified to judge of them, and who had no motive to impose upon others, attest their reality; since, to suppose that all these persons were either deceived themselves, or concurred in a scheme to impose upon others, would be more evidently contrary to the known course of Nature respecting mankind (who we must take for granted have been the same in all ages) than the reality of the miracles which they attest;—this, when all the circumstances of the case are attentively considered, being a more manifest violation of the established laws of nature than the other, and for no end.”* “If the world went over to Christianity,” says Danté, “without miracles, this one is such that the others would not be the hundredth part so wonderful.”†

(432.) But if, in all such cases, we adopt the conclusion which is “most agreeable to Natural Analogy,” how does it happen, it may be asked, that some of the strongest objections which have been urged against the evidences of Natural and Revealed Religion have been directed to show that they are contrary to the analogy of our experience? A brief consideration of this question may enable us to see that the analogy of our own experience has a close connection with all the evidences, and that in this, as in other respects, there is a striking resemblance between those of Natural and of Revealed Religion. We may take the speculative objections or sceptical difficulties of Hume as perhaps the most remarkable specimens of this mode of reasoning. He first assailed the sufficiency of the natural evidence for the Being and perfections of God; and on

* Dr Priestley, vol. XXI. p. 93. | † Danté, Paradiso, Can. xxiv.

what ground? On the ground that the world is "a singular effect," and that while we have experience of watch-making, we have no experience of world-making, and cannot, therefore, proceed on the ground of any known analogy. He next assailed the miraculous evidence of Revealed Religion, and again on what ground? on the ground that it is agreeable to the analogy of our experience that testimony may be false, but it is contrary to the analogy of our experience that there should be any interruption to the usual course of Nature. In both cases the objection rests on the same ground, and in both it will be found to contain the same radical fallacy. That fallacy consists in transposing the things which are to be compared, and instituting a comparison between those which do not belong to the same class, and which have no resemblance to each other. He compares *the events with their evidences*; and because there is no analogy between these, he infers that the evidences are inconclusive. Whereas *the events should be compared only with other events, and the evidences with other evidences*. To run a cross comparison between the two is the likeliest means of creating confusion of thought. In the case of Natural Religion the marks of design in Nature should be compared with the well-known manifestations of intelligence in works of art,—that is, the *evidence* should be compared with the *evidence*, not with the *event* of creation which is inferred from it; and that *event*, again, if it can be said to have any analogue in our experience, should be compared with some *event* of a similar kind,—such as a miracle might be, or even the expression of thought in language, and its embodiment in works of literature and art.—In the case, again, of Revealed Religion, the same cross comparison is drawn between the *events* and the *evidences*, whereas the events should be compared only with other events, and the evidences with other evidences. Miracles are immediate effects of Divine power, and they find their fit analogue in the stupendous work of Creation; Prophecies, with their fulfilment in remote events, are manifestations of omniscient wisdom, and they find their fit analogue in the prospective provisions of Providence. But the evidences may be compared with other evidences, the testimonies with other testimonies. The human medium, through which the Divine manifestations are conveyed to us, may be strictly analogous to that of our other historical knowledge. The distinction between the two lines of thought, which have been

thus briefly indicated, cannot be safely overlooked, in seeking to find sound analogies in matters of Faith.

(433.) The fact that the evidences both of Natural and of Revealed Religion have been assailed and defended on the same ground of analogy, is surely a remarkable one, and it will be found also to be deeply instructive. It resembles another fact in the history of human thought on the subject of Religion,—namely, that the self-same axiom of reason,—*ex nihilo nihil fit*,—became the basis of Theism, on the one hand, and the pretext for Atheism on the other. Just so the analogy of experience is appealed to both by believers and unbelievers, in connection with the evidences of Natural and Revealed Religion. And surely this fact is fitted to teach us two great lessons—first that analogy is involved in each of these evidences, considered separately, and secondly, that some analogy must also subsist between the two.

(434.) Looking now, not to the human testimonies which form part of the evidence of Revealed Religion, but to the Divine attestations by which they are said to have been ratified and sealed, these will be found to be analogous in many respects to the Divine manifestations on which Natural Religion depends.

(435.) They are analogous to each other in this respect,—that it is by some manifestation of His Divine perfections that God makes Himself known, in the one case, as the Creator and Governor of the world, in the other, as the Author and Revealer of the scheme contained in His word. The facts are different, but the kind of evidence which they afford is the same. It is, in either instance, a manifestation of His attributes in certain effects which cannot be accounted for by ascribing them to a human origin or a natural cause. In the works of Creation and Providence we have manifestations of wisdom, power, and goodness; and it is by the effects of the self-same attributes that He makes Himself known as the author of Revelation. For what are miracles but manifestations of His power,—what are prophecies but exhibitions of His prescience,—what is the scheme of Redemption itself but a product of His “manifold wisdom” and infinite love? Were the question seriously entertained,—How can God make Himself known in any case to His intelligent creatures? we should feel that, apart from experience, the question is one too high for us; but so far as our experience goes, we are

warranted in saying, that both in Natural and in Revealed Religion, it is by some manifestation of His Divine perfections in their actual effects that He bears witness to Himself as the Author alike of Nature and of Revelation.—Until the facts are regarded in this light, no Divine evidence is discerned; but as soon as any one of them is seen to be radiant with the Divine glory, it is sufficient to afford a ground of faith as infallible as is the witness of God Himself.

(436.) Viewed in this light, the scheme of Revealed Religion may contain within itself, as the system of Nature does, the most convincing evidence of its Divine origin. It may bear upon it a legible impress of the Divine perfections. It may even exhibit a more signal manifestation of them than any that can be discerned in the works of Creation and Providence, for God may have “magnified His word above all His name.” Still it is an evidence of the same kind with that on which Natural Religion rests; and the resemblance between them is sufficiently strong to warrant us in saying, that, different as they are in other respects, they are strictly analogous in this.

(437.) The analogy which subsists between the evidences of Natural and Revealed Religion will become still more apparent, if we bear in mind that, in considering their respective claims on our belief, we are occupied with the self-same question in regard—both to Nature and to Revelation—the question, namely, as to their origin or cause. The same principles, therefore, which regulate and determine our conclusions in respect to the one, may be involved also in our judgment concerning the other. In either case, we are seeking to ascertain the *commencement* of an existing order of facts. In the prosecution of that inquiry, we are led up to an original act of Creation as the only sufficient cause of the facts which we observe in Nature, and to supernatural interposition as the only sufficient cause of those other facts which are exhibited in the records and ordinances of the Church. The facts are different, the question as to their cause or origin is substantially the same. In like manner the *solution* of the question, not less than the question itself, is similar in both cases,—it amounts in substance to this, that, on a conjunct view of all the facts in each of them, the supposition of the Divine origin of Nature, and the Divine authority of Revelation, is less at variance, or more in accordance, with the analogy of our experience than any other hypothesis concerning them.

(438.) That some analogy must subsist between the evidences of Natural and Revealed Religion may be inferred from the fact that, in the case of both, there is implied a supernatural interposition at the commencement,—followed by an ordinary course of administration,—and manifested in a resulting product, which is visible and permanent. We read of an old, and of a new, creation, each of which is ascribed to immediate supernatural interposition; but in either case, the resulting product is its standing monument. In the one Nature is the permanent and visible proof of Creation, in the other the Church is the permanent and visible proof of Revelation. And just as the old creation bears witness to God as its Creator and Lord, so the new creation bears witness to God as the Author of that vast scheme which is exhibited in Scripture, and embodied in the Church.

(439.) The evidences of Natural and Revealed Religion are analogous to each other also in this respect, that the evidence in either instance consists of many parts, derived from various distinct sources, which, when they are combined, constitute a *cumulative* proof such as is capable of producing the highest moral certainty. It is universally acknowledged that a confluence of different indications all converging to the same conclusion, or even the frequent repetition of the same indications, imparts a *multiple* force to the evidence which springs from them,—insomuch that circumstances which, taken singly, might seem to have little weight, acquire, by their concurrence or their frequency, an irresistible power over our convictions. Butler affirms that “probable proofs, by being *added*, not only increase the evidence, but *multiply* it.”* Now the evidence both of Natural and Revealed Religion is *cumulative*, and its full cogency is only felt when its various elements are combined. They are distinct in themselves, and derived from different sources, but they all point in the same direction, and converge to the same result. For this reason it is necessary, in studying the evidence both of Natural and Revealed Religion, to take a comprehensive view of all the various proofs, and to pronounce on their value when conjoined.† It is because the “general evidence of religion is complex and various” that it is so much easier for an opponent to raise difficulties on some

* Butler's Analogy—Introduction, p. 1, and Part II. c. vii.

† Pascal, “Pensées,” pp. 174, 176, 228. Butler's Sermons, Halifax Ed., p. 269.

particular points than for an apologist to set forth in their full strength the grounds and reasons of his belief. But the cumulative force of such an array of proofs should be sufficient to raise us above the level at which only the pressure of such difficulties is felt, and should lead us to suspect that we are wrong in yielding to their influence, rather than that a scheme so supported is unworthy of our belief.* The existence of evil is a great difficulty in Natural Religion, but the general strength of the evidence is such that we believe in spite of it, and are content to wait for its solution hereafter. There may be similar difficulties, although there are none so great as this, in Revealed Religion; and yet here too the general strength of the evidence may be sufficient to neutralize any objection that is founded upon them.

(440.) It is chiefly the force of cumulative evidence by the confluence of many proofs, or the frequent repetition of the same, that our convictions are determined, and our conduct regulated, with regard to the common affairs of life; and on the same kind of evidence both Natural and Revealed Religion rest their claims. "The very firmest of our convictions," says Mr Taylor, in a passage already quoted, "come to us in this very same mode—that is, in the way of the *congruity* of evidences, meeting or collapsing in the conclusion."†

* Mansel, "Limits," pp. 240, 247.

† "Restoration of Belief," pp. 102, 220.

CHAPTER VI.

ANALOGY BETWEEN THE VOLUMES OF NATURE AND
REVELATION.

(441.) The term "Volume," which properly denotes a book, is applied metaphorically to Nature, on the ground of an obvious analogy between the two, when they are considered severally as sources of instruction and objects of study. Hence we speak familiarly of "reading," of "interpreting," and of "understanding" Nature, just as we use the same expressions, in a similar sense, with reference to the records of Revelation.

(442.) On the supposition of their Divine origin, it might be presumed that there would be some analogy between the two, and even such an analogy as may afford some proof that the Author of both is the same. It is not unreasonable to suppose that, on a comparison between the Works and the Word of God, we may discern such a resemblance as may materially contribute to confirm our belief in the scheme of Revealed Religion. This source of analogy is so copious, that we can only indicate a few among the innumerable streams which flow from it.*

(443.) On a general survey of their contents, the two Volumes will be found to exhibit many points of analogy to each other in some of their most *characteristic features*. One of the first which will strike the mind of a thoughtful inquirer is the amazing variety and inexhaustible fulness of each.—No human mind has ever been able to expound the whole system of Nature, and no human mind will ever exhaust the full meaning of Revelation. In the case of both, the subject is so vast that, even for an inadequate and incomplete exhibition of it, recourse must be had to a division of labour, distributed over its various departments. No

* See "God's Two Books, or Nature and the Bible have one Author," by T. A. G. Balfour, M.D., p. 6 (Edin. 1861). Dr James Carlyle (Dublin), "Letters," vol. I. p. 2. Sir David Brewster's Life of Sir Isaac Newton.

philosopher could ever say that he had constructed a complete system of natural knowledge, and no divine will ever be able to say that he has fathomed the depths, and mastered the whole contents, of Revealed Religion.

(444.) Yet with all this variety and copiousness of details, there is, in each of the two volumes, a simplicity of plan, and a unity of purpose, such as constitutes a *second* point of analogy between the two. This is one of the most striking characteristics of nature,—all its material combinations may be reduced to a few simple elements, and all these elements are subjected to a few uniform laws, which bind them together into one harmonious system. The same laws which regulate motion on the surface of the earth extend also to the planets in the sky, and the unity which is discerned amidst so much diversity enables us to rise to the conception of a Uni-verse,—consisting of many parts, but forming one system of created being. There is the same majestic simplicity, and the same perfect unity, in the plan of Revelation. It consists of many parts, but they may all be reduced to a few principles, and all its successive dispensations on earth are but the unfoldings of one magnificent plan, which stretches onwards beyond the limits of time, and connects earth with heaven.

(445.) The two volumes further resemble each other in this,—that their contents are presented to us not in a systematic form, but in a miscellaneous collection, and yet admit of being reduced to system, and this is a *third* point of analogy between them. Science is the methodical arrangement of natural objects and events, which are placed before us without any apparent order or connection. Theology is the methodical arrangement of scriptural facts and lessons which are placed before us in every variety of form,—in history, in biography, in parable, in prophecy, in the maxims of proverbial wisdom, or in the strains of poetry and song.* “The two Books of Nature and Revelation are not merely written by the same hand, they are to a certain extent written in the same *style*; both are marked by a wondrous variety, yet with a certain unity pervading it; in both we observe the frequent repetition of typical ideas; in both we note the same absence of Scientific arrangement. . . . In God’s word, we have here a promise, there a tender exhortation; a doctrine lies imbedded in

* Albert Barnes, “Science and Theology,” p. 213.

a narrative or an argument,—a precept is conveyed in a burst of poetry or a group of proverbs. But in vain do we search the Bible for any body of divinity, for any theological system. The materials are all there from which the student may frame his own classification, and draw his own lines of definition, which after all will be but a faulty mapping out of Divine truth.”* Yet the contents of each volume, when presented to the human mind acting spontaneously according to its own natural laws, admit of being reduced to a systematic form; and Science bears precisely the same relation to the one, which Theology bears to the other.

(446.) There is a similar mixture in both volumes of light and shade, of clearness and of obscurity; and this is the more remarkable because, in either instance, that is made clear which is most necessary to be known for practical use, while much that is more abstruse is either hid from our view altogether, or left to be discovered by patient research and persevering study. God might have made all things equally plain in both; but manifestly He has not done so in either; He presents some truths clearly, while others are only dimly revealed both in the light of Nature and in the light of Revelation. But in each of the two, the lessons are more or less clearly taught in proportion as they are more or less remote from those practical ends to which all knowledge is designed to be subservient. “The strange composition, or constitution of the Scriptures, being made up of depths and shallows, of things near at hand and things afar off, of things mysterious and profound, and things obvious and plain, . . . so exactly answers the temper and model of the universe, or great body of the creatures, that it is a great argument, that one and the same workman was the architect and contriver of both. If we look into the constitution and frame of the universe, we shall see the like *chequer-work*, as we may call it, there.”†

(447.) Looking still to the general characteristics of the two volumes, another point of analogy between them consists in this, that each reveals a scheme or system of things which is regulated by laws,—carried on by a long series of means,—developed gradually and progressively,—and depending on many prospective provisions, which come into operation only as the scheme advances

* British Quarterly Review, No. LVII. p. 142.

† John Goodwin, “Divine Authority of Scripture,” pp. 38, 53. Pascal, “Pensées,” p. 234.

in its course. In all these respects, the system of things revealed by the one is manifestly analogous to the system of things revealed by the other: the things are different, but the method is the same; and if we consider that no reason can be assigned for the present constitution of Nature any more than for the actual constitution of Revelation,* the resemblance of the one to the other in these respects affords a strong proof of the common origin of both.

(448.) Another point of the general resemblance between the two consists in their having the same ultimate end—the glory of God. In Nature “the invisible things of Him are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even His eternal power and Godhead,” and in Revelation “He has magnified His word above all His name,”—that is, has given a fuller and clearer manifestation of His glory, by revealing His mind and will in the scheme of Redemption and Grace, than any that had been given before. This is the chief end of both;—an end which is contemplated in all the arrangements of Nature, and which is steadily kept in view in the whole course of Revelation. It follows that each of the two volumes must exhibit some manifestations of the Divine perfections,—for His essential glory consists in these, and His declarative glory in making them known; they must each contain, therefore, within themselves, an evidence of their Divine origin, and possess a self-evidencing light, which, as soon as it is discerned, will lead us equally to acknowledge God as the author of Nature, and the author of Revelation.†

(449.) Such are some of the more prominent points of analogy between the two volumes, when regard is had merely to their *general characteristic features*; and this comprehensive class of analogies has often been illustrated and applied with striking beauty and effect. In making use of them, however, we should be careful to form a distinct conception of the proper terms of the comparison. We may compare Nature with Revelation, or we may compare Science with Theology; but we shall fall into inextricable confusion of thought if we institute a cross comparison between the two,—if, instead of comparing Nature with Revelation, and Science with Theology, we compare Theology with Nature, or Science

* Butler, “Analogy,” c. iv. § 3.

† Dr Owen, “Works,” IV. 406–421.

187–191. Mestrezat, “De l'Ecriture Sainte,” 13, 20, 46, 64, 420.

Dr Hodge, “Essays and Reviews,”

with Scripture. Nature and Revelation are the two standard authorities, the one in philosophy, the other in faith; and these two may, for that reason, be brought into comparison with each other. Science and Theology are the human interpretations of these standards respectively, and they may be true or false, partial or perfect, while the standard, in either case, is Divine and infallible. This caution is rendered necessary by its having been occasionally neglected or overlooked. Science has been spoken of as if it were a Revelation distinct from Nature as well as from Scripture—"a new and additional Revelation, given without miracle, through uninspired genius;" and we are even told that "Science has opened to us some views of the Divine Being which even surpass those which are furnished by Scripture itself."* Science is not a Revelation, any more than Theology is; it is a human exposition of Natural truth, just as Theology is a human exposition of Religious truth, the former revealed in the volume of Nature, the latter in the volume of Revelation. The two Divine Volumes, or the two human expositions, may be compared with each other respectively, and, in both cases, we shall find many instructive analogies between them; but we must not institute a *cross* comparison between things so different as Science and Scripture, or Theology and Nature. It is a grievous error to suppose that Science is more certain, or less fallible, than Theology, because the Book of Nature is less liable to be misunderstood or misinterpreted than the volume of Revelation;† for there have been as many errors in Science, as there have been heresies in Religion, and both springing from similar causes,—the neglect or misinterpretation of Nature, in the one case, and the neglect or misinterpretation of Scripture, in the other.

(450.) The relation between the two volumes of Nature and Revelation is one of the most prolific sources of sound analogies in matters of faith, and its importance, in this view of it, can scarcely be exaggerated. "There are two volumes," says Archbishop Whately, "both by the same Divine Author, spread out before

* Farrar, "Science and Theology," Preface xiii. 25, 31.

† *E.g.*, "Primus liber, scilicet Naturæ, non potest falsificari, nec deleri, neque false interpretari; ideo hæretici non possunt eum false intelligere, nec

aliquis potest in eo fieri hæreticus. Sed secundus potest falsificari, et false interpretari, et male intelligi."—Raimond de Sebonde, "Theolog. Naturalis," quoted by Hallam, "Literature of Europe," I. p. 192.

us for our instruction and benefit, from each of which we may learn something of His dealings, so as to apply what we learn to our own practical advantage. One of these may be called the Book of Nature, or the system of the created universe ; the other the record of Inspiration ; and there is a correspondence, in many points, between the two. For, as man is capable of becoming, by attentive observation, acquainted with many of the substances that exist in Nature, and of learning more or less of their properties and the laws to which they are subjected, and is enabled thence to apply these to his own use,—but is quite incapable of either *creating* any substance, or changing the laws of Nature ; so it is also in respect of Revelation. Man, by attentive study of the Scriptures, may learn much of God's dealings with our race, and of His gracious offers and promises, and may so apply this knowledge, and avail himself of those offers, as to become ‘wise unto salvation through faith which is in Christ Jesus ;’ but he can no more *make* or *alter* a Revelation, than he can set aside the physical laws of the universe ; nor must he, therefore, ‘teach as with authority,’ or pronounce, *independently of an appeal to Scripture*, what is the meaning of Scripture, and what are the designs of the Most High, and the faith and the duties of Christians.”*

* Whately, “Essays on Dangers to Christian Faith,” 147 ; see also Whately, “Bampton Lectures,” p. 91. Joseph Glanville, “Essays,” IV. 34 ; V. 20. Sir Wm. Hamilton, “Lectures on Metaphysics,” I. 82, 267, 284.

CHAPTER VII.

ANALOGY BETWEEN THE INTERPRETATION OF NATURE
AND SCRIPTURE.

(451.) The general resemblance which subsists between the two volumes in respect of their characteristic features, suggests some special analogies, bearing more particularly on the treatment which they should severally receive at our hands; and as these are applicable to the determination of some of the most important questions of modern time, we shall now briefly indicate their nature and origin. They may be described generally as analogies between Science, as the interpretation of Nature, and Theology as the interpretation of Scripture.

(452.) In the study both of Science and of Theology we are taught with *authority*; and the authority is, in either instance, external to the mind of the student,—it lies in the volume which is placed before him. It is not in matters of faith only that we are subject to authority, if that term be understood in its widest and most comprehensive sense, as denoting a rule or standard to which our judgment should be conformed. Nature is the standard or rule of natural knowledge,—the supreme authority in matters of Science. Scripture is the standard or rule of Religious knowledge,—the supreme authority in matters of Faith. In regard to physical science, it is generally admitted that the only authority by which any of its doctrines can be established lies in the facts of nature, ascertained by experience or experiment. In the case of mental science, we are equally subjected to authority; we are not left to think as we will. We are under authority in two distinct respects—first, as being subject to certain laws of thought which we can neither resist nor change; and secondly, as being brought face to face with the facts of consciousness, which are as real and as certain as are the objects and changes of the material world. A sound Psychology can only ascertain the facts and the

laws which are revealed in consciousness, and it must be brought into conformity with them. And so in the case of Revealed Religion, we are subject to *authority*, and that authority lies in the facts and lessons of Scripture.

(453.) In the study both of Science and of Theology, we are *mere interpreters*,—in the one case, of the volume of Nature, in the other, of the volume of Revelation. We may avail ourselves of human commentaries on both, but only as helps to the right understanding of these; for the great work of the philosopher and also of the divine is simply to interpret the volumes to which they respectively appeal, as the primal sources of their knowledge. Never was a more pregnant or more important aphorism announced than that with which Lord Bacon introduces his “*Novum Organum*,” and which may be justly described as the foundation-stone of modern Inductive Science—“Man, as the minister and interpreter of nature, does and understands as much as his observations on the order of nature, either with regard to things or the mind, permit him; and neither knows nor is capable of more.”* Man is called to interpret a lesson, not to invent a theory; he is not to create, but to receive the truth. The same principle is applicable to Theology. “Let the ministry, in this and in every coming age, approach the Book of God as Bacon and Boyle and Newton approached the world of matter and of mind before them, as simple *interpreters*, and the outer limit of theological attainment will have been reached. The human mind will be emancipated, and the strength of the human faculties in Theology will be demonstrated by sitting at the feet of Christianity evincing the higher laws of the universe, just as men who sat down before the Works of God evincing its lower laws, with childlike simplicity, learned what was the order of His material creation. . . . The botanist does not shape his facts. He is the collector, the arranger, not the originator. So the framer of systems in Religion should be; and it is matter of deep regret that such he has *not* been. He should be merely the collector, and arranger, not the originator of the doctrines of the Gospel.”†

* So rendered by Devey, p. 383. Bacon's words are, “*Homo, naturæ minister et interpres, tantum facit et intelligit, quantum, de naturæ ordine, re vel mente observaverit; nec amplius scit, aut potest.*”—Bacon's Works

in 10 vols., vol. VIII. p. 1. See on this, Whately's “*Essays on Dangers to Christian Faith*,” pp. 143, 148.

† Albert Barnes, “*Essays on Science and Theology*,” pp. 159, 215.

(454.) In the study both of Science and of Theology, the interpretation of Nature and Scripture must be conducted on the same principles, and according to the same method,—that of Inductive inquiry. Just as we survey the natural world in all its departments with a view to ascertain the facts which it exhibits,—to arrange them into classes according to their character and relations,—and to co-ordinate them under general laws ; so we must survey the whole field of Revelation as it lies before us in Scripture,—take into account every statement which meets us there,—classify them according to their bearing on the same topics,—and arrange the classes thus formed according to their relations to each other, so as to construct an inductive Scriptural Theology. Every text, in the one case, just as every fact, in the other, must be taken into account. The method is the same in both, the materials only are different. “The true Christian will take *the facts of the Scriptures*, as they are written, without any exception, diminution, or alteration whatever. He will not rashly assume to himself any liberty, as a reader of God’s word, which the palpable nature of the case precludes his venturing to assume, as an observer of God’s works. As he cannot accordingly bend and shape the facts of the visible world in conformity with any preconceived theory, or as the capriciousness of fancy may dictate, but must receive, and believe them, and reason from them, as they really are ; he will in like manner consider the truths of the Scriptures, as unsusceptible of any modification from his own mind,—as *facts* no less rigid than the phenomena of the natural world ; and receive, and believe, and reason from them, as they are written by the finger of God.”* Nor is this the duty of the Christian only who is already convinced of the Divine origin of Scripture ; it is the duty of every one who honestly seeks to know what is the real meaning of Scripture, although he should be for a time sceptical in regard to its Divine authority. For surely, whatever may be his ultimate decision with regard to it,—whether he shall receive or reject its claims,—he should endeavour, in the first instance, to ascertain what it really teaches ; and, with this view, should institute a calm, deliberate, and patient investigation of its actual contents, conducted in an inductive method, and in a candid, impartial spirit.

* Dr Hampden, “Philosophical Evidence of Christianity,” p. 262.

(455.) In the study both of Science and of Theology, Reason stands in the same relation to the book of Nature, and the book of Revelation ; and this relation is, in both cases, that of a *scholar* and *subject*, not that of a *censor* or *superior authority*. This proposition follows as a necessary corollary from the fact already noticed, that the *authority* lies in the volume, in either instance, and not in the mind of the student ; but it is necessary, in the present state of speculation on such subjects, to state it distinctly by itself, and to give it that degree of prominence to which it is entitled by its intrinsic importance. Man may, or rather must, *judge*, but he can judge only of facts which are placed before him in the volume of Nature or the volume of Revelation ; and in judging of these facts, he must be guided and governed by certain laws of thought which are imposed upon Him by authority, and are entirely independent of his will. He may *command*, in the sense of making use of means for the accomplishment of his purposes, but he can "*command only by obeying*"—he can succeed only by conforming to the laws of the natural or spiritual systems. It has been said, indeed, that "the truths of mathematics are absolute truths," that "they are legislative, not interpretative," and that "in this sphere man is no longer only *minister et interpretes*, he is sovereign and lawgiver."* But even here our first ideas of magnitude and figure are derived from the lessons of experience ; and so far from being "sovereign and lawgiver" in regard to them, they dominate over our belief irresistibly, and constrain our assent to the conclusions which flow from them. The *supremacy* of reason cannot be affirmed in any other than a relative sense ;—it may be supreme with reference to our lower faculties, or with reference to the mere opinions of our fellow-men,† it is not supreme, but subordinate, with reference either to the volume of Nature, or the volume of Revelation.

(456.) In the study both of Science and Theology, the volume of Nature and the volume of Revelation are, each, *its own interpreter*. In a certain sense, the student may be said to be the interpreter of both, for he seeks to learn the lessons which they severally teach, and for this end makes use of many means and

* Dr Samuel Brown, Letter to Combe in Combe's "Relation of Science and Religion," p. 275.

† Gioberti says : "Doué qu'il est

d'une intuition spéciale de la vérité, il est maître et non disciple, capitaine et non soldat, roi et non sujet."—*Restauration*, I. 236.

appliances, such as may enable him to elicit their true meaning; but both Nature and Scripture are justly described as being each its own interpreter, because, in either instance, the *rule* of interpretation is contained within itself. We interpret the one according to the Analogy of Nature, we interpret the other according to the Analogy of Faith. What is obscure in either is illustrated by that which is clear, and explained so as to be in harmony with it. When a difficulty arises in the interpretation of Nature, we have recourse to Nature itself for the means of its solution.* In like manner, when a difficulty arises in the interpretation of Scripture, "the infallible rule of interpretation is the Scripture itself," so that "when there is a question about the true and full sense of any Scripture, it must be searched and known by other places that speak more clearly." For "the Supreme Judge, by whom all controversies of religion are to be determined, and all decrees of Councils, opinions of ancient writers, doctrines of men, and private spirits are to be examined, and in whose sentence we are to rest, can be no other but the Holy Spirit speaking in the Scripture."†

(457.) But the volume of Nature and the volume of Revelation, although distinct and independent, have a certain relation to each other, and refer often to the same things; and hence the question has been raised, how far the one may be employed in the interpretation of the other? To this question two opposite answers have been given. Some have held that "Philosophy is the Interpreter of Scripture;"‡ others that "Scripture is the Interpreter of Nature."§ There can be no doubt that they throw light mu-

* Dégérando, "Histoire Comparée," II. 404. "On emprunte de la Nature elle-même l'art d'expliquer ses phénomènes."

† *Westminster Confession*, C. I. s. ix. x. See Whitaker's "Disputation on Holy Scripture," Question v. p. 405; Dr Goode, "Rule of Faith," III. 439.

‡ "Philosophia Scripturæ Interpres," an anonymous treatise, ascribed to Meyer, or to Reimar, and republished by Semler, 1776, Works, vol. I. It was answered by John Wilson, M.A., Cambridge, 1678, in his Treatise entitled "The Scriptures' Genuine Interpreter Asserted."

§ "Gratia Naturæ Interpres," by Johannes Brunsmannus, which is de-

signed to show that "Sacrae verba Scripturæ, non minus physicis de rebus, quam, de cæteris, vim habere probandi." It was a reply to the first Dissertation of Wittichius, "De Sacrae Scripturæ in rebus Philosophicis abusu," in which he had raised two questions: 1. "An Physicæ genuinum Principium sit Scriptura? 2. An hæc de rebus naturalibus loquens accuratam semper veritatem, an potius sensum et opinionem vulgi, sæpius sequatur?" These questions were occasioned by the supposed heresy of Galileo in affirming the earth's motion round the sun, and they relate to the right method of interpreting those passages of Scripture which speak of

tually on each other ; that we could not understand the language of Scripture without some knowledge of Nature, and that Scripture reveals some things concerning nature,—such as the creation and the deluge—which mere physical investigation might not have discovered. We may lawfully use, therefore, our natural knowledge in the interpretation of Scripture, and yet we may legitimately accept, on the authority of Revelation, those facts concerning the material world which we find recorded in the sacred writings, without being chargeable, in either instance, with the error of confounding the two volumes, or of departing from the right rule of interpretation. We may consistently hold that Nature is its own interpreter, and that, in like manner, Scripture is its own interpreter, while we admit that Nature throws light on the interpretation of Scripture, and that Scripture throws light on the history of Nature. And if in interpreting each volume according to its own rule, we arrive, in any case, at results which are apparently at variance, we may reasonably infer that our interpretation of the one or of the other is erroneous, and seek to rectify it by further inquiry.

(458.) In the study both of Science and of Theology,—it is our duty to receive impartially *all* the facts which are exhibited in the volume of Nature, and *all* the lessons which are taught in the volume of Revelation. We are not entitled to receive one and to reject another, according to our own discretion or caprice. This is another important point of analogy between the two. There is both in Science and in Theology a sound Eclecticism, which is legitimate and safe ; there is also a vicious Eclecticism, which is unwarrantable and dangerous. It is not difficult to discriminate aright between them. In Science Eclecticism is not permissible so far as regards the facts or the laws of Nature ; every fact must be recognised, and every law admitted, which is established by sufficient evidence, whether they be in accordance with our preconceived opinions or adverse to them, and whether we can see the reasonableness and wisdom of the natural order of things, or not. But Eclecticism is not only permissible, it is absolutely indispensable, so far as regards the theories or speculations of men in regard to these facts and laws ; for such theories are often dis-

natural things. Hutchinson and his school endeavour to show that the Scriptures contain a system of natural	truth. See "Abstract from the Works of John Hutchinson, Esq.," ascribed to Bishop Horne.
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cordant, generally one-sided, containing an element of truth imbedded in an alloy of error,—and we must eliminate the error while we extract the truth, so as to form out of many a heterogeneous system a compact body of science. In like manner Eclecticism has no place with reference to the doctrines or precepts of Scripture; every doctrine must be received, and every precept obeyed, simply because they are sanctioned by Divine authority, whether they be agreeable or obnoxious to our natural taste, and whether they can be proved by reason, or not. We are not at liberty, in the domain of Science, to pick and choose among the phenomena of Nature; nor are we at liberty, in the domain of Theology, to make a selection of some lessons of Scripture, while we overlook or refuse to receive the rest. But in both there is a right *scepsis*, or suspense of judgment,* and a right *eclecticism* also, in regard to the comments of men. The reason is plain. When we speak of Nature, we speak of the Works of God; when we speak of Scripture, we speak of the Word of God. But when we speak of Science, we speak of men's commentaries on His Works; and when we speak of Theology, we speak of men's commentaries on His Word. We may choose between the opinions of men, we must receive implicitly the "oracles of God."†

(459.) In the study both of Science and of Theology, there is a *fixed* and unchangeable standard of truth in the two volumes to which they respectively appeal, while there is also room for indefinite *progress* in the interpretation of each of them. Fixed articles of faith have been supposed to be at variance with the favourite modern theory of Development or Progress; and certainly if that theory implies that all truth is mobile and fluctuating,—that it has no fixed standard or stable ground,—and that the human mind, under a law of progress, and by a process of development, may ultimately cast aside *all* its present beliefs, the supposition is correct. But it will not be easy to show that there is any real difference, in this respect, between the articles of Faith and the doctrines of Science. Both have reference to an objective standard which is constant and invariable; and both, it may be safely affirmed, contain some ascertained truths which the progress of inquiry will never be able to displace or subvert. There is ample room for

* Bacon, "Advancement" (Devey), pp. 19, 52, 135, 136, 187. Joseph Glanville, "Scepsis Scientifica."

† Hampden's "Philosophical Evidence," p. 262.

progress in the interpretation of each of the two volumes, and for that legitimate development of doctrine which consists in the more correct definition of its import, the more rigorous deduction of its logical consequences, and the more extended application of its practical uses ;—but every truth which has been ascertained by the study of either, on what is really good and sufficient evidence, must remain a truth for ever, a part of the noblest heritage of our race, the accumulated knowledge and wisdom of the Past.*

(460.) In the study both of Science and Theology, we are liable to the same temptations and dangers, exposed to the same objections and cavils, met by the same diversities and variations of opinion, by the same necessity for controversial discussion, and the same antagonism of opposing systems ; while the two volumes of Nature and Revelation afford the only sure means of guarding us against evils, and correcting errors, which arise, not so much from their intrinsic obscurity, as from the manner in which they have been severally treated by the human mind. We are apt to come to the study both of Nature and of Scripture with certain preconceived opinions or party predilections,—to take a partial and one-sided view of the evidence which they afford on such subjects as have a relation to our prejudices,—to form hasty generalizations on insufficient data,—and to construct systems composed partly of our own speculative fancies, and partly of what we have derived from report or tradition. These and similar causes have given rise to partial and contradictory systems in Science as well as in Theology. If in the one we have the opposing systems of Calvinism, Arminianism, Pelagianism, and Socinianism, we have in the other the great opposing systems of Philosophy, Dogmatism and Scepticism, Materialism and Idealism, Rationalism and Empiricism.†—The consequence has been that the same objections have been urged against both Science and Theology, and with equal reason. If Bossuet insisted on the “Variations” of Protestantism, and Edgar on the “Variations” of Popery, De Bonald is equally eloquent in exposing the “Variations” of Philosophy.‡ If there has been priestcraft in the domain of Theology, there has not been awanting imposture in that of Science :§ alchemy preceded

* “Christian Errors Infidel Arguments,” pp. 274, 355.

† Dégérando, *Histoire Comparée*, vol. III. Pascal, “*Pensées*,” 268.

‡ De Bonald, “*Recherches Philos.*, I. 1, 5, 58.

§ Sir Thomas Browne, “*Vulgar Errors*,” pp. 11, 13.

inductive chemistry,—astrology preceded astronomical science,—and the art of healing itself has had its exploded nostrums and panaceas. Hence with some writers the vanity and uncertainty of Science has been a favourite commonplace.* We have no wish to disparage Science, and think it a miserable expedient to found religious faith on the ruins of natural certitude: but we advert to the variations, and controversies, and conflicting systems in philosophy on purpose to show that, if the interpretation of Scripture is objected to on account of the diversities of opinion to which it has given rise, the same objection is applicable, in all its strength, to the interpretation of Nature; and that the evils in question have arisen, in both instances, from the same cause,—namely, the method in which men have conducted the interpretation of Nature and Scripture.

(461.) “It is true in fact,” says Warburton, “that neither class of these inquirers (philosophers and divines) made, throughout a vast series of ages, any very considerable advances in real knowledge; but it is as true, that the impediments in both cases proceeded, not from any difficulties in the nature of the things inquired after, but from the *wrong methods* employed in the search. Instead of endeavouring to find out the real constitution of things from the frame of God’s Works, as they are objected to our senses; or the nature of Revelation from the study of His Word, as conveyed to us in Scripture,—they invented imaginary systems out of their own scanty stock of Nothing, and then, by wresting and distorting, forced Nature and the Bible to father the shadowy and spurious issue. But both divines and philosophers, when they became convinced of their follies, and, in consequence of that conviction, proceeded with more modesty as well as better sense, to renounce their fanciful hypotheses, and to erect theories on the real constitution of things, both made great advances in Natural and Religious truth.”†

(462.) Such are some of the more prominent points of Analogy between the two systems of Science and Theology. Many more might be enumerated, were it our object to exhaust the subject, but the specimens which have been offered are sufficient to indicate the line of thought which should be pursued.

* Henrici Cornelii Agrippæ de “Incertitudine et Vanitate Scientiarum, atque excellentia Verbi Dei.” Montaigne’s Essays, II. 230, 280, 251.

† Warburton, “Works,” vol. IX. p. 28.

CHAPTER VIII.

ANALOGY BETWEEN HUMAN AND DIVINE TESTIMONY.

(463.) When the apostle says—"If we receive the witness of men, the witness of God is greater,"*—his statement implies that there is a real resemblance, and yet an important difference, between Divine and human testimony,—and that while the resemblance between them lays a solid ground for reasoning analogically from the one to the other, the difference between them imparts to that reasoning the force of an *a fortiori* argument.

(464.) When another apostle says—"What man knoweth the things of a man, save the spirit of man which is in him? even so, the things of God knoweth no man, but the Spirit of God,"†—his statement implies that there is a difference between "the things of a man" which may be naturally known by the human mind, and "the things of God," which can only be supernaturally revealed by His Spirit:—and yet that there is an analogy between them,—for this is involved in the expression *even so* which connects the two clauses,—an analogy, not between Divine and human testimony, as in the former case, but between the self-conscious knowledge of the human mind, and the self-conscious knowledge, if we may so speak, of the Spirit of God, by which He is qualified to reveal "the things of God."

(465.) When the Lord Himself said—"Ye sent unto John, and he bare witness unto the truth. But I receive not testimony from man. . . . I have greater evidence than that of John; for the works which the Father hath given Me to finish, the same works that I do, bear witness of Me that the Father hath sent Me; and the Father Himself which hath sent Me hath borne witness of Me;"—His statement implies that the human testimony of John was in accordance with the testimony of His Father, but

* 1 John v. 9.

† 1 Cor. ii. 11.

that the one was inferior and subordinate to the other,—the Divine testimony being that to which He chiefly appealed in confirmation of His claims as “the Christ, the Son of the living God.”—And when He proceeds to say, in the same context,*—“There is one that accuseth you, even Moses, in whom ye trust;—for had ye believed Moses, ye would have believed Me, for he wrote of Me: but if ye believe not his writings, how can ye believe My words?”—His reasoning implies that the “writings” of Moses, which were accepted by them and recognised by Himself, as inspired and canonical, possessed the highest of all evidence, since in them human and Divine testimony were combined, and “the witness of man” was the medium for conveying “the witness of God.”

(466.) The analogy, and yet the difference, between Divine and human testimony, are both recognised in all the passages which have been quoted, and each of these considerations must be kept in view, if we would form a right estimate of the authority of Revealed Religion. We have already seen that analogy is related to other proofs, and connected with other laws of thought.† More particularly, the perception of resemblance is inseparable from the perception of difference; and both are involved in the conception of Divine testimony, which is framed partly in the way of comparison, and partly in the way of contrast, with the testimony of man.

(467.) There is, first, an analogy between the “witness of men” and the “witness of God,” and this analogy is one of fundamental importance. It is closely connected with the distinctive principle of Revealed Religion, which differs from every other branch of human knowledge in being taught by express Divine authority.‡ In one sense, indeed, all truths come from God, and, in that sense, may be said to be equally Divine; but all truths do not come from God in the same way, nor are they taught, like those of Revealed Religion, by an articulate expression of His mind and will. The sciences are taught by natural objects and natural events, which are known by experience and observation; “We do not take them for truths upon the credit of any foregoing testimony that God gives to us of them, but we assent to them

* John v. 31-46.

† Part I. C. vii. and viii. pp. 179, 198.

‡ Dr Tatham, “Chart and Scale,”

II. 17, 28, 37.

propter evidentiam rei, and finding them to be certainly true, we gather that they are of God from whom all truth comes. The method of Faith is widely different from this;—here we first own the testimony of God speaking in the Scriptures, and thence we are persuaded that what the Scripture speaks is true. . . . God is the author of all true and sound philosophy . . . but God is not *so* the author of philosophy as He is of the Scripture. He is so far the author of the Scripture, as that He hath infallibly directed His servants in penning its several parts, and preserved them from error in that work; but He is not *so* the author of philosophy, as infallibly to direct any man in the world so as not to err in his philosophy.”*—The truths of Revealed Religion are taught in a way in which no other truths are taught; they rest on the testimony of the Revealer, and are received on His authority. Faith consists in believing what God says, because He says it, just as obedience consists in doing what He commands, because He wills it. If this be the distinctive principle of Revealed Religion, as contradistinguished in this respect from all our mere natural knowledge, the fundamental importance of the analogy between Divine and human testimony becomes at once apparent, since it is only by means of our knowledge of the one that we are qualified to form any conception or estimate of the other. Had we no experience of human testimony, we could neither understand nor believe the Divine: and the analogy between the two lies at the foundation of our religious belief.

(468.) “We receive the witness of men.” Human testimony is one of the natural grounds of belief. Whether this belief be the result of an instinctive principle, or of an acquired experience, it is natural and universal. It is necessary, also, to the conduct of life—so necessary that our very existence, as well as our welfare, may be said to depend upon it. It makes the experience of others available for our use.† It brings near to us, and places clearly before us, objects and events, lying far beyond the range alike of our senses and our reason. It makes known many things which could not be discovered in any other way, and which, even when discovered in this way, cannot be proved otherwise than by

* John Wilson, A.M., Cambridge, “The Scriptures’ Genuine Interpreter,” pp. 229 and 102. (1678.)

211, 219. Baxter, “Works,” XX. pp. 106, 107. Dégérando, “Des Signes,” III. 443, 457.

† Mercier, “De la Certitude,” pp.

historical evidence. It is, in fact, the chief source of by far the larger part of our natural knowledge.*

(469.) It is not the mere testimony, however, taken by itself, and viewed apart from other considerations, which constitutes the proof; for some testimonies are true, while other testimonies are false; and it is absolutely necessary, therefore, to consider the conditions on which its truthfulness may be safely inferred. These conditions have been carefully investigated by all the writers on historical or judicial evidence,† and have been illustrated under many distinct particulars;—but they may all be reduced ultimately to two leading principles,—first, that the witness has the means of being himself duly informed in regard to the facts which he attests, and secondly, that his character and circumstances were such as to afford a proof of his sincerity in attesting these facts. The former condition is necessary to show that he was not himself deceived; the latter, that he had neither the motive that might induce, nor the means that might enable him, to deceive others. The existence of the testimony is the sign or index, rather than the substance or strength of the proof.‡ It is merely a fact which requires to be accounted for. It is tested by those laws of human nature which are known to be in constant and universal operation,—in other words *by the analogy of our experience in similar cases*,—and it is accepted as true only when the supposition of its truth seems to afford the best explanation of its origin. It may seem that as testimony is not true in all cases, and as we are left to judge of its truth by means of criteria, derived from experience, which may be doubtful in themselves and very likely to be misapplied, the evidence arising from this source can in no case be strong, and must in many be extremely weak. But while it often yields little more than a bare presumption, it becomes an irresistible proof where there is a concurrence of several independent witnesses, corroborated by *real*, as distinguished from *verbal*, evidence of a circumstantial kind. And such is the high moral certainty which belongs to it, that judges and juries proceed upon it unhesitatingly when the highest earthly interests,—the fortune, the

* Dr Tatham, "Chart and Scale," I. c. iv. v.; II. pp. 23, 25.

† Bentham, Glassford, Gambier, Smedley, and many more.

‡ Glassford, "Essay on the Principles of Evidence," p. 48. Bentham "Rationale of Judicial Evidence," I. p. 110.

reputation, the liberty, and even the life of a fellow-creature are at stake.

(470.) “We receive, then, the witness of men;” and through this medium we acquire a knowledge of many things which do not come within the range either of our senses or of our reason; and which could neither be discovered nor proved without its aid. And the fact that we do receive and act on such evidence when it comes to us in the words or writings of our fellow-men, is the natural analogy which the apostle employs to illustrate the duty of receiving also “the witness of God.” The two cases are strictly analogous. For just as our fellow-men, in former ages, or in other lands, have witnessed many things which lie far beyond the range of our individual experience, and have made them known to us through the medium of testimony, so God knows many things which are undiscoverable by human reason, and incapable of being proved otherwise than by a Revelation of His mind and will; and He can make them known to us through the medium of a Divine testimony, so as to make it manifest that He is the Revealer. This is the analogy.

(471.) But if there be a real resemblance, there is also a radical difference, between the two cases: a difference in the most fundamental point—the character of the witnesses. Man is liable to be deceived, he is capable, also, of deceiving others;—God is omniscient, and therefore infallible, He is the very God of truth, and cannot deny Himself or deceive others:—this is the difference, and when it is combined with the analogy, the two have the force and cogency of an *a fortiori* proof.—In all kinds of testimony the character of the witness is the ultimate and fundamental ground of our conviction. In the case of human witnesses, their credibility must be tried by various tests, before their testimony can be implicitly received; in the case of God, let it only be proved that He has spoken, and His character is an infallible voucher for the truth of His word; and every lesson taught by His authority, however it may transcend the limits of reason, demands our immediate and unhesitating belief.

(472.) Such is the *analogy*, and such also is the *difference*, between Divine and human testimony. It is only necessary to recall what was formerly stated as to the manner in which they stand related to each other in that scheme of evidence to which Revealed Religion makes its appeal. That evidence depends partly on the

“witness of men,” and partly “on the witness of God,”—but the two are not presented separate or apart from each other; they are *combined*, and so combined as to form one complex but concurring attestation, in which the human is the medium of the Divine, and the Divine the voucher and guarantee of the human, testimony.

(473.) It is evident that in the apostolic age the human testimony was accompanied with a supernatural attestation by which it was ratified and sealed. But the question arises whether any provision has been made for transmitting the truth to later ages attested by evidence Divine and infallible? That question is sufficiently answered, if it can be shown that there is an inspired record of Revelation, and that God is still bearing witness to His word by the events of His Providence, and the operations of His Spirit. That record is presented to us in the Scriptures, which narrate the miracles which were wrought in primitive times, and which contain predictions also of what God would yet accomplish by His providence in the world, and by His grace in the Church. It makes provision, therefore, for a growing and accumulating evidence which should emerge at every successive stage along the whole course of the Church’s history; and this evidence is properly Divine.* The sacred narrative is still the infallible voucher of those miraculous facts by which the authority of the apostles was attested at the first, and which justified the faith of the primitive Church.†

(474.) This is a kind of testimony which can never become obsolete, and which loses none of its force by the lapse of time. Laplace, Craig, and Halley, overlooking the difference between oral and written testimony, have made a vain attempt to prove that “it is waxing old, and ready to vanish away.” But Bentham himself could detect and expose the egregious fallacy of this reasoning. “Halley, whose deficiency in Christian faith was not much less notorious than his proficiency in astronomy and mathematics, thought he had given a death-blow to Revealed Religion when he had published in the Philosophical Transactions a paper

* Dean Lyall, “Propædeia Prophetica,” gives an undue prominence to Prophecy, as compared with Miracles, but his remarks on it are otherwise instructive.

† Richard Baxter, “Works,” vol. XX. p. 83: “A determination of the

Question, Whether the miraculous works of Christ and His disciples do oblige those to believe who never saw them?” See Robert Fleming’s great work, “The Truthfulness of the Scriptures.”

with x's and y's, showing the time at which the probative force of all testimony would be reduced to an evanescent quantity. Yes, if testimony had no other shape to exhibit itself in than the oral. But the Bible comes to us in the written form; and whatever may be the difference in point of extent, as measured by numbers, between the judgment that will be passed on it ten thousand years hence, and the judgment passed on it at present, it will not be easy to say on what account its title to credence should by that length of time, or any greater length of time, be considered as diminished."*

(475.) Such is the nature of the Testimony in favour of Revealed Religion, and whether we consider the analogy which it bears to human testimony, or the difference between the two, every one must feel the force of the apostle's statement, "If we receive the witness of men, the witness of God is greater; and this is the witness of God which He hath testified of His Son."

* Bentham, "Rationale," I. 137. | Works, III. 143. Dr Ol. Gregory's
Dr Calman, in reply to Laplace, | Letters, p. 156. Dr Chalmers.

CHAPTER IX.

ANALOGY BETWEEN SECULAR AND RELIGIOUS EDUCATION.

(476.) We have hitherto spoken of truth, and the way in which it is taught; of evidence, and the various channels through which it is conveyed; and of knowledge, as the result of both. But Education, in the highest sense of the term, is more than a method of teaching, and contemplates other ends than the mere communication of knowledge. It is a course of discipline, or a process of training, by which our mental powers are exercised and invigorated; and it is directed to the formation of right intellectual and moral habits, which are more valuable in themselves, as well as more permanently useful, than much of the information which mere teaching imparts. It has been happily described as the "Georgics of the mind," for "the mind may be fitly compared to a piece of land, and what ploughing, digging, and harrowing is to the one, that thinking, reflecting, examining is to the other."* Much of the mere knowledge which we acquire on earth, and which is so valuable to us in the conduct of life, will cease to be of use to us after death, except in so far as it has been a means of exercising and improving the mind, or of leading it up to those truths which are not terrene and transient, but spiritual and eternal. The linguist who has acquired a knowledge of many tongues and dialects, the chemist who is familiar with the constituent elements of material bodies, the statesman who has studied the laws which determine the welfare of communities within the sphere of time, will have little fruit of all their acquirements hereafter, except in those intellectual and moral habits which have been formed, and the spiritual lessons which have been learned, in their several walks of inquiry. These, and these only, are of permanent value to an immortal mind.

* Berkeley, I. 302. See also Bacon's "Advancement," by Devey, 267, 282, 284.

(477.) But there are two kinds of Education. There is a secular education, for the common business of this world ; there is also a spiritual education, which is profitable both “for the life which now is, and for that which is to come.” When the two are compared, they will be found to have a resemblance to each other in many respects, and this, when duly considered, may become a fruitful source of analogies in matters of Faith.

(478.) Had the mere communication of knowledge been the only end contemplated in the Divine method of educating men, it might have been accomplished by simpler and more direct means than those which are actually employed, and to an extent, also, far surpassing the limited range of our present attainments. Truth might have been directly revealed, and intuitively discerned ;—and a much larger amount of truth might have been presented in the light of its own self-evidence, or of demonstrative certainty. But we are incompetent judges of the wisdom and fitness of the Divine method, unless we could be acquainted with all the ends which it is designed to accomplish in connection with the scheme of God’s moral government. It is certain that there may be, and there is every reason to believe that there really are, many other ends, besides the mere communication of knowledge, which are contemplated in that scheme of discipline under which men are placed. What these ends are, and what provision has been made for effecting them, cannot be divined *a priori*, or determined by abstract speculation, but must be learned from experience and observation. In this respect there is an exact analogy between the education of men in regard to natural things, and in regard to spiritual things,—we are incompetent judges beforehand of the methods which Divine wisdom might deem it meet to employ for the various ends to which such education was designed to be subservient.

(479.) “As God governs the world, and instructs His creatures, according to certain laws and rules, in the known course of Nature, known by reason together with experience, so the Scripture informs us of a scheme of Divine Providence additional to this. . . . Now, if the natural and revealed dispensation of things are both from God, if they coincide with each other, and together make up one scheme of Providence, our being incompetent judges of one, must render it credible that we may be incompetent judges also of the other. . . . As we are in no sort judges beforehand,

by what laws or rules, in what degrees or by what means, it were to have been expected that God would *naturally* instruct us ; so, upon supposition of His affording us light and instruction by *revelation*, additional to what He has afforded us by reason and experience, we are in no sort judges, by what methods, and in what proportion, it were to be expected, that this supernatural light and instruction would be afforded us. We know not beforehand, what degree or kind of natural information, it were to be expected God would afford men, each by his own reason and experience ; nor how far He would enable, and effectually dispose them to communicate it, whatever it should be, to each other ; nor whether the evidence of it would be certain, highly probable, or doubtful ; nor whether it would be given with equal clearness and conviction to all. Nor could we guess,—upon any good ground, I mean,—whether natural knowledge,—or even the faculty itself by which we are capable of attaining it, reason,—would be given to us at once, or gradually. In like manner, we are wholly ignorant what degree of new knowledge, it were to be expected, God would give mankind by revelation, upon supposition of His affording one ; or how far, or in what way, He would interpose miraculously to qualify them, to whom He should originally make the revelation, for communicating the knowledge given by it, and to secure their doing it to the age in which they should live, and to secure its being transmitted to posterity.”*

(480.) While we are incompetent judges beforehand of the manner in which either the secular or the spiritual education of men should be conducted, yet when the two methods which have been actually employed are compared with each other, we may be able to discern many points of analogy between them,—and these may be so numerous, and of such a kind, as to serve the double purpose of neutralizing objections against the scheme of revelation, by showing that similar objections are applicable to the scheme of our natural knowledge, and of affording some positive evidence that the Author of the Natural, is also the Author of the Revealed, method of Education. Some of these analogies may be briefly indicated.

(481.) The fundamental ground of all the analogies which belong to this class, may be found in the fact, that God’s method

* Butler’s “Analogy,” P. II. c. iii. p. 346 (Bishop Wilson’s Edit.).

of educating men is adapted to the natural constitution of a race of beings, who are not created, as the angels were, individually and independently of each other, but born into the world of human parents as little children, and placed from their infancy under tutors and governors, and in the relations of domestic and social life. It is manifest, from the difference between the two cases, that angels, created immediately by the hand of God, and having no kindred or relationship to their fellows other than what is implied in a community of nature with them, must necessarily be educated in a way different from that which is appropriate to the condition of men, who are brought into being *mediately* through human parentage, and placed, in a state of utter helplessness and dependence, under the responsible guardianship of those who are older and more experienced than themselves. It was evidently God's design that every child, on its first entrance into the world, should not only be surrounded with the objects of external nature, and then left to be its own unaided discoverer of whatever it should need to know, but should also be supplied with human instruction, and taught by such as it could trust and love. It was no less evidently His design that the young immortal should not only be taught by the direct communication of knowledge from the lips of others, but should undergo a course of practical training, with a view to the formation of his character and habits, on which, far more than on the mere acquisition of speculative knowledge, his future welfare depends. Hence that marvellous device of Divine wisdom—the Family Institute. Parents are the natural Instructors of their Children, and, unlearned as they may be in many respects, they cannot but impart a large measure of useful information, were it only in teaching the use of speech, and naming the familiar objects of nature.

(482.) But there is far more than this in the process of domestic training. It is from the Family that the child derives his first notions of social relations and their corresponding duties,—of paternity and sonship,—of brotherhood and sisterhood,—of paternal government and moral discipline, which are afterwards transferred, analogically, to the wider circle of the Commonwealth, and even to the higher relations of the kingdom of God.* As we

* Christopher Anderson, "The Domestic Constitution," 9, 13, 44, etc. Dr Harris, "Patriarchy," pp. 4, 86.

have elsewhere said, "The Family is a Divine institution. It is not a creation of human policy, nor a result of human contrivance, but the wise and well-ordered product of Divine wisdom and benevolence, and it is one of the most admirable of God's arrangements. His wisdom is not more displayed in the construction of an individual man, than in the construction of the social system in which every such individual is placed. God has chosen that the whole race should be divided into so many little communities, each of which is under the superintendence and government of its natural head, and all its members bound together by the ties of natural sympathy and affection. For this end, He has so arranged the economy of His providence, that men are brought into the world in a state of absolute helplessness—the helplessness of infancy; and that from their earliest years, they are placed in a state of entire dependence on their parents, and of absolute subjection to their authority. They are not created in a condition of solitary independence, but born in certain moral relations which make their very birth a bond of mutual interest and endearment, and provide for them a company of friends and protectors on their first entrance into the world. . . . The institution of Families seems to be one of God's chief ordinances for the education of the World. Even did the children of a family receive no set lessons,—they are so placed by a wise Providence that they cannot fail to derive from their connections a large amount of useful information; they pick it up, day by day, from the conversation and example of those who are older and more experienced than themselves; and all the advantages which they derive from the intimate and familiar intercourse of domestic life, must be ascribed to that wise arrangement by which one generation of human beings is linked to another,—so linked, that the current experience and knowledge of the world are transmitted imperceptibly, and almost without an effort, from sire to son continually." . . . But the mere transmission of knowledge does not exhaust "the beneficent purposes for which it was designed. These purposes are—to draw forth into exercise, and, by exercising, to develop and strengthen, both the mental faculties, and the moral and social affections, of infant humanity; to bring children from their earliest infancy under a course of training, to form in them habits of subjection to authority, of submission to a superior will, of order, and regularity, and self-denial in their daily conduct; and thus to prepare them, as it

were, in a private nursery, for the intercourse, and business, and duties of manhood.”*

(483.) Such being the Divine provision for the early education of children with a view to their entering on the business of the present life, a corresponding provision, which, in one of its aspects, may be said to be identical with the former, and, in another, strictly analogous to it, has been made for their Religious training. The Family Institute, which contributes so largely to the Education of the World, is also the primary School of the Church. The elements of Religious, as well as of secular, knowledge are taught by parents to their children, at a time when, without such instruction, the youthful mind is as yet incapable of discovering the truth for itself, and of appreciating the evidence on which it rests. And such parental instruction in spiritual things is expressly recognised in Scripture as a Divine ordinance, and as one of the most effective of those means which are employed for training up a “godly seed.” “I know Abraham,” says the Lord, “that he will command his children and his household after him, and they shall keep the way of the Lord.” “These words which I command thee this day shall be in thine heart, and thou shalt teach them diligently unto thy children, and shalt talk of them when thou sittest in thine house, and when thou walkest by the way, and when thou liest down, and when thou risest up.”—“For He established a testimony in Jacob, and appointed a law in Israel, which He commanded our fathers, that they should make them known to their children; that the generation to come might know them, even the children which should be born; who should arise and declare them to their children, that they might set their hope in God, and not forget the works of God, but keep His commandments.”† Provision is thus made for transmitting, from generation to generation, the substance of revealed truth, through the lips of believing parents, who must feel that, if they are called to instruct their children in natural things with a view to their welfare in this world, they are much more solemnly required to instruct them in religious truth with a view to their spiritual and eternal interests. That instruction,—associated from their earliest years with a father’s authority and example, and a mother’s ten-

* Scottish Christian Herald, First Series, vol. I. p. 17.

† Ex. xviii. 19; Deut. vi. 6, 7; Ps. lxxviii. 5, 6, 7.

derness and love,—accompanied with the exercises of domestic worship,—and impressed on their hearts by those dispensations of providence which first made them feel sympathy with sorrow, and taste the bitterness of bereavement,—has often been the means of planting the first germ of religion in their minds, which, as it sprung up and grew in the genial atmosphere of a pious household, became a tree of righteousness, the planting of the Lord.

(484.) This *traditive* method of instruction may seem, at first sight, to be liable to many grave objections; and it is certainly at direct variance with some prevailing theories in regard to the relative functions of instruction and evidence in matters of faith. But account for it as we may, the fact is certain that, in every department of knowledge, *instruction comes first, and then, through instruction, we are prepared for evidence*. In many popular speculations this order is inverted. Men have come to be so jealous of everything having the semblance of authority in matters of opinion or belief, that they would willingly exclude instruction, if that were possible, until the mind is capable of forming its own judgment on the evidence of the truth. This is manifestly at direct variance with the constitution and course of Nature. All the truths of our common natural knowledge, except such as are the objects of immediate perception, are first taught, then proved. In this respect, our Religious Education is in strict analogy with that which is Natural. Language, for instance, is a tradition,—and a most important and valuable one—which must be received, in the first instance, on the authority of teachers, and is subsequently verified by manifold experience: There is no more instructive study, and none which brings before us more clearly the great principles which are involved in the Divine method of educating both the World and the Church, than that of *a child learning to speak*.* He receives every word, in the first instance, on the authority of his parent or teacher, and not only the word, but the meaning of the word; and it is only by subsequent experience, when he makes use of the word in that meaning, and finds that it is so understood by others, that he is able to verify the lessons which he has been taught. In learning Mathematics at a more advanced stage, he proceeds in a similar way. Its first axioms are

* Dégérando, "Des Signes," I. 157, 237, 242. De Bonald, "Recherches," I. 199. Norris, of Bemerton,—an

English Platonist—has a curious speculation on the subject in his "Reason and Religion," p. 212.

self-evident, and need only to be proposed to his understanding to command his immediate assent,—but the theorems and problems of Euclid are first taught, with or without the accompanying demonstration; and it is only in so far as he can master the demonstration for himself that he becomes independent of the authority, while he is still indebted to the teaching, of his guide.* It is precisely by a similar process that the human mind is educated in matters of Faith. The truths of Religion are first taught, and afterwards verified. They are proposed, and then proved. We are not left to form the conception of God for ourselves, or to derive it by our own unaided powers from the works of Nature; it is first suggested to us by parents and teachers, and afterwards verified by observation and reflection. In like manner, all those truths of Revelation which depend on the mere will and good pleasure of God, are, and can only be, made known to us by external teaching, and must be, in some measure, understood, before we are qualified to estimate the evidence on which they rest.

(485.) These remarks may throw some light, not only on the analogy which subsists between our Natural and our Religious Education, but also on the apparently conflicting views of two rival schools of Theology. The one school is represented by the maxim of Anselm, “*Crede ut intelligas* ;” the other by that of Abelard, “*Intellige, ut credas*.” The former gives the first place to authority, the second to evidence, in matters of faith. They represent different tendencies of thought, and these tendencies, when exclusively followed out, issue in rival and seemingly opposite systems. But, in point of fact, there is no real contrariety between teaching and evidence, or between understanding and faith; they are not necessarily exclusive of each other; on the contrary, they may, and should, be combined. The understanding may be instructed in order to the production of faith, and faith may react on the understanding by supplying it with fresh evidence of an experimental kind. Every believer knows that he was indebted to instruction for his first conceptions of Divine truth, and yet feels that his faith rests on evidence. He is able, therefore, from his own experience to understand the fine combination described by Bartholmèss—“*Fides quærens Intellectum,—Intellectus quærens Fidem* ;” and to appreciate the

* Whately, “*Cautions*,” pp. 352, 356, 358.

profound saying of Vinet, "La Foi a sa Raison, et la Raison a sa Foi."

(486.) There are natural beliefs which spring up spontaneously under a process of instruction, long before the mind is capable of estimating the *whole* of that evidence by which the truth is subsequently confirmed,—beliefs which would never have been developed had such instruction been withheld, but which are perfectly reasonable, since they arise from the natural laws of the human mind, and rest on the best kind of evidence which is yet attainable,—the testimony of those whom it can trust and love. "In the order of nature," says Sir William Hamilton, "belief always precedes knowledge,—it is the condition of instruction. The child (as is observed by Aristotle) must believe in order that he may learn; and even the primary facts of intelligence—the facts which precede, as they afford the conditions of, all knowledge—would not be original were they revealed to us under any other form than that of natural or necessary beliefs."* In this respect the method of our Religious Education is conducted on the same principles which regulate the common process of instruction in natural things, and no objection can be urged against the one which is not equally applicable also to the other. Both are adapted to the constitution of our race, which consists of a series of successive generations, each brought into existence in a state of infancy, and dependent for years on the experience and intelligence of that which preceded it. We may think that a better constitution might have been adopted,—that men might have been created, like angels, or endowed from the first, like our first parent, with adult intelligence, so as to be independent of instruction, and exempt from the necessity of believing anything until its whole evidence could be intelligently apprehended; but manifestly this is not the *actual* order of nature; and the method of our Religious Education is strictly analogous, in this respect, to that by which we acquire every other part of our knowledge.

(487.) But there is another important point of analogy between the two, and one which should have the greater prominence assigned to it, because it brings into view the means which have been provided for correcting the errors of mere traditive instruction, and also for exercising our minds in the pursuit of truth,

* Sir William Hamilton, Lectures on "Metaphysics," I. 44.

and forming the habit of free, candid, and discriminating inquiry. It consists in this, that whatever we have been taught by parents or other instructors in regard either to natural things, or the truths of Religion, must be *tested*, by comparing it, in the one case, with the volume of Nature, in the other, with the volume of Revelation. Although we first receive the truth, in both departments, by means of instruction, yet ample scope is given, as we grow in years and become capable of appreciating evidence, for the exercise of free inquiry and the use of private judgment. We shall never cease to be largely indebted to the instruction which we received in early life,—but, as the mind grows in strength not less than the body in stature, we soon reach a critical period of life, when we must begin to think and to act for ourselves,—when the authority of parents and teachers ceases to be our only guide,—when some of their early lessons are found to be at variance with opinions which reach us from other quarters,—and when we feel ourselves constrained to bring them to the test of some unerring standard. We may not,—perhaps no man ever did,—discard entirely those early beliefs which education implants in the infant mind, or seek, like Descartes, to construct anew the whole fabric of our knowledge on the basis of “initial doubt;” *—but where diversities of opinion exist, we are not satisfied until we have *tested* our own beliefs, and ascertained that they rest on a solid foundation. It is in this sense that one apostle exhorts us to “prove all things, and hold fast that which is good;”—not in the sense of proving every article of our faith by argument, but of *testing* it by the unerring rule of Scripture; and another, “believe not every spirit, but *try* the spirits, whether they be of God.” †

(488.) In this respect, there is a beautiful analogy between our Secular and our Religious education. In both there is a risk of error in blindly following the traditions which we have been taught, and in both we must have recourse to the same remedy,—by bringing these traditions to the test, of Nature, in the one case, and of Scripture, in the other. “There is no one who has not grown up under a load of beliefs—beliefs which he owes to the accidents of country and family, to the books he has read, to the society he has frequented, to the education he has received, and,

* Descartes, “Meditation Premiere,” p. 66.

† 1 Thess. v. 21, *παντα δε δοκιμα-
ζετε*. 1 John iv. 1, *δοκιμαζετε τα πνευ-
ματα*.

in general, to the circumstances which have concurred in the formation of his intellectual and moral habits. . . . And this is the reason why philosophy, as the science of truth, requires a renunciation of *prejudices* (præ-judicia, opinionones præ-judicatæ), *i.e.*, conclusions formed without a previous examination of their grounds." "In this, if I may without irreverence compare things human with things Divine, Christianity and Philosophy coincide, for truth is equally the end of both. What is the primary condition which our Saviour requires of His disciples? That they throw off their old prejudices, and come with hearts willing to receive knowledge, and understandings open to conviction. 'Unless,' He says, 'ye become as little children, ye shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven.' Such is true Religion, such also is true Philosophy."*

(489.) This mixed method of education, in which instruction is combined with free inquiry, is employed with reference both to natural and religious truths; and it is fitted to stimulate, while it guides and regulates, our mental activity. It is adapted to our condition as creatures who are capable of learning much from others, but who are not left to depend entirely on their authority. By instruction we inherit the wisdom of the past, and transmit it to future times, while by inquiry, we test, and verify or correct, the lessons we have received. The two combined are fitted to form those habits which are most conducive to our intellectual and moral improvement. But separate the one from the other, or forbid the legitimate use of either, and you lay an arrest on our progress, and doom us to ignorance or error. If you exclude instruction, or—since that is impossible so long as we use the language which we have received by tradition and hold converse with our fellow-men—if you seek to disparage its value, and treat it in a sceptical spirit,—you leave every individual to discover anew for himself all that the race has already acquired,—you make him forfeit his noblest patrimony, the treasures of wisdom which ages have been accumulating for his use,—you cut him off from all sympathy with kindred minds who have heretofore en-

* Sir Wm. Hamilton, "Lectures on Metaphysics," I. p. 82. See also Dégérando, "Des Signes," I. 99, 101; II. 504, 505; III. 243-246. Joseph Glanville's "Essays," Ess. I. pp. 22, 29; III. p. 50. Bacon marks the same analogy, "Aditus ad regnum hominis, quod fundatur in scientiis, quam ad regnum Cælorum, in quod, nisi *sub persona infantis*, intrare non datur."

gaged in the pursuit of truth, and have left behind them records of their thoughts,—and you place him in a position of solitary independence, far more likely to engender presumptuous speculation and pride of intellect, than that docile, childlike spirit which every student should cherish. If, on the other hand, you admit instruction, but exclude inquiry,—if, not satisfied with the right of teaching, you claim for that teaching an authority so absolute that it must be allowed to override the exercise of private judgment, and to inhibit an appeal to Nature in matters of Philosophy, or to Scripture in matters of Faith,—you leave every individual to walk blindfold under the guidance of others,—to receive without discrimination the truth and the error which are mixed together in all systems of mere human opinions,—and to be imbued with a servile, sluggish spirit, such as is fatal to all true progress, and at direct variance with the native tendencies of a free-born mind, conscious of its powers, and of its own responsibility for the use of them. In the school of Nature and in the school of Revelation, instruction is combined with free inquiry,—and the union of the two constitutes a prominent feature in that method of education which is directed, not to the mere communication of knowledge, but also to the improvement of our minds, and the formation of practical habits.

(490.) Another point of analogy between our Secular and our Religious Education may be found in the fact that, in both, large use is made of our own *experience and practice*, as a means auxiliary to mere instruction, and subservient to some of its most important ends. In regard to natural things, what would mere instruction avail without the concurrence of our personal *experience*? or how could that instruction become intelligible to us, if experience did not furnish us with a key to its interpretation? A blind man can form no notion of light, because, although he has been taught the word, his experience has not come in aid of the lesson, so as to enable him to understand its meaning. In like manner a child might hear of the sun, the sky, the air, the sea, and of all the living or inanimate objects of nature, without understanding the words, did not his own experience enable him to interpret them. Accordingly, “God instructs us by experience—for it is not reason, but experience, which instructs us.”*

* Butler, “Analogy,” Part II. c. v. sec. 7, p. 393. (Wilson’s Ed.)

Parents may teach us the words, but experience must furnish the commentary. Nature is adapted to the education of man, and it is known only by experience.* It is our first educator, as it is also the ultimate rule and standard of all natural knowledge.

(491.) In our Religious, as well as our Secular, Education, large use is made of our own experience. Revelation speaks much of sin ; but how could we understand its lessons on that subject, if we had no experience of a moral law within, and of our want of conformity to it ? It speaks much of Divine wrath, and of penal infliction, on account of sin ; but our own experience gives impressiveness and effect to these solemn warnings when it testifies that " God is known by the judgment which He executeth," and that " though hand join in hand, the wicked shall not pass unpunished." It makes known a method of salvation, undiscoverable by the light of nature, and dependent on the sovereign will—the mere good pleasure,—of God : but we could neither understand the nature, nor feel the necessity, nor appreciate the suitableness and value, of that salvation, unless we were taught by our own experience the guilty, and depraved, and miserable condition into which we have fallen. When these simple, but fundamental, truths, which are authoritatively declared in Scripture, and abundantly confirmed by experience, have once taken possession of our minds, we are prepared to understand the true meaning and design of the Gospel of Jesus Christ ; and when it comes home to our hearts " in demonstration of the Spirit and with power,"—when we receive it " not as the word of man, but as the word of the living God, which worketh effectually in them that believe," we are quickened into spiritual life, and begin to have a new kind of experience,—we have new views, new tastes, new desires, new affections, new hopes, new habits ; we know experimentally the conflict between sin and grace in the heart,—“ the law in the members warring against the law of the mind ;”—we know what it is to " hunger and thirst after righteousness ;"—“ to desire, as newborn babes, the sincere milk of the word, that we may grow thereby ;”—to live " a life of faith,"—and " to commit our way unto the Lord, that He may bring it to pass." Here is a new life, and a new experience ; and these enable us to understand the

* Dr Cheever, "Voices of Nature," 71. Dégérando, *Des Signes*, III. 111. B. Browne, "Procedure," 206.

spiritual meaning of the Scriptures, while they afford an experimental verification of their truth—for “he that believeth hath the witness in himself.”

(492.) But in the process both of Secular and of Religious Education, God makes use of *practice* as well as of *experience*, as a means at once of imparting knowledge, and of strengthening right principles by the formation of useful habits. A child is taught to speak, to walk, and to act, not by mere lessons conveyed in words, but by practice; and his first feeble efforts, often repeated, are the means of acquiring facility in the use of his bodily powers through the influence of habit. When he is prepared to enter on the business of life, a wise parent is not satisfied with teaching him by verbal instruction merely, but subjects him also to practical training by means of a laborious and protracted apprenticeship. This is an essential part of the Divine method of educating men in secular things, and it is equally important in the process of our Religious education. “If any one will *do* His will,” said our Lord, “he shall *know* of the doctrine, whether it be of God.”* We must know something of His will in order to do it, but by doing it, we shall learn more, and know assuredly that the doctrine is Divine. “If thou draw out thy soul to the hungry,” says the prophet, “and satisfy the afflicted soul, then shall thy light rise in obscurity, and thy darkness be as the noonday.”† The habitual practice of charity will bring the soul into an atmosphere of spiritual light. “Be ye *doers* of the word,” says the apostle, “and not hearers only, deceiving your own selves. For if any be a hearer of the word, and not a doer, he is like unto a man beholding his natural face in a glass: for he beholdeth himself, and goeth his way, and straightway forgetteth what manner of man he was. But whoso looketh into the perfect law of liberty, and continueth therein, he being not a forgetful hearer, but a *doer of the work*, this man shall be blessed in his *doing*.”‡ Many complain of darkness and doubt, simply because they are negligent in doing. They are not acting according to the light they have, and cannot, therefore, acquire more light. They are neglecting a divinely appointed means for the growth of knowledge, and the increase of faith. It is a great lesson which is taught by Coleridge, when he says, “An hour of solitude passed in sincere and earnest prayer,

* John vii. 17.

† Isa. lviii. 10.

‡ Jas. i. 22-25.

or the conflict with, and conquest over, a single passion or 'subtle bosom sin,' will teach us more of thought,—will more effectually awaken the faculty, and form the habit, of reflection, than a year's study in the schools without them." And again, speaking of truths which have become so familiar as to have lost their power to interest or impress our minds, he adds, "To restore a commonplace truth to its first uncommon lustre, you need only translate it into *action*."*

(493.) There is an additional point of analogy between our Natural and our Religious education arising from the fact that, in both, God teaches by means of *events* and *examples*. The course of Nature is instructive, and the events of life constitute a method of discipline. The consequences of our own conduct, and the concurring dispensations of His providence towards us, are amongst the means which are employed for this end. They teach us, often more forcibly than any verbal lesson can, that we are subject to a government which cannot be disobeyed with impunity, and that it is our interest, as well as our duty, to act in conformity with it. Sickness, bereavement, and affliction in all its forms are severe, but salutary, lessons; and when we are suitably exercised by them, they teach us "the meekness of wisdom" and produce in us "the peaceable fruits of righteousness." The great lesson taught by the events of life, so far as they depend on our own conduct, is that, with reference to our temporal interests, we must deny ourselves to many present gratifications with a view to our future welfare, and that self-denial is essential to our highest happiness, even in the present life. This is a lesson taught in the usual course of nature; and it only needs to be transferred to the higher sphere of religion, to teach us how infinitely reasonable it is, to regulate our present conduct with reference to our future prospects in another state of being. And as God teaches by *events*, He makes use also of *examples*. In our common natural education, it is proverbially true that "example is better than precept;" and one of the most potent influences that can be brought to bear on our mental and moral culture, is the society of the wise, and the good. One noble and generous spirit is often found to elevate the views and mould the character of a whole community. And

* Coleridge, "Aids to Reflection," pp. 5, 6. See also Lee on "Inspiration," p. 35; Barnes, "Science and Theology," 154; Butler's "Analogy," 242, 264.

so in our Religious Education, God makes use of "living epistles which may be known and read of all men,"—patterns of faith and holiness, of meekness and charity, of humility and heavenly-mindedness, which, wherever they appear, are felt to be the best of all instructors, and the most impressive proofs of the reality and worth of true Religion.*

(494.) Many other points of analogy, belonging to this general head, might be enumerated; but enough has been said to indicate the line of thought which may be profitably pursued. It is evident that we cannot form a right estimate of the Divine Methods for the education of men, unless we take into account *all the ends* which they are designed, respectively, to subserve, and *all the means* which are employed for their accomplishment. It is equally evident, that the two methods, in so far as they are distinct, are truly and properly analogous to each other, if it can be shown that they contemplate similar ends, and make use of similar means. And it has been our object to show that the mere communication of knowledge is not, in either instance, the only or the ultimate end,—that the education of the mind itself, by the exercise of its faculties, and the formation of right intellectual and moral habits, are contemplated in both,—and that, in these respects, there is an undeniable analogy between the two.

* Howe, "Living Temple," Works, I. p. 90.

CHAPTER X.

ANALOGY BETWEEN A LITTLE CHILD AND A CHRISTIAN DISCIPLE.

(495.) The Divine method of Education is adapted, not only to the constitution of our race, as composed of successive generations connected by hereditary ties, but also to the capacities which belong to us at different periods of life, and to the various stages of progress through which we must pass.—Both in the Natural and the Supernatural economy, God accomplishes His ends by slow successive steps. Nothing is brought to maturity at once; everything is subjected to the law of gradual growth and progressive development. Infancy precedes childhood; childhood is followed by youth; and youth by mature manhood.* At these successive periods of life we have different capacities, and that method of education which might be suitable for the one, would be unsuitable for the other. In childhood, we are absolutely dependent on the teaching of our parents or other instructors; in youth, as our faculties begin to expand, we are able to test, and verify or correct, some of the lessons which we have been taught; in mature manhood, we are still less dependent on mere human authority, and more capable of estimating the evidence, and judging for ourselves of the claims, of truth.

(496.) This progression, in the case of an individual, as he passes through the different periods of life, is distinctly recognised, and instructively applied, in Scripture. "When I was a child," says the apostle, "I spake as a child, I understood as a child, I thought as a child; but when I became a man, I put away childish things."† He is speaking of his own experience in the course of life, first, when he was in a state of minority as a child, and

* Butler's "Analogy," Part. II. c. iv. p. 369. (Wilson's Ed.)

† 1 Cor. xiii. 11. Dégérando, "Des Signes," II. 416, 475.

secondly, when he reached maturity as a man ; and he marks a difference between the two periods, both in respect of thought and speech,—a difference so great that the one is contrasted with the other. And this fact, so undeniably evident from our experience in the present life, is applied as a natural analogy to illustrate *another* difference,—the difference between our present and our future states of being—which have the same relation to each other as that which subsists between childhood and manhood. For just as little children are in a state of minority with reference to their future manhood in this world, so all men are in a state of non-age and pupillarity with reference to their prospects in another state of being. For “we know in part, and we prophesy in part ; but when that which is perfect is come, that which is in part shall be done away. Now we see through a glass darkly, but then face to face ; now I know in part, but then shall I know even as also I am known.”* There are thus two distinct minorities—the minority of a little child, and the minority of the Christian disciple ;—and the one is employed as a natural analogy to explain and illustrate the other.

(497.) A similar progression is marked in Scripture as having been manifested in the successive states of the Church, considered collectively, under the different dispensations of Divine truth. “The heir, as long as he is a child, differeth nothing from a servant, though he be lord of all, but is under tutors and governors until the time appointed of the father. Even so we, when we were children, were in bondage under the elements of the world. But when the fulness of the time was come, God sent forth His Son . . . that we might receive the adoption of sons.” “Before faith came, we were kept under the law shut up unto the faith which should afterwards be revealed ; for the law was our schoolmaster to bring us to Christ.”† Here is another natural analogy, derived from our earthly experience, and applied to illustrate the difference between the successive states of the Church under the dispensation of the Law, and that of the Gospel. As an earthly parent places his son under tutors and governors, and subjects him to the restraints of discipline until he comes of age, so our heavenly Father was pleased to place His Church on earth under the Law as a schoolmaster during its minority, in the preparatory

* 1 Cor. xiii. 9, 10, 12.

† Gal. iv. 1–5, iii. 23, 24.

dispensation of Divine truth,—and to train it gradually “by carnal ordinances imposed until the time of reformation,”*—by symbols, figures, and types, a pictorial method of instruction adapted to the Church’s nonage,—until it should be prepared for the more spiritual and perfect dispensation of the “fulness of time.”

(498.) All the reasons for this progressive method of Revelation† we may not be able to ascertain; but it is manifestly in strict accordance with the analogy of our individual experience in passing from childhood to youth, and from youth to manhood; and with the gradual character of God’s procedure in other cases, in which the ultimate end is reached by a long series of intermediate means. The Gospel, which was predicted and promised as the crowning dispensation of Divine truth in this world, was reserved for the manhood of the Church, while its childhood was instructed in the first principles of the oracles of God, and trained under a yoke of rites and ceremonies. But even under the Christian dispensation, complete and final as it is with reference to the present life, the Church has not reached its full maturity, and may still be regarded as in a state of minority with reference to its future state in heaven,—for “there is a hope for which we yet wait,”—there is a “glory which remaineth to be revealed,”—there is a “salvation ready to be revealed in the last times.” It is a state of manhood as compared with the previous dispensation of the Old Testament, but it is a state of minority as compared with its future condition in heaven. It must be viewed in each of these aspects, if we would give a consistent and intelligible interpretation to many expressions in Scripture which might otherwise appear to be contradictory.—Compared with the darkness of Heathenism, and even with the twilight of the Old Testament, it is a state of “light;”—“the day-spring from on high hath visited us, to give light to them that sit in darkness and in the shadow of death;”—“ye are all the children of light, and the children of the day; we are not of the night, nor of darkness;”—“ye were sometimes darkness, but now are ye light in the Lord; walk as children of light.”‡ Yet compared with the glory which remaineth to be revealed, it is a state of “darkness,”—for “now

* Heb. ix. 10.

† Dr Shuttleworth, “Consistency of Revelation with Reason,” p. 88.
Dr Young, “The Mystery,” p. 280.

‡ Luke i. 79; 1 Thess. v. 5; Eph. v. 8.

we see through a glass darkly, but then face to face.”—Compared with what went before, it is called the “day,”—“this is the day of salvation;” yet compared with what is to follow after, it is called the “night,”—“the night is far spent, the day is at hand.”* In like manner, it is a state of manhood when compared with the infancy and childhood of the Church; but it is still a state of minority when compared with the future condition of “the spirits of just men made perfect” and “the inheritance of the saints in light.”—The progress of the Church is like the “path of the just, which shineth more and more unto the perfect day;” and her present state, even under the Christian dispensation, is one of expectation and hope, in which she is called to wait “till the day break, and the shadows flee away,” and to take heed to the “sure word of prophecy, as unto a light which shineth in a dark place, till the day dawn, and the day-star arise in her heart.”†

(499.) These analogies, as employed by the sacred writers, imply that there are two minorities—that of the little child, and that of the Christian disciple; and that the one is, in some important respects, similar to the other.—But there is also a wide difference between the two, which is equally marked in Scripture; for the apostle expressly says, “Brethren, be not children in understanding: howbeit in malice be ye children, but in understanding be men;” and again, “I speak as unto wise men, judge ye what I say.”‡ He speaks as if they should be, at one and the same time, both *men* and *children*—men in understanding, men in the full and free exercise of all their mental powers,—but children still in disposition and feeling, cherishing habitually that childlike simplicity, that humble and teachable spirit, that confiding faith and trust without which there can be no progress in the School of Christ, and no preparation for our coming manhood in heaven. This combination of a childlike spirit with manly intelligence is necessary in Science, not less than in Religion. “The condition,” said Sir W. Hamilton, “on which we must enter the kingdom of philosophy is the condition on which we must enter the kingdom of heaven—‘Except ye become as a little child, ye shall in no-wise enter therein.’”§ Mr Carlyle finely describes the rare combination of manly thought with a childlike spirit. “You remember

* 2 Cor. vi. 2; Rom. xiii. 12.

† Cant. ii. 17, iv. 6; 2 Pet. i. 19.

‡ 1 Cor. xiv. 20, x. 15.

§ Rev. J. B. Dickson, “Temple Lamp,” No. IV. p. 113.

that fancy of Aristotle's, of a man who had grown to maturity in some dark distance, and was brought, on a sudden, into the upper air to see the sun rise. What would his wonder be, his rapt astonishment, at the sight which we daily witness with indifference! With the free open sense of a child, yet with the ripe faculty of a man, his whole heart would be kindled by that sight. Simple, open as a child, yet with the depth and strength of a man."* "Take, I say, reason, and understanding, and science to help you, and when you, by their aid, have endeavoured to conceive and to understand the height, and breadth, and depth of God's wonderful revelation, so that you can see its whole connection, behold! as is quite right, *man* stands there as a *child* in the presence of the great and good Father, believing and adoring; believing precisely because he understands,—believing even where he does not *fully* understand,—because he now for the first time properly knows the Divine, because he now knows in Whom and what he believes. Yes, first of all enter into the childlike spirit, and with this we then enter into the kingdom of Heaven."†

"O I would walk

A weary journey, to the furthest verge
Of the big world, to kiss that good man's hand
Who, in the blaze of wisdom and of art,
Preserves a lowly mind; and to his God,
Feeling the sense of his own littleness,
Is as a child in meek simplicity."‡

(500.) A childlike spirit is not inconsistent, then, with manly intelligence, and they ought to be combined in the character of every Christian disciple. The analogy between his case and that of a little child has sometimes been perverted into an argument in favour of blind faith, and implicit submission to authority. "A child," said a Roman Catholic preacher, "believes implicitly whatever his parents tell him, and does what they bid him, without thinking of *inquiring* whether it is reasonable or not. And this," he added, "is what is required of the Christian." And so it is with respect to anything which we are sure is really taught us, or commanded us, by our heavenly Father. But we ought, first, to be very sure of this, else we may be in the condition of a

* T. Carlyle, "Heroes," p. 11.

† Dr Lund, quoted by Miss Bremer.

‡ H. Kirke White.

silly child who believes implicitly what it is told by some gipsy who is designing to steal it from its real parents. And hence it is that we are exhorted by the apostle to be "children in malice, but in understanding to be men," and that our Lord warns His disciples to be "wise as serpents," though "harmless as doves."*

(501.) The apostle says expressly—"When I became a man, I put away childish things;" and this statement applies equally to his natural, and to his religious, knowledge. But in what sense is it to be understood? It cannot mean that, in the sphere of his natural knowledge, he cast aside all the lessons of his childhood, or forgot the many truths which he had been taught, and which were designed and fitted to prepare him for his future manhood; nor can it mean that, in the sphere of Religious knowledge, he put away from him the beliefs which had been instilled into his tender mind by early parental instruction, or the habits which he had formed in the school of domestic piety. Assuredly Paul would never have exhorted his beloved Timothy to cast off, even for a moment, the "unfeigned faith which was in him, which dwelt first in his grandmother Lois, and his mother Eunice," or to put away, as "childish things," those truths "which he had learned and been assured of," when "from a child he had known the Holy Scriptures which were able to make him wise unto salvation." No, these lessons were taught on purpose to prepare him for manhood, and if they are to serve their end, they must not be rejected, but retained. It is not any portion of the truth that is to be put away, for what is true and useful to the child may be equally true and useful to the man; it is the childish method of understanding, and thinking, and speaking about the truth,—and especially of receiving it on the mere authority of parents and teachers,—a method adapted to the state of infancy, but unsuitable to the condition of manhood.

(502.) It is the manifest design of Providence that the mind should grow not less than the body, and reach its maturity through the exercise of its own powers,—that, while in its earlier years a child is left to depend on its parents both for physical nourishment and mental training, it should be gradually raised out of this state of absolute dependence, and acquire the habit of speaking, and thinking, and acting for itself,—and that as it advances in life, it

* Whately, "Cautions," p. 125.

should become a rational and responsible agent, not altogether independent of external teaching, but capable now, as it was not before, of examining and reflecting on what it has been taught,—of testing the lessons of parents and teachers in the free exercise of its own judgment,—and of appealing to the only supreme standard of knowledge—the volume of Nature, which is God’s revelation of Natural truth, and the volume of Scripture, which is God’s revelation of Religious truth. In regard to each alike, the change which occurs as the child grows up to manhood is precisely the same,—he is liberated from dependence on mere human authority in respect to both, and required, as well as permitted, to inquire and judge for himself in the free exercise of his own intellectual powers; but even as a man he is only transferred from one school to another, and if he has ceased to be a child with reference to earthly parents and teachers, he must still be as “a little child” with reference to God, and learn the lessons which He teaches, whether by means of His Works, or His Word.

(503.) This holds true even of our common secular education, but it is more specially and emphatically true of our Religious training. For in the latter there are peculiar, and very formidable, obstacles to our progress, arising from the condition of our own minds, which do not equally affect our knowledge of natural things. These obstacles must be removed; and this can only be effected by a radical internal change, which is called in Scripture a “regeneration,” or a “new birth.” The effect of this supernatural change is that we become as “little children,”—not now with reference to our earthly parents, to whom we owed our first birth,—but with reference to our heavenly Father, to whom we are indebted for our second birth. The necessity of this great change, and the kind of discipleship which should be consequent upon it, are frequently declared by our Lord and His apostles: and “a little child” is invariably selected as the model or pattern of a Christian disciple. When the disciples asked their Lord, “Who is the greatest in the kingdom of heaven? Jesus called a little child unto him, and set him in the midst of them, and said,—Verily I say unto you, except ye be converted, and become as little children, ye shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven.”* In His conver-

* Matt. xviii. 1-4; Luke xviii. 15-17.

sation with Nicodemus this new childhood is connected with a new birth. "Except a man be born again (or from above) he cannot see the kingdom of God."* There is a birth "after the flesh," and that first birth places us under human parents;—but there is also a birth "after the Spirit," and that second birth places us under our heavenly Father,—in both cases as "little children." For this reason, the apostle describes all true disciples as "new-born babes, who desire the sincere milk of the word, that they may grow thereby."† But even here, in this new spiritual life, there is room for progress, similar to that by which a child grows from infancy to manhood; for Paul speaks of some disciples as being only "babes in Christ," whom he had "fed with milk and not with meat, for hitherto they were not able to bear it." And speaking to such as had yet made comparatively little progress in the school of faith, he says, "When for the time, ye ought to be teachers, ye have need that one teach you again what be the first principles of the oracles of God; and are become such as have need of milk, and not of strong meat. For every one that useth milk is unskilful in the word of righteousness, for he is a babe. But strong meat belongeth unto them that are of full age, even those who by reason of use (or habit) have their senses exercised to discern both good and evil."‡

(504.) The Christian disciple, as long as he remains on the earth, is in a state of minority in respect to the more perfect state which lies before him. As a little child he came into this world, that he might be trained by his earthly parent for future manhood,—as a little child he is admitted into the kingdom of God on earth, that he may be trained by his heavenly Father for the kingdom of God in Heaven. The two childhoods are not the same, but they are analogous to each other. In the one he stands related to "the father of his flesh," in the other, to "the Father of his spirit,"§ as his teacher and governor. For a time the father is to the child in the place of God, for the infant mind, in which reason and conscience have not yet come into operation, knows no other instructor, and looks to no higher authority;|| but as he

* John iii. 3.

† Heb. v. 12, 13, 14.

§ Heb. xii. 9.

† 1 Pet. ii. 2.

|| Christopher Anderson, "Domestic Constitution," pp. 320, 323. See Harris, "Patriarchy," 405-415.

advances in life, and is taught to know God as revealed in His Works and His Word, his earthly must give place to his heavenly Father, and human authority to that which is Divine. He must now listen to God's teaching with the same simple faith,—the same humble reverence,—the same teachableness of spirit,—and the same submission to authority, with which heretofore he listened to a father's voice; and this all the more because now he is listening to One who can neither err nor deceive, and who is teaching and training him, by means selected by omniscient wisdom, for a state of being which he cannot as yet fully comprehend. It is infinitely reasonable, therefore, to exercise faith while we are in this state of spiritual childhood, and preparation for a higher state hereafter.* "Every true Platonist," Shelly used to say, "must be a lover of children, for they are our masters and instructors in Philosophy."† They are equally, and, perhaps, still more, an example and a model to us in Religion. For, in the words of Archbishop Whately, the example of children as proposed to Christians "may be regarded as twofold; *first*, as children are in regard to their parents, so, in some respects, are we in relation to God; and, *secondly*, as children are in comparison of what they will be hereafter, so, in some respects, is the Christian in this present life, compared with what he hopes to be in the world to come."‡

(505.) There are different degrees of progress in the Divine life even on the earth,—but every step of that progress depends on one continuing to cherish a childlike spirit; for it is only when "as new-born babes we desire the sincere milk of the word" that "we grow thereby," and the word of God comes to "dwell in us richly in all wisdom and spiritual understanding." It is as "little children" that we enter the kingdom on earth; and, whatever our progress may be, it is still as "little children" that we must enter the kingdom in heaven. For the case of a little child "coming in" to this world, and that of an aged disciple "going out" of it, resemble each other in this—that each is entering on a new, and hitherto untried, state of being. A true poetess has seized the

* See Vinet's Discourse on "The Necessity of becoming Children," "Vital Christianity," pp. 167–175.

† Medwyn, "Life of Shelley," I. p. 289.

‡ Whately's "Essays," First Series, on "The Peculiarities of the Christian Religion," p. 275, see also p. 300.

analogy between the two, and enshrined it in the following beautiful lines :—

“ In that house were joy and sorrow
 Where an infant first drew breath,
 While an aged sire was drawing
 Nigh unto the gates of death.
 His feeble strength was failing,
 And his eye was growing dim ;
 He was standing on the threshold,
 When they brought the babe to him.

“ As to murmur forth a blessing
 On the little one he tried,
 In his feeble arms he raised it,
 Pressed it to his lips, and died ;
 Oh ! an awful shadow resteth
 On the path they both begin,
 Who thus met upon the threshold,
 Going out and coming in.” *

* Poems by “ Isa.”

CHAPTER XI.

ANALOGY BETWEEN NATURAL AND REVEALED LAWS.

(506.) We take a partial and defective view of Religion, when we consider it only as *a branch of knowledge*; it is also *a law of life*. It is designed and fitted to regulate our conduct. It imposes an obligation to act according to the truth, so far as that has been made known to us. The mere communication of knowledge is not the only, nor even the chief, end of the Divine dispensations towards us, nor is the acquisition of knowledge, however important, the ultimate end of man.* The production and nourishment of spiritual life in the soul, the culture and exercise of all gracious affections, and the habitual practice of duty in a course of intelligent and willing obedience—these are the great practical ends to which Religious knowledge is designed to be subservient, and which Revelation itself keeps steadily in view.

(507.) Some have said that “Christianity is not a doctrine, but a life;”—but this is only a one-sided and partial view of it.† It should be regarded as being, in different aspects, *both* a doctrine and a life; a doctrine as it is objectively presented in the written word, and yet a life when it is subjectively realized so as to become “in us the engrafted word which is able to save our souls,”—“an epistle of Christ, written not with ink, but with the Spirit of the living God; not in tables of stone, but in fleshly tables of the heart.”‡ It may be right and useful to remind a sceptical or speculative inquirer that “Christianity is not a theory or a speculation, but a life,”—not a philosophy of life, but a life and a living process, and that “much of its evidence depends on our obedience and experience;”§ but it should never be forgotten that there is *a law* as well as *a life*;—an authoritative rule of

* Bartholmæss, “Histoire Critique,” pp. 24, 25.

† Dr Cunningham’s Lecture.

‡ Jas. i. 21; 2 Cor. iii. 3.

§ Coleridge, “Aids to Reflection,” p. 157.

faith and duty, by which the vital principle of religion in the heart is to be directed and governed. When Revealed Religion is viewed in this light,—not now as a branch of knowledge, but as a law of action,—it may be compared with those other laws which are imposed upon us, naturally, for the regulation of our conduct; and this comparison will supply us with some new and instructive analogies in matters of Faith.

(508.) Everything in nature is subject to laws, imposed upon it by the will of its Creator. The mere fact that it has a distinct individual existence, and possesses a definite constitution, by which it is what it is, and may be distinguished from everything else, is sufficient to show that it is under law,—that it is endowed with properties, and subject to conditions, which determine its peculiar character, and which cannot be changed otherwise than by the will of Him who made it. No other created thing can be a law to it in the same sense in which it is a law to itself. Many other things may be closely related to it, and may even have power over it, but they can only act upon it according to its nature, and by means of its own inherent properties.

(509.) If this be true in regard to the objects of material nature, it is equally evident in regard to everything that is endowed with life, and capable of growth or of action. The physical laws of inanimate matter, the organic laws of vegetable and animal structures, the laws of instinct, of sensation, of reason, and of conscience, are all impressed on the nature of the substances, or beings, to which they severally apply, and determine the mode of their existence and operation. Man, by the constitution of his nature, as a complex being composed of body and soul, is subject to all these laws; and every one of them may be said, in a certain sense, to have some bearing on the regulation of his conduct. In so far as they are known to him, he must have regard to them, and act in accordance with them. But there is a wide difference between those laws which are natural and necessary in their operation,—whether they relate to the mind or the body,—and such as are properly *moral*, being imposed on the will of intelligent and voluntary agents for the regulation of their conduct. The former cannot be violated, the latter may be transgressed. The term *law* is applied to both, by reason of a certain analogy between them, but it is such an analogy as is compatible with a most important difference. “That which doth assign unto each thing the kind,—

that which doth moderate the force and power,—that which doth appoint the form and measure, of working,—the same we term a Law. . . . All things do work after a sort according to law. . . . But forasmuch as those things are termed most properly *natural agents*, which keep the law of their kind unwittingly, as the heavens and elements of the world, which can do no otherwise than they do ; and forasmuch as we give unto intellectual natures the name of *voluntary agents*, that so we may distinguish them from the other,—it will be expedient that we sever the law of nature observed by the one, from that which the other is tied unto.”* In considering Religion as a Law of life, it is evidently with the latter class of laws that it should be compared,—namely, such as are adapted to the nature, and designed to regulate the conduct, of intelligent voluntary agents.

(510.) Both sets of law are exemplified in the complex constitution of Man ; and there is an instructive analogy between his body and his mind, in this respect, that, in each of the two, some important functions are independent of the will, and exempt from its control, while in each also we are capable of voluntary action. In the body, the functions of the lungs, the action of the heart, the circulation of the blood, the processes of digestion and secretion, go on, as it were, mechanically, and are neither directed by our knowledge, nor governed by our will. So in the mind, there are natural laws of thought which come into operation spontaneously, and which are felt to be irresistible,—laws of sense, laws of memory, laws of reason, laws of association, laws of conscience, laws of habit,—which are all independent of our will, and from whose control we cannot escape. In both, therefore, we are, to a large extent, subject to a natural necessity ; and yet in both, also, there is room for voluntary agency, within certain limits ; and our actual conduct, in these circumstances, will have a most important bearing on our present and future welfare. Hence the necessity of inquiring what Law should regulate our lives, as intelligent voluntary agents, whose safety and happiness are left to depend, in a great degree, on our own conduct.

(511.) That some such law exists, is generally admitted, by all who have ever bestowed a thought on the subject. But what

* Hooker's Ecclesiastical Polity, Book I. pp. 148, 154. See also Barton, "Analogy," p. 72.

that law is,—where it is to be found, and whence it has been derived,—is a question which has given rise to different systems of opinion. Some, taking the lowest possible view of man's condition as an intelligent voluntary agent, have spoken only of a law of *prudence*, founded on his knowledge of the circumstances in which he is placed,—the conditions to which he is subject,—and the consequences, beneficial or injurious, which are likely to flow from his own actions,—a law which, as expounded by Volney and Combe,* is founded on our sentient, rather than upon our moral, nature, and directs us how to act with a view to our individual preservation and welfare as beings capable of pleasure and pain; while as it is expounded by Bentham and Bowring,† it is extended so as to embrace “the greatest happiness of the greatest number,” but still proceeds on the mere principle of utility with exclusive reference to the interests of the present life, and gives no account of the origin or significance of the fundamental idea of Duty or moral obligation.—Others, rising a step higher, and recognising the existence of a moral faculty in man, by which “he is a law to himself,” have thought that natural conscience, apart from all religion, affords an adequate rule for the regulation of our conduct, especially when its dictates are found by experience to be in exact accordance with the lessons of prudence, and conducive both to individual and social welfare. This is the theory of Secularism which teaches the “Ethics of Nature.”‡ Others, again, rising still higher, and referring this moral law to the will of a Supreme Lawgiver, who must be the Creator of man on whose nature it is inscribed, have thought that Natural Religion must come in aid of natural conscience, so as to constitute a complete and authoritative law for the conduct of life; but that these two are sufficient for that end,—so sufficient as to supersede the necessity of Revealed Religion, as was taught by Herbert and the Deistical writers in England, and the Theo-philanthropists in France.§

(512.) This is the highest point to which even the most gifted men can attain under the guidance of the mere light of nature;

* Volney, “La Loi Naturelle,” ou Principes Physiques de la Morale. Combe, “Constitution of Man,” and “The Relation between Science and Religion.”

† Bentham, “Deontology,” 2 vols. Bowring, “Minor Morals.”

‡ Holyoake, “Trial of Theism,” p. 95.

§ Leland's “Account of the Deistical Writers,” 2 vols. Dr Alexander, “Evidences of Christianity,” Dr Andrew Thomson's Edition, Edinburgh, 1863, p. 18.

and the only law which we can discover for the regulation of our conduct may be said to consist, partly of prudential maxims suggested by experience, partly of the moral dictates of conscience, and the duties which are involved in our natural relations to God. Such a law is sufficient to impress our minds with a deep and solemn sense of obligation and responsibility,—and, when seriously considered, in connection with our actual conduct in regard to it, it can scarcely fail to awaken a feeling of guilt and a foreboding of danger; but it leaves us ignorant in regard to all that is most necessary to our present peace, or our future welfare,—it tells us nothing of God's will in regard to the way in which we may be delivered from the evils of our actual condition, and prepared for what may be awaiting us at death,—it gives no answer to such momentous questions as these—"How shall a man be just with God?"—"What must I do to be saved?"—"What good thing shall I do that I may inherit eternal life?"—and affording no information on such subjects as these, it cannot be an adequate rule of life to us, if we be indeed sinners, doomed to die, yet destined to live for ever.

(513.) But Revealed Religion comes to our aid, and by making known "the will of God for our salvation,"—by revealing Christ as the Saviour of sinners, and the Holy Spirit as their Sanctifier,—by explaining the origin of those evils to which we are subject, and the nature of our present state as one of discipline and trial preparatory to a state of retribution hereafter,—by giving certainty to the hope of immortality, and placing before us the divinely appointed means of obtaining eternal life,—it brings into view new objects and relations, which were undiscoverable by the unaided light of nature, and a corresponding class of duties, of which we could have no conception before. It is a clear addition to our knowledge,—and such an addition as is essential to an adequate rule of action,—in the circumstances in which we are now placed.

(514.) It must be remembered, however, that revealed Religion,—considered as an additional law of life,—is not necessarily exclusive of those inferior and less perfect rules of conduct which are derived from the lessons of experience, or the dictates of conscience, or the more elementary truths of Natural Religion. On the contrary, it presupposes them all,—enforces them by new motives and sanctions,—and stamps upon them the *imprimatur* of its

own Divine authority. It is not a mere republication of the law of nature, but a new and more comprehensive law, founded on truth supernaturally revealed, which gathers up and incorporates with itself whatever was really valuable and useful in any natural rule of human conduct, and adds to it a Divine commentary, and a Divine sanction. So far from being exclusive of the law of prudence, or the law of conscience, or the law of Natural Religion, it is comprehensive of them all; it presupposes and assumes them,—it sheds upon them fresh light,—it enforces them by new sanctions,—it gives them articulate utterance as lessons of Divine wisdom; while, considered as a law of life, it is itself, in many respects, *analogous* to them.

(515.) The difference, and yet the analogy, between Prudence, Morality, and Religion, as rules of human conduct, has been prominently presented in the writings of Coleridge. Speaking of his “Aids to Reflection,” he says that its object is “to establish the distinct characters of Prudence, Morality, and Religion; and to impress the conviction that, though the second requires the first, and the third *contains and proposes both the former*, yet still moral goodness is other and more than prudence on the principle of expediency, and religion more and higher than morality.”* This statement is true, were it supposed to refer only to the laws of prudence, conscience, and Natural Religion; but it is still more important when it is extended so as to include the higher law of a supernatural Revelation.

(516.) Of this higher law, considered as a Rule of Action, we affirm that, while it is *additional*, it is strictly *analogous*, to those natural laws which have been given for the regulation of our conduct. The difference between them, however real and great, is not such as either to make them incompatible with one another, or to leave no remaining points of resemblance. It may be useful to indicate a few of these, as they are eminently suggestive.

(517.) There is an evident analogy, for instance, between the law of Nature and the law of Revelation in this respect, that in each of them the rule of action is *truth*,—apprehended as an object of knowledge,—adapted to the use of intelligent voluntary agents,—and designed at once to enlighten the understanding, and to influence the will. Both require a rational and willing obedience,

* Coleridge, “Aids to Reflection,” 37, 154. See also Schedel, “Emancipation of Faith,” I. 300, 338.

and in order to this, a knowledge of truth, combined with that habit of thoughtful reflection upon it, by which it may be brought to bear upon the springs of action. Neither in our natural, nor in our religious, life are we to act under a blind impulse, but to be governed by a law suitable to our nature as responsible agents; for ignorance is as little the mother of virtue as the mother of devotion. Even in the lowest form of law,—that of mere secular Prudence, truth must be known, and it must be believed, if it is to have any effect either in directing our course of conduct, or in guiding and governing the will; and in every higher form of it, the same connection is established between truth and duty, knowledge and action. To *act* is the end of knowledge, to *know* is the spring of action. In the law of Revealed Religion the same principle is involved,—God reveals truth, that, being known and believed, it may govern our lives.*

(518.) There is an analogy, also, between the truths on which we are obliged to act with reference to the interests of the present life, and those on which Religion requires us to act with reference to our spiritual and eternal welfare. Not only must truth be our guide in both cases, but the two kinds of truth, different as they are in other respects, resemble each other in this, that in neither is it speculatively complete, yet in each it is practically sufficient. Some truth is presented for the information of our minds, but only so much as is necessary for practical uses. The truths on which we are obliged to act with reference to the present life, are only like stars shining in a midnight sky,—luminous points amidst surrounding darkness,—yet sufficient to direct the wayfarer on his course. A thousand mysteries remain in the most familiar objects of our natural knowledge; and if similar mysteries exist also in Revealed Religion, may it not be justly said to be analogous, in this respect, to every other law which God has ever given for the regulation of our conduct, as intelligent, but not omniscient, beings? It is further remarkable, that both in Nature and in Revelation, whatever truth is necessary either for temporal or spiritual life is

* Lamourette, "Pensées," Demonstr. Evangeliques, XIII. p. 352. " Dans l'économie de la Nature et de la Foi, notre vocation essentielle, c'est *d'agir*. La nature exerce, loge, nourrit, conserve, et guérit *l'homme de la présente*; la foi règle les pensées, dirige les

affections, soumet les passions, et épure le cœur de *l'homme de l'éternité*. Sous l'un et l'autre point de vue, l'entendement ne nous a été donné, que pour discerner, par la voie de *l'épreuve*, ce qui convient au divers *besoins* de notre double destinée."

clearly taught and made accessible to all, however poor or unlearned, while ample provision is made to encourage and reward more recondite research by many remaining obscurities and unresolved difficulties.

(519.) The Natural and Revealed laws of conduct are also analogous to each other in respect to the kind of evidence on which they respectively depend. In both the evidence is mediate and moral, not demonstrative.* All that portion of our common natural knowledge which is most necessary for the direction of our conduct in life, is of this nature. A part of our knowledge is demonstrative, but it exerts little power over us in regard to all that most nearly concerns our welfare even in the present life, in comparison with those prudential maxims which rest on moral evidence, and are taught by experience and reflection. By far the larger portion of our common secular knowledge—that on which we are accustomed to act in everyday life,—depends on moral evidence. It reaches us mediately through experience, observation, or testimony; and it affords moral, as contradistinguished from demonstrative, certainty. It is only a very small part either of our common or scientific knowledge that is derived from intuition, or that admits of being demonstrated. None of the Inductive Sciences can appeal to any other than mediate and moral evidence, although in some of them, as in Astronomy and Mechanics, mathematical formulæ may be applied to the facts of observation. It would only be in accordance, then, with the analogy of our experience in regard to that secular knowledge which is most closely connected with the practical business of life, if we should find that the truths of Natural and Revealed Religion, which have a direct relation to the conscience, and a close connection with our actual conduct, are also left to depend, not on direct and demonstrative, but on mediate and moral evidence. Every one knows that, in other cases, this kind of evidence is sufficient to give moral certainty, or such a measure of probability as *ought* to determine his conduct. In most instances the evidence on which he must act in regard to his temporal interests—the regimen which may best preserve his health,—the remedies which may most effectually restore it,—the means by which he may obtain support for himself and his family,—the prospect of success in agriculture, or

* Henry Rogers, "Reason and Faith" (reprint), pp. 2, 5.

navigation, or commerce, does not even amount to moral certainty, but only to a higher or lower degree of probability; and yet he never hesitates to act upon it, even when his life or his livelihood, his fortune or his family, is concerned in the issue. So true it is, in the memorable words of Butler, that "probability is the very guide of life." The analogy, then, of other parts of his knowledge should teach him to be content with that kind of evidence which is sufficient to regulate his conduct in common life, and not to expect demonstrative proof in matters which do not admit of demonstration. For, as one has well said, "Do men expect mathematical proof and certainty in moral things? They may as well expect to see with their ears, and to hear with their eyes."

(520.) The moral law of Conscience, and the revealed law of Religion, are further analogous to each other in this twofold respect,—that they severally require not only an external, but also an internal, morality,—and are not merely negative, but positive also, since they not only prohibit that which is evil, but enjoin that which is good. In these respects Revealed Religion, considered as a law, differs from mere human laws, and is analogous only to the natural moral law which, like itself, is Divine. The latter is not fulfilled by mere external action; it requires right affections, right motives, right intentions; insomuch that the very same act which, done from a right motive, is good, may be utterly vitiated and become morally evil, if it be done from an improper motive. It is a good act to pray in a spirit of piety, but if we pray to be "seen of men," our very prayer is sin; it is a good act to supply the wants of the poor in a spirit of benevolent sympathy, but if we give alms for ostentation, or with a view to selfish objects, such charity is not "doubly blest,"—it may bless him who receives, it cannot bless him who gives. In short, the moral law of Nature is spiritual, extending to the thoughts and intents of the heart; and the law of Revealed Religion is analogous to it, requiring us to *be*, as well as to *do*. "Be ye holy, for I am holy."—The distinction between *habitual* and *actual* righteousness, as well as the relation between the two, are equally real in Ethics and in Theology;* and the reason is obvious—Revelation incorporates with itself the moral law of Nature, and is throughout adapted to it; while by the new truths which it unfolds it elevates the standard, and enlarges the

* *Justitia habitualis et actualis*. See Dr Whewell, *Elements of Morality*, I. 133.

sphere of duty, and raises its disciples from the low level of mere natural morality to the higher atmosphere of Christian holiness.

(521.) Revealed Religion, considered as a rule of action, is further analogous to the natural law of human conduct, in this—that each of the two prescribes the *subordination* of the lower to the higher principles of our nature. In the natural world, itself, there is an established gradation between different orders of things ; material substances are subordinate to vegetable products, and the laws of life and organization have the power of modifying and assimilating them so as to make them subservient to vegetable growth ; these products of vegetation, again, are subordinate to animal structures, and the laws of animal life and organization convert them into nutritious food ; while both the vegetable and animal tribes are made to contribute to the support and growth of the human body, and, through it, to the development also of the human mind. In like manner, in the constitution of man, the senses are made subordinate to his reason, the body to the mind, the appetites, desires, and affections to the moral faculty. In exact analogy to this order of nature, which makes the physical subordinate to the mental, and both subordinate to the moral, is that order which Revealed Religion makes known, when it subordinates them all to a still higher end, and makes them subservient to that which is spiritual and eternal.

(522.) Revealed Religion, considered as a rule of action, is still further analogous to the natural law of human conduct, since each of the two proceeds on the principle that the future should rule the present, and prescribes the duty of self-restraint and self-denial. Every natural law, even that of mere secular prudence, makes it the duty of intelligent voluntary agents to act with a view to the consequences of their conduct, and to submit to present restraint with a view to a greater ultimate good. The law of Conscience and of Natural Religion is, in this sense, a law of self-denial, not less than that of Revealed Religion ; but the latter is enforced by higher motives, and should be the more effectual in proportion as the interests of the present life are infinitely less important than its final issues in an eternal state of being. It assures us that our conduct here will determine both our character and our condition hereafter ;—and that it should be regulated now by a regard to our future prospects. In this respect it is strictly analogous to the natural laws of human conduct.

CHAPTER XII.

ANALOGY BETWEEN HUMAN AND DIVINE RELATIONS.

(523.) Our religious, and our relative, duties resemble each other in this respect, that they severally depend on the relations which subsist, in the one case between man and man, in the other, between man and God. These two sets of relations, when compared, are found to be analogous, insomuch that common terms are applied to both ; while the ethical principles, which determine the duties proper to such relations, are the same. There is, therefore, much more than a superficial resemblance,—there is an intimate and deep-rooted analogy, between the two.

(524.) All our relative duties depend on the relations which subsist between us and our fellow-men. The family supplies us with our first conceptions of social relations. Husband and wife, father and mother, sons and daughters, brothers and sisters, are all related, although in different ways, and not only knit together by ties of natural affection, but bound to each other by the obligations of moral duty. We feel that a parent *ought* to love and cherish his child, and that a child *ought* to reverence and obey his parent. Every member of a family receives acts of kindness, and hence arises his relation to benefactors, and the duty belonging to that relation—the duty of gratitude. Another relation, different in its nature from that of parent and child, and different also in its peculiar duties, is the relation between master and servant, which rests on mutual agreement or contract, and which requires a discreet exercise of authority on the one side, and faithful service on the other. Social relations of another kind connect us with the community to which we belong, especially our relation to an established system of law and government, and the authorities, supreme or subordinate, by whom it is administered.

(525.) Thus early and thus naturally are we instructed to form clear and distinct conceptions of these fundamental relations, and

of the moral duties which belong to them ; and thus are we prepared for understanding our higher relations to God, and the Religious duties which these relations impose. As soon as we come to know the existence of God, and to think of Him as our Father, Benefactor, and Governor, we simply conceive of these new relations according to the analogy of those earthly ones which are so familiar to us ; and we transfer to them the same moral principles which we are wont to apply to the duties of common life. Religion is entirely founded on the relations between God and man,—between *such* a Being as God is, and *such* a creature as man,—for the *nature* of both must be taken into account in judging of the relation between the two, and the duties which that relation involves. Religion results from “the relation between God, the Creator, the Moral Governor of the universe, and man, the creature, the moral agent in this lower world. Out of this supreme relation, springs the law of the moral Governor, on the one hand—which is the will of God,—and, on the other, the obligation of the moral agent, operating on the will and affections of man. Here we find *the foundation of all religion*, which forms the crown and perfection of intellectual and moral truth.”*

(526.) Natural Religion is founded on our natural relations to God, in so far as these can be ascertained by our unaided reason ; but, for ought we can tell, God may have established other relations between Himself and us by an act of His sovereign will, which it may greatly concern our welfare to know, but which are utterly undiscoverable otherwise than by a revelation from Himself. Revealed Religion makes known these new relations, and the new duties which result from them ; and in respect to

* Tatham, “Chart and Scale,” II. p. 2.

That this supreme relation cannot be understood, nor the duties resulting from it duly estimated, without reference to the *nature* both of God and man, is thus stated by Lamennais:

“Dieu ayant créé l’homme être intelligent, il existe entre Dieu et l’homme des *rappports* nécessaires.

“Tout rapport entre les êtres derive de leur *nature*.

“Donc les rapports entre Dieu et l’homme derive de la nature de l’homme et de celle de Dieu.

“Ces rapports constituent, à proprement parler, la Religion. Donc il existe une vraie Religion, ou une Religion nécessaire. . . .

“La Religion étant l’expression des rapports qui dérive de la nature de Dieu et de celle de l’homme, il s’ensuit 1. qu’il ne peut en exister qu’une seule, puisque ces rapports sont invariables : 2 que toute Religion fausse est opposée à la nature de Dieu et à celle de l’homme,—qu’elle les separe, par conséquent, au lieu de les unir.”—“*Essai sur l’Indifférence*,” Tom. II. p. 165.

both, while it is a clear addition to the law of nature, it is strictly analogous to it. It proceeds on the same fundamental principle—that personal relations involve or imply moral duties; and with a view to complete the law under which we are placed and to adapt it to our circumstances and wants, as beings who have been ruined by sin, but are capable of being restored, it brings before us a supernatural scheme or constitution, under which God sustains new and most important relations towards us, and requires at our hands such duties as these relations necessarily impose. It gives a moral revelation, that the conscience may be quickened and enlightened to discern these duties; but its grand object is to reveal God as sustaining towards us the character of a Redeemer, a Saviour, a Sanctifier, and to bring us under the influence of those moral feelings and affections, which such a discovery of His character ought to inspire.

(527.) It was finely said by Robert Boyle that revelation may be to reason what the telescope is to the eye.* Applying this comparison to the point in hand, we might say that all the truths of Natural Religion are like the stars which are more or less clearly visible to the naked eye; while the peculiar truths of Revealed Religion are like the stars which are beyond the range of our vision, since they are undiscoverable by the utmost efforts of unaided reason; but that just as the eye is aided by the telescope, so reason may be aided by revelation; and, in either instance, with the same twofold effect, first, the revelation of new objects and new relations, and secondly the fuller and more distinct manifestation of such as were previously, but less perfectly, discerned. Revelation contemplates both objects, and accomplishes both results; it reveals anew, and places in a clearer and stronger light, all the truths both of natural Ethics and natural Religion, while it brings into view a vast spiritual economy, comprehending many new objects and many new relations, which could only be determined by the will, and revealed by the word, of God.

(528.) We can conceive of a Revelation having been necessary, and even of its having been given, for the sole purpose of shedding fresh light on the truths of Natural Religion, and enforcing the principles of moral duty, when these had been obscured

* Hon. Robt. Boyle, "Theological Works,"—"The Excellency of Theology Compared with Natural Philosophy," III. 3.

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or perverted through human degeneracy; but had it contemplated no other end, and had it succeeded in so enlightening the mind, and so awakening the conscience, as to impress us with an habitual sense of our natural relations to God as our Creator, Governor, and Judge, while it revealed Him in no other character, and said nothing of "the will of God for our salvation," its only effect must have been "a spirit of bondage unto fear," not "the spirit of adoption, whereby we cry, Abba, Father." But the revelation contained in Scripture is not of this character; it assumes and presupposes our natural relations to God, and sheds over them the light of a fresh and vivid illustration, but it reveals at the same time other relations which were undiscoverable before; and these new relations constitute the peculiar ground of Christian duty.

(529.) For example, Christianity is a revelation from God "of a particular dispensation of providence, carrying on by His Son and Spirit, for the recovery and salvation of mankind, who are represented in Scripture to be in a state of ruin. And in consequence of this revelation being made . . . other obligations of duty, unknown before, to the Son and the Holy Ghost, are revealed. The importance of these duties may be judged of, by observing that they arise, not from positive command merely, but also from the *offices* which appear from Scripture to belong to those Divine Persons in the Gospel dispensation, or from the *relations* which, we are there informed, they stand in to us. . . . How these relations are made known, whether by reason or revelation, makes no alteration in the case; because *the duties arise out of the relations themselves*, not out of the manner in which we are informed of them. . . . The internal worship to the Son and Holy Ghost is no further matter of pure revealed command, than as the relations they stand in to us are matter of pure revelation; for the relations being known, the obligations to such internal worship are *obligations of reason, arising out of those relations themselves*."*

(530.) It thus appears that Christian duty, in so far as it is peculiar and distinctive, is analogous to natural duty, since both depend equally on certain relations which involve or imply moral obligation; and further, that our natural and revealed relations, although different, are also analogous to one another,—so strictly

* Butler, "Analogy," Part II. c. i. p. 322 (Wilson's Ed.).

analogous that the same ethical principles which are applicable to the former are equally applicable to the latter.

(531.) Reverting once more to the idea of Robert Boyle, that Revelation is to Religion, what the telescope is to Astronomical Science, since the one as well as the other brings into view new objects and new relations, which were undiscoverable without their aid, we may briefly notice a striking analogy between Mathematical and Moral relations, which has been eloquently illustrated by Dr Chalmers,* but applied by him chiefly to the duties of Natural Religion, while it admits of being extended also to the more peculiar duties of the Christian disciple. There is an obvious distinction between the objects and the mathematics of Natural Philosophy,—the former being the facts or data of the science, which are ascertained by observation; the latter demonstrable truths, derived by rigorous deduction from a few rudimentary definitions and axioms, which are applicable to the relations of all material bodies everywhere throughout the universe. There is a similar distinction between the objects and the Ethics of Moral Philosophy,—the former being the relations subsisting between persons or moral agents,—the latter, the moral proprieties which belong to such relations, and which are of universal and everlasting application, in whatever sphere, and at whatever time these, or similar, relations may come into view. The relations subsisting between man and man are the first objects or facts of Moral Philosophy, and the duties which result from these human relations are its first and simplest lessons. But suppose that similar relations are found to subsist between man and God,—that He is the Father of our spirits, our Preserver, our Benefactor, our Lawgiver, our Governor,—then the same duties which result from these relations as subsisting between man and man, result also from the same or similar relations as subsisting between man and God; and we thus arrive at a code of Natural Religion. Suppose, further, that other relations between man and God, not discoverable by the unaided light of Nature, are made known by the supernatural light of Revelation, and that these, again, are analogous to certain other relations which are familiarly known

* Dr Chalmers' Works, Vol. I., On Natural Theology; Chap. i. "On the Distinction between the Ethics and the Objects of Theology," pp, 17-24, 29, 35.

to us as subsisting between a forgiving father and an offending child, or a clement sovereign and his rebellious subject, or a liberal creditor and his discharged debtor, or a redeemer and his emancipated captive,—then the same duties which result from these relations as subsisting between man and man, result also from the same or similar relations as subsisting between man and God; and we thus arrive at the Law of Revealed Religion.

(532.) It is thus, that on the sure ground of analogous relations, we rise from the terrestrial to the celestial in Physical Science, and from the human to the Divine in Moral Science. There is an instructive analogy, in this respect, between Astronomy and Theology. In Astronomy the same forces and laws of motion which are known to be in action on the surface of the earth are applied to explain the movements of the heavenly bodies. For a time this was not thought of, and even when it was suggested, it was opposed; but ultimately the experimental and rational evidence of the truth prevailed against the incredulity of ignorance, and even against the apparent evidence of sense.* The Copernican theory of the heavens was established by the discovery of analogous relations between material bodies on the earth and the heavens under the regulation of the same physical law, and is now an article not only of scientific but of popular belief. And it did require “a very general concurrence of competent judges to overcome the repugnance of what called itself common sense, and was in fact a prejudice as natural, as universal, and as irresistible as could influence human belief.”†

(533.) In theology, in like manner, we rise from human relations and the moral duties which are appropriate to them to Divine relations and the religious duties which these relations involve. The two sets of relations are analogous to each other, and the same ethical principles are applicable to both. The same connection which subsists between terrestrial and celestial physics, subsists also between terrestrial and celestial morals. In either case we begin with earthly, and rise to heavenly things, and thence descend again with a knowledge of truth which may be applied to practical uses. What we know of astronomy and the

* J. S. Mill, “Logic,” I. 558.

† Hallam, “Literature of Europe,” II. 453. See also Sedgwick’s “Dis-

course,” 5th Ed. p. xxii.; Tatham, “Chart,” I. xliii.

movements of the heavenly bodies may be applied to the art of navigation ; what we know of God and His relations to ourselves may be applied to the conduct of life. The terrestrial and the celestial economies are thus seen to be so connected with each other both by physical and moral analogies, as to constitute *one* harmonious system ; the laws of motion on the earth are also the laws of motion in the sky ; and the laws of duty on the earth are also the laws of duty in heaven. And when Revelation makes God known to us as “the Just God and the Saviour,”—when it tells us of Jesus Christ, and what He did and suffered to redeem us,—when it speaks of the Holy Ghost as “the Spirit of all grace,” and of what He has undertaken to do for the renewal and sanctification of our depraved nature,—when it “brings life and immortality clearly to light,”—when it points forward to a state of final retribution in which every one will be dealt with “according to the deeds done in his body,”—it only serves, like the telescope, to enlarge the sphere of our vision ; and every new truth which it enables us to know becomes an additional ground of Religious duty,—a fresh motive and inducement to a Religious life.

CHAPTER XIII.

ANALOGY BETWEEN SCRIPTURE AND EXPERIENCE.

(534.) Revealed Religion may be regarded, not only as a branch of knowledge and a law of life, but as a scheme or system of doctrine; and, as such, it may be compared with the facts of nature and history,—or the lessons which we learn from experience in regard to “the constitution and course of nature.” This is the peculiar argument of Butler, and he has expounded and illustrated it with singular felicity and force. He has conclusively shown that the scheme which is unfolded in Scripture is not out of analogy, but is in entire accordance, with the scheme which is exhibited in the constitution of nature and the course of providence. There is a wide difference between the two, but such a difference as is perfectly compatible with a true and proper analogy.

(535.) There are two classes of Facts which are affirmed and attested in Scripture; some which are *common* to it and to our natural experience, and some which are *peculiar* to itself alone. For this reason Butler considers Christianity in two distinct aspects, first as a republication of Natural Religion, and secondly as a revelation of truths which were undiscoverable by the light of Nature.* In so far as the truths which are *common* to Scripture and experience are concerned, the facts, when compared with each other, are *coincident* rather than *analogous*, although each of them may be illustrated, as Butler has shown, by natural analogies derived from other facts in the constitution of nature and the course of providence. Hence Bishop Hampden has treated of “the credibility obtained to a Scripture revelation from its *coincidence* with the facts of nature,” and the ground of

* Butler's Analogy (Bp. Wilson's Edition), pp. 314, 321.

his argument is stated in the following terms.—“We have a general presumption that there must exist some points of coincidence in the truths unfolded in the Scriptures, and those taught by the experienced course of nature. . . . We are led to think that the Divine science of the word of God cannot be found, when rightly estimated, to be a knowledge detached from all communion and sympathy with the science of Nature, or the truths inculcated on our minds by observation of the course and constitution of the world. . . . The question, then, recurs, whether there are any just media of comparison by which the two classes of truths may be brought to the test of their agreement or disagreement with each other, so that the unseen truth may obtain a credibility from its coincidence with that which is matter of experience.”* The same coincidence has been recognised by Bishop Shuttleworth and the President Riambourg as a source of proof.†

(536.) The facts which are *common* to Scripture and experience are independent of the authority of Revelation; they would have been equally true had revelation never been vouchsafed, and they would still continue to be true were revelation proved to be false.‡ They are facts known and read of all men, whose evidence is as certain as that of any matter of experience can possibly be. And they are facts of a very serious and solemn kind,—so serious and solemn that we cannot reflect upon them, so as to realize their full import in relation to our actual condition and future prospects, without feeling that some better light than that of our own reason is needed to solve the problems which they suggest, and to give us, in the view of these facts, anything like peace of mind. Revelation refers to these facts and founds upon them, and it is chiefly for this reason that many recoil from the Bible, as if it presented a gloomy view of the state and prospects of men; but it does not create, it merely recognises them, appealing to our actual experience for its verification in doing so;—and

* Bishop Hampden, “Philosophical Evidence of Christianity,” pp. 8, 10.

† Bishop Shuttleworth, “Consistency of Revelation with Itself and Reason,” pp. 3, 62. President Riambourg, “Rationalisme et Tradition,” p. 474.

‡ Whately, “Essays on the Peculiarities of the Christian Religion,”

pp. 19, 20, 69; “Essays on the Difficulties in Writings of Paul,” p. 115. Albert Barnes, “Science and Theology,” pp. 240, 253, 368. Shuttleworth, “Consistency of Revelation,” pp. 35, 73. Butler, “Analogy” (Wilson’s Edition), p. 361. Isaac Taylor, “Spiritual Christianity.”

it is not to be held responsible for them, unless a remedy can be said to be responsible for a disease.

(537.) What are these facts? The existence and prevalence of evil, physical and moral, which is the one great difficulty to which all objections against Natural and Revealed religion may be ultimately traced,—the established connection between the one kind of evil and the other,—the existence of a moral government which takes cognizance of guilt, and visits it with punishment;—the depraved and disordered state of human nature,—the manifold afflictions of life,—the inevitable doom of death,—and the awful prospect of what may, or rather the instinctive foreboding of what *must*, come after it,—these are all facts in human experience which are known independently of Revelation, and which would have been equally real, and surely not less alarming, if Revelation had never been vouchsafed. The Bible assumes these facts, and appeals to our own experience in confirmation of them; but as a Gospel, it is a revelation of a remedy for evils which had an actual existence before it was proclaimed, and which would have been irremediable without it. So far as these facts are concerned, there is, in the first instance, the evidence of experience, which is only recognised and confirmed by Scripture; there is a perfect coincidence between the two authorities; and the peculiar truths of revelation themselves can only be understood when they are viewed in the light of what we know from consciousness and observation. What could we know of salvation, if we had no natural experience of sin? or of sin, if we had no natural consciousness of moral obligation? or of duty, if we had no connatural law written on the tablets of our hearts? Could any external teaching, were it even Divine, give us the conception of these things, if they were not first revealed in the light of our natural experience?

(538.) Looking, in the first instance, to those facts which are *common* to Scripture and experience, and comparing them with the peculiar lessons of Revelation, we find an evidence somewhat different from that of analogy,—although analogy may also be involved in it,—the evidence of *adaptation*, which is sufficient to show that the Author of the Gospel knew what was in man, and has devised a suitable provision for all the most urgent wants of his soul. Is he guilty? here is pardon through a propitiation for sin. Is he depraved? here is sanctification by the truth and the Spirit of God. Is he doomed to die, and through fear of death all

his lifetime subject to bondage? here is "the resurrection and the life," and "a hope full of immortality." This adaptation to the actual state and deepest wants of the soul is felt by every earnest inquirer to be one of the strongest proofs of the Divine origin of the Gospel.*

(539.) The proof which is derived from the adaptation of Revealed Religion to the actual wants of men is founded, not on speculative reasoning, but on undeniable facts. It is a fact that such wants exist; it is also a fact that a suitable provision for them is proposed to us in the Gospel. The doctrines of Scripture are all of them the revelation of Facts,—the fact of the Fall, the fact of the Trinity, the fact of the Incarnation, the fact of Redemption, the fact of Regeneration now, the fact of Resurrection hereafter; and these facts, when duly attested, are not to be set aside by any *a priori* speculation,† nor can they be at variance with any fact of experience.‡ The facts revealed in Scripture are compared with other facts ascertained by actual observation; not with what may be conceived to be possible in an imaginary world, but with what are known to be real in the world as it is.§ The argument, therefore, depending as it does on two sets of facts existing independently of each other, and founded on the relation between the two, is based on a comparison of two terms, each of which is certain, and neither of them speculative or imaginary. And the adaptation of the scheme which is unfolded in Scripture to the course of God's government, and the ordinary experience of men, affords a strong evidence of the Divine origin of the Gospel.||

(540.) The *coincidence* of Scripture and Experience in respect to those things which are common to both, is one fact,—the *adaptation* of the peculiar truths of Revelation to the actual condition and most urgent wants of men, is another; but there is a third,—namely, the *analogy* between both the common and the peculiar contents of Scripture and certain similar facts or truths which are

* Dr M'Cosh, "The Divine Government, 1st Edit., p. 491. R. Baxter, "Works," vol. XXI. 181, 191, 293. H. Rogers, "Eclipse of Faith," p. 363. Mansel's "Limits of Religious Thought," 163. Mozley, "Augustinian Predestination," p. 331.

† Barnes, "Reason and Theology," p. 238. H. Rogers, "Eclipse of Faith," p. 404; "Defence," p. 102.

‡ Berkeley, "Minute Philosopher," I. 459.

§ Shuttleworth, "Consistency of Revelation," 33, 38, 41, 55. Butler, "Analogy," p. 152.

|| John Goodwyn, "The Divine Authority of Scripture," pp. 332, 336, 345, 559.

made known by our familiar experience. This last is the special aspect of the subject which we propose to illustrate, by adducing some specimens of those analogous facts which come under our daily observation, and which serve, in some cases, to illustrate, in others to accredit, both the common and the peculiar doctrines of Revealed religion.

(541.) We may select, in the first instance, some analogous facts which are applicable to such truths as are common to Natural and Revealed religion.

(542.) The doctrine of a future state of existence after death belongs to this class. It may be rendered credible by arguments derived from experience, as well as attested by the authority of Revelation. Some of these arguments may be sufficient only to neutralize objections or remove apparent presumptions against it,—others may afford a certain degree of probability, more or less, in its favour,—and several of them have a high positive value as moral proofs, while their combination and joint concurrence towards the same conclusion give them the multiple force of a cumulative proof. Let the doctrine be proposed, in the first instance, simply as an hypothesis, and then let it be compared with any analogous facts that fall within the range of our experience. Let it be compared, for instance, as it has been by Butler, with the well-known fact of our natural birth, by which we were introduced into our present state of being; or with the bursting of birds from the shell after a preparatory process of incubation; or with the marvellous transformation of a grub into a chrysalis and butterfly. These facts have an evident analogy, in some respects, to the change which is supposed to take place at death in the case of men; and although they are not sufficient—and should never be applied as if they were sufficient—of themselves and apart from other evidence, to prove a future state of existence, they serve at least to make it credible, by showing that it would be in accordance with the analogy of nature in other cases which are familiarly known to us. This is the first step. But when we examine the two cases more closely, we find that there are other features of resemblance between them than the general one which has just been noticed. For besides finding in nature many instances of transformation by which the same living being passes into different states of existence, we find also many examples of a prospective provision, by which preparation is made beforehand for

its future destination, and which may be fairly regarded as natural signs or indications of what is to be expected hereafter. The eye is framed in darkness, but is adapted to light, and designed for vision; the lungs grow in the womb, but are adapted to the external atmosphere, and prepared for respiration; and when the child is born into the world, every organ finds its appropriate object, every instinct its natural gratification, and every faculty a suitable field for its exercise. So uniform is our experience in this respect, that we never hesitate to reason from the existence of an organ to the existence of a corresponding object, and from every natural power, whether it be an animal instinct, or a rational faculty, or a moral feeling, to a suitable field for its manifestation and activity in actual life.

(543.) Now apply these analogous facts to the prospects of man. Consider the innate capacities of the human soul,—its vast range of thought,—its power of conceiving an unending futurity,—its boundless aspirations,—its longing affections and desires,—above all, its capacity to form real and solemn, though inadequate, conceptions of God, of His universal government, of His kingdom on earth, and its relation to a wider and eternal administration;—may we not discover, in these facts of our own conscious experience, a prospective provision for a higher and nobler state of existence hereafter, such as the analogy of similar cases, known by actual observation, teaches us to regard and interpret as a natural indication of the Divine purpose in regard to it? May we not discern in the faculties, desires, and affections of the human soul, when compared with the limits within which it is confined in the present life, some indication of its being destined to another state of being? Its powers are manifestly so great, and capable of such indefinite progress, that the present life, short and uncertain as it is, seems to afford an inadequate field for their exercise, and looks rather like a season of preparation for another. May it not change its state at death, as the foetus changes its state at birth, and may not death be only its birth into another world? The argument is founded on what is peculiar to man, and is applicable, therefore, to man only, as a being endowed, not only with organs and instincts, but with reason, conscience, and will. He is capable of forming conceptions, and conscious of aspirations, hopes, and fears, such as have no place in the experience of inferior animals, and mark him out as possessing a nature essentially

different from theirs ; whereas on the supposition of his existence being confined to the present life there is no corresponding difference between their destination and his. In so far as merely animal existence is concerned, our whole experience teaches us, that for every organ there is a suitable object, for every instinct an appropriate gratification ; and if, reasoning by analogy, we extend the same principle to the intellectual and moral powers of man, we can scarcely fail to conclude that the prospect of his continued existence hereafter is necessary to account for the peculiar properties of his nature, and that on any other supposition he may be truly said to have been “ made in vain.”* This argument, like many others, may have little force with those who are ignorant of their own nature, and are content to lead, like mere animals, a sensual and secular life ; but it grows in strength in proportion as our intellectual and moral nature advances ; and it becomes irresistible in the case of those who have acquired any knowledge of God, or any fellowship with Jesus Christ :—for with them it will be utterly incredible that, having once known God, they shall ever cease to know Him, or that, having once loved Christ, they shall ever cease to love Him.†

(544.) This is the second step in the process, in which, proceeding on the ground of analogy, we infer from the existence of certain faculties and capacities in the human mind its probable destination hereafter,—an inference which implies that the present life does not afford an adequate explanation of the Divine purpose in regard to us. But there is a third step, depending on another and a quite distinct set of analogies, which may be found in the facts of the moral world. For there is a different and additional class of facts which may also be applied, on the principle of analogy, to confirm the doctrine of immortality,—the facts of our moral consciousness and experience. Combining the intuitive perceptions of conscience with the facts of our actual experience in the present life, we can hardly fail to believe that we live under a scheme of moral government, but of a scheme which is as yet incomplete—whose initial movements can be clearly discerned, but whose final issues have not been unfolded,—a system

* See Howe's Discourse on “The Vanity of Man as Mortal,” Works, | vol. III. p. 295. Sir Kenelm Digby,
 “Treatise of Man's Soul,” p. 83.
 † Fenelon, “Œuvres Spirituelles.”

admirably adapted to a preparatory state of discipline, but very far from being an adequate exemplification of what conscience would lead us to expect in a state of righteous retribution. We seem to see the *commencement* of a plan whose *consummation* is deferred; and are instinctively led to anticipate a time when all seeming irregularities in the distribution of good and evil will be redressed,—when the righteous who have suffered unjustly, such as the confessors and martyrs, will be vindicated, and when the wicked who have here escaped with impunity, such as powerful oppressors and persecutors, will be judged according to their desert. It is not the authoritative revelation of Scripture merely, but the solemn voice of nature also, which is heard in such words as these: “I considered all the oppressions that are done under the sun; and behold the tears of such as were oppressed, and they had no comforter; and on the side of their oppressors there was power; but they had no comforter.” “And moreover I saw under the sun the place of judgment, that wickedness was there, and the place of righteousness, that iniquity was there: and I said in mine heart, God shall judge the righteous and the wicked; for there is a time there for every purpose and for every work.”* From these facts we reason in regard to the future on the principle of analogy, just as, in other cases, we reason from the known principles of a scheme to its ultimate issues,—from the commencement of a work to its final completion,—from the seed-time to the harvest,—from known tendencies to actual results,—from the design of law and government to its certain fulfilment. In these facts we find a new class of natural analogies, which impart to the doctrine of a Future State such a character of verisimilitude, and afford such an amount of probable evidence in its favour, as fairly entitles it to take its place among the articles of Natural Religion.

(545.) These moral analogies lead us to expect not only a future state of *existence*, but a future state of *retribution*. They have a deep foundation in the moral nature of man, and in the moral government of God, when these are viewed in the light of our natural experience, and compared with facts having a relation to our mere temporal interests in the present life. For there is a natural as well as a moral Government, and there is, with many

* Eccles. iii. 16, 17, iv. 1.

important differences, a manifest analogy between the two. Considered merely as inhabitants of this lower world, and looking only to our secular interests or temporal welfare, we feel that we are subject to natural laws, which we cannot resist without exposing ourselves to physical evil, or even neglect without incurring danger; and common prudence, even were there no higher principle, would dictate the necessity of acting in conformity with them. It is one of the clearest lessons of experience that we must act now with a view to future consequences, and deny ourselves, on many occasions, a present gratification if we would avoid the risk of far greater evil. These prudential maxims, derived from our secular experience, are analogous to those moral laws which conscience suggests, while these, again, are analogous to those higher lessons which are taught by Natural and Revealed Religion. And they all concur with each other, as well as with the natural analogies already mentioned, in leading us to believe that a future state of existence may be, and probably will be, a state of retribution.

(546.) Our common secular experience teaches us that physical happiness or suffering is connected with our voluntary actions, and dependent, to a large extent, on our own conduct; our peculiar moral experience, as intelligent and responsible agents, impresses us with a sense of demerit and a fear of punishment, when we act in violation of known duty, or in opposition to the dictates of conscience; and it would be in entire accordance with these analogous facts, were our conduct now to be visited with retribution hereafter. Indeed, on the supposition of a future state of existence, retribution of some kind would seem to be inevitable. We learn from experience that punishment takes effect on the transgressors of law in two distinct ways,—first, in the way of natural consequence, and, secondly, in the way of positive judicial infliction. Both are included in the doctrine of a future state of retribution, and both may be illustrated and, to some extent, proved by analogous facts in nature. Punishment in the way of natural consequence we know to be inevitable under the common government of God; for any violation or neglect of His laws invariably affects us injuriously, sometimes in the way of physical suffering, sometimes in the way of moral deterioration; and no reason can be assigned to show that death will arrest the progress of this natural retribution, on the supposition of a future state of con-

scious existence. But under the same Government of God we have experience also of punishment by positive judicial infliction, —for crime, besides being punished in the way of natural consequence, is visited also with penalties which are not self-inflicted, but imposed by authority, when the magistrate, as “the minister of God,” acts as “an avenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil.”* Some such positive infliction seems to be necessary in the present life in addition to the mere natural consequences of men’s actions, and it may be equally necessary in a future state; for the natural effect of sin is to sear the conscience, to harden the heart, and to deaden the sensibilities of men, in proportion as they become more hopelessly depraved; and we are taught by the whole analogy of criminal procedure on earth, that a punishment inflicted by authority may be necessary to vindicate the majesty of law, and to manifest the rectitude of the Divine administration.

(547.) These analogies are sufficient to show that there may, and probably will be, a state of future retribution; and when that doctrine is authoritatively declared in Scripture, they serve to accredit it, by proving that it is in strict accordance with the facts of our familiar experience. The sanctions of reward and punishment are common to Natural and Revealed Religion, and in this respect there is an indissoluble connection, as well as an undeniable analogy, between the two. The only peculiarity of the doctrine of a future state as taught in Scripture is the assurance that our eternal condition will be determined wholly by our conduct in the present life, and will be declared by a solemn and irrevocable sentence at the judgment of the great day. And in respect even to this peculiarity, we are not without analogous facts in our common experience. Crime is often allowed to go on unpunished for a long term of years; at length the criminal is detected, tried, and doomed; and the sentence once pronounced is irreversible, otherwise than by an act of free and sovereign grace. Nothing that the criminal himself can either plead or do will avert or alter his doom. Neither repentance nor reformation, were these supposed to be possible, or even real, has any effect. The law takes its course, and the sentence is carried into execution, even although it should sever him for ever from his country, and deprive him of

* Rom. xiii. 5.

life itself. The law, considered as such, does not, and cannot, contain any provision for the pardon of the guilty ; so that if pardon be possible at all, it can only be provided by the same authority which enacted the law, and bestowed on principles analogous to those which led to its enactment.—The light of nature cannot discover any termination to future punishment, and, to say the least, Scripture reveals none. The mere possibility of such an issue, and that measure of probability, be it less or more, which may be derived from the analogies of our actual experience, is sufficient of itself to impose a solemn obligation on every man to live now, as assuredly he shall wish he had lived, when he comes to die, and to enter, prepared or unprepared, into a new and eternal state of being.

(548.) The whole analogy of our experience teaches us to regard the present life as a state, not of retribution, but of respite, in which we are under probation, with a view to a state of retribution hereafter.—This is the doctrine of Scripture, which affirms that, immediately after the fall, the curse of the law, although not reversed, was suspended, and a promise of mercy vouchsafed. There are accordingly in the present dispensations of Providence, many tokens both “of mercy and of judgment,”—of “goodness,” and yet of “severity,”—of forbearance, compassion, and long-suffering, yet of a moral law and a judicial administration.* The apostle describes this as the condition even of the Gentile world, as well as of the Jewish nation: “Despisest thou the riches of His goodness, and forbearance, and long-suffering, not knowing that the goodness of God leadeth thee to repentance? but after thy hardness and impenitent heart, treasurest up unto thyself wrath against the day of wrath and revelation of the righteous judgment of God, who will render to every man according to his deeds.”† In the course of Providence, as in the cross of Christ, we see an exhibition of justice mingled with mercy ; and for this reason those who see two Christs in the Gospel,—the one kind and compassionate, the other stern and austere ;—and two aspects of Christianity, the one attractive, the other repulsive,—will also find in nature and Providence an analogous manifestation of the

* Breckenridge, “Knowledge of | and Theology,” p. 284. Pascal, “Pen-
God,” p. 37. J. P. Smith, “First | sées,” p. 265.
Lines,” p. 396. Barnes, “Science | † Rom. ii. 4, 5.

character of God, fitted to excite alternately their hopes and their fears. Under this mixed administration of mercy and judgment men are now placed in a state of probation, preparatory to a final reckoning; and they may find in their familiar experience many facts which are strictly analogous to such a trial, and by means of which they are enabled to form a right conception of it.—For in the actual business of life every one knows that a servant, an apprentice, a steward is placed for a time on trial preparatory to his final acceptance or rejection, which is left to depend on the manner in which he conducts himself in his probationary state. It would only be in accordance with these natural analogies, were the present life a season of probation for a future state of being.

(549.) These few specimens may suffice to illustrate those analogous facts which are applicable to such truths as are *common* to Natural and Revealed Religion. The *peculiar* truths of Revelation must always rest mainly on the direct evidence of its Divine origin, and be received on the authority of Scripture. They reveal a scheme which is essentially supernatural, and which originates in the sovereign will of God. We cannot expect, therefore, to find in the constitution and course of nature so many, or such adequate, analogies applicable to these peculiar doctrines as may be applied to the proof or illustration of such truths as belong equally to Natural and Revealed Religion. Probably for this reason, a new and most instructive set of analogies was provided, by positive Divine institution, in that magnificent scheme of prefiguration which preceded the dispensation of the fulness of times. Still the scheme which is revealed in Scripture, although it be supernatural, can scarcely be supposed to be out of all analogy to our common human experience; it is manifestly intended to be adapted to our actual condition, and to provide a suitable supply for our spiritual wants; and it may be presumed, therefore, to have some resemblance to those means which, in other cases, are employed as a remedy for disease, or as a method of deliverance from danger, or as a practical discipline for teaching and training the human mind.

(550.) We attach little value to those natural analogies which have been employed to prove or illustrate some of the peculiar doctrines of Revelation. The doctrine of the Trinity, for in-

stance, has been treated in this way both in former and in more recent times;* but the analogies which have been so employed appear to me to have no argumentative value, further than as they afford a proof that in many other cases we are accustomed to conceive of a trinity in unity, and may thus serve to neutralize an objection which has been urged against the Christian doctrine on the ground that it is inconceivable or self-contradictory. That sublime doctrine must ever rest mainly on the authority of Scripture; and it seems to have been one of the grand designs of Revelation to make that doctrine known,—just as God makes His being and perfection known by the works of creation and providence,—by a series of successive dispensations in which the *work* of each person in the Godhead is prominently presented to our view.† But there are other doctrines amongst those which are peculiar to Scripture, which may be illustrated, and, to some extent accredited, by sound natural analogies.

(551.) We are indebted to Scripture for an authoritative assurance that man was not created in his present condition, but in a state of original righteousness, from which he fell by his voluntary transgression; and that his actual condition is one of degeneracy and degradation. Some analogous cases of *degradation* have been found in the natural world;‡ but, without insisting on these, we refer rather to analogous facts in the history of man. That history exhibits many instances of gradual degeneracy, but none of spontaneous or unaided elevation, among the tribes of the human race. Many nations once civilised have become savage, but no savage race has become civilised, otherwise than by some influence exerted upon it *ab extra*,—by colonization, or by war, or by commerce, or by missionary instruction.§ This fact, which is attested by the collective experience of the world, is analogous to what we read in Scripture respecting the original condition of our race, its subsequent degeneracy, and the methods which were employed in successive ages to arrest its downward tendency by

* By Poiret, Kidd, Lamourette, Field, Tupper, Cousin, Bautain, etc., etc.

† Dr Waterland on the Trinity.

‡ Hugh Miller, "Footprints."

§ President Riambourg, "Rationalisme et Tradition," pp. 170, 171, 184,

193, 226. De Bonald, "Recherches Philosophiques," I. 327. Isaac Taylor, "World of Mind," 394. H. Rogers, "Eclipse of Faith," 161, 265; Defence of, 55. Valroger, "Etudes Critiques," 263, 277. Whately's Lectures to Young Men in London.

means of an external Revelation. It may be applied, therefore, to accredit the scriptural account of the primeval state of man, and to establish the necessity of an interposition *ab extra* for its restoration after it had fallen into a state of degeneracy.

(552.) We are told in Scripture that the fall of our first parent involved the fall, and caused the degeneracy, of his posterity. Created in "the image of God," when he became sinful, "he begat a son in his own likeness, after his image."* He sustained two distinct relations to his descendants—the one natural, arising out of the constitution of the race,—the other imposed by positive Divine appointment. He was their natural root—he was also their federal head or legal representative. The analogous facts which may be applied to these two distinct aspects of his character, are also different. In respect to the first, all those facts may be applied which serve to prove that disease and degeneracy may be transmitted hereditarily,†—in respect to the second, all those facts which show that, both under human and Divine government, individuals may be, and often are, appointed to act for others, as their trustees or representatives; and that their conduct, in that capacity, may affect, for good or for evil, the welfare of those whom they represent.‡ These analogous facts are sufficient to prove that the scriptural doctrine is in entire accordance with our actual experience, while the proper proof of the doctrine must ever rest on the authority of Revelation.—But to those who seek to discover the ground and reason of such an arrangement as is revealed in Scripture, we are warranted, I think, in saying that, while that arrangement must be ascribed to the sovereign will and mere good pleasure of God, yet it may be, to some extent, accounted for, and accredited, by the manifest analogy which subsists between *the revealed economy*, and the *family institute*. The human race has a constitution very differ-

* Gen. i. 27, v. 3.

† "It is a law of God's providence which we cannot alter, that the sins of the father are really visited upon the child in the corruption of his breed, and in the rendering impossible many of the feelings which are the greatest security to a child against evil."—Arnold's "Life and Correspondence," p. 386.

‡ These are not justly characterized

by Coleridge, when he speaks of "flimsy analogies drawn from the imperfections of human ordinances and human justice-courts,—some of very doubtful character, even as human institutes, and all of them just only as far as they are necessary, and rendered necessary chiefly by the weakness and wickedness, the limited powers and corrupt passions, of mankind."—"Aids to Reflection," p. 216.

ent from that of the angelic host. We are told of the angels that "they neither marry, nor are given in marriage." Of course there is in their case no hereditary descent,—no relation of pater-nity or sonship,—no dependence such as that of children on their parents, and no influence such as that of parents on their children. Each is brought into being directly by Divine creative power, and each is responsible for himself alone, although there may be, even in their case, other relations of superiority and subjection. They might be left, for ought we know, to stand or fall individually, and the fall of one might have no influence, otherwise than by the force of example, on the conduct or welfare of others. But the human race is differently constituted; and such relations are established between parents and their children as render it impossible that the former can fall without affecting, to a very serious extent, the character and welfare of the latter. This is the natural constitution of the race as a family; and the revealed doctrine of a federal arrangement by which our first parent was constituted the trustee or legal representative of his posterity, is analogous to it, and that arrangement may have been adopted for this among other reasons known only to the omniscient mind.*

(553.) We learn from experience that the present life, considered simply in its natural aspect, and in connection with our secular interests, is a state of discipline and trial, in which we are subjected to the influence both of mercy and of judgment, with a view to our temporal welfare; we learn from Scripture that God has instituted and revealed a higher supernatural economy designed to promote our spiritual and eternal interests; and when the two schemes—the natural and the revealed—are compared, we find, not only that the one is adapted to the other, but that they are analogous, also, in many important respects. They resemble each other in having a common relation to our interests, while the interests which they severally contemplate are different, being secular and temporal in the one case, spiritual and eternal in the other. They have a resemblance also in respect to the means employed, these being in both cases manifestations of mingled mercy and judgment, adapted to a state of probation and trial. And they are strictly analogous to each other in respect to the conse-

* Mansel, "Limits of Religious Thought," p. 226. Dr Young, "The Mystery," 156, 226, 246, 253.

quences which result from them respectively, since in both we are treated as responsible for the use which we make of the means of securing our welfare, and our happiness or misery is left to depend, to a large extent, on our own conduct.

(554.) The supernatural scheme which is revealed in Scripture is mainly designed to make known "the will of God for our salvation." It assumes that our natural state is one of guilt and danger, and that our natural character is depraved. It reveals a Divine provision for redressing these evils in our natural condition—for the free pardon of sin and deliverance from condemnation; also for the renewal of our fallen nature, and the communication of spiritual and eternal life. As it contemplates these various ends, so it may be viewed in several distinct aspects, and characterized by different epithets. When respect is had to its origin in the sovereign good pleasure of God, it is called a scheme of Grace; when respect is had to the evils which it is designed to redress, it is described as a Remedial dispensation; when respect is had to the means by which its design is carried into effect, it is considered generally as a scheme of Mediation, or more specifically, as a scheme of Redemption; and when respect is had to the result which it contemplates, and in which, wherever it is rendered effectual, it never fails to terminate, it is described as a scheme of Salvation. Such being the general nature of the scheme, and such the various aspects in which it may be viewed, we shall find, on comparing it with our common experience, not only that it is adapted to our actual wants, but that it is analogous also to certain facts in the natural government of God which serve both to illustrate and to accredit it.

(555.) Considered simply as a *remedial* economy, and without reference, in the first instance, to the nature of the means employed, it has its analogue in those natural provisions for curing disease and redressing or repairing evil, which experience enables us to discover under the natural government of God. "We may observe in nature the provision which has been made to prevent the natural bad consequences of men's actions. We are apt to think that the constitution of the world might have been such, as to have prevented the introduction of misery at all. On the contrary, however, we find that evil is permitted, but that the Author of nature has so far interposed on our behalf as to *provide us with remedies* which, in many cases, prevent the destruction which must

otherwise have ensued. And this is an instance both of severity and of mercy in the constitution of things.”*

(556.) Considered again as a scheme of Mediation, which is carried on by the Lord Jesus Christ as Mediator betwixt God and men, there is no office on earth which is in all respects the same with His, for it is unique and peculiar to Him alone; but there are many analogous instances of mediation between man and man which enable us to form some conception of His work as Mediator; and which, forming, as they do, part of the scheme of God’s natural government, afford a presumption that some similar agency may be employed with a view to our spiritual welfare. We are familiar with many cases of mediation, in which one influential party interposes for the benefit of others, and with many cases of intercession, in which benefits are actually procured for those on whose behalf it is offered; and it is by the aid of these natural analogies that we are enabled to conceive of the corresponding functions of Christ as Mediator. It is undeniably the law of God’s natural government, that He ordinarily accomplishes the counsel of His will by the use of means, and that, among these, He employs, to a large extent, the agency of some with a view to the benefit of others.

(557.) Considered again in its most peculiar aspect as a scheme of Redemption, implying the expiation of sin by vicarious suffering and satisfaction, it finds its best analogue in the universal practice of Sacrifice in connection with religious worship,—a practice which may have originated in Divine institution contemporaneously with the first announcement of God’s purpose of mercy towards a fallen world, but which, by its continued use in all ages and among all nations, even such as did not enjoy the light of Revelation otherwise than through the dim reflection of tradition, affords the strongest evidence of its being a fit expression of the feelings, the hopes, and the fears of the human soul. It is vain to say that there is anything unnatural or inconceivable in such a method of expiation; for the analogy of our whole experience with reference to the worship which has prevailed in the world refutes the objection, and supplies some measure of proof in support of the idea of vicarious expiation or atonement. But besides the analogy of sacrifice, there are other analogies arising from the

* Parkinson, “Analysis of Butler’s Analogy,” p. 76.

facts of our common experience ; for there are instances of vicarious suffering, and of the good of others being secured by it, under the ordinary government of God. If this be true, may we not say with reference to this aspect of the scheme, that "the matter of the revelation itself is evidenced and interpreted by *those awful, far-reaching analogies of mediation and vicarious suffering*, which we discern in the visible course of the world?"* These analogies will not prove the truth of the doctrine, for that depends on the sovereign will of God, and can only be made known by a revelation from Himself ; but when it has been revealed, they may show that it is *likely*, as being *like* to what we learn from experience, and may thus become an important aid to faith. For, as the same writer has said, "There is, perhaps, no greater satisfaction to the Christian, than that which arises from his perceiving that the Revealed system is rooted deep in the natural course of things of which it is merely the result and completion ; that his Saviour has interpreted for him the faint or broken accents of nature ; and that in them, so interpreted, he has, as if in some old prophecy, at once an evidence and a lasting memorial of the truths of the Gospel."

(558.) Some of those peculiar doctrines of Revelation which are most offensive to the unrenewed mind are strictly analogous to facts in our common experience. Regeneration, or the communication of spiritual life, is analogous to our first birth, or the communication of natural life.† Justification through Christ by faith may be illustrated, although it cannot be proved, by natural analogies.‡ The sovereignty of God in giving or withholding according to His mere good pleasure the gifts of His grace, is supported by a host of analogous facts in the unequal distribution of natural endowments, of providential mercies, and of external means and opportunities of salvation.§ Election to outward privileges—the only election which some distinguished writers will acknowledge,||—is only a manifestation, in a lower

* J. H. Newman, "Sermon on the Theory of Religious Belief." Preached before the University of Oxford. P. 33.

† Berkeley, "Minute Philosopher," Works, I. 4, 59. Copleston, "Inquiry," p. 158.

‡ Mansel, "Limits of Religious Thought," p. 227.

§ Barnes, "Science and Theology," p. 266. Dr Symington, "Elements of Divine Truth," pp. 228, 266.

|| Archbishop Sumner, "Apostolical Preaching." Archbishop Whately, "Essays on the Difficulties in the Writings of St Paul." Dr Stanley Faber, "Primitive Doctrine of Election."

sphere, of the same principle of sovereignty which is involved in election to eternal life. That sovereignty is really manifested in giving or withholding the means of grace; and the unequal distribution of these means is analogous to the very unequal degrees of knowledge and civilisation which exist among different nations under the light of Nature.

(559.) The future resurrection of the body has its natural analogue in the annual resurrection of Nature from the death-like torpor of winter;* and its possibility is proved, while its nature is illustrated by the apostle, when he refers to similar facts in our actual experience. "But some man will say, How are the dead raised up? and with what body do they come? Thou fool, that which thou sowest is not quickened, except it die. And that which thou sowest, thou sowest not that body that shall be, but bare grain, it may chance of wheat, or of some other grain: But God giveth it a body as it hath pleased Him, and to every seed his own body."†

(560.) In like manner the intimate union and interdependence of all true believers, arising from their common relation to Christ, as well as the reciprocal duties which flow from it, are represented by the analogous case of the members of the same material body. "As the body is one, and hath many members, and all the members of that one body, being many, are one body, so also is Christ. For by one Spirit we are all baptized into one body. . . . For the body is not one member, but many. If the foot shall say, Because I am not the hand, I am not of the body, is it therefore not of the body? And if the ear shall say, Because I am not the eye, I am not of the body, is it therefore not of the body? If the whole body were an eye, where were the hearing? if the whole were hearing, where were the smelling? But now hath God set the members every one of them in the body as it has pleased Him. And if they were all one member, where were the body? But now are they many members, yet but one body. And the eye cannot say unto the hand, I have no need of thee, nor again the head to the feet, I have no need of you. . . . That there should be no schism in the body: but that the members should have the same care one for another. And whether one member suffer, all the members suffer with it, or one member be honoured, all the

* Dr Cheever, "Voices of Nature."

† 1 Cor. xv. 35-38.

members rejoice with it. Now ye are the body of Christ, and members in particular.”*

(561.) The inward spiritual conflict between sin and grace in the hearts of believers is different from, but strictly analogous to, the conflict between reason and passion, or conscience and will, which is one of the facts of our most familiar experience. A spiritual law coming into contact with a carnal heart irritates and inflames it, just as the purest light irritates a diseased eye; and even when the heart is renewed, but as yet only imperfectly sanctified, its remaining corruptions must be in constant conflict with grace itself. The power of sin is never known until we begin to resist and to strive against it, just as the force of a current is little felt while we suffer ourselves to glide along with it on its smooth surface, but makes itself known as soon as we turn ourselves to make head against it. There is a natural, as well as a spiritual conflict of this kind; and the spiritual conflict of which the apostle speaks† is analogous to that which is natural, and of which even a heathen could say

Video meliora proboque

Deteriora sequor.‡

(562.) Many other points of Analogy between Scripture and Experience might be enumerated; but the specimens which have been selected are sufficient for our present purpose, which is merely to show that the relation which the one bears to the other is a fertile source of sound analogies in matters of faith.

* 1 Cor. xii. 12-27. Pascal, “Pensées,” p. 294.

† Rom. vii. 14-25.

‡ Muller, “The Doctrine of Sin,” pp. 31, 198, 210. Copleston, “Inquiry,” p. 158. Dr R. Poole, “The Grand Contrast,” p. 7. Pascal, “Pensées,” pp. 276, 293.

CHAPTER XIV.

ANALOGY BETWEEN THE CONSTITUENT TRUTHS OF
REVELATION.

(563.) The lessons of Revelation are analogous not only to the facts of Experience, but also to one another. There are internal harmonies between the truths of Scripture themselves, as well as external correspondences between them and what we know of the constitution and course of nature. They constitute one self-consistent scheme of doctrine, and there is a mutual relation and interdependence between all its parts, just as there is in Nature, or in Science which is the interpreter of Nature.* This correlation between the different truths of Scripture is usually called by divines the "Analogy of faith," and is regarded both as a rule for the interpretation of Scripture, and also as an evidence in support of its claims.† For this reason it is held that Scripture is its own best interpreter,—that it can only be understood by comparing one part of it with another, and ascertaining the relation which subsists between its various lessons, just as in the department of Science, truth is the only test or touchstone of truth, in the scheme of our mere natural knowledge.‡

(564.) The "analogy of faith," considered as a rule of interpretation, has been misunderstood by some, and objected to by others;§ but its real import and right application may be best explained and vindicated by offering some examples of the analogies to which we refer.

(565.) There is a real analogy in some respects, while there is

* Dr Hampden, "Essay on the Philosophical Evidence," pp. 99, 100, 130. Dr R. Poole, "Grand Contrast," p. 313.

† Bellarmin's *Disputationes*, vol. I. p. 250. Wiseman's "Conferences" in *Demonstrations Evangeliques*, vol.

XV. p. 785. Mestrezat, "de l'Ecriture Sainte," pp. 389, 458.

‡ Dégérando, "Histoire Comparée," III. 178. Wilson, *Scripture Interpreter Asserted*, pp. 100, 102.

§ Kitto's *Cyclopædia*, Art. "Analogy of Faith."

an important difference in others, between the two covenants of life—the covenant of precepts or of works, and the covenant of promises or of faith. There was grace in both covenants,—for it was an act of free and sovereign grace on God’s part when He condescended to pledge His promise, and to “become debtor to His own faithfulness”* for its fulfilment, that man should not die but live on condition of his obedience to the precept; just as it was an act of free and sovereign grace, when He gave the first promise of a Saviour, and announced a plan of redemption which originated in His mere good pleasure, and was to be accomplished by means devised, provided, and rendered effectual by His own wisdom and love. They are analogous, also, as having the same ultimate end in view, which was, in either instance, the enjoyment of eternal life,—not the mere continuance of conscious existence, but the everlasting duration of spiritual life,—the Divine life of the soul. Yet while they resemble each other in respect both to their original source, and their ultimate end, they differ fundamentally in respect to the conditions on which the fulfilment of the promise was left to depend;—for, in the one case, it was to depend on the personal obedience of our first parent, and if that obedience had been rendered, he would have been justified by his own works, and his reward would have been “not of grace but of debt”—in the other case, it was to depend on the work of another who is revealed as the “seed of the woman,”—a suffering yet victorious adversary of the wicked one; and on the accomplishment of that work the promise of grace becomes “sure to all the seed,” and “the gift of God is eternal life,” which is merely received or appropriated by faith. It is manifest from this difference between the two, that the first Covenant, or the Law, was adapted to the condition of man unfallen, and while he was yet in a state of pristine innocence and perfection; whereas the second Covenant, or the Gospel, is adapted to our condition as fallen beings, and makes provision for our salvation not by works, but by grace through faith.† Each of the two is adapted to the condition for which it was designed.

(566.) But, with respect even to the conditions on which eternal life was promised, there is a striking analogy between the two covenants. In each of them, one was constituted by Divine

* Boston on “The Covenant of | † Richard Baxter, “Works,” vol. Works.” | XXI. pp. 191, 195.

appointment the Representative of others, and dealt with as the Federal Head of those whom they severally represented. To understand the doctrine of Scripture in regard alike to the fall and the redemption of man, we must form a clear and definite conception of *representative*, as distinguished from *individual*, action, and of a *generic*, as distinguished from a *personal*, law.* It is the public official character with which they were respectively invested, which constitutes the real ground of the analogy, so strikingly marked in Scripture, between the first and the second Adam. "Since by man came death, by man came also the resurrection of the dead; for as in Adam all die, so in Christ shall all be made alive. . . . And so it is written, The first man Adam was made a living soul, the last Adam was made a quickening spirit. . . . The first man is of the earth, earthy, the second man is the Lord from heaven. As is the earthy, such are they also that are earthy; and such as is the heavenly, such are they also that are heavenly. And as we have borne the image of the earthy, we shall also bear the image of the heavenly." "As by one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin, and so death passed upon all men, for that all have sinned,"—or as it is stated in the resumption,—“as by the offence of one, judgment came upon all men to condemnation, even so by the righteousness of one, the free gift came upon all men unto justification of life. For as by one man's disobedience many were made sinners, so by the obedience of one shall many be made righteous.”† On the ground of this radical analogy between them in respect of their representative character the first Adam is described as the type or figure of the second—ὁς ἐστὶ τύπος τοῦ μέλλοντος.

(567.) The representative character of each is generally acknowledged by divines, as well as the analogy which subsists betwixt them in this respect.‡ But some writers have misconceived and misapplied the doctrine, while others have sought to evade or explain it away. Among the former, Mr Thompson admits that there may be a generic law, imposed on the whole race through one who is constituted their representative; but affirms

* The Princeton Essays, I. Series.

† 1 Cor. xv. 21, 22, 45-49; Rom. v. 12, 18, 19.

‡ Dr Shuttleworth, "Consistency of Revelation," p. 249. Dr Tholuck,

"Guido and Julius," pp. 70, 74. Dr Breckenridge, "Knowledge of God," pp. 481-485. Dr Cormack on Original Sin. Dr Symington's "Elements," pp. 142, 144, 332.

that universal sinfulness and universal redemption are necessary correlates;* whereas they are universal, respectively, only with reference to the parties who were represented under the first and the second covenants,—*all* the natural posterity of Adam, in the one case, and *all* the seed who were given to Christ, in the other, and who are expressly distinguished in the first promise of a Saviour, from “the seed of the serpent” or “the children of the wicked one:” and if this difference were overlooked, we should be shut up by the language of Scripture, to the doctrine, not only of universal redemption, but of universal salvation; for salvation, and not mere salvability, is the promise of the everlasting covenant. Dr Harris, again, admits the representative character of our first parent, but affirms that in regard to depravity, we are placed in precisely the same state we would have been in, if the representative relation between Adam and his posterity had never existed, and if he had sinned only in his private and personal capacity:† whereas the very idea of representation implies that his constituents are liable to be affected, for good or for evil, by the conduct of their representative, as such. Others have sought to evade or explain away the doctrine of Scripture on this subject. At one time, recourse is had to the desperate expedient of representing the account of the Probation and Fall of man as a mere allegory. This is the position assumed by Mr Ellis, when he says that “every just and consistent claim of the narrative is met when we regard it as giving a sketch of the workings and experiences of humanity on this earth, in an *allegorical representation*, by which an individual is made to stand as a type of us all. Adam is, and means *Man*; and Adam’s experience is representative of the experience of all human beings. We are all created as he was. Human nature works in us as it worked in him. We sin, as he sinned; we suffer, as he suffered; we die, as he died. We do not sin *because* he sinned, but *as* he sinned,—in like manner, since we have a like nature.”‡ Coleridge seems to sanction this view, when he says that Adam was a representative only as every other man is one, and that his name is a generic term, denoting the race, not the individual.§

* Thompson, “Christian Theism,” II. 243, 259, 251, 298, 302.

† Dr Harris, “Man Primeval,” pp. 416, 424, 432; and “Patriarchy,” p. 34.

‡ G. E. Ellis, “Half-century of Unitarianism,” p. 76.

§ Coleridge, “Aids to Reflection,” p. 232.

But if the narrative in Genesis be an allegory, everything in Scripture which is founded upon it, and especially the whole scheme of grace and redemption, must be allegorical also; and so we shall have, not only an allegorical fall, but an allegorical salvation, an allegorical Gospel, an allegorical Christ.* The analogy of which we now speak assumes the historical truth of the sacred record, and is founded on a comparison of one part of it with another. But even when the narrative in Genesis is acknowledged to be historical, a desperate effort has been made to get rid of the idea of representative action, and the connected doctrines of imputation, and hereditary guilt,—for instance, by Dr Beecher, who makes the important admission—which we conceive to be the most valuable part of his treatise—that the actual state of the moral world cannot be explained except on the supposition of “a forfeiture prior to birth;” and yet rather than adopt the obnoxious doctrine of federal headship and representation, he prefers to have recourse to a theory of pre-existence, and speaks as if every man had fallen for himself before he entered this world at all, and is now only suffering the consequences of his own personal sin.† The theory of pre-existence is not new; it was advocated in former times by Bishop Rust, Joseph Glanville, and others; but we have little fear for the doctrine of federal headship and representative action, if it has no more formidable antagonist or rival than this purely imaginary hypothesis.

(568.) This fundamental and deep-rooted analogy between the two great dispensations of Revealed Religion,—the first and the second covenants of life,—has important consequences when it is viewed in relation to many of the doctrines which compose the scheme of systematic Theology. It will be found that the radical difference between the two great schools of Theology—called in America the Old School and the New—which have divided the Church in all ages, and exhibited opposite tendencies and results,‡ may be traced in a great measure to the views which they have respectively taken of the nature of these two federal constitutions, and the relation which they bear to each other. Were the analogy which subsists between them clearly discerned, it would go far to

* See Holden's Dissertation on the Historical Character of the Narrative.

† Dr Beecher, “Conflict of Ages,” pp. 312, 328, 420, 433.

‡ Dr Hodge, “Essays and Reviews,” p. 532.

determine many controversies in regard to particular doctrines. Accordingly Mr Croker, when he undertakes to compare or contrast the rival schools in America, traces the difference between them to this source. According to his statement the Old School hold that "God constituted Adam properly and truly the head and representative of our race, and with him, as such, entered into covenant; that our first parent, acting in behalf of all his posterity, involved them in the guilt of his transgression, so that, for his act, they became justly liable to eternal death. . . . Closely *allied* to this doctrine is another respecting the nature and extent of the atonement. God, say they, entered into covenant from eternity with His Son Jesus Christ, to save a part of our race, on condition that He should suffer the punishment due to their sins. Christ, in making an atonement, literally bore the penalties of the law in His own person, and by the full payment of the debt due to Divine justice, purchased the redemption of the elect; they alone were embraced in the covenant of grace, and His righteousness becomes, by imputation, really and truly theirs through faith. . . . Another doctrine nearly connected with that first mentioned is that, mankind having lost the Divine image in their transgression and fall with Adam, and being born into the world with a constitution morally depraved, have no ability in any sense to obey the command of God, or to comply with the conditions of salvation in the Gospel. The power necessary to right moral action, having been destroyed by the fall, is communicated only by Sovereign grace. Hence regeneration is an effect of the Spirit's operations, in which man is entirely passive,—as much so as in his original creation."* On these important doctrines the New School differs from the Old, and that difference has its source in the view which they severally take of the nature of the two covenants, and of the relation which they bear to each other.

(569.) The bearing of this fundamental analogy on some of the most important articles of faith is admirably stated by Dr Hodge of Princeton. "Our union with Adam and our union with Christ,—the relation of the sin of the one, and of the righteousness of the other, to our condemnation, on the one hand, and our justification, on the other,—the derivation of a corrupt nature from Adam, and of a holy nature from Christ,—are in-

* Croker's "Catastrophe of the Presbyterian Church," p. 75.

cluded in the analogy between the first and second Adam, as that analogy is presented in the Bible.”* In like manner Mr Mozley, in explaining the views of Augustin on the doctrines of Grace, asks, “How is the doctrine of original sin the reason and basis of the Scripture doctrine of predestination,” that is, to eternal life? and adds the following statement:—“Scripture distinguishes in the most marked way between two covenants. The first was that under which mankind was created, and which ended at the fall. Its language was, This do, and thou shalt live. It endowed man with free-will, or the power to obey the Divine law, and in return claimed the due use of this power from him—the proper exercise of that free-will. The burden of obedience, the attainment of salvation (eternal life?), was thrown upon the man himself. . . . This was the covenant of works. The covenant of grace was opposed to it. But how could it be opposed to it, if under that covenant the salvation of man still continued to depend, as before, on his free-will? . . . Whatever additional grace there may be under the second covenant, no substantial difference is made out so long as the use of this grace remains dependent on the will,—the burden of obedience is still thrown on the man himself in the first instance, and his salvation depends on an original act of choice, as it did under the first covenant.”†

(570.) Particular analogies between the constituent parts of Revealed religion might be multiplied indefinitely. We can only offer a few specimens as indications of a line of thought which may be profitably pursued.

(571.) There is an evident analogy, for instance, between the Law and the Gospel in this respect, that each of them requires a *righteousness* as the ground of our justification before God, and such a righteousness as is sufficient, in His estimation, to meet and satisfy the claims of justice. The reason is that, in either instance, a man can only be justified, in the scriptural sense of the term, when he is accepted as righteous in the sight of God, and invested with a title to eternal life, as well as delivered from a sentence of condemnation. In the loose popular sense, it may mean nothing more than the pardon of sin and exemption from penal suffering, and this is often supposed to proceed from the

* Princeton Review, Ap. 1860, p. 338.

† Mozley on “Augustinian Predestination,” p. 10.

mere mercy of God, without any satisfaction to His justice : but as the Law requires, so the Gospel recognises, a righteousness as indispensable both to pardon and acceptance ; and the only difference between the two in this respect is that, in the one, a *personal*, in the other, a *vicarious*, righteousness is revealed as the ground of Justification. The *three* cases of Imputation which are revealed in Scripture—the imputation of the guilt of Adam's first sin to his posterity—the imputation of the sinner's guilt to Christ as his substitute,—and the imputation of Christ's righteousness to the believer as the ground of his justification and acceptance with God—are all closely connected by the bond of analogy, and must all stand or fall together. Accordingly they have been, for the most part, maintained or assailed, by the same parties, and on similar grounds. If guilt cannot be transferred, neither can righteousness ; and if we thus get rid of the imputation of sin, it is at the expense of forfeiting a propitiatory Atonement, and a vicarious Justification.

(572.) There is such a correlation between certain truths, that the proof of the one presupposes, and is, to some extent, founded on, the truth of the other. In this way the scriptural doctrine of human depravity stands related to the scriptural doctrine of God's efficacious Grace in conversion ; the former is presupposed in the latter, while the latter, if it cannot be proved otherwise than by express testimonies of Scripture in regard to the nature and extent of Divine influence, is accredited by the former, as being in exact accordance with it.* In like manner, the doctrine of original righteousness and that of original sin are so related, that we cannot even conceive aright of our present degradation without reference to our pristine dignity ; and both have been denied by the same parties, and on the same grounds.† The scriptural doctrine of the sinfulness of unbelief depends upon, and is involved in, the assumption that God speaks to us in His word : it is felt to be consistent with the claims of Scripture, and undeniable, if these claims be well founded.‡ The scriptural doctrine that God's chief end is His own glory is analogous to the

* Vinet, "Vital Christianity," pp. 174, 188, 230, 255, 277. Pascal, "Pensées," 276.

† Dr Boardman on Original Sin. Princeton Essays. Mohler's Sym-

bolism, I. 32-114. Pascal, "Pensées," pp. 50, 168, 177, 266.

‡ Davies, "Supremacy of Scripture," 327.

scriptural doctrine that man's chief end is to glorify and enjoy Him.*

(573.) As there is an exact correlation and interdependence between the doctrinal truths of Revelation, so *its doctrines are analogous to its precepts*. It requires just such a frame of mind as its lessons are fitted to produce. The Ethics of Christianity are as peculiar as its revealed truths, and there is not only a close connection, but a real analogy, between the two. It is because they resemble each other, and involve principles which are common to both, that the doctrines are fitted to become motives to Christian duty.† Were these doctrines materially different from what they are, they would have no tendency to produce the peculiar morality which the Gospel requires. That morality is unique, and widely different from any other ethical code. It exhibits a striking contrast to the current morality of the world, and to the ethical philosophy whether of the Stoical or Epicurean Schools, in respect alike to the principles on which it proceeds, and the character which it is designed and fitted to form. The reason is that the doctrinal truths of Scripture are analogous to its moral precepts, and fitted, therefore, to be urged as motives to the discharge of its most peculiar duties.

(574.) We are required, for instance, to "be imitators of God, as dear children:" and this precept is founded on two distinct analogies,—the one being that which subsists between the relation of children to a father, and our relation to God not only as His offspring by creation but as His adopted children by grace; the other being that which subsists between God and man as a creature who was made in His image. This latter doctrine is presupposed in the precept and analogous to it, insomuch that the imitation of God would be impossible were there either no resemblance between the human and Divine nature, or were we unable to conceive wherein that resemblance consists. Accordingly, it has always been felt to be a strong objection to the views of King, Whately, and Copleston, in regard to our analogical conceptions of the Divine perfections, that were they adopted and carried out to their legitimate application, they would leave no room for the discharge of this practical duty. It is only because

* Lamennais, "Essai sur l'Indifférence," vol. I. pp. 384, 389.

† Vinet, "Vital Christianity," pp. 86, 118.

our analogical conceptions of these attributes are founded on a real resemblance between His nature and our own, that we are capable of being "imitators of God."*

(575.) We are required, again, to "love our enemies," "to bless them that curse us," "to do good to them that hate us, and to pray for them that despitefully use, and persecute us;" but why? "That ye may be the children of your Father which is in heaven, for He maketh His sun to rise on the evil and the good, and sendeth rain on the just and on the unjust."† The precept, which is designed to regulate man's conduct, is analogous to the principle, which regulates God's procedure in the ordinary course of His Providence, and it is enforced by a motive derived from that source. We are further required to forgive as we hope to be forgiven; and even assured that "if ye forgive men their trespasses, your heavenly Father will also forgive you; but if ye forgive not men their trespasses, neither will your Father forgive your trespasses."‡ The doctrine of Divine forgiveness is analogous to the precept which requires a forgiving spirit in man, and it is applied as a constraining motive to enforce this duty. "Be ye kind one to another, tender-hearted, forgiving one another, even as God for Christ's sake hath forgiven you."§ Every conscience must feel the force of that solemn appeal, "O thou wicked servant, I forgave thee all that debt, because thou desiredst Me: shouldst not thou also have had compassion on thy fellow-servant, even as I had pity on thee?"|| When the analogy is thus applied to the regulation of human conduct it is equally instructive and useful, for we are bound to be "imitators of God;" but it may become a source of serious error if it be so extended as to make man's duty to his fellow-men the rule or test of God's procedure towards us,—for He sustains other relations to His creatures than that of a Father—especially those of a Lawgiver, a Moral Ruler, and a Righteous Judge; and this fundamental difference between our condition and His may warrant Him in inflicting punishment where it might be our duty to abstain from doing so. And the difference, as well as the analogy, is recognised in Scripture when it is said, "Dearly beloved, avenge not yourselves, but

* Archbishop King's "Discourse," appended to Whately's Bampton Lectures, p. 455. Barton, "Analogy," pp. 322, 342, 355, 363.

† Matt. v. 44-46.

‡ Matt. vi. 14, 15.

§ Eph. iv. 32.

|| Matt. xviii. 32, 33.

rather give place unto wrath; for it is written, Vengeance is Mine, I will repay, saith the Lord.”*

(576.) There is also an instructive analogy between the *doctrinal truths* and the *historical facts* of Scripture. The sacred narrative is throughout a practical commentary on its religious lessons. The same truths which are taught in words, are illustrated and exemplified by events. The doctrine of God’s providence, for instance, is visibly exhibited, as it were, in the whole history of the Jewish nation, and in the biographies of individual men, such as Abraham, Joseph, and Moses. The narrative of our Lord’s humiliation, again, is analogous to His whole design in regard to man, and His conduct, as recorded in the Gospels, was thus designed and fitted for our instruction and improvement; for “He suffered for us, leaving us an example that we should walk in His steps.”†

(577.) The *ordinances* of the Church are analogous both to the *doctrines and the facts* of Scripture. The former were designed to symbolize and represent the latter, and must consequently have some resemblance to them. The ordinance of circumcision, for instance, by which Jewish children were admitted into the Church, was analogous to the Lord’s promise to Abraham, “I will be a God unto thee, and to thy seed after thee.” The same principle which is expressed in the promise is exhibited in the ordinance. In this respect, baptism, as applied to infants under the New Testament, is analogous to circumcision under the Old: but in both cases there is a deeper and more fundamental analogy between the ordinance and the doctrine of original sin. The mere fact that such ordinances were provided under the scheme of grace, and that they were intended for the benefit of little children, shows that they were regarded and treated as sinful and fallen creatures; and no argument was more conclusive than this against the Pelagian heresy in former times, or against the kindred errors of Socinianism in our own.‡ We must view baptism in its relation to the Word, as a sign and seal, and consider “their aspect each to the other, and their concurrence to one excellent end—the word un-

* Rom. xii. 19. Mansel, “Limits of Religious Thought,” pp. 2, 15. Wm. Law, “Case of Reason Stated,” p. 58. Butler’s Sermons, pp. 101, 102.

† 1 Pet. ii. 21. Lamourette, *Pensées*, Dem. Evang. XV. pp. 451, 453.

‡ Dr Channing’s *Memoirs*, I. 379; II. 189.

folding the sacrament, and the sacrament sealing the word ; the word, as a light, informing and clearing the sense of the seal, and this again, as a seal, confirming and ratifying the truth of the word ; as you see some significant seals, or engraven signets, have a word about them, expressing their sense.”*

(578.) The ordinance of the Passover, again, considered in the first instance as a commemorative or historical monument, and apart from its typical reference, was analogous to that great fact in the history of the Jewish people, their redemption from the land of Egypt and from the house of bondage. Several of the directions which were given for its celebration, had reference to the particular circumstances which accompanied that event,—such as their eating the Passover with bitter herbs and unleavened bread, with shoes on their feet and staves in their hands, as if it were to be a dramatic representation of the actual occurrence. In its typical aspect it prefigured “Christ our Passover, sacrificed for us,”—“the Lamb of God who should take away the sin of the world,” and in this aspect it is analogous to the Lord’s Supper by which our Redemption by the shedding of blood is now commemorated. And both the Passover and the Lord’s Supper are analogous to each other, as well as to the truths of Revealed Religion, since they show that by blood, shed and sprinkled, salvation was secured, and that by the same blood God redeemed a people to Himself whom He claims as peculiarly His own. For while the Lord “passed over” the houses of the Israelites, He caused to “pass over” to Himself all the first-born of man and beast ; and so in the sacrament of the Supper, the death of Christ is celebrated as our redemption from a worse than Egyptian bondage, and every believing communicant, while he rejoices in being the Lord’s freedman, acknowledges that he is not his own—that he has been bought with a price, and that, like the first-born of Israel, he and all that is his, is consecrated to God.

(579.) It may seem that some of the cases which have been brought into comparison are examples of coincidence, or correspondence, or adaptation, rather than of analogy ; but it will be found on further reflection that analogy underlies them all, and that there is a radical resemblance in some respect between the principles which are common to each of the terms of comparison.

* Coleridge, “Aids,” p. 293.

CHAPTER XV.

ANALOGY BETWEEN TYPE AND ANTITYPE.

(580.) The magnificent scheme of Prefiguration, which preceded and prepared the way for the last and crowning dispensation of Revealed Religion, may be justly regarded as a Divine provision for supplying a new class of analogies in matters of faith. We have already referred to the Typical System in illustrating the scriptural applications of Analogy;* we now recur to it merely for the purpose of marking it out as a distinct source both of evidence and instruction, and offering a few specimens of those analogies which are peculiar to the scheme of Revelation itself, and which spring from the relations established between its different parts. It might be necessary for the grand ends of that scheme that some such analogies should be provided. The symbols of nature might be inadequate to represent the more peculiar truths of a supernatural economy. There might be that in "the New creation" which could find no suitable type in the Old. The teaching of nature, too, however expressive, is mute and cold, in comparison with that instruction which is conveyed by revelation from the mind of God to the mind of man, and embodied, or rather exemplified in living action, through an instituted system of worship, and the actual observance of its rites and ordinances by an external visible society. Being instituted by Divine authority on express purpose to prefigure what was to be afterwards fulfilled and more fully revealed, such a system can easily be proved to have had a *pre-ordained connection* with the event,—and this, which is necessary to its typical character, is not so manifest with reference to mere natural symbols, many of which may have

* Part I. chap. v. sec. 4.

been designed for the illustration, rather than for the establishment, of truth. For these reasons, as well as for others which may be known only by the omniscient Mind, it may have been necessary, for the accomplishment of His designs with reference both to the Jewish and to the Christian Church, to establish a Typical system under the preparatory dispensations of Divine truth, and to record it, also, for the instruction of the Church in all future time.

(581.) We find that, in point of fact, God laid the first stone of the typical system, in immediate connection with the earliest announcement of a purpose of mercy towards sinners, and at the very commencement of the "new creation." The ordinance of sacrifice lies at the foundation of the whole scheme of prefiguration. That it was not a human invention, as some have supposed,* but a Divine institution, intimately related to the first promise of a Saviour, and designed to prefigure the method of our redemption by the blood of Christ, might be proved by showing, that the killing of an innocent animal has no natural connection with Religious worship, and, if done without authority, would have been an act of presumptuous will-worship,—that the sacrifice of Abel was offered "by faith," which always implies in Scripture a Divine testimony or command,—that it was accepted by God as well-pleasing to Him, so that Abel "obtained witness that he was righteous, God testifying of his gifts," probably by fire from heaven consuming the sacrifice;—and that the distinction, already established between clean and unclean animals, had probably reference to sacrifice, rather than to food.† If it was instituted by God and observed by Abel in immediate connection with the first promise of a Saviour, we cannot fail to find in it a profound significance such as makes it strictly analogous to the redemption of the cross. "It was thus that God provided from the beginning, for preserving among men, in a way the most impressive that can be conceived, the knowledge and the remembrance of the great *principle*—that sin deserves death, and that if the sinner be forgiven, it is because his guilt is transferred to a substitute who should die in his room. By the same ordinance God did also provide for preserving the knowledge of the great

* Davison on Prophecy.

† Dr Shuckford, "Sacred and Profane History Connected," I. 175; IV. 48, 535, 761. American Edition.

promise—that such a substitute should one day appear, and take away sin by the sacrifice of Himself—even ‘the seed of the woman that was to bruise the serpent’s head.’ It was thus, too, that the covenant of Grace was not only obscurely hinted at in the curse pronounced upon the serpent, but embodied and set forth in a positive and palpable *institution*,—an institution which continued through all future ages, till the coming of Christ, to be the clearest and most significant of all the exhibitions that were given of the great principle of that covenant,—and one which was made available, not only for the salvation of the first man that died, but for rendering him a pattern of faith in a Redeemer to the whole human race; for it is testified of Abel that, by his sacrifice, ‘he, being dead, yet speaketh.’”*

(582.) The ordination of sacrifice, coupled as it was with the sanctification of the Sabbath, and the distinction between clean and unclean animals, and consistently followed up by the corresponding reservation of blood as a consecrated thing when the right to use animal food was conferred in the days of Noah, may be said to have been the only ritual types under the primitive Patriarchal dispensation. In the later Patriarchal dispensation, extending from Abraham to Moses, circumcision was added “as a sign and seal of the righteousness which is by faith;” and Canaan was promised as the type “of a better country, that is, an heavenly.” But the Divine scheme of Prefiguration branched out into a thousand new ramifications in the Law of Moses, which incorporated all previous types, while it added a multitude which had no existence before.

(583.) That we are warranted in regarding the Mosaic economy as typical of another and better dispensation which should be established in the fulness of times, is evident from the discourses of our Lord, and His apostles, as recorded in the Gospels and the Acts; and especially from the whole contents of the Epistle to the Hebrews.† The “first tabernacle” was “a figure for the time then present;”—“the holy places made with hands” were “a figure of the true;”—“the law” had “a shadow of good things to come, and not the very image of the things.”‡

* Dr Gordon, “Christ as made Known to the Ancient Church,” vol. I. p. 61,—an admirable work in four volumes, 1854.

† Owen’s “Exercitations” and “Commentary” on this Epistle.

‡ Heb. ix. 9, 24, x. 1.

Accordingly, the tabernacle, the temple, the mercy-seat, the high priest, and almost every rite and ceremony under the law, is explained and applied as having a typical reference to corresponding realities under a new and better dispensation. We cannot enter into a detailed exposition of these analogies, but must refer our readers to the standard works on the subject,—especially the “*Philologia Sacra*” of Glassius, and the excellent work of Dr Fairbairn on the Typology of Scripture. It may be useful, however, to offer one or two examples merely as specimens of the analogies which may be derived from this source.

(584.) On comparing the type with the antitype, we discern a resemblance, and also a difference, between the two; and both the analogy and the contrast must be taken into account. The high priest under the law was an eminent type of the High Priest under the Gospel, but not in all respects; and accordingly the points of difference are marked as well as the points of agreement. “Every high priest taken from among men is ordained for men in things pertaining to God, that he may offer both gifts and sacrifices for sin And no man taketh this honour to himself, but he that is called of God as was Aaron. So also Christ glorified not Himself to be made a High Priest, but He that said unto Him . . . Thou art a Priest for ever after the order of Melchisedec.” And, “Every high priest is ordained to offer gifts and sacrifices, wherefore it is of necessity that this man have somewhat also to offer.”* Here two points of resemblance are marked,—first in respect to the Divine ordination which is common to both, and secondly in respect to their official work, which consisted in *transacting with God* on behalf of His people, and offering *to Him* gifts and sacrifices for sin. And so in regard to the other function of the sacerdotal office,—the work of intercession which follows after, and is founded upon, the work of atonement,—the high priest of old was to enter into the second tabernacle within the veil “once every year, not without blood, which he offered for himself and for the errors of the people;” and in exact accordance with this, Christ “by His own blood entered in once into the holy place, having obtained eternal redemption for us.”† But with reference to the Priesthood, and in respect both to the work of atonement and the

* Heb. v. 1, 4, 5, 6, vii. 3.

† Heb. ix. 7, 12.

work of intercession, there is a difference, as well as a resemblance, between the type and the antitype ; and that difference is so great as to lay a solid foundation for an *a fortiori* argument in favour of the superior worth and efficacy of the latter. “Those priests (the Jewish) were made without an oath, but this with an oath by Him that said unto Him—The Lord swear, and will not repent, Thou art a priest for ever after the order of Melchisedec ; by so much was Jesus made surety of a better testament. And they truly were many priests, because they were not suffered to continue by reason of death ; but this man, because He continueth ever, hath an unchangeable priesthood. . . . He needeth not daily, as those high priests, to offer up sacrifice, for this He did once, when He offered up Himself. For the law maketh men high priests which have infirmity, but the word of the oath which was since the law, maketh the Son, who is consecrated for evermore.”—“Christ being come an High Priest of good things, . . . not by the blood of goats and of calves, but by His own blood He entered in once into the Holy Place.” “For it is not possible that the blood of bulls and of goats should take away sins.” “But this man, after He had offered one sacrifice for sins, for ever sat down on the right hand of God ;” for “by one sacrifice He hath perfected for ever them that are sanctified.” “Almost all things are by the law purged with blood ; and without shedding of blood is no remission. It was therefore necessary that the patterns of heavenly things should be purified with these, but the heavenly things themselves with better sacrifices than these. And Christ is not entered into the holy places made with hands, which are the figures of the true, but into heaven itself, there to appear in the presence of God for us.”* There is thus a difference between the type and the antitype in respect—to the character of the Priest and the manner of His appointment,—the nature of the sacrifice which was offered,—and of the intercession which was founded upon it ;—but it is a difference which, so far from destroying or weakening the analogy between the two, serves only to give the force of an *a fortiori* argument to the conclusions which the apostle deduces from it, partly in the way of comparison, and partly in the way of contrast.

* Heb. ix. x.

(585.) The points both of analogy and of contrast are vividly presented in one view when he reasons thus, "If the blood of bulls and of goats and the ashes of an heifer, sprinkling the unclean, sanctifieth to the purifying of the flesh, how much more shall the blood of Christ, who through the Eternal Spirit offered Himself without spot to God, purge your conscience from dead works to serve the living God?"* Sin is here compared to those ceremonial defilements, which excluded the Israelite who had contracted them from all access to God in the ordinances of His house, until they were taken away; but we are reminded that provision was made for their being removed, by the application to his person of the blood of atonement and the water of purification; and that the use of these means had an immediate and certain efficacy in purifying the flesh,—that is, in removing the uncleanness which shut him out from the congregation of the Lord, and restoring him to all his outward privileges as a member of the Jewish Church. He was then "cleansed according to the purification of the sanctuary." These ceremonial defilements, and their effect in separating the unclean Israelite from the visible Church, were symbolical lessons which represented sin as the uncleanness of the soul, and its inevitable effect in separating the soul from God,—while the blood of atonement and the water of purification, with their certain efficacy for the end contemplated by them, prefigured and typified the blood of Christ, and its certain efficacy for the far higher end for which it was designed,—not "the purifying of the flesh," but the "purging of the conscience from dead works," so as to restore the sinner to the spiritual service and acceptable worship of God. These two—the blood of atonement and the water of purification—constituted the provision which was made for the case of an unclean Israelite under the Law; and they prefigured the two great remedies for sin which are provided in the Gospel—"the sprinkling of the blood of Jesus Christ," and the "washing of regeneration" or the "renewing of the Holy Ghost;" and accordingly we read, "This is He that came by Water and Blood, not by water only, but by water and blood; and it is the Spirit that beareth witness; . . . for there are three that bear witness on earth, the Spirit, and the Water, and the Blood; and

* Heb. ix. 13, 14.

these three agree in one.”* The apostle’s inference in favour of the efficacy of the blood of Christ for the higher ends for which it was designed, is founded partly on the points of resemblance, and partly on the points of difference, between the figure and the reality,—the shadow and the substance.

(586.) Another specimen of the analogies, which may be derived from this source, is to be found in the designation by which He, who was revealed at first simply as “the seed of the woman,” and afterwards as “the seed of Abraham,” and “the Son of David,” came to be known, by the growing light of prophecy under the Old Testament, and by which He is still known under the New,—as the CHRIST. In the light of both Testaments, this name is profoundly significant, and may be said to contain a comprehensive summary of the whole Gospel; for “Whoso believeth that Jesus is the Christ is born of God.” It can only be understood when it is viewed in connection with the typical system, and the concurrent voice of prophecy, which served at once to explain the type, and to determine its reference to the promised Saviour. We find in the Old Testament that three distinct classes of office-bearers were anointed with oil in the name of the Lord, to intimate that they were appointed, respectively, by Divine authority, and that they were qualified for their work by Divine influence. These were the prophets, the priests, and the kings, of Israel. We find also in the Old Testament, that concurrently with the appointment of these three classes of functionaries, prophecy pointed to the future advent of One, in whose person all their offices should be combined, and who should be at once God’s Prophet, to reveal His will for our salvation, God’s Priest to atone and intercede for us, and God’s King to rule over us and to reign in us as our Master and Lord. And we find in the New Testament that Christ was anointed by the Father with the Holy Ghost, and thereby consecrated to each of these offices; so that each person of the Godhead is represented as concerned in the scheme, and engaged in the work, of man’s redemption, while the three offices prefigured by the prophets, priests, and kings of Israel, are

* 1 John v. 6, 8. Dr Shuttleworth, “Consistency of Scripture,” pp. 216, 222, 226, 265, 271, 279, 283, 307.

declared to have been combined in Him who claimed to be the Messiah promised to the fathers.*

(587.) These few specimens, selected from the rich storehouse of Scripture, may suffice as illustrations of the kind of analogies which may be derived from this source. In studying them, it is necessary in every case to ascertain, in the first instance, what was the immediate design and primary meaning of this or that ordinance, considered as a symbol or significant emblem exhibited for the instruction of the Jewish Church; and thereafter to consider what analogy subsists betwixt it, considered as a type or prophetic prefiguration, and its antitype in the New Testament.† We shall find that, thus considered, the typical system affords the best explanation of what has been called the “double sense of prophecy;” for when a prediction spoke of a person, such as David,—or of an ordinance, such as the Passover,—or of an event, such as the return from the captivity at Babylon,—if these were themselves typical of what was yet future, the same prophecy which had a primary reference to them might also have an ulterior reference to what *they* prefigured or foreshadowed.‡ And on a conjunct view of the Typical system, and the Prophetic series, we can hardly fail to acknowledge such an analogy between the two, and also between both and their respective fulfilments in the New Testament, as is fitted to convince us that such a scheme as the Scripture unfolds bears upon it the legible impress of Him who “sees the end from the beginning,” and “the thoughts of whose heart are to all generations.”

(588.) The typical system was designed and fitted to be at once a means of instruction, and a very peculiar species of evidence. It is a means of instruction, since the meaning of the type, when that has been ascertained, throws *much* light on the typical expressions which are applied to the antitype, as when the sacrificial language of the Old Testament is applied to the death of Christ in the New.§ And it affords a peculiar and very strong species of evidence,—for every type is a visible, practical predic-

* Dr Fairbairn “on Prophecy,” p. 156.

† Davison on Prophecy, pp. 138, 144, 149.

‡ Bellarmine, vol. I. 218.

§ Dr Symington’s “Elements,” p. 408. Dr J. P. Smith, “Four Discourses on Sacrifice;” and “First Lines of Theology,” 437, 442, 530. Dr Outram “on Sacrifices.”

tion, and when the antitype appears, the obvious analogy between the two is an evidence additional to that which is found in the fulfilment of verbal prophecy. It serves also as a vinculum to connect the Old Testament with the New, as consistent and harmonious parts of one and the same scheme, and establishes the Divine authority of both.*

* Becanus, "Analogia Veteris ac Novi Testamenti," p. 4 (1782). "Qui enim videt figuram Christi conspirare cum ipso Christo, et umbram imaginis cum ipsa imagine, *pleniorum habet cognitionem*, quam qui alterum sine altero cognoscit, nec unius cum altero consensum et proportionem advertit. . . . Denique qui mysteria Incarnationis, Passionis, Mortis, et Resurrectionis Christi, prout jam impleta sunt, confert cum iis ipsis, prout in Veteri Testamento sub umbra et velamine occultabantur, *magis confirmatur in fide*, quam si vel sola mysteria sine umbris, vel solas umbras sine myste-

riis, per se seorsim consideraret. . . . Ex consensu, conspiratione, et analogia utriusque (Testamenti) doctrinæ inter se collatæ, certo constet, eam veram esse fidem, et religionem Novi Testamenti, quæ retinet consensum, conspirationem, et *analogiam* cum doctrina Veteris Testamenti." The author belonged to the Church of Rome, and his treatise, otherwise valuable, is weakened by some false and unscriptural analogies between the Jewish and Christian Churches.—See also Dr Taylor, "Moral Government," vol. II. p. 91.

CHAPTER XVI.

ANALOGY BETWEEN THE OLD AND NEW TESTAMENTS.

(589.) We have seen that there is a real and instructive analogy between the *constituent truths* of Revelation ; we now add that there is a similar analogy between the *consecutive parts* of Scripture, and especially between its two great divisions, the Old and New Testaments. Some of the analogies already mentioned,—such as those between the type and the antitype, or between the evidences of Judaism and of Christianity,—might be ranked under this head ; but the consideration of Scripture as the record of a progressive scheme of Revelation which was gradually unfolded, and at length completed in a series of distinct but consecutive parts, opens up another source of analogies in the comparison of its successive dispensations with one another, such as may contribute largely to the confirmation of our faith.

(590.) We might compare all the successive dispensations—the Primeval, the Patriarchal, the Mosaic, the Prophetical, and the Christian,—and find many intimate and deep-rooted analogies between them all. These analogies originate in the essential unity of the scheme under all its various forms and modifications. There is “a diversity of administrations,” but it is the “same Lord” whose voice is heard in every part of Scripture, and it is the same religion which He teaches, only in a more or less developed form. In the first promise of a Saviour we have the germ of the whole Gospel—and that promise is the text which all subsequent prophecy was designed to repeat, and to illustrate by additional intimations, until it should be accomplished in the fulness of times. “The testimony of Jesus was the spirit of prophecy,” and “to Him gave all the prophets witness.” Our Lord could say, therefore, to the unbelieving Jews—“Search the Scriptures, for in them ye think ye have eternal life, and they are

they which testify of Me :” and again to His doubting disciples, “O fools ! and slow of heart to believe all that the prophets have spoken. Ought not Christ to have suffered these things, and to enter into His glory ? And beginning at Moses, and all the prophets, He expounded unto them in all the Scriptures the things concerning Himself.”*

(591.) Christ is thus the centre of the whole scheme of Revelation—the living principle of its unity.† Christ in promise as *coming*, or Christ in presence as *come*;‡ Christ in figure, or Christ in person,—Christ foreshadowed in the type, or Christ manifested in the flesh,—Christ “the same yesterday, and to-day, and for ever,”—is the one unchangeable reality which connects all the dispensations of Revealed Religion ; and their common relation to Him is the one fundamental analogy which binds them all together, as consistent and harmonious developments of the same scheme. All true Theology has an indestructible unity by reason of its relation to the unchangeable nature and character of God ; and so the Christian Theology, although revealed at “sundry times and in divers manners,” is the same in substance, while it is diversified in form, by reason of its relation to the person and work of Christ. Hence the apostle speaks as if, Christ being ever the same, the true doctrine concerning Christ must also be ever the same : for having said that “Jesus Christ is the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever,” he adds the exhortation, “Be not carried about with divers and strange doctrines.” “The Gospel of God concerning His Son Jesus Christ our Lord,” however variously it may have been revealed, has been, and ever will be, in all ages, substantially one and the same, just because Christ is the same.

(592.) The unity which belongs to the whole scheme of Revelation in consequence of its relation to Christ as revealed in the first promise, and the analogy which subsists, in this respect, between all its successive revelations, afford a very strong argument in favour of its Divine origin. For when we consider that the Bible is a book composed of many different parts, written by many individuals, living in different ages and countries, and

* John v. 39 ; Luke xxiv. 25–27.

† Pascal, “Pensées,” pp. 205, 208.
M’Cosh, “Divine Government,” 471.

Fleming, “Fulfilling of the Scrip-

tures,” p. 24. Fairbairn on “Prophecy,” pp. 20, 28, 165. Hartley on “Man,” pp. 401, 413.

‡ ὁ ἐρχομενος—ὁ ἔλθων.

adapted also to different conditions of the Church, while we find, on comparing the successive parts of the series, that they serve each in its turn to develop the same scheme, and to contribute something to its gradual growth and ultimate perfection, we can hardly fail to believe that a scheme so perfectly unique, and so far transcending the utmost limit of mere human sagacity and foresight, could only have been portrayed under the guidance of that "wisdom which cometh down from above," and will be ready to conclude, on the ground of this internal evidence as well as in deference to the authority of the sacred writers, that "all Scripture is given by inspiration of God," and that "holy men of old spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost."

(593.) These remarks refer to the analogy which subsists between the whole series of successive revelations, considered as so many special developments of the same scheme; and they might be illustrated by comparing the Adamic dispensation after the fall, with the Noachic after the deluge; by comparing these again with the Abrahamic covenant, and this with the Mosaic economy; and then carrying out the comparison of the whole series of preparatory dispensations,—marking what was peculiar to each, and what was common to them all—so as to bring out the analogy which subsists between them and the complete development of the scheme in the Gospel of Jesus Christ. But without entering into any detailed comparison of the various special revelations which are recorded in the Old Testament, and which were all preparatory to the more perfect dispensation of "the fulness of times," we propose merely to take a general view of the analogy between the two great divisions of Scripture,—the Old and the New Testaments.

(594.) This is a different analogy from that which was formerly marked as subsisting between the two covenants of Life—the covenant of works and the covenant of grace: it is the analogy between the different dispensations of the *same* covenant—the covenant of grace—as these are exhibited in the Old and the New Testaments respectively. And this analogy mainly consists in what is common to them all, as being distinct but consistent developments of the same scheme, while what is peculiar to each of them gives it its distinctive character, and may afford ground for contrast as well as for comparison. There is a difference, as

well as a resemblance between the preparatory dispensation of the Old Testament, and the perfect dispensation of the New; and both are marked and commented on by the sacred writers. The analogy between the two is affirmed and applied when we are told that "the Gospel was preached unto Abraham;" that he was "justified by faith," and that "righteousness was imputed to him;" and that "David also describeth the blessedness of the man unto whom God imputeth righteousness without works, saying, Blessed are they whose iniquities are forgiven, and whose sins are covered; blessed is the man to whom the Lord will not impute sin." In these and other respects there was something common to all the dispensations of Revealed Religion—there was in substance the same Gospel, and the same method of salvation, throughout,—and this constitutes the radical analogy between the Old Testament and the New. But there was also a difference, and this, too, is affirmed and applied to show the imperfection of the Jewish, and the transcendent superiority of the Christian, dispensation. The Old Testament itself describes the Jewish economy as a local and temporary one, which was to be succeeded by another that should be permanent and catholic. And the apostle, founding on the prophetic intimation, contrasts the covenant of grace as it was revealed under the Law with the same covenant as it is now revealed under the Gospel. "But now hath Christ obtained a more excellent ministry, by how much also He is the Mediator of a better covenant which was established on better promises. For if that first covenant had been faultless, then should no place have been found for the second. But finding fault with them, He saith, Behold, the days come when I will make a new covenant with the house of Israel and with the house of Judah,—not according to the covenant that I made with their fathers. . . . In that He saith, A new covenant, He hath made the first old. Now that which decayeth and waxeth old, is ready to vanish away."*

(595.) The *connection* and the *contrast* between the Old and New Testaments are equally important, and each of them might be illustrated by many particular examples;† but it is sufficient for

* Heb. viii. 6-13.

† Dr W. L. Alexander, "Congregational Lectures," Seventh Series: "The

Connection and Harmony between the Old and New Testaments."

our present purpose to show that there is a general resemblance between the two, which may be a source of many particular analogies in matters of faith, and that this resemblance is not of an accidental or superficial character, but deeply rooted in principles which are common to both, and inseparable from the very substance of the scheme which they respectively reveal.

(596.) But we may briefly advert to the attempts which have sometimes been made to dis sever the connection between the Old and New Testaments, and to disprove their harmony or agreement. In one of its recent phases, unbelief has assumed the form of a professed recognition of the New Testament, combined with an avowed rejection and zealous disparagement of the Old. Mr Norton in America and Baden Powell in England have adopted this strange course, as if the New Testament, which they professedly receive, did not itself recognise and found upon the Old, which they reject.* Christ and His apostles invariably appealed to the Scriptures of the Old Testament, as containing "the Oracles of God," and applied them as a rule of faith and practice. And not only so, but the claim of Jesus to be received as the Messiah was left to depend, in a great measure, on the accordance of what He was, and said, and did, with what "Moses in the Law," and "the prophets," had written concerning Him. The indissoluble connection between the two Testaments, and the indispensable necessity of each to the full understanding of the other, have been established by irresistible evidence.†

(597.) Others have denied the harmony or agreement of the two Testaments, and have alleged, not only that the one teaches some truths more clearly and fully than the other,—for this is granted on all hands,—but that there is a radical difference, and even discordance, between what they severally teach on some of the most important articles of Revealed Religion. For example, one of the leading objects of the Old Testament is to establish the unity and sole supremacy of Jehovah as "the one only living and

* Norton, "Genuineness of the Gospels." B. Powell, "Christianity without Judaism." See Moses Stuart, "Critical History and Defence of the Old Testament Canon," 2, 4, 349, 419.

† Leland's "Divine Authority of Revelation," pp. 27, 69, 367. Fairbairn's "Typology," I. pp. 20, 29, 35, 46, 60.

true God," and this has been supposed to be at variance with the Christian doctrine as taught in the New Testament, which ascribes Divine names and titles, and represents Divine homage and worship as being due, also to the Son and the Holy Spirit. The character of God, again, as delineated in the Jewish Scriptures, is said to be altogether different from that which is ascribed to Him in the Gospels and Epistles; in the one He is represented as an arbitrary, jealous, and vindictive Ruler, in the other as a merciful, tender, and compassionate Father. The worship, too, which was required under the law was entirely different from that which the Gospel prescribes; that consisted mainly in outward ceremonies and ritual observances, and had a tendency to lead the worshipper to rest on these, to the neglect of "the weightier matters of the law," while this is an internal spiritual worship, which implies a right state of the heart and affections, and has a tendency to elevate, refine, and purify our whole moral nature. Again, the sanctions of Religion under the Law were different from those which are revealed in the Gospel,—these being temporal promises and judgments in the one, eternal life and future retribution in the other. The moral precepts, also, of the two Testaments exhibit, it is said, a striking contrast, and were fitted to form very different types of character,—concubinage, divorce, and slavery being permitted in the one, and forbidden in the other; while revenge, retaliation, and hatred of enemies, which have been supposed to be consistent with the Jewish law, are at utter variance with the meek, forgiving, and merciful spirit which the Gospel enjoins, and is fitted, as well as designed, to produce.

(598.) Such are some of the chief differences which have been supposed to subsist between the teaching of the Old Testament and that of the New. The general position in regard to them which we are prepared to lay down and defend is this,—that some of these differences are not real, but imaginary; and that in so far as any of them can be proved to exist, they are sufficiently accounted for by the more or less complete development of the same scheme, which is necessarily implied in the distinction between a preparatory and a final dispensation of Divine Truth. Some of these alleged differences have no foundation in fact. For example, the unity of God is as clearly taught in the New Testament as it was in the Old, while the doctrine of the Trinity, if it

was not so fully developed in the Jewish as it is in the Christian Scriptures, is in entire accordance with those indications of a plurality of persons in the Godhead which are of frequent occurrence in the writings of Moses and the prophets, especially in those passages which identify the promised Messiah with the Angel of the Covenant, to whom the incommunicable name of Jehovah is given.* The character of God as delineated in the Old Testament—"the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob"—is the same in all respects with that of "the God and Father of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ," and, in Him, the God and Father of "as many as believe in His name"—although His paternal relation to His people was not so fully revealed till the manifestation of His own Son in the flesh, who spoke to His disciples, of "My Father and your Father, My God and your God." And Christ Himself, considered as a living personal manifestation of the Father, exhibited the same union of mercy and justice, of kindness and severity, of tender compassion and righteous indignation, which is ascribed to the character of God in the Jewish Scriptures, insomuch that the same parties who have found two different Gods in the Old and New Testaments, have also found two different Christs in the Gospel itself. There is a real and wide difference between the worship of the Jewish, and that of the Christian, Church; but that difference did not consist in the one being *merely* outward and ceremonial, while the other is inward and spiritual; for spiritual worship was required of all, and rendered by every true believer, under the law, as well as under the Gospel, and their ritual services were designed, and fitted as means, to produce and cherish repentance, faith, and hope, and these graces wherever they exist in the heart will find expression in spiritual worship. And that they were made effectual for this end in the case of many devout members of the Jewish Church is proved by the Psalms of Moses and David, the strains of Isaiah and Jeremiah, and the songs of Zacharias, Anna, Simeon, Elisabeth, and Mary, which still continue to be models of true spiritual worship to the Christian Church itself. There were temporal promises and judgments under the law, which were adapted to the very peculiar constitution under which the Jews were then placed,

* Dr Allix, "Testimony of the Jewish Church against the Socinians."

as a Theocracy in which God was their temporal Sovereign ; these were the sanctions of the law, considered simply as such, and had reference, not to individual, but to national obedience or disobedience ; but the sanction of reward and punishment in a future state of being, if it found no place in that Theocratic constitution, did find a place, as Warburton himself admits, in the Religious faith of the Jews, and as the apostle expressly affirms, when he says—that “ Enoch was not found, because God had translated him,” and that “ he must have believed that God is, and is the rewarder of them that diligently seek Him ;”—that Abraham “ looked for a city which hath foundations, whose builder and maker is God ;” that “ Moses had respect unto the recompence of the reward ;”—and “ these all died in faith, not having received the promises,” or *things promised*, “ but having seen them afar off and were persuaded of them, and embraced them, and confessed that they were strangers and pilgrims on the earth, . . . they desired a better country, that is, an heavenly : wherefore God is not ashamed to be called their God ; for He hath prepared for them a city.”* Finally, the difference between the morality of the Old and New Testaments is merely that of the more or less perfect. Divorce, concubinage, and slavery were suffered, not enjoined, under the preparatory dispensations ; while from the beginning monogamy was God’s ordinance, and all men were bound to love God as their common Father, and one another as brethren. When our Lord gave His own authoritative interpretation of the Law, He did not seek to add new precepts to it as if it were defective, or to reform it as if it were wrong, but merely to correct the erroneous interpretation which had been put upon it by the Scribes and Pharisees.† In short, we may say with Milton,

“ The Law appears imperfect, and but given
 With purpose to resign them, in full time,
 Up to a better covenant, disciplined
 From shadowy types to truth—from flesh to spirit—
 From imposition of strict laws, to free
 Acceptance of large grace—from servile fear
 To filial—works of law to works of faith.”

* Heb. xi.

† Matt. v. vi. See Dr John Edwards, “ Survey,” vol. I. p. 332, etc.

(599.) That a real and deep-rooted analogy subsists, notwithstanding all the differences that can be discerned, between the Old and New Testaments, is sufficiently evinced by two significant facts. The first is, that a system of doctrinal and moral Theology, similar in all essential respects to that of the Christian Church, although less complete in particular details, may be, and has been, extracted from the Old Testament *alone*.* The second is, that the whole language of the New Testament is just the language of the Old *evangelized*. Every expression in the one has been cast, as it were, into the mould of the other, and bears its stamp and impress. And the force of this consideration will be deeply felt if we arrange side by side the parallel passages from both Testaments which relate to the same subjects. This has been done to our hand in a work which facilitates the comparison, although, from its size, it is not so accessible as we could wish it to be to general readers.†

(600.) We have thus indicated various distinct sources of Analogy in matters of Faith, and have offered a few specimens derived from each of them. There may be other sources to which we have not referred; and there are a thousand instructive analogies which we have not illustrated. What has been said may be sufficient, perhaps, to point out some of the leading lines of inquiry, and to prompt the student to cultivate the field for himself. He will assuredly find it to be a pleasant, as well as a profitable labour; and one which will increase his knowledge, while it strengthens his faith.

* "Syntagma seu Corpus Doctrinæ veri et omnipotentis Dei, ex Veteri Testamento tantum, methodicaratione, collectum; per Joannem Wigandum et Matthæum Judicem." Basil A.D. 1563. "Jucundum et gratum est piis mentibus, perpetuum Ecclesiæ Dei consensum in doctrina cœlesti perspicere: neque parum consolationis affert piis, cum ipsis quotidie soleat à falsa ecclesiâ objici, quòd recedant à doctrina veteris orthodoxæ Ecclesiæ: si, rectè examinatis singulis capitibus doctrinæ cœlestis, verè deprehendant

se eadem sentire, quæ Ecclesia Patriarcharum, et Prophetarum, Christi et Apostolorum, sensit ac docuit, Si quis autem conferat doctrinam Veteris Testamenti cum corpore doctrinæ Novi Testamenti, faciliè deprehendet, eadem de singulis capitibus in utroque tradita esse, et eundem ac perpetuum esse consensum in ecclesia Dei. Eam vero collationem etiam hic noster labor juvare mediocriter poterit," p. 7.

† Whowell's "Analogy of the Old and New Testaments." London.

PART III.



ANALOGY APPLIED TO MODERN RELIGIOUS QUESTIONS.

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(601.) In applying Analogy to some of the chief problems of modern Thought, it is necessary to bear in mind that several analogies, derived from different sources, may be applicable to the same subject, according to the various aspects or relations in which it may be contemplated. When any erroneous system is brought under review, we must seek, in the first instance, to single out those fragments of truth which are invariably blended with error in every heresy that obtains general or permanent credit amongst intelligent men; then to detect the *πρώτον ψεύδος*—the fundamental error—on which the whole system is based, so as to lay bare the precise hinge on which the discussion should turn; and having thus eliminated whatever is true, on the one hand, or irrelevant, on the other, we shall be prepared to consider from what sources we may expect to derive such analogies as will be most applicable to the point in hand. Sometimes we must have recourse to the facts of experience, sometimes to the laws and conditions of thought, sometimes to the extent and limits of knowledge,—the analogies which are available, whether for the establishment of truth or the neutralizing of objections, being different according to the nature of the various topics to which they are to be applied. And the distinct consideration, first, of the precise point at issue,—whether it be a truth that is to be proved, or an error that is to be refuted,—and, secondly, of the kind of analogies that are applicable to each particular case, will tend more than anything else to prevent confusion of thought, and enable us to detect and expose irrelevant or inconclusive reasoning, to whatever subject it may be applied.

(602.) We are firmly persuaded that Analogy, judiciously applied, and consistently carried out to its legitimate results, would go far of itself to determine most of the problems which occupy the attention of thoughtful men in the present age; and under this persuasion, we propose to pass several of these problems under review,—not attempting a full discussion of any of them, but offering merely some specimens of the way in which analogies, derived from various sources, may be applied either in confirmation of truth, or in neutralizing objections which have been urged against it.

CHAPTER I.

ANALOGY APPLIED TO THE NATURAL PROOFS OF THEISM.

(603.) Butler assumes that there is “an intelligent Author of Nature, and natural Governor of the world;” and affirms that it “has often been proved with accumulated evidence,” especially “from this argument of *analogy and final causes*.”* By final causes he means those facts in nature which exhibit examples of adjustment of one thing to another, and of adaptation of means to ends,—facts which are made known by experience and observation. By analogy he means the similarity which exists between these natural adjustments and adaptations and those with which we are familiar in the products of human intelligence and skill,—a similarity which is immediately discerned on a simple comparison of the two, and which leads us to rank both under the same *genus*, as indications of Design. And the proof depends partly on the facts which we observe in nature, and partly on the analogy between these facts, and certain other facts which are familiar to us from our own conscious experience as living, intelligent, voluntary agents. Both are necessary to warrant the inference—for it is an inference—that the works of nature, like the products of human art, exhibit the well-known marks of Design; and can only be accounted for by ascribing them to a living, intelligent, and voluntary Cause. Neither the facts alone, nor the analogy alone, would be sufficient;—the facts might be observed, but unless they were seen to resemble those other facts which we know to be the results of moral, as distinguished from physical, causation, we should be incapable of reducing them under the same generic idea of Design; and there could be no room for analogy if there were no facts in nature indicating adjustment and adaptation. Hence the necessity of bearing in mind the relation which analogy bears to other sources of proof. †

(604.) It may conduce to clearness of conception, if we

* Introduction.

† Part I. c. vii. s. i. ii. pp. 179–197.

analyse the process by which we infer the existence of a living, intelligent, personal God from the comparison of analogous facts in Nature and Art; for it is by a process, and not by an instantaneous act, of thought, that we reach the ultimate conclusion that God is the Creator, as well as the Maker, of the world; and much confusion has arisen from not distinguishing aright between the different parts of the proof.

(605.) The first step consists in the comparison of two species or sets of objects,—the works of human art and the works of nature,—and the perception of a resemblance betwixt the two in this respect, that both exhibit an adjustment of parts and an adaptation of means to ends such as is known, in the one case, to be an effect of intelligent, voluntary design, and inferred, in the other, to be a manifestation of a still higher wisdom. In this first stage, we are engaged simply in interpreting the signs of moral, as distinguished from physical, causation; a task which our most familiar experience qualifies us to perform, since in the ordinary affairs of everyday life, we are perpetually conversant with certain marks or indications by which we are enabled to recognise, in the effect, the agency of an intelligent, voluntary cause. Thus far, the only *effect* with which we have to do is the orderly arrangement, the regular adjustment, the mutual adaptation of certain materials,—not the origin of these materials themselves. They may, or they may not, have been originated, or the mode of their origin may be to us unknown, and even inscrutable. It matters not so far as our first conclusion is concerned—here is a phenomenon which we recognise at once as an effect,—which our whole experience teaches us to regard and interpret as a sign of intelligence,—and which, appearing as it does both in the works of Art and the works of Nature, implies such a resemblance as affords a firm foundation for Inductive Analogy. For while the two sets of objects are only similar, since they differ in other respects, yet the relation between the consequent and the antecedent is the one point in which they agree. The only consequent which comes under our present consideration is order, arrangement, adaptation, subserviency to an end; and the only antecedent, intelligence and will; and the relation between these two, in each class of objects, is not *similar* only, but precisely the *same*. It affords ground, therefore, for a rigorous induction, provided only we be capable of interpreting the *signs* of moral causation, and of discerning the existence of such signs in nature.

(606.) Bearing in mind, then, that the only effect or product of which we now speak consists in the arrangement of certain materials, and not in the materials themselves,—an arrangement of such a kind that wherever it is discerned in works of human art, even when the materials are known to have been supplied, irresistibly suggests the idea, and exhibits the well-known marks, of intelligent design,—let it be further observed, that the Analogy consists simply and solely in the resemblance of known relations between two sets of objects, each of which falls equally within the range of our experience and observation, and that the inference depends entirely on the relation between the two products, not at all on the method of their production. There could be no ground for Analogy, unless the two sets of objects, or the two terms of comparison, were equally known; but they are both before us, the one in the works of human art, the other in the visible wonders of Nature. They are both matters of present experience,—facts which can be observed,—signs which can be read of all men. They are equally the objects of sensible perception and intellectual apprehension. Of neither can it be said that, while the one is present, the other is absent,—that while the one is near at hand in this practical world, the other is remote and distant, the object only of ideal or transcendental vision. The two terms of comparison are equally near and equally real.

(607.) This resemblance between several species or sets of objects is as real, and may be as readily recognised, as the existence of the objects themselves; and the inference which is founded upon it, in any case where the marks of moral causation are clearly discerned, is instantaneous and irresistible; it springs spontaneously from the perception of that resemblance, as subsisting between certain products, and has no dependence on the method of their production, nor even on the knowledge of their origin. In speaking of such products, we must distinguish between two things which are often included under the same general term,—the effect, which indicates design or intelligence, and which is the sign or mark of moral causation, and the object in which that effect may be discerned, or that sign exhibited. If this distinction is once rightly made, we shall see at a single glance that a real analogy may exist between different objects in which the same characteristic mark is visible, while the objects themselves may differ widely from each other in respect to their origin or the mode of their

production. In other words, a resemblance between several distinct sets of objects, is compatible with the utmost diversity in other respects, and especially in respect to the production of the objects themselves. This general statement is exemplified in our most familiar experience, and may be illustrated by innumerable instances. We look on one portrait, which has been delineated by the art of the Painter;—and we discern at once, not only the traces of his pencil and his brush, but the marks of his intelligent perception and artistic skill: we look on another portrait, executed not by manual labour, but by the solar rays, reflected from the living features of the face, and received on a surface suitably prepared to absorb and retain them; and here, too, we discern at once, not only traces of the physical element which has been employed in the work, but marks also of the Artist's skill in making the light of heaven itself subservient to his design. The painting and the photograph are *analogous effects*, and the resemblance betwixt the two consists in each exhibiting marks of intelligent design. The mode of production is different, but not the character of the product; the radical analogy is not affected by this circumstantial diversity; it remains intact and entire, so long as the effect, in either case, is a mark or sign of intelligent design, in whatever way the object may have been produced, in which that characteristic feature is discerned. Or to take another case as an illustrative example:—We may convey a message by letter or by telegram: in either instance there is an expression of thought, and in this respect the two are analogous,—they are effects having the same relation to an intelligent cause; but the mode of production is different, the wire and the electric fluid being substituted, in the one, for the pen and ink that are used, in the other.

(608.) As a real analogy may exist between objects, whose mode of production is various, so it is not incompatible with the existence of many other differences, however real and great, provided they resemble each other in some one characteristic property, and especially in exhibiting the same or similar marks of intelligent design and voluntary activity. There is a wide difference between an orrery and a steam-engine,—but who that examines their structure can fail to see that the arrangement of their several parts is directed to an end, and made subservient to its accomplishment; or that, although both the means and the end are different, they have each the same common character as effects of a design-

ing cause; and that this common character affords ground for an analogical inference, such as warrants us to believe that if the one, so the other also, is the product of human skill? Any specific difference that may be observed between the two, cannot counter-vail their generic resemblance as works of arts; and hence no one by whom that resemblance is discerned would for a moment suspend his judgment, or wait for further evidence, although he had witnessed the formation of the one, and never seen the construction of the other,—nay, although he had never been present at the actual production of either. It is thus that we judge of all the various specimens of human Art, which, with many specific differences and even individual peculiarities, have still a generic resemblance, inasmuch as they all exhibit certain appearances which we know from experience to be the characteristic marks of intelligent design;—and it is the self-same principle which guides and regulates our judgment, when, instead of comparing one work of human art with another, we compare these with the works of Nature, and discern in both such an adjustment of parts and such an adaptation of means to ends as can only be ascribed to an intelligent, designing cause.

(609.) The resemblance in this respect between the works of Art and the works of Nature, is the real analogy on which the theological inference ultimately depends, and it is the only analogy with which, in the first instance, we have anything to do. It is the generic resemblance between two sets of objects, each of which bears the well-known impress, and exhibits the characteristic marks, of intelligent design; it is not a specific resemblance in all respects, and still less an exact correspondence in respect to the method of their production: for they may differ to an indefinite extent in everything else, while they resemble each other in this, that they have the same undeniable relation to an intelligent, designing cause.

(610.) It is from overlooking this first and fundamental analogy, or refusing to it that measure of attention to which it is obviously entitled, that modern Atheists have objected to the validity of the natural evidence in favour of Theism. They have said that in regard to all matters falling within our common experience, analogy may be a safe guide, and may afford a valid evidence, because both terms of comparison come under our actual observation; whereas we have no experience of creation or of

world-making. The objection is thus stated by a recent writer. "What legitimate analogy is there between a man making watches out of previously existing materials, and a God giving existence to non-existent matter, or, in plain words, creating anything out of nothing? There was a time when these specific arrangements of things called watches, etc., did not exist. This we know. Was there ever a time when that arrangement of materials called the universe did not exist? Do we know that? To assume, as the argument of design implies, that there was such a time, is to assume the very thing to be proved."* The objection is not new; it is merely the reproduction of Hume's argument founded on the world's being "a singular effect," but extended, consistently enough, from the world to the universe at large. "When two species of objects," says Hume, "have always been observed to be conjoined together, I can infer by custom the existence of one whenever I see the existence of the other, and this I call an argument from experience. But how this argument can have place where the objects, as in the present case, are single, individual, without parallel, or specific resemblance, may be difficult to explain. And will any man tell me with a serious countenance that an ordinary universe must arise from some thought and art, like the human, because we have experience of it? To ascertain this reasoning, it were requisite that we had experience of the origin of worlds; and it is not sufficient surely that we have seen ships and cities arise from human art and contrivance."†

(611.) It will be observed, that in these statements no deliverance is given on the analogy on which alone our present argument depends, and that both writers take refuge in an alleged difference between our knowledge of the works of man and the works of nature. They do not compare the marks of design which are common to both; but they contrast our experience of watchmaking with our want of experience of world-making. And when we are asked, "What legitimate analogy is there between a man making watches out of pre-existing materials, and a God giving existence to non-existent matter, or creating anything out of nothing?" we answer that the terms of comparison are not correctly stated,—that the analogy on which the Theological conclu-

* The Reasoner, New Series, No. XI. p. 172.

† Hume, "Dialogues on Natural Religion," p. 65.

sion rests, consists in a resemblance between two classes of objects, each of which is known to us by experience, and may be discerned and ascertained without reference, in the first instance, to the method of their production;—and that it is a mere artifice, dexterous, perhaps, but easily detected, by which that real and undeniable analogy is set aside or kept out of view, while recourse is had to points of difference or contrast, which may exist between the objects compared without affecting the only point on which our present argument depends. The first question is—Does a real analogy exist between the products of human intelligence, and the works of nature? If no such analogy exists, the matter is ended; there is no room, and no need, for further reasoning. But if there does exist a real, intimate, and instructive resemblance between the two—a resemblance not only in some superficial appearance or unimportant circumstance, but in their most essential and characteristic features, as works of art,—then, but only then, when this analogy has been distinctly recognised, we shall be prepared to advance to the ulterior question of creation, strictly so called, and shall also have a sufficient inducement to raise and entertain the question as to the commencement of the existing order of things.

(612.) If it be said that this analogy cannot of itself, and apart from other evidence, prove more than a mere moulding and fashioning of materials which may have existed before, we are entitled at least to ask whether it may not establish the existence of a Maker, if it cannot establish that of a Creator, of the universe? It is indispensable that we should come to a clear and definite understanding on this point, in the first instance, with those who deny or dispute the Theological inference. For the process by which we reach our ultimate conclusion consists of several distinct steps; and we are entitled to insist that each step shall be distinctly marked, and a decided, definite, and honest deliverance pronounced upon it. The first and most fundamental step in the process is—the comparison of two sets of objects, the products of human Art and the works of Nature, with a view to ascertain whether any, and what, resemblance may be discerned as subsisting between them. Both terms of the comparison are equally before us, each being a matter of familiar experience, and patent to common observation. The relation, whether it be one of resemblance or of contrast, which exists between the two, is also a

matter of fact which may be clearly apprehended and fully ascertained. If they be found to resemble each other in certain characteristic respects, and especially in such properties as are known by experience to be the effects, and, consequently, the marks and indications of Design, then the character of the product will indicate the origin of these manifestations, even were the origin of the materials unknown; and the existence of these marks and signs, which is itself an effect, and which we are enabled only by experience to construe and interpret, is as real as are the objects in which they are discerned, and may warrant us in ascribing them to an intelligent, designing cause, even were we ignorant as yet of the method in which these objects were themselves produced.

(613.) This being the real state of the question, in so far as the only point in hand is concerned, we are entitled to say—Take this part of the proof,—examine it thoroughly,—consider it in the light of your own experience; and before you advance a step further, pronounce a deliberate judgment upon it. Is there, or is there not, a real analogy between the products of human Art, and the works of Nature? Different as they are in other respects, do they or do they not resemble each other in this—that they severally exhibit such an adjustment of parts, and such a subserviency of means to ends, as your own experience has taught you to recognise as the *effects*, and to interpret as the *signs*, of an intelligent, designing Cause? Are we, or are we not, capable of ascertaining what are the signs of moral, as distinguished from mere physical, causation? and do we, or do we not, discern these signs in the works of Nature? If we are capable of ascertaining such signs, and if we do actually discern them in the works of Nature, are they not sufficient to indicate a designing Mind as the cause, at least, of all the manifold adjustments and adaptations which we observe in the existing order of the Universe; and may not this great conclusion be clearly apprehended and firmly grasped, even were we ignorant as yet of the method of their production?

(614.) A distinct and definite answer to these questions would go far to detect and expose the miserable fallacies by which the discussion has been perplexed and obscured. In the present advanced state of Science, no one will deny, as some of the earlier sceptics seem to have been disposed to do, the existence of *order* in Nature; for the universal prevalence of *law* in every

department to which our knowledge extends, is now admitted by all. Nor will it be denied that there is a real analogy of some kind between the products of human Art and the works of Nature; for every one who compares the structure of a telescope with that of an eye, will see that they resemble each other in having a common relation to the laws of light and the faculty of vision. But these facts being admitted, it is still strangely held by not a few that there is no evidence in Nature either of *design*, or of a *designing Mind*. It exhibits uniform order, and invariable regularity; there is an admirable adaptation of parts in organized structures, and a harmonious action of different agencies in producing beneficial results; and so far the works of nature may be said to resemble some of the works of man; but all this, it seems, may exist, and yet afford no ground for the inference of design. "My reverend friend," says Mr Holyoake, "is wrong in supposing that I admit *design*, and yet refuse to admit the *design-argument*."* He seems to have felt that the existence of any evidence of design in Nature, would render the argument founded on it in favour of a designing Mind irresistible, and for this reason he boldly denies the existence of that evidence altogether. At this point, therefore, we must press the question home,—Are we, or are we not, capable of ascertaining what are the marks of design; and if we are capable of ascertaining them, then what are they? and are none of them discernible in the works of Nature? We can have no difficulty in answering any one of these questions. We know quite well what are the characteristic marks of any works of art; and wherever these marks appear, we infer the operation of a skilful hand or a designing mind,—and this, too, notwithstanding every conceivable diversity in other respects, and even without having had any opportunity of witnessing the production of these works, or knowing the method in which they were produced. Everything else is irrelevant,—*these* marks alone are needful, and these alone are decisive. We know equally well,—for it is a fact apparent in everything around us,—that the characteristic marks of intelligent design do really exist in the works of Nature, and are instantly recognised and appreciated by the same faculties which enable us to pronounce a judgment on any specimens of human Art. And we are indebted partly to experience, and partly to the natural

* Discussion between Townley and Holyoake, p. 27.

laws of thought, both for our knowledge of these marks, and for our conviction that they exist in Nature. "The result of our whole experience," said Sir Gilbert Elliot, writing to Hume himself, "seems to amount to this:—There are but *two* ways in which we have ever observed the different parcels of matter to be thrown together—either at random, or with design and purpose. By the first, we have never seen produced a regular complicated effect, corresponding to a certain end; by the second, we uniformly have. If, then, the works of nature and the productions of man resemble each other in *this one general characteristic*, will not even *experience* sufficiently warrant us to ascribe to both a similar, though proportionable, cause?"*

(615.) This is the fundamental analogy on which the Theological inference mainly depends;—an analogy between two species or sets of objects, which are equally patent to the observation of all, and which are found to resemble each other in those respects which are known by experience to be the distinctive signs or characteristic marks of *moral*, as distinguished from mere *physical*, causation. We must hold, in short, either that we cannot ascertain from experience what are the marks of design, or that we cannot discern these marks in the works of nature, if we would seek to evade the otherwise inevitable inference of a designing Cause. It is vain, in such a case, to speak, as Hume does, of the objects being "single, individual, without parallel, or specific resemblance;"—the two sets of objects are both before us,—they are palpably distinct,—they may be easily compared: each set includes a vast variety of individual cases, and between these there may be no exact parallel or specific resemblance; but there is that common to them all which constitutes a generic resemblance, and lays a firm foundation for inductive inference.

(616.) There is no "singularity" in the effect, in so far as the common marks of design are concerned, and these alone are essential to the proof. It is equally vain, in such a case, to demand, as Hume does, that we should have "experience of the origin of worlds;" we have ample experience to show what are unequivocal signs of moral causation; and when these are clearly discerned in the works of Nature, we infer a designing cause from the character of the effect, without reference, in the first instance,

* Mr Dugald Stewart, "Preliminary Dissertation," Notes, p. 287.

to its historical origin, simply because we have experience of like consequents being produced by intelligent, voluntary design, and *no* experience of such consequents from any other cause. But it is worse than vain,—it is a disingenuous evasion, to slur over the analogy without pronouncing any definite judgment upon it, and to take refuge in the points of difference that may easily be discerned between the works of man and the works of nature,—for these points of difference may be admitted, while the analogy is nevertheless affirmed; and in point of fact, a difference to some extent is essential to an analogical proof. The products of Art and the works of Nature may differ in the history of their origin, in the method of their production, and in many other respects: but all these differences leave the one fundamental analogy intact and entire,—the analogy which consists in common marks of design, and warrants the inference of a designing cause, whatever may have been the mode in which the objects themselves were called into being, or thrown into their present forms. And what can be more unfair than to affirm that we “assume the point to be proved,” when we assume nothing except what we are prepared to establish by the evidence of experience,—namely, that there are certain sure marks of intelligent causation which every man is qualified to recognise and interpret, and that these marks may be discerned in the works of Nature not less than in the works of Art? By means of these *signs* we come to know that there is an effect in the case,—an effect which necessarily presupposes a *cause*, and therefore proves it: but the effect in question is simply the arrangement, the adaptation, the adjustment which are known by experience to be marks, and, therefore, proofs, of design; and not, at least in the first instance, the production of the material objects in which these marks appear. We may, or we may not, be able to account for their production;—we may suppose that they were formed out of pre-existing materials, as in the case of human Art, or we may find reason to believe that the materials themselves were created with a view to the uses which they were designed to subserve; but no question that can be raised as to the mode of their production, can set aside or invalidate the analogy which undeniably subsists between the products of human Art and the works of Nature.

(617.) In the case of a human artist, who can deal only with pre-existing materials, and bend them to the accomplishment of

his purposes, the analogy is seen to be independent of any consideration of their origin. It holds good even when the materials are known to have been supplied to his hand, and only subjected to his skill: it is still true that the work of his hand is a work of Art, a product of intelligence and will. As such, it is known at once to be an effect, and such an effect as implies a designing cause; and the certainty of this conclusion is not destroyed nor weakened either by our knowledge that he made use of pre-existing materials, or by our ignorance of the method in which these materials were themselves produced. The real analogy in the case, and the only analogy with which we have to deal, in comparing one work of human Art with another, is their resemblance to each other in respect to what are known to be the characteristic marks of design. And so, in comparing all the works of human Art with the wonders of Nature, the real analogy, and the only one with which we have to deal in so far as the inference of a designing Cause is concerned, is their resemblance in that respect which alone is necessary to distinguish a work of intelligent design from a fortuitous concourse of atoms. This analogy would continue to be alike real and conclusive, were it supposed that all the materials employed in the works of Nature, were, like the materials on which the Artist expends his skill, in existence before they were fashioned into their present forms, and even were we to remain for ever ignorant of the history of their origin, or of the method of their production. For, in point of fact, the supposition of pre-existing materials, and the difficulty of accounting for their origin, are common to the works of human Art as well as to the works of Nature; and if, in regard to the former, they are not held to destroy or even to weaken the proof of design and a designing cause, neither should they have any such effect, in regard to the latter. There may be other reasons why, in this case, we should entertain the higher question, whether pre-existing materials are necessarily required on the part of such a Maker as the frame of Universal Nature reveals, and whether the supposition of their being underived and eternal,—independent of His will so far as their origin is concerned, yet absolutely subject to His control in respect to the use that is made of them—may not be a gratuitous and groundless imagination, alike unwarranted by experience, and inconsistent with His infinite perfection, and sole supremacy?

(618.) In the meantime, we are entitled to affirm that the wonderful analogy between the products of human intelligence and the works of Nature is sufficient to establish the existence of an intelligent Maker and Governor of the world, in opposition both to Atheism and to Pantheism. It shows that there are manifest indications and sure marks of design in the works of Nature; and design, as all experience testifies, can be predicated only of a living, personal, intelligent agent.* Suppose that this analogy could not of itself, and apart from other considerations, establish the doctrine, or even suggest the idea, of a *creation*, strictly so called,—suppose that the question as to the origin of the materials were left open in the meantime, and reserved, not that it may be evaded, but that it may be resumed at a later stage,—it might still be necessary to select this one argument for special consideration,—to fix our minds upon it stedfastly and earnestly, so as to grasp its full import, and realize the conclusion to which it leads, waiving for a time all higher speculations on the origin of things. Is it duly considered by those who speak of our inability to prove the existence of a Creator, what is implied in the existence even of a Maker of such a universe as that which we behold?—a Maker of the sun, moon, and stars; of the heavens and the earth; of the sea and the dry land; of the systems of astronomy,—of the tribes of animal life; of everything, in short, in which we discern orderly arrangement, the manifestation and effect of His wisdom and power? What must be the character of His wisdom, and what the extent of His power, who could even mould and fashion the primordial elements of Nature into their present forms, and adapt them to the purposes which they are employed to subserve? Nature may thus exhibit a *manifestation* of attributes, of which it affords no adequate *measure*; the effect is finite, but may reveal an infinite cause; and what other conception can be formed of that Intelligence and Power, which the actual phenomena of Nature irresistibly suggest, than one which implies their competency to produce any effect, however stupendous, by the mere energy of His will?

(619.) Were this grand idea duly realized; were we once thoroughly convinced that the works of Nature exhibit marks of design, which imply the operation of a designing Mind, as truly

* Müller on Sin, vol. I. pp. 17, 18, 84.

as do any of the most perfect specimens of human Art; and did we honestly acknowledge a supreme Protoplast,—a Maker, possessing such perfections as the mere construction of such a universe even out of pre-existing materials necessarily implies, we might not yet have the full formal idea of God, as the self-existent One, the Creator of all things,—but we should be at least on our way towards it,—and the sure analogy which leads us up to this point, so far from being the limit or the goal of inquiry, would only become a stepping-stone to further progress,—a firm vantage-ground on which we might rise to a wider range of vision, and descry other analogies or arguments, such as would commend the doctrine of *Creation* to our highest reason, and fill us at once with profound reverence, and serene satisfaction, in adoring God as the uncreated Centre of the Universe,—the sole Source of being,—the First Cause of all.

(620.) If we have formed any suitable conception of God, considered simply as the Designer and Maker of the works of Nature, we shall be able to assign no limit to the exercise of His perfections; and we can scarcely fail to believe that, manifested as they have been on a scale which far transcends our highest thoughts, they must be competent to the production of effects such as have no parallel in the works of human wisdom and power. The idea of creation, strictly so called, might not occur spontaneously to our own minds; but when it is suggested, it will commend itself to our highest reason, as being in all respects credible, when viewed in connection with the attributes which must necessarily belong to such a Being. Perhaps the nearest analogy which we can find in any specimen of human Art to what is implied in the higher doctrine of Divine creation, is that of an artist conceiving, inventing, and framing his own tools, with an ulterior view to the production of certain other effects by means of them. It is true that in this, as in every other, instance of human workmanship, the use of pre-existing materials is necessary to the execution of his design, and some previous knowledge of these is implied in the very conception of it,—this being an indispensable condition of human intelligence and power, a condition imposed on *man* by the necessary limitation of his nature. But the general idea of a design to invent and make use of certain instruments, and to adapt them to various practical uses, which is suggested by our most familiar experience, may be conceived apart from these

human limitations,—we may abstract the power to conceive and invent an instrument for use, from all consideration of the existence or non-existence of the materials that are to be employed ; and we may entertain the thought that, in the case of a Mind capable of forming the plan, and framing the fabric, of such a Universe as this, that power may exist independently of all material conditions, and may manifest its peculiar and incommunicable perfection by creating its own instruments, and calling things into being which had no existence before.

(621.) It is “through faith,” indeed, that “we understand that the worlds were framed by the word of God, so that things which are seen were not made of things which do appear;”* and probably, had there been no supernatural revelation of Divine truth, we should never have risen, by the unaided light of Nature, to the sublime conception of a Creator. But when the idea is suggested, from whatever source, we may lawfully compare it with any human or natural analogies that may serve to illustrate its credibility, or confirm its truth. Now, the invention of instruments,—the making of tools,—the preparation of means,—is itself a work of design, undertaken and executed not for its own sake, but with a view to some useful application or ulterior effect,—and familiar as it is to our own minds, it enables us to conceive of the Divine Mind as planning the whole frame of the Universe, and providing beforehand the elementary substances which were to be employed in its construction,—endowing them with such properties as might best subserve His purpose,—giving them definite constitutions,—establishing between them certain relations and affinities,—subjecting them to regular and stable laws,—and supplying them in such proportions of “measure, number, and weight,” as should render a few simple instruments subservient to the vast multiplicity of His various works. We can form this conception,—and when we compare it with all that we know of the constitution of matter, we find nothing incredible in the supposition that every one of its constituent elements is a product of omniscient Wisdom and almighty Power,—an instrument which, when viewed in the light of its manifold applications, is seen to have been framed by design, with a view to prospective results, and which is found to possess properties, or to be subject to laws, such as are not neces-

* Heb. xi. 3.

sarily inherent in it, but purely arbitrary, as if they were imposed by an intelligent will, acting with a view to certain ends which were to be effected by this means. For what do we know of the constitution of matter, except that every material object in nature may be reduced by analysis to a few elementary substances? and what do we know of these its constituent elements, except their common or peculiar properties,—their natural laws, and mutual relations, by which they are adapted to the uses for which they were evidently designed? So that, while there is nothing in the idea of matter that is inconsistent with the supposition of its origination by an omnipotent will, there is a legible impress of design even on its primordial elements, such as imparts a profound meaning to the words of Sir John Herschel when he says, that the most recent discoveries of Chemistry respecting “the atomic constitution of bodies effectually destroy the idea of an eternal self-existent matter, by giving to each of its atoms the *essential characters* at once of a *manufactured article* and a *subordinate agent*.”

(622.) This is, perhaps, all that can be expected, and it is, certainly, the utmost that can be required from mere Natural Theology, in treating of a theme which transcends all human analogies, and stands connected with the incommunicable perfections of God. But it is sufficient to render the highest doctrine of Creation credible,* and to prepare the way for other proofs, derived either from the facts,—Geological and Historical,—which attest the comparatively recent origin of the present order of things,† or from the authoritative declaration of Scripture, that “in the beginning God created the heavens and the earth,”—that “He created all things by the word of His power,”—that He said, “Let light be, and light was,”—that “He spake, and it was done; He commanded, and all things stood fast.”

(623.) The resemblance between the products of human intelligence and the works of nature, as having the same common marks of design, is not the only source of analogies applicable to the Theistic argument. There are other sources from which we may derive arguments sufficient to neutralize all the objections

* For a fuller statement of this view, the author may be permitted to refer to his former work—“Faith in God, and Modern Atheism Compared,” vol. I. 275. See also Crabbe’s “Natural

Theology,” and Jules Simon, “La Religion Naturelle.”

† Sir Matthew Hale, “The Primitive Original of Mankind.”

which have been urged against our belief in the first and fundamental article of Natural Religion.

(624.) One objection, which has recently been urged with great vehemence by an able but erratic writer,* is founded on the assumption that we neither have, nor can have, any knowledge of causes, whether efficient or final, and on the fact that the Theistic argument postulates a knowledge of both. This objection to the proof of Theism is effectually neutralized by the fact that, if it were valid, it would be equally conclusive against a large part of our common natural knowledge, which unquestionably includes many instances of the production of effects by voluntary agency, and such effects as indicate the design or intention of the agent. These instances are analogous, in both respects, to the works of nature; and if from the manifest effects of power and wisdom we infer human agency, in the one case, we may on the same principle infer from similar effects Divine agency in the other. Were M. Comte's doctrine correct, it would be as impossible to prove that he was the author of the "*Cours de la Philosophie Positive*," as that God is the author of Nature; and he admits that Theology is inevitable if causes are at all capable of being known.†

(625.) Another objection which has been urged against Theism is founded on the consideration, that it necessarily involves conceptions which far transcend our capacity of thought, and are utterly incomprehensible by the human mind. This objection may be effectually neutralized by analogies derived from two distinct sources,—the laws and conditions of thought, and the extent and limits of knowledge; and these analogies have a legitimate application to the point in hand, since it will be found that the same conceptions which are objected to as being involved in Theism, are equally involved in Atheism and in Pantheism. It is not duly considered by those who urge this objection that in any attempt that may be made to explain the history or account for the origin of the present order of things, the first step in the process is common to every system of opinion—namely, that since something now exists, something must have existed from all eternity; and that it is this first step which brings us face to face

* M. Comte, "*Cours de la Philosophie Positive*." † Comte, "*Cours*," vol. IV. p. 664.

with all that is most incomprehensible in Theism, such as the ideas of self-existence and eternity. The Atheist and the Pantheist, not less than the Natural Theologian and the Christian Divine, must confront these ideas, and cannot evade or get rid of them,—and any objection against Theism which is founded upon them may be neutralized by showing that they are equally involved in their own scheme of thought, for if God be not, nature must be, self-existent and eternal.

(626.) Akin to the former is another objection,—that we cannot extract the infinite from the finite, and that if we could, it would still be utterly unthinkable, so that, to use the words of Sir Wm. Hamilton, “the last and highest consecration of all true religion must be an altar—*Ἀγνωστῷ Θεῷ*, to the *unknown and unknowable God*.”* If this were intended merely to intimate that God cannot be fully comprehended by any created mind, it would be in entire accordance with reason and Scripture, for “who can by searching find out God? who can find out the Eternal unto perfection?”† But if it meant that we can have no true knowledge of God at all, it raises the question, “May our knowledge be partial and incomplete, yet true and certain as far as it goes?” or, as it might be otherwise stated, “Can there be any real knowledge without Omniscience?”‡ And this question is answered by the analogy of our whole natural knowledge, for no one object in nature, and no one event in time, is known in all its aspects and relations. A finite mind, therefore, may have some true knowledge of an infinite Being.

(627.) These few specimens are sufficient to indicate the way in which analogy may be applied to neutralize objections against the evidences and the truths of Theism. We have confined our remarks to the fundamental doctrine of Natural Religion,—the

* Sir Wm. Hamilton, “Discussions,” pp. 12–15. A similar statement was hazarded by Robinet, when he spoke of the “*Deus Ignotus*.” Bartholmæss, “*Histoire*,” I. pp. 193, 202, 204.

‡ “British and Foreign Evangelical Review,” No. XXVIII. p. 430.

† In this sense it occurs in the following hymn:—

Ἕμῶν σε, μάκαρ
καὶ διαφανῆς
Ἕμῶν σε, μάκαρ
καὶ διασιγᾶς.
Ὅσα γὰρ φῶνας
τόσα καὶ σιγᾶς,
Αἰεὶς νοεράς.
Πάτερ ἄγνωστε!
Πάτερ ἄρρητε!

—Quoted in Leighton's Theolog. Lectures.

existence of a living personal God, the Creator and Governor of the world ; but analogy is applicable also, both in the way of neutralizing objections and of affording a confirmatory evidence, to all the other articles of Natural Theology, such as the doctrine of Divine Providence, of the immortality of the soul, and of a future state of rewards and punishments. Butler has effectively applied analogy to these doctrines, and the duties which result from them ; and we have merely attempted to show how his great argument may be extended so as to include the proof of the existence of God, which he assumed as the basis of his reasoning, and to neutralize the objection that his argument, even were it conclusive in other respects, would still leave open the dreary alternative of Atheism.

CHAPTER II.

ANALOGY APPLIED TO THE STANDPOINT OF DEISM.

(628.) The terms Theism and Deism might be employed, so far as their etymological meaning is concerned, to denote the same scheme of Religious belief; but by general usage they have come to represent two different systems. The first includes the belief of the existence, attributes, and government of God, and is properly opposed to Atheism and Pantheism; the second recognises the same truths, more or less explicitly, in so far as they can be proved by the mere light of nature, but refuses to receive the additional lessons of Revelation, and is properly opposed, not to Natural, but to Revealed, Religion. Deism includes Theism, but excludes Christianity. It affirms the sufficiency of the light of nature for all the ends of religious and moral instruction, and denies the necessity, while it doubts the truth, and even the possibility, of a supernatural Revelation.

(629.) Such being the peculiar standpoint, and distinctive character, of Deism, it may be regarded as an intermediate system between Atheism and Christianity, since it abandons Atheism by adopting those Theistic beliefs which are common to Natural and Revealed Religion, while it refuses to acknowledge the authority of Revelation, and rejects all its peculiar doctrines. Many have thought that they might consistently rest in this "via media," and that, by doing so, they should be equally exempt from the charge of irreligion on the one hand, and of superstition on the other. But when they assign the reasons for their distinctive belief, in opposition to Atheism at one time, and to Christianity at another, they make use of arguments which, if they be valid against the one, would seem to be equally valid in favour of the other. In opposing Atheism, they make use of a kind of evidence which is analogous, as we have seen, to that of Revealed Religion, and which should be regarded, on that account, as a presumption in its

favour: and in opposing Christianity, they urge objections which apply equally to Natural Religion, and which, if they were valid, would seem to be in favour of Atheism. For this reason it has often been said that the intermediate position of Deism is untenable, and that the only alternatives are Atheism or Christianity; not that it is impossible to believe the elementary truths of Theism without receiving the additional doctrines of Revelation, but because the principles on which Deism proceeds, must, if consistently carried out, terminate either in the rejection of Natural, or in the reception of Revealed, Religion.

(630.) It was one object of Butler's treatise to establish this position. His argument was directed against the Deists of his own age. They admitted the existence of God, and for this reason, he assumed it. But some of them denied the reality of a moral government, and of a future state of retribution; while, with one consent, they all repudiated the claims of Revealed Religion. He set himself to prove, first, that Natural Religion, and secondly, that Revealed Religion, was analogous to the "constitution and course of nature;" and that neither of them could be rejected consistently with their professed acknowledgment of God as the Creator and Governor of the world. This he did by the aid of Analogy. He showed that no objection could be urged against a moral government and a future state of retribution, which might not be neutralized by the facts which prove a natural government, and an actual dispensation, in the present life, of rewards and punishments; and that no objection could be urged against the more peculiar doctrines of Revelation, which might not be neutralized by analogous facts in Nature and Providence. The inevitable inference from his argument is, that such objections are either not valid at all, or, if valid against Natural and Revealed Religion, they are equally conclusive against the Theistic belief of those by whom they were urged.—His reasoning may be summed up in a few words:—the objections to Revealed Religion are analogous to the objections which have been raised against Natural Religion: the objections against Natural Religion are analogous to objections which might be raised against the constitution and course of nature itself; and consequently none of these objections can be conclusive, so long as the existence of God, and His natural government of the world, are consistently maintained.

(631.) This negative use of Analogy, in neutralizing the ob-

jections which Deists have urged against the scheme of Revelation, is undeniably legitimate, and is sufficient of itself to relieve the Christian argument of many adverse presumptions, which might otherwise excite a feeling of prejudice against the direct and peculiar proofs to which it appeals. It should have the effect of silencing an opponent, since it shows that the same or similar difficulties are common to Nature and to Revelation; and it may even afford a presumption that the same God may be the Author of both. But in addition to this negative use of analogy, there are some positive proofs which may be derived from this source, and which can hardly be resisted by the Deist, since they rest on analogous facts admitted by himself, and necessarily involved in his own theory of Religion. For in reasoning with him, we are not confined to the use of those analogies which alone are available in our argument with the Atheist; we are entitled to assume all the truths which he professes to believe, and to found upon them, if they afford any sound analogy in favour of a Revelation from God. The sources from which sound analogies may be derived are multiplied, in this case, in proportion to the number and importance of the principles which can be shown to be common to Natural and Revealed Religion. A few specimens of this positive use of analogy, when it is applied to some of the fundamental positions of Deism, will be sufficient to show that, besides neutralizing objections against Revealed religion, it is capable of yielding a balance of likelihood or probability in its favour.

(632.) One of the strongholds of Deism is the alleged *unlikelihood of a Revelation from God*. This can only refer to a supernatural Revelation; for unquestionably, on the principles of Deism itself, there is a natural Revelation from God. Waiving for the present, and reserving for future consideration, the supposed improbability of any interference with the established course of nature, or of any Revelation additional to that which is made by the works of Creation and Providence, we ask our readers to consider the significance of two facts which are acknowledged by the Deist himself, and which are, in their essential import, strictly analogous to any further Revelation of God's mind and will. These facts are—first, the revelation of natural truth, through the medium of His works; and, secondly, the revelation of religious truth, through the same medium, accompanied with such evidence as is sufficient to show that He is Himself the Revealer.—These

facts, if they can be established, are strictly analogous to any other Revelation which He may be pleased to make of His mind and will; and they are both involved in the scheme of Deism, although, by a strange inconsistency, the fact of a Divine Revelation in the natural world is regarded as a proof that no other Revelation is possible, or likely, or capable of being proved.

(633.) The first fact is,—the revelation of natural Truth. That all truth is revealed by God, and received only by the mind of man, is a truth which is common to the Deist and the Christian; although there is reason to fear that it is often overlooked or forgotten by both. Besides being our Creator, God is our Teacher in regard even to natural things. He is “the very God of Truth” and the Fountain of all knowledge; the “Father of lights, from whom cometh down every good and perfect gift.” All reality and all truth depend either on His *nature* or His *will*. His unchangeable nature is the ground of eternal and immutable Truth—and also of eternal and immutable Morality: * for there would have been Truth—absolute, necessary, eternal Truth,—had the Divine will never called the created universe into being, just as holiness and goodness would have existed as attributes of His character, had there never been any expression of His sovereign authority, or any other law than that by which He is a law to Himself. By His will, again, He gave existence to other beings, derived and dependent,—distinct from, yet necessarily related to, Himself; and by doing so, originated all those truths which are involved in the nature, properties, and relations of created things. To His sovereign will we must trace that definite constitution which belongs to every one of all the various objects in nature—all their mutual relations to one another,—their generic resemblances and specific differences—and especially that marvellous adjustment of things so different as mind and matter, by means of which, in the case of beings constituted as we are, knowledge becomes possible. He is the Teacher of all natural truth both as He is the Creator of the mind, and the Author of every manifestation which is made to it. The subject and the object of thought are equally derived from Him, and all the means and conditions of knowledge are determined by His sovereign will.

(634.) God is the source, therefore, of all natural knowledge,

* Dr Cudworth.

first, because He created the mind itself and endowed it with all its noble faculties ; secondly, because He surrounded it with objects possessing various properties, and exhibited them for its instruction ; and thirdly, because He established a reciprocal relation between the mind within and the world without. Here is a natural revelation, which every consistent Theist must admit to be Divine ; and it is sufficient of itself to show that God is the Teacher, as well as the Maker, of His intelligent creatures, and to afford a presumption that if He teaches men natural knowledge with a view to their interests in the present life, He may also become their Instructor in a still higher knowledge, if they need it to prepare them for a life to come. To this extent, the revelation of natural truth is strictly analogous to the revelation of spiritual truth. There is a difference between the two—the one being natural, the other supernatural ; but notwithstanding this difference in respect to the method of instruction, or the medium through which it is conveyed to us, they resemble each other as being *revelations*,—and there is that common to both which constitutes a real analogy between the two.

(635.) But the second fact, which is also implied in the theory of Deism, is still more important,—namely, that God has made a Revelation of religious truth through the medium of His works, accompanied with such evidence as is sufficient to prove that He is Himself the Revealer. Every one who believes in the existence of God, on the ground of those manifestations of His perfections which may be discerned in the works of Creation and Providence, must admit that it was God's design to make Himself known to His intelligent creatures ; and that He has actually accomplished this design, to some extent, by natural means. He has thus made Himself known, as the Creator and Governor of the world. This is implied in Deism itself ; for it affirms, in opposition to Atheism, a natural revelation of God, and such a revelation as makes Him known as the Revealer. The Deist must acknowledge that we could have had no knowledge of God at all, unless He had revealed Himself ;—and His having done so by natural means affords a presumption that He may reveal Himself still further in an extraordinary way, should it be necessary for the instruction of men, and especially for the salvation of sinners. The doctrine of final causes is not exhausted when it is applied to prove the mere existence of God ; it implies further His design to make

Himself known to His intelligent creatures, so as to lay a solid foundation for the duties of practical Religion. And should any change occur in their condition and character, such as to make it necessary for their welfare to know more of His mind and will than can be discovered by the mere light of nature, it is in entire accordance with the analogy of His procedure in revealing Himself as their Creator and Governor, to suppose that He may also reveal Himself as sustaining new relations to them, such as did not, and could not, exist before that change occurred,—provided He has any purpose of mercy towards them, and any desire that they should be made acquainted with it. And, surely, if He could make Himself known by natural means as the Revealer of any kind of Religious truth, that analogous fact is sufficient to prove that He is equally able to make Himself known as the Revealer of any other truths which it may be necessary for our welfare to understand and believe.—The natural method of Revelation, by the objects of Creation and the events of Providence, were it not so familiar to us as to be seldom made the subject of deliberate thought, would appear to be quite as strange and wonderful as any supernatural manifestation whatever. For were the problem proposed to us, How can God convey to our mind a knowledge of Natural truth, or a knowledge of Himself by means of His works? we should find it as difficult of solution as any question that can be raised respecting the communication of Revealed Truth through the medium of human language, and by the instrumentality of inspired messengers.

(636.) But the unlikelihood, which is supposed to attach to a Revelation of the mind and will of God, is said to arise, not so much from its general character as a Revelation, but from its peculiar and exceptional character as a *supernatural* one. And in the mouth of an Atheist or Pantheist who refuses to admit the existence of any Being distinct from Nature, and superior to it, this objection may be urged in perfect consistency with his cheerless creed, and can only be refuted by means of those analogies and final causes which establish the existence and perfections of a living, personal God. But in the mouth of a Deist, who professes to believe the truths of Natural Religion, it is neither consistent nor conclusive. For in admitting the existence, providence, and government of God, he acknowledges, not less than the Christian, a *supernatural* economy; and cannot affirm the improbability of a

supernatural revelation, unless he can show that all the ends of that economy are thoroughly known by him, and that these ends might all be accomplished by natural means. Such a Revelation as is contained in the Scriptures does involve the idea of supernatural interposition, both in the way of revealing truths undiscoverable by the mere light of nature, and establishing them by miraculous evidence. So far there is a departure from the usual course of nature; but it does not follow that there is any departure from the usual course of God's procedure towards His intelligent creatures, or from the great ends which were contemplated from the beginning in the plan of the Divine administration. It being His design, as nature itself testifies, to glorify Himself by making known to them the perfections of His nature, and the principles of His government, some direct communication of His mind and will by other than natural means, may form part of the general plan of His procedure here, as elsewhere in the moral universe; and any temporary departure from the usual course of nature may be rendered subservient to the accomplishment of that high design. For anything we can tell, a supernatural revelation, in which God holds direct converse with His creatures, might be necessary to make Him known to them as One who was willing to hold friendly communication with them,—to draw near to them, and to speak with them, instead of standing aloof behind the veil of His works, or addressing them only through the mute, and comparatively cold, symbols of nature,—and to win their confidence and affection in a way analogous to that personal intercourse which an earthly parent holds with the minds of his children.*

(637.) On the principles of Deism, neither a supernatural Revelation, nor a miraculous interposition, can be justly held to be incredible; for Deism admits the reality of a supernatural power; and, the existence of God being acknowledged, "all things are possible with Him." It admits the stupendous miracle of Creation at the commencement of the present order of nature, and that miracle is sufficient to prove the possibility of any other. It is an analogous fact, which proves the reality of supernatural interposition in one case, and the possibility of it in many more. And if its possibility be admitted, it cannot be proved to be improbable, unless we knew all the ends which are contemplated in

* Dr Channing, "Works." Howe, "Living Temple."

the vast scheme of the Divine government, and could show that those ends could be as well, or better, accomplished by other than supernatural means. Whatever views he may entertain of the sufficiency of the light of Nature, the Deist must acknowledge, on his own principles, that many truths are known to the Divine Mind, and dependent, in fact, on the Divine Will, which cannot be discovered from any natural indication, and which can only be made known by supernatural Revelation; and to assume that none of these truths can be necessary for our instruction and guidance, merely because they are not written in the volume of nature, is virtually to affirm that we are competent judges of the whole scheme of the Divine administration from everlasting to everlasting, and qualified to sit in judgment on the Divine method of educating the world.

(638.) According to the Scriptural account, a Divine supernatural Revelation was coeval with the origin of the human race, and has been progressively unfolded "at sundry times and in divers manners" along the whole line of its history. Monotheism was not left to be discovered by the unaided light of nature. The world has never been placed in a position such as alone could enable us to solve the problem, whether man, by the mere exercise of his rational powers on the works of Creation, could have risen to the conception of the "one only, the living and true God." For He made Himself known to our first parents, according to the Scriptures, not only by the mute signs of nature, but by direct personal converse with them,—expressly revealing Himself as their Creator, Lawgiver, and Judge. The truth, thus suggested to their minds, was confirmed by a body of natural evidence, and transmitted, more or less perfectly, by oral tradition and domestic instruction. And the authentic history of the whole race, in all its tribes and in every age and country, goes to prove that, while there are innumerable instances of declension from a purer to a more corrupt form of faith and worship, there is not a single instance of a spontaneous elevation of any people from Fetichism or Polytheism to a pure system of Natural Religion by the mere exercise of their inherent powers, or without an impulse brought to bear upon them from without. The doctrine of Mahomet, which proclaimed the unity of God, and revived some of the other truths of Natural Religion, affords no exception to this remark, but rather a confirmation of it; for that doctrine, as appears from every page

of the Koran, was an offshoot from Revelation. These analogous facts may be applied to confirm the Scriptural account of a primeval Revelation, followed by many subsequent disclosures of the Divine mind and will; and to show that, if a supernatural Revelation must be held to imply a departure, to some extent, from the ordinary course of nature, it does not imply any departure from what has been, from the beginning of the world, the usual course of the Divine procedure.

(639.) The English Deists of a former age generally agreed with Herbert of Cherbury in affirming the sufficiency of Natural Religion, and denying the necessity of any further Revelation from God. They were ably met, on this special ground, by many distinguished Apologists.* To most minds the shrewd remark of Paley, that few men feel, even with the Bible in their hands, as if they had more light than they need for their religious guidance,—viewed in connection with the undeniable fact that a pure system of Religious faith and worship has never existed except where the influence of Revelation was felt,—will afford a sufficient answer to all the declamations of Deists on this subject. It may be safely affirmed that the Theism of Lord Herbert and his followers, in so far as it is sound and true, is a mere reflection of the light of that Revelation whose authority it disowns. Were it only for the benefit which it has conferred on Natural Religion itself, by exhibiting pure and worthy conceptions of God, and enabling us to discern in nature a mirror of His perfections, the world would still be largely indebted to Revelation. It is conceivable that it might have been designed only for this end; and surely, on their own principles, all serious Deists must admit that, on this supposition, it would have been in accordance with the analogy of God's procedure in exhibiting a natural manifestation of His perfections, that He might be known, and worshipped, and obeyed by His intelligent offspring. A republication of Natural Religion might have become necessary, through the growing ignorance and degeneracy of men, with a view to the accomplishment of the very end which He contemplated in their creation, and which the whole doctrine of final causes declares to have been the knowledge and enjoyment of Himself. But in the

* Dr John Leland, "The Necessity of Divine Revelation," 2 vols. Professor Haliburton, of St Andrews, | "The Insufficiency of Natural Religion;" republished by Dr Robt. Burns, now of Toronto.

fallen state of human nature, such a revelation would not have been sufficient to supply our most urgent wants, or to secure our spiritual welfare; and the analogy of our whole experience teaches us to expect that it would be adapted to our condition, and adequate to our need.

(640.) When Deists affirm the sufficiency of natural light, and deny the necessity of supernatural Revelation, they must be met on a broader and more general ground than that on which some writers have chiefly insisted,—namely, the ignorance, depravity, and misery of man. This may determine the kind of revelation which he needs; but the necessity of a Revelation, in addition to the mere light of nature, may be proved by considerations of a more general kind, which are applicable to his original, as well as to his actual, condition. Such a revelation of God's mind and will might be necessary even in a state of pristine innocence and integrity. It might be necessary if man was to be brought into personal converse and fellowship with God,—and if he was to be taught God's mind and will on some subjects of serious importance to His safety and happiness, in regard to which he could derive no information from the light of nature. There were truths depending on the mere good pleasure of the Divine will which could only be made known by a revelation from Himself, and which were not revealed in His works of Creation and Providence. Man knew that he lived a holy and a happy life: but whether he was thus to live on for ever,—what was the tenure by which such a life was held,—and what were the terms, if any, by which its continuance might be secured,—these were questions which the light of nature might suggest, but could not solve; and without a revelation of God's will, he could have no ground of faith and hope in regard to them, although they involved his highest interests, temporal and eternal. These were, accordingly, the very questions which, as we learn from Scripture, were made the subject of a special revelation in the state of innocence itself;—questions which neither reason nor nature could have enabled man to answer for himself, but which God could answer by an authoritative intimation of His sovereign will. The first covenant of life, and that alone, revealed the terms or conditions on which a holy and happy state of existence should be secured for ever; and also its certain forfeiture on the violation of these terms. If a Revelation was necessary, at least to this extent, in a state of

pristine integrity, surely no one will affirm that it became less necessary after the fall : for that event gave rise to new questions of overwhelming magnitude and urgency, on which Natural Religion sheds no ray of light. They depend for their solution on the sovereign will and mere good pleasure of God. They are such as these—How will God deal with the transgressors of His holy and righteous law ? Will He punish them as their sins deserve ? Or will He pardon them and receive them again into His favour ? and if so, in what way, and on what terms ? These were, accordingly, the very questions which, as we learn from Scripture, were made the subject of a special Revelation immediately after the Fall. The second covenant of life, and that alone, revealed in the first promise of a Saviour God's purpose and plan of mercy towards the guilty, and pointed to the way in which it should be carried into effect. That promise was repeated, and explained, and amplified by a series of successive Revelations, until it was accomplished in the fulness of times. There is an obvious analogy between these two great revelations in this respect, that they both relate to questions which could only be determined by the sovereign will of God, and which the light of nature was neither designed nor fitted to answer ; while these questions were the most important which the mind of man could entertain, whether he was in a state of innocence and integrity, or in a state of sin and ruin. And this analogy between the two imparts a character of verisimilitude to the Scriptural account of both, as being consecutive, but consistent, developments of the same administration of Providence, adapted, only, to the different conditions of man.

(641.) It will be found, however, that the objection, as it is usually stated by Deists, is directed, not so much against the necessity of a Revelation in general, as against the substance of the Christian Revelation in particular. They deny the necessity of that remedial economy—that scheme of mediation and redemption—which the Gospel unfolds ; and affirm that, God being placable, the repentance and reformation of the sinner are sufficient to ensure His forgiveness and favour. Were this statement true, it might still be desirable, or even necessary, to have a revelation from God, at least, to this effect ; for assuredly, all analogy is against the efficacy of repentance and amendment of life in averting the penal consequences of past transgression.

But the statement is not true ; for the Law, as such, can contain no provision for the pardon of the offender ; it makes provision only for his punishment. If pardon be possible, it must come from another source, even from sovereign grace and mercy. God is placable, but He is also just : and the grand problem which the Gospel solves, and which Deism cannot seriously grapple with, is just this, How He can be the just God, and yet the Saviour of sinners ? It is by the scheme of Mediation and Redemption, and by that alone, that this question is answered. The Gospel does not say, as Deism does, " Repent, and you are sure of pardon ;" for this is a legal doctrine, in which repentance is substituted for perfect obedience ; but it proclaims " repentance and remission of sins in the name of Christ," and assures us that " He is exalted as a Prince and a Saviour," to bestow the one, not less than the other. Deism assumes that man is able of himself to " repent and turn to God ;" the Gospel, with a truer and deeper insight into his actual condition and character, holds him to be incapable of acceptable repentance until he has been brought under the power of the truth as it is in Jesus. Now if all analogy be against the efficacy even of a real repentance in averting the consequences of past transgression, and if, moreover, man is either unable to repent as he ought, or doubtful what kind of repentance will be sufficient, the necessity of a Revelation to assure us at least on these points must be admitted, even were it possible to dispense with the more peculiar lessons of Scripture in regard to the method of our redemption.

(642.) But the analogy of our experience shows still further, that a remedy must be adapted to the disease ; and there is nothing in the bare truths of Theism, apart from the remedial scheme of grace and redemption, that can cure, or even relieve, a sin-sick soul. If the end is to be accomplished, we cannot dispense with the means. The Deists in England, and the Theophilanthropists in France, failed in their attempt to institute a pure form of faith and worship, not because there was no truth in the principles which they respectively held, but because they omitted, or rejected, other truths which were necessary to give these principles a practical power over the hearts and consciences of men. The Deists were right in affirming the existence, the providence, and the government of God ; the Theophilanthropists were right in affirming that the substance of true religion consists in love to

God and love to man, for “on these two commandments hang all the law and the prophets:” but they were equally wrong in supposing that the belief of the truths, which they respectively inculcated, would suffice for the production of a real, vital, spiritual religion, apart from the peculiar doctrines of the Gospel. They failed, accordingly, in every attempt to extend or perpetuate their peculiar views. They have never been able to institute an organized Church, or to maintain, for any length of time, a form of public worship. They have no Schools for the instruction of the young, and no Missions for the education of the heathen. They have never attempted to establish a pure form of Natural Religion on the ruins of Polytheism and Idolatry. In short, Deism, considered as a Religion, is practically inefficient, simply because it is not adapted, as Christianity is, to the actual condition of man, and makes no provision for the most urgent wants of his soul. It is not fitted, as a means, to produce that warm, heartfelt, living piety which springs from faith in the peculiar doctrines of the Gospel. In the absence of that faith, it wants the motive power which alone can make the simple, but sublime, truths of Natural Religion itself effective as a rule of duty, or a spring of action.

(643.) We have referred to some of those analogies which are applicable to the intermediate scheme of Deism, as contradistinguished from Atheism, on the one hand, and from Christianity, on the other; and have offered a few specimens of the use which may be made of them, both in the way of neutralizing objections against a supernatural Revelation, and of affording a certain amount, less or more, of probability in its favour. Many other analogies, besides those which have been adduced and applied, might be derived from the different sources which have been indicated in a previous part of this treatise. It might be shown that Deism, in so far as it is purely Theistic, is analogous to Revealed Religion,—in respect to the conditions and laws of belief on which it depends,—in respect to the kind and amount of evidence to which it appeals,—in respect to the difficulties which are involved in it,—in respect to the mysteries which it implies,—and in respect to the objections which may be urged against it. In a full discussion of the Deistical controversy, all these analogies should be illustrated and applied; but it is sufficient for our present purpose to indicate the sources from which they may be derived, and the lines

of thought which they severally suggest to the mind of every thoughtful inquirer. We close the discussion with a few weighty remarks from the pen of a very thoughtful, able, and learned writer. "The man who has been accustomed to think concerning the power of the Creator and His relation to man, must be startled at the assertion that Revelation is impossible. He must feel that to deny God's ability to communicate immediately to the mind of man, or make man sensible of His presence, is to make Him inferior to the lowest of the human race. Men make themselves known, interchange ideas, learn from those who have lived in ages long since past, teach their fellows, communicate with those whom they never saw, and leave tokens of their existence, and monuments of the inmost working of their souls, to those who come after. Why cannot God do as much? . . . The Rationalist professes to believe that all the knowledge of truth at which man arrives, is owing to the original wisdom, will, and power of the Almighty, in giving man a certain intellectual constitution to be unfolded by the circumstances of human history and necessities,—that, therefore, moral and religious truth, such as the Rationalists acknowledge, are still to be ascribed to the purposes and power and efficacy of the Great Spirit, acting on that which is material and compound. Why, then, should it be impossible for the Creator to shorten the process—to help man in his painful and often unsuccessful search after truth,—and to make known that which exists in the Divine Mind and purpose? . . . If there ever was a period in duration in which God could act upon matter, or endue finite intelligences with the means and capability of knowledge, He can do so still. If He cannot now, He never could." *

* Dr A. M'Aull, "Thoughts on Rationalism," p. 31. See also in the "Eclipse of Faith," an admirable section showing that on the Deistical

scheme, "that which is possible with man, is impossible with God," pp. 73, 80, 93, 141.

CHAPTER III.

ANALOGY APPLIED TO THE CLAIMS OF RATIONALISM.

(644.) The use and the abuse of reason in Religion, is one of the most important questions of the present critical times. It is equally necessary to defend its legitimate use, in opposition to the blind submission which Romanism demands; and to condemn its lawless abuse, in opposition to the presumptuous arrogance which Rationalism inspires. The two opposite tendencies which are so characteristic of the age in which we live, and which have prevailed, more or less, at all times in the history of the Church,—the one towards a blind implicit faith, the other towards a sceptical free thinking such as seeks to be independent of all authority, human or divine,*—can only be effectually counteracted by showing to what extent reason may, and should be, exercised, and by what laws or limits it may, and must be, circumscribed. We think that this twofold object may be best accomplished, not by a process of abstract reasoning, but by a fair application of certain natural analogies.

(645.) The general position which we are prepared to lay down on this point may be thus stated;—That the same exercise of reason which is necessary and legitimate in interpreting the facts, and investigating the origin, of the System of Nature, is also necessary and legitimate in discovering the sense, and ascertaining the origin, of the Scheme of Revelation,—and that, *vice versa*, there may be, and has been, the same, or a similar, abuse of reason in the treatment of both. If this position can be established, the obvious analogy between the two cases in respect alike to the use and abuse of Reason, when combined with the important difference which must ever subsist between a Natural and Supernatural Revelation of truth, will be sufficient to show that if Rationalism

* Count Gasparin, "Les Ecoles du Doute et l'Ecole de la Foi," p. 7.

be, as the logic of Induction holds that it is, untenable in Philosophy, it is, *a fortiori*, untenable also in Religion.

(646.) A brief explanation of the facts on which this analogy depends, may be necessary to bring out and to place clearly before the minds of our readers the real state of the question. It is assumed, in the first instance, that there are two volumes before us—the volume of Nature, and the volume of Revelation,*—that they are both addressed to our intelligent faculties, and designed for our instruction,—and that our interpretation of the one is, and should be, in some respects, analogous to our interpretation of the other.† This being assumed, the question arises, how far, and in what respects, man's reason is related to each of the two volumes and concerned in the interpretation of them,—whether the use of reason with respect to the one may not be analogous to the use of reason with respect to the other,—and whether the same, or similar, evils may not arise in both cases from the abuse of reason, or from its being allowed to usurp a supremacy which does not rightfully belong to it?

(647.) The term Rationalism is employed to denote a system of opinion which, not content with the legitimate use, affirms the absolute supremacy, of Reason. It is susceptible of several modifications, and has assumed various forms. In its most general aspect it may be described as comprehending all those varieties of opinion which, however different in other respects, concur in this,—that they severally affirm the existence of a *subjective test* of some kind,—whether intellectual, moral, or æsthetic—which entitles man to sit in judgment on the works, and the ways, and the words of God, and to receive or reject whatever is taught by any of these means according to its conformity, or want of conformity, with this human standard. The mind of man is thus made the measure of the mind of God,—his intellect the criterion of God's omniscient knowledge and infinite wisdom,—his moral sense the test of God's procedure—of what He may, or may not do,—of what He may, or may not, permit to be done; and his feelings and affections, not only an index of similar sentiments in the mind of God, but an infallible proof of the manner in which He must feel and act towards His creatures, whatever may be the relations which He sustains towards them, and whatever the feelings

* Supra, Part II. c. 6, p. 285.

† Part II. c. 7, p. 291.

which they cherish, and the conduct which they pursue, towards Him. All the advocates of such a *subjective test* may be included under the common name of Rationalists;* but it may conduce to greater clearness if we confine our attention, in the first instance, to what may be called pure Rationalism, or rather, as Sir William Hamilton says, "Intellectualism," and reserve for subsequent consideration, on its own proper merits, the more refined system of modern spiritualism, which finds its test in the moral feelings and natural affections of the human mind.

(648.) Thus limited, our inquiry is directed to the proper functions of Reason, and by this we understand, generally, our cognitive faculties—all those faculties which constitute man an intelligent being, and which enable him to acquire knowledge or to receive instruction. It is not necessary for our present purpose to found on the psychological distinction between *intuitive* and *inferential* Reason; or to mark, with Stewart,† the difference between Reason and Reasoning; or, with Coleridge‡ and the German Schools, the difference between the Reason and the Understanding; or, with Morell,§ the difference between the Intuitional and the Logical Consciousness; for in our acceptation of the term, it comprehends both the one and the other, and experience has shown that each of the two has been employed alternately, or in combination, as a subjective rational test.

(649.) But it is necessary, in order to guard against a very common fallacy, to point out the ambiguous use, both in popular and philosophical language, of the term *Reason* itself. It is used to denote sometimes the intellectual faculty by which knowledge is acquired, and sometimes the object of that faculty, or the truth or error,—be it which it may,—which it apprehends and receives. These two senses of the term are essentially different, just as the eye differs from the object which it sees, or the ear from the sounds by which it is impressed. In the one case reason means man's intelligence, considered simply in itself, as a capacity or

* In this comprehensive sense, Rationalism is well described by Count Gasparin as "cette forme particulière de la liberté d'examen qui, non contente de s'assurer que Dieu parle, et d'étudier ce que Dieu dit, soumet les déclarations Divines au critère—de la raison,—de la conscience,—ou de senti-

ment."—"Les Ecoles du Doute et l'Ecole de la Foi," p. 353.

† Stewart's "Elements," II. 9, 67, 85, 290.

‡ Coleridge, "Aids," xviii. Pref., pp. 165, 170, 183, 196, 199.

§ Morell's "Philosophy of Religion," pp. 5, 24, 88, 124, 131.

power of conceiving and thinking; in the other, it is man's intelligence, considered as instructed and informed, well or ill, by the manifestations of objective truth which have been presented to it. And according as it is viewed in the one light or in the other, the use of reason with reference alike to natural and revealed truth, may be either presumptuous and rationalistic, or legitimate and right. If the mere faculty of reason, uninstructed and uninformed, were proposed as a criterion or test of anything that God has done or said, this would be pure and unmixed Rationalism; for, in that case, man's reason would be set up as the rival or antagonist—the measure or the criterion—of the wisdom of God. But if what we know by natural reason of the works and ways of God be brought into comparison with what we are taught to believe concerning Him by a Revelation of His mind and will, this would be a legitimate, and not a presumptuous exercise of our natural powers, since it would amount to nothing more than a comparison of one objective revelation of truth with another—a comparison of the natural with the supernatural Revelation. "Much misconception," says Dr Hampden, "would have been avoided, had that fallacy been commonly guarded against, which is involved in the use of the word Reason, to denote, at once, the knowledge naturally acquired by the mind, and the faculties or principles of the mind by which it is acquired. We are apt, when we speak of any truth as a truth of reason, to impose on ourselves by a tacit belief that it is a truth which is *taught by reason*; whereas, in reality, it is not *reason*, but *experience* which teaches us. The mere exercise of the faculties can teach us nothing. They may be employed, indeed, on themselves alone, and need no external objects in such a case as their material of instruction; but, even then, it is from inward observation, or experience of themselves as distinct, in respect of their existence, from their mere exercise, that they learn the truths relative to themselves. A truth then becomes a truth of human reason when the evidence of it is simply perceived by the mind—whose reason is thus informed, enlightened, and improved, as the *recipient*, and not the vehicle of knowledge."* The same distinction is marked by Joseph Glanville when he speaks of "reason in the faculty" and

* Dr Hampden, "The Philosophical Evidence of Christianity," p. 288; also 290, 292.

"reason in the object," and affirms that "intuitive truths and the conclusions deduced from them make up what we call Reason."* In like manner, De Bonald speaks of Reason as including "experience and analogy;" † and Dégérando describes it as comprehending three kinds of knowledge—"real, abstract, and mixed," ‡—that is a knowledge of facts, a knowledge of relations, and a knowledge in which both are combined. When we make use of the familiar expression, "It stands to reason," we mean not merely that the truth of which we speak commends itself to our intelligence, but that it does so because it is in harmony with other truths already acknowledged, which might be adduced as reasons for its being also believed.

(650.) This ambiguous use of the term Reason cannot be overlooked, in discussing the subject of Rationalism, without involving us in inextricable confusion of thought. There is evidently no Rationalism, in the obnoxious sense of that expression, when reason is merely exercised in the acquisition of knowledge, from whatever source that knowledge is derived,—when it occupies its proper position as a learner, and submits to be taught. The naked faculty, unfurnished by experience, is dormant; and even when stimulated into activity by external impulse, it can only act on the materials which experience supplies. So far from being independent and supreme, it is by the law of its nature a scholar and a subject, and it can only learn by being taught whatever it can really know. When it arrogates supremacy, it abdicates its proper function, which is that of a mere recipient of instruction. It can no more create or annihilate a truth than it can create or annihilate a world. It is true that all its knowledge is not derived from without, although an impulse from without seems to be necessary to originate it; for many facts are revealed in the light of consciousness, and many truths evolved from its intuitive perceptions by its own inherent power; but it is equally true that all its knowledge is derived from experience, external or internal,—and that it is taught whatever it is capable of learning, partly through the medium of sense, and partly through the medium of consciousness. If there be truths of pure reason which transcend

* Jos. Glanville's "Essays," p. 50; Essay 5, p. 5.

† De Bonald, "Recherches Philosophiques," II. p. 219.

‡ Dégérando, "Histoire Comparée," I. p. 73. See also J. H. Newman, "Theory of Religious Belief," p. 43.

experience, and are felt to be necessary, universal, unchangeable, and eternal, even these are derived from certain connatural laws of thought to which reason is subject, and the existence and operation of these laws can only be revealed in the light of our conscious experience. The laws themselves are prior to experience, and independent of it in respect to their origin; they are even necessary to make our actual experience possible; but as known to us, they are facts in our mental constitution, which can only be discovered by their own natural evidence. Everything that we know, or can know, must be derived from without or from within; and for whatever we know from within we are as dependent on experience as for what we know from without. Psychology depends on experience not less than Physics; and Mathematics itself, although it may be carried on indefinitely by the mere exercise of reason, is indebted to experience for its first conceptions of figure and magnitude, as well as for the intuitive perception of those relations, proportions, and analogies, on which its conclusions depend.

(651.) If this be a correct view of the right position, and proper functions, of Reason, it follows that there is nothing rationalistic in its exercise, when it is directed simply and solely to the acquisition of knowledge, by examining the evidence, and interpreting the meaning, of whatever truths are presented to it, whether they be natural or revealed; and that Rationalism, in the obnoxious sense of the term, commences only when Reason ceases to be a mere learner, and aspires to become a critic, arbiter, or judge, of these truths. Reason may be, and should be, subject to Truth; but Truth cannot, and must not, be subject to Reason. The truth is truth, whether reason recognises it or not; it may be received or rejected, but it is independent of human opinion, and claims a rightful authority over it. The usurped dominion of reason, considered as a faculty of the human mind, it utterly disowns; for reason, as such, is a scholar, and nothing more. But if reason be considered objectively, as denoting the whole body of truths which have been ascertained on sufficient evidence, there is nothing rationalistic in comparing one set of truths with another, derived from different sources, with the view of ascertaining their accord and analogy; or in contrasting known truths with doctrines which are still doubtful, even should the result be a manifest discrepancy or contrariety between the two. In either instance, we are not setting up the supremacy of reason in oppo-

sition to the authority of truth ; but comparing one set of truths, already known, with another set of doctrines, claiming to be received as true ; and this exercise of reason is alike legitimate and useful ; since, whatever may be the fallibility of reason, all truth must necessarily be self-consistent and harmonious.

(652.) The application of these principles to the subject in hand is most important. They are sufficient at once to vindicate the legitimate exercise of reason, in examining the evidence, and interpreting the meaning of every system of doctrine, whether natural or revealed, which is offered for our acceptance ; and also to exclude the lawless usurpation of reason, when, instead of being a scholar and a subject, it aspires to become, in its own right, an authoritative arbiter, and supreme judge, of truth. There is a sense in which reason is a judge, but its judgment is purely ministerial, not lordly. It must be governed, like every civil or criminal judge, by the authority of law, and the evidence of facts. Its decision, whether right or wrong, and whatever consequences may result from it, is final, so far as individual opinion is concerned,—for opinion must be determined by every man's private judgment ; but it is not final as a criterion of truth,—for reason is fallible, but truth cannot be affected by its erroneous decisions. Reason may receive or reject a truth, but it can neither alter its essential nature, nor destroy its proper evidence. Its only function is to examine the evidence and interpret the meaning of any lesson which is presented to it, whether in the volume of Nature or of Revelation.

(653.) The relation which the exercise of private judgment bears to the volume of Nature is strictly analogous to that which it bears to the volume of Revelation. The same exercise of reason, and no other, which is necessary and legitimate with reference to the one, is equally necessary and legitimate with reference to the other. And the exercise of private judgment in respect to both is all the more indispensable on account of the manner in which all our knowledge, whether of natural or religious truth, is first conveyed to us. It is not acquired, in the first instance, by the unaided and independent exercise of our individual reason ; it comes to us through the medium of parental instruction or other channels of traditional information. In the earlier stages of life—in infancy and childhood—the human mind is subject to domestic and social influences to which it is indebted for a large

portion of its knowledge, and for a time it is almost entirely dependent on human authority. But as its powers grow to maturity under the fostering care of parents and guardians, the season of minority and pupillage gradually draws to a close, and the time arrives when it must think, and judge, and act for itself. Not that it should now unlearn, or cast aside without sufficient reason, any one of the lessons which it had imbibed in earlier years, for most of these will be found to contain some element of useful knowledge; but that it is now able, and, being able, is entitled and even bound, from a sacred regard to truth, and with a view to its own safety and well-being, to test them all by bringing them to the touchstone either of experience, which is the standard of natural truth, or of Scripture, which is the standard of revealed truth. In doing so, reason is not a subjective test either of Nature or of Revelation; if it be a test at all, it is rather a test of mere *human teaching* or *traditional instruction*; and the criterion which it applies, when it either verifies or corrects the lessons which it had been taught, is not its own preconceptions or arbitrary fancies, but the Works of God, in the one case, and the Word of God in the other.

(654.) We are far from thinking that at any stage of life, and least of all at the critical period of transition from youth to manhood, it is either right, or necessary, or even possible, to divest ourselves of all our hereditary beliefs, and to commence the work of self-instruction anew from the Cartesian starting-point of initial doubt. Belief is the natural and normal result of those original laws of thought which come into spontaneous action when any kind of evidence is perceived, and which are prior to the process of reflection by which they are discerned, as well as presupposed in experience itself. Doubt is legitimate only where there is no evidence on either side, or equal evidence on both sides, of any question which engages our thoughts. We are not entitled to doubt, any more than to affirm or deny, without a reason; and that reason must be derived, in every instance, from the volume of Nature, if it be a natural truth which is in question, or from the volume of Revelation, if it be a religious one. We may retain, therefore, all the lessons of traditional instruction, until we find reason to believe that what we have been taught by man is at variance with what God teaches by His Works or in His word. Indeed we must retain many of them as long as we retain

the use of language, which is itself a tradition, and one which exerts a powerful and permanent influence on human thought. At no period of life are we required, or even warranted, to doubt the lessons of our childhood, except in so far as they are seen to be at variance with the teaching of Nature or of Revelation on the subjects to which they respectively relate. When they are clearly seen to be at variance with that teaching, reason submits to an authority which is Divine and infallible, in preference to one which is merely human and liable to err. It does not obey *its own* authority, for that is human and fallible also, and it would be presumptuous to set up the reason of an individual, contending even for truth, in opposition to the reason of multitudes, maintaining some prevailing error, were the authority on which he relies supposed to reside in his own rational powers; but that which nerves him with courage to face all opposition in the great conflict betwixt truth and error, is not any confidence in the superior strength of his own intellect, or any pretended supremacy over the minds of other men, but a conviction that what he teaches is taught by a higher authority than his own, and that it may be infallibly proved by the evidence of Nature, if it be a natural truth, or by the evidence of Scripture, if it be a revealed truth. In this proof reason has its proper place and function—but it is purely ministerial. It interprets, it compares, it judges, and its judgment is right or wrong, according as it agrees with, or differs from, the evidence. It has no supremacy; it recognises rather the supremacy of another authority,—the authority of Truth in Nature and Revelation.

(655.) Yet the exercise of private judgment, which is the right and the duty of every individual, has been supposed to imply the supremacy of reason, as the test and criterion of truth.* This is an egregious error, whether respect be had to natural or to revealed truth. Reason has its proper function and legitimate exercise in regard to both, but in regard to neither has it any legislative authority or autocratic power. It is, and ever must be, merely the “Minister et Interpres.” Bacon’s fundamental principle dethrones Reason from its usurped ascendancy both in Philosophy and Religion, and places it in subjection to Nature in

* Wegscheider, “Institutiones,” Proleg. I. 11. Martineau, “Rationale of Religious Belief,” pp. 64, 69, 84, 120.

the one case, and to Scripture in the other.* Luther contended, not for the supremacy of Reason, but for the supremacy of Revelation in matters of faith, just as Bacon contended, not for the supremacy of Reason, but for the supremacy of Nature in matters of Science. Each of the two effected a revolution in his own department, but it was a revolution by which arbitrary Reason was dethroned. What Luther achieved in the Church may be best illustrated by what Copernicus achieved in the Schools. Copernicus, finding that the earth was supposed to be the centre of the solar system, effected a revolution in the whole science of astronomy, simply by showing from the evidence of fact that, not the earth, but the sun, held that position, and that the earth and all the other planets were subject to his influence, and ordained to revolve, as satellites, around him. In like manner Luther, finding that either Reason, on the one hand, or the Church on the other, was supposed to be the paramount authority in matters of faith, effected a similar revolution in Theology, simply by showing that the Word of God is the supreme authority to which both Reason and the Church must yield submissive homage. The seat of authority was changed, but authority was still recognised,—the authority of God instead of the authority of man. One authority was only substituted for another, just as the sun replaced the earth as the centre of the solar system; and the new authority was not, as Hallam imagined, that of Luther and the Reformers,† but that of God speaking in His Word.

(656.) The constitution of the human race, and the general scheme of the world, are so framed as to provide for the gradual education, and the seasonable exercise, of individual reason; and yet to exclude, at the same time, all idea of its independence or supremacy. It will not be denied by Rationalists themselves that, in the earlier stages of life, every individual is indebted to authority for all the knowledge which he can then acquire,‡ or that this knowledge can only be verified or corrected, at a later stage, by bringing it to the touchstone of fact, as made known by experience. This being undeniably true both of our natural and religious knowledge, it is evident that Rationalism has no place at least in the

* Field, "Analogical Philosophy," I. li. Riambourg, "Rationalisme et Tradition," pp. 101, 104, 129, 149, 220, 450.

† Hallam's "History of Literature," I. 524; II. 13; III. 77.

‡ Birks, "Modern Rationalism," p. 44.

earlier stages of human development. Many lessons are then taught, the full evidence of which cannot be appreciated until we begin to think and judge for ourselves. Rationalism may object and say, that the child being incapable as yet of appreciating the evidence, should be allowed to grow up, without having his mind preoccupied by instruction which may be true or false, until he reaches the age at which he becomes an intelligent and responsible agent. And were the constitution of our race, or the general scheme of the world, framed on rationalistic principles, or were no other means employed than the mere exercise of individual judgment in the education of the human mind, the objection might have some weight. But as matters stand, it only serves to show that the scheme of the world is not in accordance, but in direct antagonism, with the scheme of Rationalism, in so far as the earlier stages of human life are concerned; for unquestionably, children are dependent in every respect on their parents, and indebted to their instruction, in the first instance, for all the knowledge they are capable of acquiring, whether of natural or of religious truth. This knowledge may not be *rational*, in the sense of being the result of private judgment exercised on the evidence of truth; but it is eminently *rational*, as being in conformity with the laws of infant intelligence, and with the relation which supreme Reason has established between parent and child. A time, however, arrives when every man must judge and act for himself on his own personal responsibility; and it seems to be supposed by many, that at this critical turning-point, reason, which was subordinate before, is emancipated from all authority, and suddenly becomes autocratic and supreme. In point of fact, it rises only from a lower to a higher form in the same school;—it is a scholar still; and it only exchanges the teaching of parents, for the lessons of nature and experience, in regard to natural truth, and the lessons of Scripture, in regard to Religious truth.

(657.) The only question of any real difficulty, so far as the claims of Rationalism are concerned, arises from the fact that Christian Apologists appeal to the *internal* evidence of Scripture, as well as to its historical proofs. In doing so, they have been supposed to concede the principle for which Rationalists contend, and to admit that every man is at liberty to sit in judgment on the contents of Scripture with the view of deciding, in the first instance, whether it be worthy to be received as a Revelation from

God, to whatever extent he may be bound to defer to it, in the second instance, after its authority has been established. They are charged with inconsistency in this respect, as if they allowed at one time, and prohibited at another, the free exercise of Reason on the contents of Scripture. The objection is thus stated by a recent Socinian writer. “‘Once admit,’ says the pleader for faith in spite of reason,—‘once admit that God has said this or that; and then, however incomprehensible and confounding it may be, we must believe it.’ Very true. Most certainly we shall believe it, for the admission that God has said it, would be the highest possible proof of it.” But “one, at least, of the conditions for securing from us the acknowledgment that God has said or revealed what claims our belief as from Him, is that we can believe it of Him. If we cannot believe it of God, we cannot admit it to have come from Him.”* Here a distinction is made between the function of Reason before, and after, the establishment of the Divine authority of Revelation; and it seems to be admitted that, while free inquiry is legitimate in the study of its evidence, absolute submission is due as soon as that inquiry has resulted in the recognition of its claims. Mr Martineau raises the question whether the Gospel “is not a system of perfect Rationalism, and does not encourage the unreserved application of our understandings to its records, and their various contents of history, miracle, and doctrine?” and proceeds to show that “when the Scriptures are placed in our hands we have *two* operations to perform on them,—first, to draw forth their meaning, that is, to reach the original ideas of the authors; secondly, having obtained those ideas as nearly as we can, to yield to them the right treatment, and determine whether we are to look for additional evidence of their truth, or to receive them without further demur.” The second of these two operations must surely depend, to a large extent, on the settlement of a previous question,—namely, whether the Scriptures are to be received as the word of God or only as the word of man; for on the former supposition, we are certainly bound to believe whatever it teaches, since, as Mr Ellis admits, His word is the best possible proof. In all fairness, that preliminary question should be decided in the first instance, for the Divine authority of Scripture, if it be once established, will of itself determine what treatment is due to it. Mr

* G. E. Ellis, “Half Century of Unitarianism,” p. 294.

Martineau refers to this view of the case :—"If you are satisfied that they (the sacred writers) were inspired men, you must receive their announcements as authoritative ; they possess the highest proof, and are recommended by the attestation of God ;" and he adds—"This argument has been almost universally held to be satisfactory. Its force has been admitted by Unitarian, not less than by Orthodox, Christians ; and, in accordance with it, the former have repeatedly said,—If we could find the doctrines of the Trinity and the Atonement, and everlasting torments in the Scriptures, we should believe them : we reject them, not because we deem them unreasonable, but because we perceive them to be unscriptural. For my own part, I confess myself unable to adopt this language. . . . I am prepared to maintain, that if they were in the Bible, they would still be incredible ; that the intrinsic evidence against a doctrine may be such as to baffle all the powers of external proof ; and that, in every case, the natural improbability of a tenet is not to be set aside as a forbidden topic, but to be weighed *as an essential part of the evidence* which must determine its acceptance or rejection. . . . I will endeavour to make it clear that no inspiration whatever can establish anything contrary to reason ; that reason is the ultimate appeal, the supreme tribunal, to the test of which even Scripture must be brought."*

(658.) The whole force of this reasoning evidently depends on the supposition that the Divine authority of Scripture is still in question ; and it has no relevancy, as an argument in favour of Rationalism, after that fundamental question has been determined. It might be applied in favour of infidel Rationalism, but cannot be applied in favour of Christian Rationalism. It is founded entirely on the idea that a book, professing to be a Revelation from God, may contain doctrines which can be clearly proved to be at direct variance with the dictates of reason, considered not simply as a faculty of the human mind, but as a faculty instructed and informed by a natural manifestation of truth and evidence ; and that the mere fact of its containing such doctrines is a sufficient refutation of its claims. Were this fact established, it would seem to lead, not to the partial recognition, but to the total rejection, of its authority ; and the Deist would be more consistent than the Socinian. But inconclusive as it may be in favour of Socinian

* Martineau, "Rationale of Religious Belief," pp. 55, 56, 64.

Rationalism, it raises an important question which the Christian apologist is bound to face—namely, how far his appeal to the *internal evidence* of Scripture is consistent with his denunciation of reason as “the ultimate appeal,—the supreme tribunal,—the test to which even Scripture must be brought”?

(659.) We think that the use of the internal evidence may be vindicated, as a means of establishing the Divine authority of Scripture, without involving the slightest complicity with Rationalism, in the obnoxious sense of that expression. It implies, indeed, the exercise of Reason, but it is very far from implying its supremacy. If the Bible be the Word of God, it may be presumed to contain some internal evidence of its Divine origin, just as the System of Nature does; and if it be true that “God has magnified His Word above all His name,” we may expect to find there even a more signal manifestation of His perfections than in Nature itself. But in studying the internal evidence which Nature exhibits of its Divine origin, reason is subordinate, not supreme;—it is a mere observer,—a scholar,—an interpreter; intelligent, no doubt, but intelligent only in so far as it is instructed by the light of nature,—and judicial too, in the sense of judging for itself, but only right, in so far as its judgment is according to the evidence. In the same sense, and to the same extent, Reason, considered simply as a faculty of the mind, may be exercised on the internal evidence of Scripture, and may find there as decisive proofs of its Divine origin as any which it can possibly discover of the Divine origin of Nature. In either case, it is governed by truth and its evidence, according to the natural laws of thought.

(660.) But here it is peculiarly necessary to distinguish between reason, considered as a naked faculty of the human mind, and reason considered as instructed and informed by experience; in other words, between the faculty which forms opinions, and the opinions which are formed by it. In the common use of the term, it will be found to denote, not the mere faculty which is exercised on the works and ways of God, but the opinions which we have been led to form concerning them. This is implied in Wegscheider’s axiom that “religion is revealed to men in no other manner than that which is agreeable both to *the nature of things*, and to reason as the witness and *interpreter of Divine providence*; and that the subject-matter of every supposed supernatural Reve-

lation is to be examined and judged *according to the ideas regarding religion and morality, which we have formed in the mind by the help of reason.*"* The same meaning of the term is recognised by our best English writers;† and, indeed, if Rationalists are to give any *reason* for their unbelief, other than the mere fact that such is the decision of their judgment, they can only find it in the facts which they have observed in Nature and Providence. When they say, then, that reason, *in this sense*, is "the ultimate appeal, the supreme tribunal, the test to which even Scripture must be brought," they virtually assume that the opinions which men are led to form by the unassisted light of nature—whatever these opinions may be, whether they be true or false, whether they be well or ill founded—must be the criterion by which they are to judge of the claims of any possible Revelation from God.—It is a supposable case that these opinions may be wrong, and that Revelation may be designed for this among other ends, to rectify them, by placing the truths of Natural Religion itself in a clearer and stronger light, and thereby dispelling the darkness of superstition, and establishing a truly rational religion. Shall we hold that the very errors which Revelation is designed to correct must be the test of its claims to be received as Divine? or that Natural Religion, in its various forms as Fetichism, Polytheism, and Idolatry, may be warrantably applied to disprove the pure Theism of Scripture, simply because they are directly opposed to it? No one will answer these questions in the affirmative. It will be admitted on all hands that only a true and pure system of Natural

* Wegscheider, "Institutiones," § 11, p. 47. "Ex ideis ad religionem moresque spectantibus, quas rationis ope animo informatas habemus, atque ex aliis rebus cognitis, quarum veritas *intelligenti* cuique ac *docto* existimatori perspicua est."

Wegscheider's "Institutiones Dogmaticæ" passed rapidly through eight editions from 1817 to 1844, and may be still regarded as the highest authority on the subject of Rationalism. One of the best answers to it will be found in the "Prælectiones" of Perrone, Divinity Professor at Rome, although the scholastic method of introducing every clause by a *Distinguo*, or *Conceditur*, or *Negatur*, if it may be said to conduce

in some cases to clearness of statement, is felt to be somewhat dry by a reader accustomed to English modes of discussion.

† Wm. Law, "The Case of Reason or Natural Religion Stated," 1774, which was printed also anonymously under the title of "The Nature, Extent, and Province of Human Reason," 1792, pp. 108–112. Robert Ferguson, "The Interest of Reason in Religion," 14, 18, 28, 62, 232, 241. Dr Shuttleworth, "Consistency of Religion," 33, 38, 41, 55. Dr Young, "The Province of Reason," p. 23. Dr Hampden, "Essay on the Philosophical Evidence," p. 288.

Religion, were that attainable by the unassisted efforts of Reason, could be in any sense a test of those truths which are common to Nature and Revelation;—and even then the question would remain, whether such a system could afford an adequate measure or criterion of those other truths which may be peculiar to Revelation alone, and which, as being undiscoverable by the light of Nature, can only be made known by a supernatural expression of God's mind and will. It is their conformity to *right reason*,—that is, to reason enlightened by truth,—which imparts to the lessons of Natural Religion itself their only claim on our belief; and considering the various forms which it has successively assumed, there would seem to be fully as much need of a test of Natural, as of Revealed, Religion,—or an authoritative republication of the truth in opposition to the countless errors concerning it which have universally prevailed where the light of Revelation has not been enjoyed.

(661.) The use of the phrase “internal evidence” has sometimes led to a misconception of its real nature. It is strictly applicable only to that evidence which arises from a comparison of one part of Scripture with another, and includes all the harmonies and analogies which subsist between its various contents. It has been extended, however, so as to embrace all that evidence which arises from a comparison of the contents of Revelation with our common natural knowledge, and which may be applied to prove either their agreement or analogy. This latter kind of evidence is materially different from the former; for while it may be said to be *internal*, since the truths of Natural Religion are contained in Scripture, it is quite as much entitled to be called *external*, since it depends on facts which have an existence in Nature, and are independent of Revelation. The use of this kind of internal evidence, therefore, is not a proof *a priori* directed to ascertain the claims of a Revelation by its accordance with our preconceived opinions, whatever these may be; it is the very reverse of this, for it proceeds on a careful induction and comparison of the facts of Nature and the facts of Scripture. It is not Rationalistic, therefore, unless the mere exercise of Reason in relation to Religion, whether Natural or Revealed, must be denounced as such. It consists mainly in an appeal, not to Reason, but to Experience and Analogy.* And nothing can show more clearly the impor-

* Dr Hampden, “Philosophical Evidence,” pp. i. ii. iv.

tant place which Analogy holds in connection with the whole scheme of our Religious knowledge, and the valuable service which it may render in matters of faith, than the fact that, while it constitutes a firm bond of connection between Natural and Revealed Religion, it serves at once to vindicate the legitimate use of Reason, and to repel the presumptuous encroachments of Rationalism, in regard to both.

(662.) Such being the legitimate exercise, and the necessary subordination, of Reason, considered as a faculty of the human mind, there can be little difficulty in disproving the claims of Rationalism, with reference either to Nature or to Revelation. Our natural knowledge supplies an analogy in *favour* of the legitimate exercise of private judgment in regard to religion; it also supplies an analogy in *opposition* to the presumptuous claims of reason when it arrogates superiority, instead of yielding submission, to the authority of truth; while the fact that Rationalism has appeared equally in the domain of Philosophy and of Faith, and has given rise in both to similar errors, lays a firm foundation for reasoning by Analogy from the one to the other.

(663.) It is necessary, however, to form, in the first instance, a distinct and definite conception of what Rationalism is, and of the grounds on which its claims are based. For there are several varieties of it, which differ from each other in several important respects, while they may be shown to rest ultimately on the same radical principle. There is a professedly Christian, there is also a Deistic, and even an Atheistic, Rationalism. The first recognises the Supernatural, to some extent, in Revelation; the second rejects the Supernatural in Revelation, but recognises it in Nature; the third rejects the Supernatural in both. Of the Rationalism which is professedly Christian, and which acknowledges, to some extent, the authority of Scripture as containing a Revelation from God, there are many distinct shades or modifications. In one of its forms it is a sort of religious Eclecticism, which claims and exercises the right to receive some of the lessons of Scripture, while it rejects others, although they are all equally sanctioned by the same authority; to receive, for instance, the truths of Natural Religion and the code of moral duty as taught by the sacred writers, and yet to reject the peculiar doctrines of Christianity as

a scheme of Grace, and Redemption. In this form it appeared among the earlier Socinians, and is exemplified in such writings as those of Priestley and Belsham. In another of its forms, it is a sort of Biblical Criticism, which claims and exercises the right to sit in judgment on the Scriptures, and to receive or reject certain books, or parts of books, not according to the evidence of their canonical authority, but according to their agreement or disagreement with certain subjective tests. In this form it has long prevailed in the schools of Germany, and is represented in such writings as those of Eichhorn and De Wette. In another form, it is a sort of Neologian Exegesis—a method of interpreting Scripture in a non-natural sense, by giving a new meaning to old words, so as to retain “the letter” while “the spirit” is rejected, and to substitute for a Scriptural truth some philosophic dogma. In this form it has long prevailed in Germany, where the Fall, the Trinity, the Incarnation, the Atonement, and the Resurrection of Christ, are still spoken of, but in a sense which no scholar will affirm to be the real meaning of these terms as employed by the sacred writers.* It must be evident that, in some of these forms, there is no more than a nominal difference between Christian and infidel Rationalism; and we cannot be much surprised should we find it exchanging the one form for the other, and attempting with Paulus to explain away all miracles by ascribing them to natural causes, or to account for the origin of Christianity itself by the Mythical theory of Strauss. But Rationalism, when thus developed, will soon emancipate itself from all authority, human or Divine, and will assume the form at least of Deism, which denies God to be the Author of Revelation, or even of Atheism, which denies God to be the Author of Nature. This is its ultimate goal or landing-place; the final result of Rationalism consistently carried out by a rigorous logic, and applied to Nature as well as to Revelation. And accordingly, what is now called Rationalism by the more advanced disciples of this school, is neither the old Socinianism, nor the new Criticism, nor even the effete Deism of a former age, but what is known in England under the name of Secularism, and on the Continent under the name of Positivism, which denies the supernatural altogether, and rejects all know-

* Maret, “Essai sur Pantheisme,” | Saintes, “Histoire Critique du Ra-
pp. 30, 266, 285, 330, 342. Amand | tionalisme en Allemagne,” *passim*.

ledge of God, whether as the Author of Nature or of Revelation.*

(664.) The various forms of Rationalism to which we have referred differ from each other in some respects, but they are all founded on the same radical principle,—the independence and supremacy of Reason, as contradistinguished from, and opposed to, the authority of Truth and its Evidence. This principle is common to Rationalism in philosophy, and Rationalism in Religion, and it constitutes the ground of the analogy which subsists between the two. If it can be shown, therefore, that Rationalism in philosophy is excluded by the Baconian principle, which inculcates the mere interpretation of Nature, analogy will lead us to infer that it is equally excluded in Religion, which, in so far as it is Revealed, depends on the mere interpretation of Scripture.

(665.) Many speak of Rationalism in Religion, and admit or advocate its claims, as if they had never heard of Rationalism in Science, or of its manifest contrariety to the whole spirit and method of Inductive inquiry. Yet Rationalism has been as rampant, and as injurious, in the domain of Natural, as in that of Revealed, truth: and not only so, but in reference to both it has assumed two distinct forms, which will be found, when duly considered, to exhibit a striking analogy between the aberrations of Reason in respect to both.

* Holyoake, "Trial of Theism." Comte, "Cours de la Philosophie Positive." Littré on "Positivisme."

A remarkable proof of the statement in the text is supplied by the title of one of the most recent works on the subject,—*"LE RATIONALISME,"* par Ausonio Franchi, an Italian, edited, in French, by D. Bancel (Brussels, 1858), which is directed to the object of showing that Rationalism is equally opposed to Natural, and to Revealed, Religion. The fundamental principle of Rationalism, as equally opposed to both, is thus stated: "Il s'agit ici du principe,—du criterium que l'on doit adopter dans les choses de religion; le Theologiens le placent dans une revelation de Dieu; les Philosophes dans la raison naturelle de l'homme: les premiers veulent donc que la raison soit subordonnée à la foi, les seconds que la foi soit subor-

donnée à la raison. Le système de ceux-là est donc la surnaturalité, puis qu'il a pour point de départ un principe surnaturel. . . . Au contraire, le système de ceux-ci est le Rationalisme, en tant que le principe d'où il dérive, le criterium qu'il emploie, l'ordre de connoissances qu'il embrasse, ne sont autre chose que—la raison contenue dans les limites de la science, dans les bornes de la nature humaine et mondaine,—c'est à dire, entre la double série de lois qui constituent la vérité et la certitude; les lois des choses qui se presentent à l'esprit (élément objectif), et les lois de l'esprit qui append les choses (élément subjectif),—lois qui toutes procèdent uniquement de la nature même de l'esprit et de la nature de choses, et qui ne dependent de l'arbitraire ni de l'autorité de personne."—P. 12.

(666.) The first form of Rationalism in Science is that which affirms the supremacy of *individual reason*, and makes the private judgment, or, in other words, the personal opinion, of every man the criterion of truth to him, instead of making truth and its evidence the rule by which his opinion must be tested and tried. The opponents of Rationalism do not deny that every man is free to judge for himself, or that his judgment, be it right or wrong, must be decisive, so far as his personal opinion is concerned. He is as much entitled to exercise his individual reason in thinking, as he is "to see only with his own eyes, or to hear only with his own ears;" and, in point of fact, "their own reason always did, does, and ever will govern rational creatures in everything they determine, either in speculation or practice."* So far from objecting to the use of reason, we regret that it is so seldom, and so imperfectly, exercised with reference alike to our temporal and spiritual interests,—that it is so often blinded by ignorance, or biassed by passion, or misled by prejudice. What we object to is, the alleged independence and supremacy of individual reason; and what we contend for is, its necessary subjection to truth and the evidence of truth. The opinion of one man is not the criterion or rule of any other man's opinion, and much less can it be the test of truth. Were it the supreme authority, every man would be a sort of rational Pope, but unfortunately no one would be bound to acquiesce in his judgment, since all men, in that respect, are equal. On that supposition, there would be as many "supreme arbiters" as there are men in the world; and the mere opinion of one man might be urged as decisive against the opinion of every other. Free thinking, founded on this principle, might easily and naturally degenerate into the very intolerance which it has so often denounced, were it not that it would more probably terminate in utter scepticism or indifference in regard to the claims of truth. The mere fact of the amazing diversities of opinion which have prevailed on almost every subject of human thought is sufficient of itself to disprove the claims of *individual reason* to be regarded as

* Law, "Case of Reason Stated," p. 106.

"My reason," says Sir William Jones, "such as it is, can only be controlled by better reason, to which I am ever open. As to my freedom of thought, speech, and action, I shall

ever say what Charles XII. wrote under the map of Riga, 'Dieu me l'a donné; le diable ne me l'ôtera pas.'"
—Letter to Gibbon, in the *Memoirs* of the latter, p. 304. See Albert Barnes, "Science and Theology," p. 269.

the supreme authority in any department of knowledge. Yet such is the character that has been ascribed to it by a large class of Rationalists.*

(667.) The Rationalism, which has hitherto been spoken of, places the supreme authority in the decisions of every man's private judgment on the facts or truths which have been presented to it; but there is another kind of Rationalism in science, which is founded, not on the judgment of the understanding, but on the ideas or intuitions of, what has been called, pure Reason. Reason is supposed to be, not the recipient, but the revealer of certain truths, which mere experience could neither suggest nor prove. The question as to the origin of our ideas is one which has divided Psychologists in all ages. Some have held that all our knowledge is derived from experience,—this term being used in a comprehensive sense to denote our internal consciousness, as well as our external senses. Others have held that we possess cognitions which are not supplied by mere experience, but far transcend it, and which are generated by pure Reason, as being in itself a natural Revelation of truth. A third party, seeking to conciliate and combine both opinions, has held that, while a large portion of our knowledge is the product of experience, there are certain "cognitions native to the mind" or "generated by original laws of thought," which experience does not supply, although it is the occasion of their development, as being the means of stimulating reason into active exercise. The system of Psychology which exalts Reason above Experience, has been called Rationalism in Philosophy, just as the system of Theology which exalts Reason above Scripture has been called Rationalism in Religion. Dégérando has shown that all the various sects in Philosophy have originated in different views in regard to the relation between the subject and object—the two factors—of human knowledge;—and that Experience and Reason have been always the two great rivals, which have given birth respectively to Induction and to Rationalism.† The latter is thus described by Sir William Hamilton:—"Rationalism (more properly Intellectualism) has, from the time of Leibnitz, always remained the favourite philosophy of the Ger-

* Spinoza, "Tractus Theologico-Politicus," pp. 64, 100, 184, 234.
Gerbet, "De la Certitude," pp. 93, 188, 192, 194. Maret, "Panthéisme,"

p. 71. Comte, "Cours," V. 638, 734.
Gasparin, "L'Ecoles," pp. 166, 353

† Dégérando, "Histoire Comparée," vol. I. p. 24; vol. II. 358, 360.

mans. On the principle of this doctrine, it is in Reason *alone* that truth and reality are to be found. Experience affords only the occasions on which Intelligence reveals to us the necessary and universal notions of which it is the complement; and those notions constitute at once the foundation of all reasoning, and the guarantee of our whole knowledge of reality. Kant pronounced the philosophy of Rationalism a mere fabric of delusion. . . . But from the very disciples of his school, there arose philosophers who, despising the contracted limits, and humble results, of a philosophy of observation, re-established, as the predominant opinion, a bolder and more uncompromising Rationalism. . . . Founded by Fichte, but evolved by Schelling, this doctrine regards Experience as unworthy of the name of Science. . . . Philosophy, therefore, must either be abandoned, or we must be able to seize the One, the Absolute, the Unconditioned, immediately and in itself. And this they profess to do by a kind of *intellectual vision*. In this act, Reason, soaring not only above the world of sense, but beyond the sphere of personal consciousness, boldly places itself at the very centre of absolute being, with which it claims to be, in fact, identified; and thence, surveying existence in itself, and in its relations, unveils to us the nature of the Deity, and explains, from first to last, the derivation of all created things." *

(668.) To this sort of Rationalism we are to trace all those attempts to construct a *deductive science*,—a *deductive history*,—a *deductive scheme of the world*, a *deductive theory of Religion*, and even of *any possible Revelation*,† which have found so much favour in Germany, but which are so directly opposed to the inductive philosophy of England. The question in regard to the origin of our ideas, and the existence of such an "intellectual vision" as the Germans pretend to, we regard as simply a question in Psychology, which can only be determined by an appeal to our conscious experience, and which has little or no bearing on the claims of Rationalism, except in so far as it affords a proof that Reason has aspired to override Nature, as well as Revelation. The ideas of pure Reason are not innate, but acquired; they are occasioned at least, if they cannot be said to be supplied, by expe-

* Sir William Hamilton, "Discussions," p. 7.

† Sedgwick, "Discourse," 5th Ed., Pref. pp. cclxvi. ccci. Frank, "Cer-

titude," p. 133. Javari, "Certitude," pp. 148, 155. Maret, "Panthéisme," pp. 15, 17, 276, 315, 327. Dégérando, "Signes," vol. IV. p. 214.

rience. Some may trace them to certain laws of thought which are connatural to the mind, and which can only be regarded as ultimate facts or first principles impressed on its constitution, involved in every act of intelligence, and incapable of being either proved or disproved by any process of reasoning. Others, seeking to reduce the number, if they cannot altogether deny the existence, of such ultimate facts, may attempt to show, by a rigorous analysis, that not a few of what are called the ideas of reason may be ascribed to the operation of our mental faculties in comparing, discriminating, and, by the aid of abstraction, generalizing the facts of nature and experience. But whatever account may be given of their origin, they must remain utterly barren, or could give birth only to ideal or abstract, as distinguished from concrete or real, knowledge, until the laws of thought are applied to the data of consciousness and observation. It is consciousness which reveals to us the existence of these laws; and Leibnitz endeavoured to show that the criterion for discriminating between our "native and adventitious knowledge" is the character of *universality and necessity* which belongs to the former,*—a character which can only be ascertained by an appeal to experience. There may be many different opinions in regard to the psychological explanation of those facts which are revealed in consciousness; but the question as to the right relation between Reason and Nature, on the one hand, or between Reason and Revelation, on the other, cannot be materially affected by them, unless it could be shown that Reason is so self-sufficient as to be independent of all instruction from without, or that our "intellectual vision" is so immediate and infallible as to have some resemblance to Omniscience itself. And Rationalism, in its more mature development, seems not to shrink from entertaining even such suppositions as these.

(669.) The *second* form of Rationalism in Science is that which affirms the supremacy, not of *individual*, but of *generic*, Reason,—the reason not of each person, but of the race to which he belongs. The manifold diversities, and the ceaseless collision and conflict, of opinion, which have arisen from the exercise of private judgment, were felt to be a sufficient proof that individual reason could not be the standard or test of truth; and that its claim to be regarded as the "supreme tribunal," and the "final arbiter," could not be

* Sir William Hamilton, "Lectures on Metaphysics," II. pp. 350-358.

maintained, in the face of these facts, without exposing its advocates to scathing ridicule, as well as to unanswerable refutation. But the independence and supremacy of Reason must be maintained notwithstanding; and therefore, while the individual reason, which is the only real reason in the world, is abandoned and left to shift for itself, recourse is had to a mere abstraction of the human mind,—to reason, considered not as individual, but as impersonal; not as existing and acting in this or that man, but as pervading humanity, and common to all men, of whatever age or clime.

(670.) In this form, Rationalism in Science may appear, at first sight, to be nothing more than the doctrine of *common sense*, as taught by Reid and Hamilton, which authorizes an appeal from individual judgment to the universal reason of mankind. But, in point of fact, the appeal of the Scottish School was addressed,—not to an abstraction—not to an “impersonal reason,”—not to humanity considered as “a colossal man,”—but to the consciousness of individuals, and to common consent only as an evidence that the same laws of thought existed and operated everywhere, and at all times. This was a legitimate appeal to experience, individual and general, and was neither more nor less than an application of the Inductive method to the facts of Psychology. But the Rationalism which is founded on the claims, not of individual, but of Generic, Reason, is widely different from this, as the following facts will show.

(671.) M. Cousin, and the Eclectic school in France, not content with the doctrine of Common Sense as taught by Reid and the Scottish School, have transformed it by the addition of new views imported from Germany, and have thereby erected Reason into an infallible authority to which Science and Religion must equally defer. The Reason of which he speaks, is not reason as it exists in individual men, but reason as it is common to the race—the pervading intelligence of humanity; and this is described as absolute and universal,—as impersonal, independent, and authoritative,—and even as infallible and Divine.* The theory is not

* Cousin, “Cours de Philosophie” (Brussels Edition), I. 124, 127, 13, 155, 164; II. 37, 117, 138; III. 419. Javari, “De la Certitude,” p. 381. Vera, “De la Certitude,” pp. 52, 215, 218. Gerbet, “De la Certitude,” p. 195. Crousse, “Principes,” p. 259. Perron, p. 379. Amand Saintes, “Vie de Spinoza,” pp. 214, 315. Maret, “Pantheisme,” pp. ix. xv. 13, 41, 85. Valroger, “Etudes,” pp. 76, 202, 364.

original; it is described by Hallam as "a doctrine first held by Averroes,—that there is one common intelligence, active, immortal, indivisible—unconnected with matter—the soul of mankind; which is not in any one man, because it has no material form, but which yet assists in the rational operations of each man's personal soul, and from these operations, which are all conversant with particulars, derives its own knowledge of universals. . . . The leading tenet of Averrhoism was the numerical unity of the soul of mankind, notwithstanding its partition among millions of living individuals."* In like manner, Cousin speaks of a Generic Reason which has the same relation to individual souls as the sun has to every member of the solar system, and is "the true light which lighteth every man that cometh into the world." But this Reason must either be a Person—the Supreme Reason, the God of truth,—or it is a mere abstraction of the human mind. Admitting, as we do in the case of the Trinity, that there may be unity of essence where there is a plurality of persons, we are ready to consider any evidence which can be adduced to show that a *similar* unity and plurality may be predicated of the human race. No such evidence has been, or can be, discovered. The Reason of which Cousin speaks is "impersonal," and, in this respect, unlike the will, which is said to constitute individual personality; and it is nothing more than an abstract term which expresses our conception of what is common to the race as intelligent beings, and may be found in all the individuals of which it is composed. Were it anything else than this, and were it still held to be the sovereign test and supreme arbiter of truth, it would be incumbent on Rationalists to show in what way the dictates of this impersonal Reason can be ascertained by individual minds, and applied for their personal instruction; and were they to undertake this task, they would find that their favourite theory is liable to the same objections which they have themselves urged against the use of Revelation as advocated by the Theological School.†

(672.) This form of Rationalism, founded on the idea of a Generic, impersonal Reason, may be said to have reached its culminating point in the writings of Pierre Leroux, and the Humani-

* Hallam, "Literature of Europe," vol. I. pp. 274, 537.

† M. Perron, "Idées Fondamentales," p. 105.

tarian School in France.* With them Humanity, not in the concrete, still less in its individual specimens, but in its abstract idea, is the only God they acknowledge; reason reveals itself, and is the only revelation, but even this is variable and progressive—for all our knowledge is phenomenal, and truth itself fluctuating and mobile. And this impersonal Humanity,—this Generic Reason—these mere abstractions of the human mind, must be accepted instead of any objective revelation whether of natural or of religious truth!

(673.) Such are the forms which Rationalism has successively assumed in the field of Natural Science and Speculative Philosophy. It is surely an instructive fact, and one which can be applied, on the principle of analogy, to the refutation of many prevailing errors, that the same or similar forms of Rationalism have appeared also on the domain of Religion.

(674.) Rationalism in Religion, like Rationalism in Philosophy, has sometimes been founded on the supposed prerogatives of individual reason. The right of private judgment, as it was asserted and exercised by the Reformers, has been said to involve the principle, or to contain the germ, of which modern Rationalism is only the natural and logical development. The statement might have had some appearance of truth had the Reformers, when they rejected the authority of the Church, appealed to the authority of Reason. But they never did so; they appealed to another authority altogether, and one which they justly conceived to be superior both to Reason and the Church,—the authority of God speaking in His Word. This is admitted by Perrone himself when he draws a distinction between one class of Protestants and another,—the former appealing to a supernatural Revelation as the supreme authority, the other acknowledging no authority higher than that of human reason.† As well might it be said that Bacon became a Rationalist in philosophy, when he threw off the authority of the schools, and appealed to the authority of Nature in matters of Science, as that Luther became a Rationalist

* Pierre Leroux, "Humanité." "Encyclopedie Nouvelle," Crousse, 72-75, 176. See Maret, "Théodicée," 415-421. Valroger, "Etudes Critiques," pp. x. 122.

† Perrone, "Prælectiones," I. 39. "Confundi tamen non debent Protestantés quos vocant *rationalistas* seu naturalistas, cum aliis qui *supernaturalisti* dicuntur, quique adhuc Revelationem retinent."

in religion, when he threw off the authority of the Church, and appealed to the authority of Scripture in matters of faith. It is true that, in both cases, the exercise of reason was permitted, and even encouraged,—nay the exercise of the senses, if you will, in observing the facts of Nature, and reading the words of Scripture; but who would ever dream of saying that either the reason or the senses, exercised in the mere interpretation of the Two Volumes, should be held, on this account, to be authoritative in matters either of philosophy or of faith? It is not Reason, but Nature in the one case, and Scripture in the other, which is recognised as the standard and test of truth. The analogy between the two kinds of Rationalism is self-evident; and it is sufficient to show that every argument which can be adduced to disprove the claims of individual Reason to supremacy in matters of philosophy, are equally valid and conclusive against its claims in matters of faith.

(675.) But the aid of analogy is not exhausted when it has been applied to disprove the supremacy of individual Reason. For Rationalism in Religion, like Rationalism in Philosophy, has been founded also on Generic Reason, or at least on common consent as the best proof and surest test of its dictates. Mr Morell discards the doctrine of private judgment, under the name of “Individualism,”* and has recourse to the authority of the race, in regard to natural truth, and to the “Christian consciousness,” in regard to Religious truth, as the criterion or test of individual opinion. This doctrine is not identical with, but it is surely analogous to, that of the Romish Church, which teaches that “*quod semper, quod ubique, et quod ab omnibus*” should be received as the rule of private judgment. The theory of that Church, however, would be saved from the charge of Rationalism, if it could be proved, as its advocates assert it can be, that there resides within the Church itself an infallible authority, both for the right interpretation of Scripture, and the gradual development of Christian doctrine; for then Reason, in submitting to her decisions, would not be supreme, but subordinate;—a scholar and a subject, —not a critic but a recipient of the truth revealed.

(676.) There is surely a striking analogy between the doctrine of generic reason as applied to Science in the schools, and that of

* Lectures on “The Philosophical Tendencies of the Age,” pp. 58–64.

common consent or tradition as applied to Religion in the Church. The latter, were it not combined with a claim to infallible Divine guidance, would be, not less than the former, a scheme of unmitigated Rationalism. The legitimate use of common consent, as an evidence or indication of truth, may be admitted, both in Science and Religion, without acknowledging its authority as a rule which demands implicit submission, and is entitled to overbear all other evidence. The whole history of the world shows that truth has often been in the minority, and that error has secured the suffrages of the multitude, in both. There is no relief, in either case, except from the calm exercise of private judgment on the facts of Nature, in the one, and the testimony of Scripture, in the other. And this should be sufficient to show that Analogy may be applied with powerful effect to the claims of Rationalism.

CHAPTER IV.

ANALOGY APPLIED TO SPIRITUALISM IN RELIGION.

(677.) The system of religious opinion, which has come to be known under the name of modern Spiritualism, is generally regarded as a species of Rationalism; and justly, in so far as, like Rationalism, it proceeds on the supposition that there exists in the human mind a subjective test of the truths of Revelation. But it may be distinguished from the older forms of Rationalism, inasmuch as the test which it applies is different; that test being, not merely intellectual, but moral, also, and æsthetic,—and including, along with the dictates of reason, those of conscience, intuition, sentiment, and feeling, considered partly as the spontaneous products of our mental constitution, and partly as the results of spiritual influence.* It is much more dangerous, because it is more plausible and seductive than the balder Rationalism of the mere intellect, and may be said to bear a similar relation to it which the mystic dreams of Pantheism bear to the

* These different phases of Rationalism have been thus described:—“Tantôt il se fait mystique, et, opposant le Saint Esprit à l'Écriture, il place ce qui lui est révélé dans son âme au-dessus de ce qui lui est révélé dans la Bible. Tantôt il se fait rationaliste avoué, et alors il élève ce qu'il pense au-dessus de ce qu'il lit dans la Bible. Tantôt, enfin, il se fait subjectiviste, et il place ce qui lui dit sa conscience religieuse au-dessus de ce qui est promulgué dans la Bible. Mais quelles que soient ses transformations,—plus pieux ou plus impie, plus raffiné ou plus grossier,—le rationalisme est toujours le rationalisme . . . il n'en adopt pas moins ce qui lui plaît,—il n'en rejette pas moins ce

qui lui déplaît.” . . . “Nous ne pourrions jamais nous revolter contre la parole de Dieu, qu'en la subordonnant (1) à une interprétation infaillible, avec Rome; ou (2) au jugement également infaillible de notre sentiment, avec le *rationalisme mystique*; ou (3) de notre raison, avec le *rationalisme vulgaire*; ou (4) de notre conscience religieuse, avec le *rationalisme nouveau*. En dehors de ces quatre revoltes, je ne conçois rien,—rien que l'impiété, final.” —Gasparin, “Les Ecoles du Doute et l'Ecole de la Foi,” pp. 8, 106.

See also Mansel, “Bampton Lectures,” pp. 277, 292, 299, 316; and Dr Wordsworth, “Letters to M. Gandon,” p. 151.

cold Materialism and crude Atheism of a former age. There is reason, however, to believe that they both grow from the same root, and that the one, not less than the other, when fully developed and carried out to its legitimate consequences, will be found to be nothing more nor less than a subtle form of infidelity.*

(678.) There is a Spiritualism in Philosophy, as well as in Religion. The term has been applied to denote that system of psychology which is opposed to Materialism, and which arose as a reaction against it. It recognises the existence in man of a soul or spirit distinct from, and superior to, his material body; and so far it was a movement in the right direction. It was the affirmation of an important truth in regard to the nature of man, and was fitted to prepare the way for the reception of still higher truths in regard to God and the spiritual world. The Bishop of Avranches, indeed, was of a different opinion, and preferred the scepticism of Sextus Empiricus to the spiritualism of Descartes and Leibnitz, as the starting-point both in matters of philosophy and faith;† but in its earliest form this Spiritualism was true, and could have no adverse influence on any other truth. In its subsequent development, however, when it began to affect independence, and aspire to supremacy,—when it sought to emancipate itself from experience and all outward conditions of knowledge,—it became in the hands of Fichté, and Schelling, and Hegel, a system of mere Idealism, which had the same relation to the science of Nature as that which Spiritualism in religion bears to the teaching of Scripture. It is only in this mature form that there is any analogy between the two; but in this form the analogy is both real and instructive.

(679.) Spiritualism in Religion may be briefly described as that system which affirms, that our own nature is the supreme *test*, and the sole *source*, of all religious truth. It includes, there-

* Henry Rogers, "Eclipse of Faith," pp. 9, 10, 13, 46, 49, 52, 71. This, with its sequel, the "Defence," contains a masterly exposure of the leading abettors of modern Spiritualism, all the more effective that free use is made of humour and sarcasm.

† "C'en'est pas le *spiritualisme naturel* du genre humain qui est appelé au rôle de précurseur et d'auxiliaire du *spiritualisme surnaturel* de l'Evangile—

cette belle tâche est confiée au système selon lequel il faut douter de toutes choses. . . . Pour croire il est bon de ne pas croire; ad credendum utile est non credere." Well might Bartholmèss add, "Commencer par les Hypotyposes, et finir par les décisions de Trente, voilà la methode dont il pretend enrichir l'Eglise et l'Ecole."—Bartholmèss, "Huet, ou le Scepticisme Theologique," p. 113.

fore, the doctrine both of a subjective Criterion, and of a subjective Creed.* The former only may be held by many, perhaps by most, of the disciples of this school; but the latter also is necessary to the completeness and symmetry of the system, and is openly professed by the more advanced Spiritualists of the present age. But since some contend for a subjective criterion who shrink from advocating a subjective creed, it may be useful to treat them successively, and to consider what analogies are applicable to each of them.

(680.) The *first* doctrine of Spiritualism in Religion is that which affirms the existence in the mind of man of a subjective test, moral and æsthetic, by which we are entitled to try the claims of any supposed Revelation, and to receive or reject it, wholly or in part, according as its teaching is found to agree or disagree with that standard. In opposing those who maintain this doctrine it is not necessary to deny either the existence, or the legitimate use, of a moral faculty in man; on the contrary, both are freely admitted, and both are recognised in Scripture itself. The only question which we are concerned to settle is—what relation this faculty bears to a supposed Revelation, and what are the functions which properly belong to it? Is it subordinate or supreme? Is it a subject, or a sovereign? We speak of the supremacy of conscience, and justly, with reference to the inferior powers and propensities of our nature; but not with reference to that which is the Law of conscience, still less with reference to Him who is the Lord of conscience.

(681.) It is necessary here to distinguish between the moral law and the moral faculty. They are closely related, but so related that the authority resides in the law, not in the faculty. It matters not, in this respect, whether the law be revealed by the light of nature or by supernatural means; in either case, there is the same relation between the faculty and the law; and that relation is one of subordination and subjection in the first, and of supremacy and authority in the second. Much error has arisen from confounding or identifying the two; and especially from speaking of the moral judgments of men as if they were, in all cases, the infallible dictates of Nature or of God. Our moral, not less than our intellectual, judgments are imperfect and mingled

* H. Rogers, "Eclipse of Faith," pp. 396, 400.

with error ; and in so far as they are defective or erroneous, they cannot be a test either of the law of Nature, or of the law of Revelation. Who would say that the conscience of the savage tribes, who hold it to be lawful, and even laudable, to commit murder, by the destruction of helpless infants, or the exposure of aged parents, or the immolation of widows after the death of their husbands, or the offering up of human sacrifices to appease offended Heaven, can be regarded as a true interpretation of the law of nature, or applied as a test even of Natural Religion ? And if conscience, considered in this light as denoting the actual moral judgments of men, be neither an index nor a test,—and far less the supreme tribunal, the decisive arbiter,—of the law of Nature, how can it be regarded as the critical test of a Revelation from God ? This is an argument from analogy,—the relation of conscience to the law of Nature being compared with the relation of conscience to the law of Revelation ; and it is as conclusive against Spiritualism in Revealed, as it is against Spiritualism in Natural Religion.

(682.) The truth is that Conscience, or the moral faculty, and Reason, or the intellectual faculty, are equally dependent for their development on experience and instruction. An uninstructed or ill-instructed conscience, like an ignorant or misinformed reason, is an incompetent judge, and a dangerous guide. To set either up as a test of any possible Revelation, is a sheer absurdity. The very design of Revelation may be to rectify the mistakes of Reason, and to reverse the false decisions of Conscience. This is at least supposable, and its bare possibility is sufficient to disprove the claims of Spiritualism, in so far as they are based on the moral nature which belongs to all men universally. If it be said that they rest mainly on the moral nature of the *élite* of humanity—the advanced thinkers, in whom conscience has been enlightened by truth, and developed by culture and civilisation,—we ask, Whence was this superiority, real or imaginary, derived ? Was it not from the study of some Revelation, natural or supernatural, which was distinct from the mere faculty, and superior to it, as its instructor and guide ? It may have been from a better improvement of the light of nature, but even that is a revelation of truth ; it is much more likely to have been from the borrowed light of Scripture, for it has been truly said that “the light of Natural Theology has been kindled with furtive embers from the

altar of Revelation, and made to glow with a brightness not its own."*

(683.) There is an obvious analogy between the moral judgments of Conscience and the intellectual judgments of Reason,—since both may be erroneous, and both must be verified, or corrected, by an appeal to truth and its evidence. This analogy is sufficient to show that the same arguments which have been adduced to disprove the claims of intellectual Rationalism, are applicable also to the claims of moral or spiritual Rationalism.—The legitimate use both of Reason and Conscience is cheerfully admitted, while the absolute authority of either as the measure and rule of Divine Revelation is explicitly denied. No enlightened advocate of Revelation will maintain that Reason is bound, in opposition to its fundamental laws, to believe propositions which can be clearly shown to involve a contradiction; or that Conscience is bound to submit to doctrines which are seen to be directly opposed,—not to its previous moral judgments, for these may have been erroneous,—but to its genuine dictates, when it has been duly instructed and informed. And, accordingly, those Divines who have been most zealous in opposing the claims, both of Rationalism and of Spiritualism, have been equally zealous in maintaining both the right and the duty of private judgment, and also the legitimate exercise of Conscience, in matters of faith. They have never insisted that Reason should believe contradictory statements, but have directed their efforts to prove that statements, supposed to be contradictory, are not really so,—they have never insisted that Conscience should recognise and sanction immoral doctrines, but have directed their efforts to show that doctrines, supposed to be immoral, are not at variance with the natural standard of right and wrong.† Every one admits that if a Book professing to contain a Revelation from God were found to teach anything so contrary to natural reason as that there might be an effect without a cause; or so contrary to known fact as that all men are of the same stature or complexion, and endowed with

* Dr Hampden, "Essay on the Philosophical Evidence," p. 253.

† Tatham, "Chart and Scale," II. p. 70. Bayly, "Essay on Inspiration," pp. 135, 145, 181, 194. "As the groundwork of all positive proof,

the negative condition must be premonstrated, that the doctrine does not contradict, though it may and must transcend, the Reason; that it is incomprehensible, but not absurd."—Coleridge, "Confessions," p. 146.

equal mental gifts; or so contrary to the dictates of our moral nature, as that fraud, ingratitude, falsehood, and cruelty are to be commended rather than blamed,—its claims must be rejected on the ground that its teaching is at variance with the lessons of a prior revelation, and could not be admitted without incurring the hazard of utter scepticism. To this extent both Reason and Conscience, considered not as bare faculties, but as faculties duly enlightened and informed by natural truth and its evidence, may be recognised as a negative test of the claims of Revelation; but this recognition does not involve the radical principle either of Rationalism or of Spiritualism; it is not necessarily exclusive of the supreme authority of a real Revelation; it amounts to nothing more than the admission that it may be compared with the works of Creation and Providence, and that its claims may be, to some extent, determined by the *analogy* between the volume of Nature and the volume of Revelation.

(684.) But not content with a negative test of this kind, Spiritualism seeks to invest Conscience and Sentiment with a positive and absolute authority; and with a right to determine, not only what it is fit for man to believe, but what it is fit for God to say and to do. It has been said that our moral nature is “the first and best of all Revelations,”—that Scripture can only be held to be a Revelation in those “parts of it which accord with our moral sentiments,”—and that these are its “test or touchstone,” as being the criterion of what is “worthy of God.”* Another writer, speaking of a recent publication, says,—“The central idea of the work is, that the ultimate appeal is the witness of *man’s own spirit*, and that not only dogmas and ecclesiastical authority, but the records of Scripture itself, are to be brought to this test.”† In answering such a theory, much might be said of the condition and character of man in his actual state, as having a tendency to impair his moral sentiments, and pervert his moral judgments; for the idea of a Kafir, or a Cherokee, or a Zulu making “his own spirit” a test of the “records of Scripture,” or his moral sentiments a criterion by which to judge whether they be “worthy of God,” instead of submitting to have his false morality rectified,

* Benjamin Constant, “De la Religion,” vol. II. pp. 237, 239; IV. p. 358; V. pp. 179, 180.

† Article on Dr Beard’s “Letters on the Grounds and Objects of Religious Knowledge.”—Westminster Review, No. XX. p. 503, October 1856.

and his horrid superstitions dispelled, by their purer light, would be purely ludicrous, were it not so unspeakably sad. But supposing, in the first instance, that man still retained his primitive integrity,—that he had no guilt on his conscience and no corruption in his heart,—that the eye of Reason was still bright, and every sentiment and affection of his nature fresh and pure,—even on that supposition, so different from the actual reality of his case, neither his intellectual nor his moral nature could afford any materials for judging what course of procedure God would adopt towards him, as being most worthy of Himself;—whether He would maintain him in life, or annihilate him,—whether He would leave him to be guided by the unaided light of nature, or enter into converse and communication with him; whether He would confirm him at once in a state of unchangeable holiness and happiness, or place him in a state of probation and trial; in short, how God should act towards him as an intelligent, moral, and responsible being. These and similar questions could only be decided by the infinite wisdom and sovereign will of God; and man had no faculties, even in his unfallen state, that could furnish a test of the rectitude or fitness of His decision in regard to them. How much less is he competent to sit in judgment on the Divine procedure in his actual condition as a fallen, guilty, and depraved creature, when the question no longer relates to what it would be worthy of God to do towards holy and innocent beings, but to the manner in which He should deal with sin, after its entrance into the moral world! This question is one of deep and solemn interest, and without a revelation of God's mind and will, there is no subjective test that is applicable or adequate to the solution of it. For, sin having appeared in the moral world, what does either reason or conscience teach us as to what it would be most worthy of God to do in regard to it? Should He ignore or overlook it? Should He punish it irrevocably, as in the case of the fallen angels? Should He provide a method of salvation, and, if so, what should that method be? Should the repentance of the sinner be the sole condition of forgiveness, and what means, if any, should be provided for producing repentance itself? Or, if repentance be either ineffectual or unattainable without the aid of Divine grace, should there be a scheme of redemption for the guilty, and of regeneration for the depraved; and what scheme would be most worthy of God, and most suitable to man?

These are questions which we are utterly incompetent to solve *before* a Revelation of God's mind and will, although *after* a Revelation has been given we may be able to recognise the wisdom and suitableness of the method which He has been pleased to adopt; and the reason of our incompetency will be as evident, as the fact is certain, if we reflect on the infinite disparity between the nature of man and the nature of God.

(685.) The rule of God's procedure is His own infinite and perfect nature, which regulates every exercise of His supreme and sovereign will. It follows, that what it is fit for God to will or to do, to purpose or to perform, can only be determined by the counsel of all His adorable perfections, in the view of all the manifold relations which He sustains towards His subjects, as the Creator, Governor, and Lord of the Universe; and of all the ends which He contemplates in His administration of it both now and hereafter. But God's nature is incomprehensible by man or angel; every one of His attributes is infinite; the relations which He sustains to His creatures are only partially known by means of mere human analogies; and the ends which He contemplates, as well as the means which He selects for their accomplishment, are such as Divine wisdom alone can fully comprehend and appreciate. The inevitable conclusion is that, without omniscience, man cannot be a competent judge of what it is worthy of God to do, or to permit, in His government of the world, and that man's nature, whether intellectual or moral, can be no adequate measure of God's nature, and no test or criterion of God's will.

(686.) The claims of a subjective moral test may be most effectually disposed of by a right application of the doctrine which affirms the *analogical nature of our religious knowledge*. This doctrine serves equally to vindicate the legitimate exercise of our moral powers within their proper province, and yet to guard against that abuse of them which is implied in any attempt to make them a test of what it is worthy of God to say or to do. It avoids each of the two opposite extremes of opinion—the extreme of holding, on the one hand, that we have no real and true knowledge of God's character at all,—and the extreme of holding, on the other hand, that we have such a full and comprehensive knowledge of it, as qualifies us to be competent judges of His procedure, whether in the natural or the spiritual world. By the consideration of the *analogy* subsisting between God's moral na-

ture and our own, we are entitled to say that we may have just and true apprehensions of His perfections; while by the consideration of the *difference* between His nature and our own, we are equally entitled to say that, our knowledge of these perfections, being incomplete and inadequate, can never constitute a test of what God may be pleased to say, or to do. By overlooking the *analogy*, we should incur the hazard of speaking as if we could have no true and just conceptions of God's moral perfections, and of exposing the whole theory of our Religious knowledge to the assaults of such writers as Bolingbroke and Collins; while by overlooking the *difference*, we should equally expose ourselves to the assaults of modern Spiritualists, who seek to find in their own moral nature an ultimate standard of appeal, and to apply a subjective moral test to the general claims, and even to the particular doctrines, of Revelation. Both extremes may be best avoided by remembering the *analogical nature of our religious knowledge*, and by applying the distinction between *univocal* and *analogical* terms.* The doctrine of Religious Analogy is thus applied by Bishops Browne, Berkeley, and Butler; but by none more ably and clearly than by William Law.†

(687.) Many of the advocates of modern Spiritualism are professing Christians, and some of them, even, Christian ministers. Not a few, however, approximate indefinitely near to the confines of simple Deism; and most of the considerations already stated in regard to the Deistical scheme are equally applicable to the more advanced form of Spiritualism. There is little more than a nominal difference between the two. And there is a striking analogy between both, and the system of Atheism. The Spiritualist finds certain doctrines in Scripture which, as he conceives by means of a subjective test, intellectual or moral, are not "worthy of God," and he rejects these particular doctrines: the Deist finds certain facts and doctrines in Scripture which, by the application of a similar test, he holds to be incredible, and he rejects the claims of Revelation altogether: the Atheist, in like manner, finds certain facts in the constitution of Nature and the course of Providence which he cannot reconcile to his ideas of wisdom, or justice, or goodness; and being unable to deny these

* See Extracts from Cajetan and Suarez in the Appendix.

† Law, "Case of Reason, or Natural Religion Stated," pp. 16, 25, 39.

facts, he rejects Theism, and holds that Nature is not, or cannot be proved to be, the Work of God, on grounds strictly analogous to those on which the Spiritualist rejects some, and the Deist rejects the whole, of the contents of Scripture, as unworthy of Him. There are analogous difficulties in Nature and Revelation; and these have received an analogous treatment at the hands of these three parties respectively. And hence we may say to the Spiritualist, as an acute writer long ago said to the Deist,—“Whenever any writer shall think it proper to attack Natural Religion with as much freedom as Revealed Religion, he need not enter upon any new hypothesis, or different way of reasoning; for the same turn of thought, the same manner of cavilling, may soon find materials in the natural state of man, for as large a bill of complaints against Natural Religion and the mysteries of Providence, as any that can be brought against Revealed Religion.”

(688.) The untenableness of a subjective moral test, on the supposition of an external Revelation from God, and of a genuine and trustworthy record of it in Scripture, seems to have been felt by some of its advocates, and to have led them on,—further, perhaps, than they intended at first to go,—even to the denial of an objective communication, as distinguished from a mere subjective development, of Religious truth, and to question the supernatural inspiration and authority of the sacred Books, as the supreme Rule of faith.

(689.) The *second* doctrine of Spiritualism in Religion is found, accordingly, to be far in advance of the first, and to exhibit, in a clear and instructive light, the inevitable tendency of that mode of thinking in which it originated towards a Deistical unbelief, more or less openly avowed. It has assumed different forms, or, at least, it has been expressed in different terms; while, under every variety of form and phraseology, the same radical principle is subsumed. That principle amounts in substance to this,—that Revelation is not objective, but subjective,—in other words, that Religious truth is not conveyed to us by external teaching, or by an authoritative communication from the mind of God to the mind of man, but is the product of our own spirits,—a product which is merely elicited from them, either by an inward natural light which is common to all men, or by special spiritual influence acting upon them within. This is the general principle

which underlies every modification of the theory; and all its varieties, however different in other respects, are only so many offshoots from this prolific root. And the doctrine of a *subjective creed*, in one or other of its forms, is indispensable as a logical basis for the claims of a *subjective criterion*. It may be useful, however, to consider separately some of the various phases which it has successively assumed,—to discriminate between the truth and the error that are mingled together in each of its varieties,—and to inquire what analogies are applicable to the confirmation of the one, and the refutation of the other.

(690.) In its simplest form modern Spiritualism sets up *inward illumination* as a rival authority to *external Revelation*; and, in doing so, makes use of arguments which are specious and plausible, as having some seeming resemblance to the doctrine of Scripture itself. The sacred writers often distinguish between “the letter and the spirit,” and explicitly teach that true Religion depends on the inward work of the Spirit, in opening the eyes of those who by nature are spiritually blind,—in enlightening their minds, not with a merely speculative, but with a spiritual and saving, knowledge of the truth,—in quickening their consciences,—in renewing their wills,—in refining and purifying and elevating their affections, so that, as new creatures, they come to have a new discernment of spiritual things, and are enabled to conceive of them according to the analogy, not of their corrupt, but of their renewed, nature. In this sense, “they have an unction from the Holy One, and know all things”—“they have their eyes opened, and are turned from darkness to light”—they are no longer “carnal, but spiritual,” and, being spiritual, they have a faculty of discernment which enables them to compare “spiritual things with spiritual” and to judge according to “the analogy” or proportion “of faith.” And so great is the change which is thus wrought in all their conceptions and views of spiritual things, that what once appeared “foolishness” to them, as natural men, now appears the very “wisdom of God” to them, as spiritual men. All this is admitted by the advocates of an external, as distinguished from an inward, Revelation,—it forms an essential part of their doctrinal system,—and it is explicitly taught in Scripture. Were modern Spiritualists content, therefore, with merely urging the necessity of an inward work of the Spirit *in addition* to the outward revelation of the truth in Scripture, in order to make *that* revelation effectual for

saving purposes, they would only be proclaiming a part of the truth which we also hold, and there would be no room, and no need, for any controversy between us. But when they speak of this inward work of the Spirit as *superseding* His outward message in the Word, and set up His spiritual illumination as a rival authority to His inspired Scriptures, it is necessary to discriminate carefully between the truth and the error which are mixed together in their doctrine, and to maintain the one, while we reject the other.

(691.) We are taught in Scripture, that an external Revelation of Divine truth, and an internal work of the Spirit, are equally necessary, but for different ends. The internal work of the Spirit is not necessary for the communication of new truth, but only for the effectual application of the truth already revealed, and embodied in the Scriptures as the public and permanent record of Revelation. The sacred writers speak, as often and as explicitly, both of the agency of the Spirit in applying the truth, and of the instrumentality of the Word as the medium through which the truth is conveyed. "Open Thou mine eyes," is a prayer which recognises the need of Divine illumination by the Spirit; "that I may see wonderful things out of thy Law" is a recognition of the medium through which alone these "wonderful things" are made known. "The Lord opened the heart of Lydia"—declares the work of the Spirit in removing the inward obstacles to the entrance of Divine truth into her soul;—"that she attended to the things which were spoken of Paul,"—declares the use of external teaching in bringing her to a knowledge of the truth. Accordingly we are said to be "born again" both by the agency of the Spirit, and the instrumentality of the truth. We are "born of the Spirit," yet we are born "not of corruptible seed, but of incorruptible, by the the word of God which liveth and abideth for ever." According to the Scriptures, these are neither rival nor antagonistic truths, since the one provides for the want of light, the other for the want of vision; but according to modern Spiritualism, the one is exclusive of the other; and while the older Rationalism maintained that Scripture was sufficient without the Spirit's influence, the more recent Spiritualism maintains that the Spirit's influence is sufficient without the authority of Scripture.

(692.) The analogies, which are applicable to this form of Spiritualism, are such as these. There is a natural analogy arising from the fact that the mind is related to truth just as the eye is

related to light ; and that as natural vision depends both on the right state of the eye, and also on the presence of sufficient light, so spiritual knowledge depends equally on these two conditions,—the cure of spiritual blindness by the internal work of the Spirit, and the presentation of sufficient truth in a revelation external to the mind itself. There is another analogy arising from the resemblance which exists, according to the statements of Scripture, between the old and the new creation ; for as, in the first, God created a perceptive mind capable of discerning natural truth, and surrounded it also with external objects by means of which the knowledge of it might be acquired ; so, in the second, God, by the gracious agency of His Spirit, imparts a faculty of spiritual perception, while He enlightens it also by the lessons of Scripture, and the ordinances of the Church. The existence of a spiritual faculty in man, whether it be a gift of nature or of grace, no more supersedes the use of an external Revelation in matters of faith, than a faculty of direct perception supersedes the external world as the medium of our natural knowledge.* The doctrine of Spiritualism, indeed, is opposed to the whole analogy of our experience in regard to the Divine method of teaching Natural knowledge. This general analogy has been admirably stated and illustrated by a recent writer.† “It may be questioned whether there can be a discovery of truth at all in which the teaching from without does not combine with the apprehension from within ; and influences, *ab extra*, are as intimately connected with, and necessary to, the knowledge received, as the power of knowing in the mind itself. The capacity of apprehending truth, of whatever kind, is very different from the apprehension of the truth itself ; and while philosophy and experience alike combine in assuring us that the capacity is native to the mind, they also tell us that, in order to the truth being apprehended, this capacity must be awakened and called forth by external influences. All ideas received, realized, and appropriated are thus founded on a true and necessary antithesis between the power to perceive and know within, and the objective truth presented to it from without ; and the seclusion of

* Henry Rogers, “Defence of Eclipse of Faith,” pp. 78, 84.

† North British Review, No. LXV. p. 238. The late Principal Cunningham publicly referred to this able article

in one of his annual addresses in the common hall of the New College, and ascribed it to the pen of my esteemed friend and colleague — Dr Bannerman.

the mind from the influence of this external teaching, would leave its powers shut up in the germ, and its consciousness no better than a blank. . . . The same conditions that are necessary to the acquisition of ideas, whether in the sensible or in the intellectual world, are no less necessary to the apprehension of truth of a moral and spiritual kind. An outward teaching of spiritual truth would never, indeed, lodge the apprehension of it in the understanding and heart, unless there were previously existing there the innate capacities for apprehending it; but it is no less certain, that the powers of thinking and feeling within, would of themselves never conduct to truth, unless there were the outward teaching, which is an indispensable condition for their exercise and development."

(693.) These analogies afford a confirmatory evidence in favour of the doctrine of Scripture which teaches the necessity both of an inward work of the Spirit, and of an external word of Revelation. But in discussing the claims of modern Spiritualism it is not necessary to enter at large on the exposition of that doctrine; for it will be found that it is not an inward work of the Spirit of God, considered as a Divine Person and Agent, by whose grace and power the soul of man is renewed and sanctified, but something altogether different from this, and even opposed to it, for which Spiritualists contend, when they insist on the necessity of internal illumination, and appeal to "the light within." They generally deny or ignore the distinct Divine personality of the Holy Spirit altogether, and of course they cannot mean to speak of His agency even when they make use of expressions similar to, and borrowed from, those of Scripture. Their theory not only supersedes the use of an external Revelation, or of the Spirit's message in the Word, but also sets aside all supernatural Inspiration in the case even of apostles and prophets, and of course also in their writings; and it speaks only of an inspiration—for the term is still retained—which is natural, universal, and common, although in different degrees, to all men, whether they be Heathens, Mahomedans, or Christians. There may be some shades of difference between its various advocates; but that this is a correct account of its general character and tendency will appear from a brief review of their recorded opinions.

(694.) After the Reformation, Spiritualism in Religion first appeared in England in the guise of Quakerism; and a careful

study of the ablest writings, which appeared on both sides at that time, is the best preparation for acquiring a correct conception of the meaning, and forming a right estimate of the arguments, of its more recent advocates.* It is extremely doubtful, to say the least, whether its leading apostles and apologists held the doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation in the sense of the Catholic church, and whether they admitted the personality and agency of the Holy Ghost at all. But whether they admitted these doctrines in a sense of their own, or rejected them altogether, one thing is certain,—namely, that they advocated the claims of a “light within,” which they described as being, more or less, common to all men; and represented it as being at once the supreme criterion and test of any outward Revelation such as that which is said to be contained in Scripture, and also the chief, if not the only, source and spring of religious knowledge, and of spiritual life. Hence they were led to disparage the sacred writings as a rule of faith and practice, while they admitted that these writings, like others, might contain much that was in accordance with “the light within;” and that in so far as they did accord with it, they were to be gratefully received,—not because they had any supernatural inspiration or authority,—but because they were sanctioned and approved by that “Light,” as its own genuine dictates, although proceeding from the minds of other men.

(695.) Spiritualism, in its most recent phase, is nothing more than Quakerism transfigured into a philosophical form. In some respects, they are identically the same; in others, they are specifically different. There is much that is common to both, while there is something also which is peculiar to its more recent development. Let us first consider the points of agreement, and then the points of difference, betwixt the two.

(696.) Both agree in appealing to “the light within,” sometimes as the supreme criterion or test of what is true or false in Scripture, sometimes as being itself the source of whatever religious truths it is necessary for us to believe. It is difficult, however, to ascertain what either of the two means to denote by this

* See Robert Barclay’s “Theses” and “Apology,”—which may be safely described as the ablest defence of Spiritualism which has yet appeared.

See also Brown (of Wamphray)—

“Quakerisme the Pathway to Paganism”—a very able, but a somewhat impatient, if not acrimonious, reply to Barclay’s “Theses” and “Apology.”

ambiguous expression. It is often used in such a way as seems to imply that it is nothing else than the natural reason and conscience of men ; sometimes it is spoken of in a mystical way as if it were something higher than the individual soul, an impersonal reason, an all-pervading spirit, which is properly Divine ; sometimes it is characterized as if it were the λόγος of St John,—the eternal Word,—the Revealer of the Father,—“the true Light which lighteth every man that cometh into the world ;” sometimes it seems to be used as if it were intended to denote the enlightening grace of the Spirit of God, whether in His common operations on the souls of all men, or in His special operations in the hearts of believers.* The Quakers, for example, often made use of the expression to denote merely the light of nature, or the natural reason and conscience of all men ;† and in setting it up as the criterion and test of Scripture, they coincided with the Socinians, Rationalists, and Spiritualists. Coleridge, again, speaks of it as the Reason, not the understanding,—the λόγος which is not human but Divine : “There is a Light higher than all, even the ‘Word that was in the beginning’—the Light of which light itself is but the Schekinah and cloudy Tabernacle,—the Word that is light for every man, and life for as many as give heed to it.”‡ “As I believe,” says Kingsley, “one common Logos, Word, Reason reveals and unveils the same eternal truth to all who seek and hunger for it.” “In calling this Person the Logos, and making Him the source of all human reason, and knowledge of eternal laws, he (Philo) only translated from Hebrew into Greek the name which he found in his sacred books—the Word of God.” “What is Marcus Aurelius’s cardinal doctrine ? That there is a God within him, a Word, a Logos, which has hold of him, and who is his teacher and guardian ; that over and above his body and his soul, he has a Reason which is capable of hearing that Divine Word, and obeying the monitions of that God. What is Plutarch’s cardinal doctrine ? That the same Word, the Demon who spoke to the heart of Socrates, is speaking to him, and to every philosopher,

* Dr Henderson, “Lectures on Inspiration,” p. 563. Bailly, “Essay on Inspiration,” p. 350. Guyse, “Standing Use of Scripture,” p. 110. Davies, “Supremacy of Scripture,” pp. 210, 215, 229. Dr Calamy on “Inspira-

tion,” p. 345. Bellarmine, “Disputationes,” vol. I. p. 7, etc.

† Brown, “Quakerism the Pathway to Paganism,” pp. 24, 42, 50.

‡ Coleridge, “Confessions,” p. 10.

‘coming into contact,’ he says, ‘with him in some wonderful manner—addressing the Reason of those who, like Socrates, keep their reason pure.’”* The more serious, and less philosophical, advocates of the “Light within” seem to connect it with the doctrine of common or universal grace; and make use of expressions concerning it which might be understood to mean the common or special operations of the Spirit of God on the souls of men, were there any evidence to show that they explicitly recognise His distinct personality, and His gracious agency in applying to individuals the redemption that was purchased by Christ. But whatever ambiguity may attach to the phrase, it is clear that Quakers and Spiritualists agree in appealing to the “Light within,” as at once the critical test, and the ultimate source, of all religious truth.

(697.) They agree, further, in insisting on an immediate and private Revelation made to every man, in preference, and in opposition, to a mediate and public Revelation addressed to all men. And for this reason they agree, also, in disparaging the Scriptures as a mere “Book-revelation;” and in holding that, even were the Scriptures admitted to *contain* a revelation from God, we must still distinguish between the “letter and the spirit,” and receive only that part of its contents which is recognised and sanctioned as true by “the light within.” “We will dismiss the Scriptures,” says one, “and rather listen to God speaking to us, than return to those beggarly elements. One is not required to be learned in the law and Scripture, but to be ‘taught of God.’ Vain is the labour which is expended upon Scripture; for the Scripture is a creature, and a beggarly sort of element.”† This is only a specimen, out of multitudes which might be adduced, of the way in which Quakers and Spiritualists treat the Scriptures as inferior and subordinate to the “light within.”

(698.) It must be evident to all that if this doctrine of “the light within” being at once the criterion and the source of our religious knowledge, were correct, our faith must be shorn of everything that is distinctive and peculiar in the Christian scheme. We could have no knowledge of the historical *facts* of Christianity,

* Kingsley, “Alexandria and her Schools,” pp. 89, 96, 98. See, for otherspecimens, Rigg, “Modern Anglican Theology,” p. 139.

† Hosius Polonus, quoted by Whitaker in his “Disputation upon Scripture,” p. 36. See also Brown’s “Quakerism,” c. iv.

—none of the creation of the world as recorded by Moses,—none of the fall of man,—none of the incarnation of the Son of God,—none of His atoning sacrifice,—none of His triumphant resurrection from the dead; for “the light within” teaches us nothing of any one of these. It must be equally evident, that faith must be deprived of every Divine *promise* on which it is wont to feed, for a promise is an articulate expression of God’s will to which His truth and faithfulness are pledged, and “the light within” cannot reveal the purposes of the Divine mind so as to make them a ground of believing expectation and hope. And being deprived both of the *facts* and *promises* of Scripture, not one of its *doctrines*, which reveal “the will of God for our salvation,” would remain to us, were the Scriptural authority, on which they exclusively rest, superseded or set aside by that of “the light within.” But without insisting on these considerations, obvious and momentous as they are, we proceed to inquire what aid Analogy supplies for the solution of the questions which are thus raised.

(699.) Several distinct analogies, and these of the most conclusive kind, are applicable to the refutation of this form of Spiritualism. It is manifest, in the first place, that we are not competent judges beforehand of the method in which God may teach us what He would have us to know,—for unquestionably His method of teaching our common secular knowledge could neither be divined by human sagacity, nor even proved to be the best and fittest by rational arguments. What it is we learn only from experience, not from any *a priori* anticipations of reason. It is equally manifest, in the second place, that the actual method which God has adopted for teaching us this common secular knowledge is not exclusive of an external manifestation of truth; on the contrary, it makes use of the great volume of Nature as the medium through which natural truth is made known. All the lessons of Natural Religion, in the third place, are taught in the same way, for they come to us not by immediate intuition, or as innate truths, but through the medium of God’s works in Creation and Providence;—He bears witness to Himself by the works of Creation, for “the heavens declare the glory of God,” and “what may be known of Him is manifest,” being “understood by the things that are made, even His eternal power and Godhead;”—and He bears witness to Himself by the works of Providence, for “He hath not left Himself without witness, in that He did good,

and gave us rain from heaven and fruitful seasons, filling our hearts with food and gladness." In either instance, the Revelation is mediate and public, and is exhibited in external facts which may be "known and read of all men;" not immediate or private, as being discoverable by mere intuition apart from teaching from without, or addressed exclusively to this or that individual. These natural analogies have been illustrated already, and are merely referred to now for the purpose of indicating their application to the claims of modern Spiritualism.

(700.) There is a Scriptural analogy which we conceive to have great weight, and which, when duly considered, will be found sufficient of itself either to disprove these claims, by neutralizing all the arguments which have been adduced in support of them, or to compel their advocates to fall back on what is really the fundamental ground of their whole theory, by supplying an unanswerable proof of its infidel character and tendency. The analogy to which we now refer is that which subsists between God's method of teaching Religious truth in former times by Divinely commissioned and accredited messengers, who were employed instrumentally to instruct the minds of their fellow-men, and His method of teaching now by means of inspired Scriptures containing an authentic record of Divine Revelation. There is, of course, a difference between the oral and the written method of instruction, but that difference does not affect the analogy on which we found; for different as they are in other respects, they agree in this, that in both there was the same relation between the few who were inspired, and the multitudes who were instructed by their ministry. This relation was constant and invariable under all the successive dispensations of Revealed Religion. We nowhere read in Scripture of an immediate Revelation having been made to every man in any age or country; but we read everywhere of an immediate Revelation having been made to Divinely commissioned and accredited messengers, who were warranted to speak to their fellow-men in the name of the Lord, and of a mediate revelation to all others either by word or writing accompanied with evidence of its Divine authority. The Scriptures, if they be inspired, occupy the same place, and possess the same authority in relation to us, which belonged to inspired men in relation to the people of the times in which they lived; and in both cases external instruction is the rule, while in neither can it be shown to be

inconsistent with, or exclusive of, an inward work of the Spirit of God.*

(701.) This analogy, derived from the recorded method of Divine teaching under every former dispensation, would be conclusive against the claims of Spiritualism, on the supposition that there was any real difference, except in degree merely, between the inspiration of prophets and apostles, and the subjective illumination which was common to them with all true believers. Accordingly many recent writers have fallen back on this fundamental question, and have not hesitated to affirm that all private Christians are inspired in the same sense, although not, perhaps, in the same measure, as the apostles were : and even that this inspiration is not peculiar to them, but is shared by all men, whatever may be their creed or character, and is the same in kind either with natural genius, or with common or special grace. They admit a natural inspiration of all men, but deny a supernatural inspiration of any, even of prophets and apostles. They tell us that all good books are inspired, in so far as they are really good, and that all great men are inspired as Jesus was.† And to make their theory complete, they advance a step further, and deny not only a supernatural inspiration, but a supernatural Revelation, or any direct communication of truth from the mind of God to the mind of man. Revelation and Inspiration are not distinguished, as they ought to be,‡ but confounded as if they were one and the same ; and thus both are purely subjective and merely human ; while all religious truth is the product of our own spirits. And what then becomes of the Divine authority of Scripture ? “The Bible still remains,” we are told, “though no longer as an inspired and infallible record. Though not the Word of God, it contains the words of the wisest, the most excellent, the most devout men, who have ever held communion with Him.” § It is not the Word of God, but “it is the voice of the congregation,” “an expression of devout reason,” “a record of the spiritual giants whose experience generated the Religious atmosphere we breathe.” ||

* Brown, “Quakerism,” pp. 33, 37, 40, 45, 60.

† Greg, “Creed of Christendom,” p. 235. See Whately’s “Cautions,” p. 241.

‡ Lee on “Inspiration,” pp. 26, 115, 140, 195, 261, 319, 323, 405.

§ Greg, “Creed of Christendom,” p. 242.

|| Dr Rowland Williams, “Essays and Reviews.”

(702.) It is at this point that Spiritualism manifests its tendency towards infidelity, so as to be scarcely, if at all, distinguishable from it. In weighing its claims we must carefully distinguish between Revelation, considered as the supernatural communication of truth from the mind of God to the minds of His commissioned messengers, and Inspiration, considered as the supernatural influence by which they were guided in conveying the truth to the minds of their fellow-men. We must also distinguish between the natural inspiration which is common to all men, although pre-eminent in some, and the supernatural inspiration of the few who "spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost." A natural inspiration is not denied, when a supernatural inspiration is affirmed, any more than a natural revelation of truth is superseded or excluded by the addition of a supernatural message. There is something peculiarly insidious in the attempts to found an argument against the authority of Revelation on the fact, which is acknowledged on all hands, that all truth, of whatever kind, comes ultimately from God. It is of no consequence, some have said, whether Revelation be objective or subjective — whether from supernatural interposition or from natural human development, — since in either case truth is equally Divine.* But truth, which is taught naturally, may have neither the clearness nor the authority of truth supernaturally revealed; while there are other truths undiscoverable by the light of Nature which can only be made known by an expression of God's mind and will. "Though all truth is from God, yet what is revealed in Scripture is so in a peculiar manner. Though other writers, as far as they suggest what is improving and useful, were under a Divine conduct, yet it is a special Divine conduct that our sacred penmen were under who were to serve special and peculiar purposes, and therefore were under such an influence of the Most High as others have no ground or reason to pretend to."†

(703.) We are entitled to conclude, that the analogy of God's recorded method of revealing His will to His commissioned and accredited messengers, and leaving the truth to be conveyed by them to the minds of their fellow-men, affords a strong argument in favour of a mediate and public, as distinguished from an imme-

* Benjamin Constant, "De la Religion," vol. II. pp. 221, 236.

† Dr Calamy on "Inspiration," p. 29.

diate and private, Revelation ; and that the force of this argument cannot be evaded otherwise than by falling back on the denial of an objective Revelation of any kind, and of any other than a merely natural inspiration. But some seem to imagine that a special objection lies against what they call “a Book-revelation,” such as might not be applicable, at least to the same extent, to an uninterrupted series of living men bearing witness to the truth. They may think that had they lived in the times of Christ and His apostles ; had they listened to the voice of Him “who spake as never man spake ;” had they witnessed the wonderful works which He performed, and had they enjoyed the oral instruction of a Paul or a John, they could scarcely have denied the existence of an external authority, or the reality of a higher than mere human inspiration. But now that Jesus has departed, and His apostles have followed Him, they feel as if they were placed in a position of comparative disadvantage when they are left to depend on a Book,—a mere record of former Revelations,—with the ministry only of its fallible interpreters. But here another Scriptural analogy comes to our aid. Their position now is strictly analogous to that of the Jews in our Lord’s days, to whom He said, speaking of Moses,—“If ye believe not his writings, how shall ye believe My words ?” And again, “If they believe not Moses and the prophets, neither would they believe though one rose from the dead.” And the Scriptural analogy rests, like every other, on a firm basis of natural truth ; for the whole analogy of our common experience in regard to the best and surest method for the transmission of truth from age to age is in favour of “a Book,”—as the likeliest means of preserving it pure and entire. For testimony in a written form is permanent ; it is also independent of the fluctuations of human opinion, and may always be appealed to as a fixed standard of truth. When the truth is designed to be a rule of life, nothing can be more necessary than that it should be embodied in a permanent and unchangeable record, external to individual minds, lest it should be gradually transmuted into error, and accommodated to their caprices or tastes, which, in depraved creatures, must often be opposed to it. And the advantage of a fixed written rule is only the more apparent, if it be necessary, with a view to the instruction of the multitude, to superadd oral teaching by parents or ministers, according to the wise provision of the Christian scheme ; for then every one can bring the lessons of his

human teachers to the test of an authority to which they themselves appeal.*

(704.) Such are some of the analogies which may be applied to the doctrine of Quakerism, and to the cognate forms of modern Spiritualism. But the latter, in some of its more recent developments, differs from the former, and offers itself for our acceptance under the character of a Philosophical theory, rather than a Religious doctrine. It is the theory of what has been called "Intuitive Theology."† This theory is applied equally to Natural and Revealed Religion. With reference to the former, it affirms that the existence and attributes of God are not to be proved either by induction or deduction, but are intuitively discerned in the light of their own self-evidence.‡ With reference to the latter, it holds that the Prophets and Apostles were enlightened, not by doctrinal propositions, conveying Divine truth from the mind of God to the minds of His commissioned Messengers; but by their own intuitions, quickened, it may be, by some influence acting upon them from without or from above, but still retaining their character as direct perceptions of the human mind, elicited from within, independently of any external manifestation of truth.§ This philosophical theory,—for it is nothing more,—is at variance with the whole analogy of our experience in regard to the Divine method of imparting to our minds a knowledge of natural truth. The intuitive or direct perceptions of the human mind are not denied;|| but it is contended that these are not independent of information from without, and that they only come into action when materials for their exercise are supplied *a posteriori*. They are not sufficient of themselves to account, either for Christian belief, whether in primitive times, when men were taught by oral instruction, or in the present times, when they are taught by a written record of Revelation;—or for belief in Natural Religion itself apart from the external evidence of the being and perfections of God, which is exhibited in the works of creation and providence.

* Baxter, "Works," vol. XX. 19, 23, 88, 90; XXI. 242; XXII. 276, 282. Rob. Hall, "Works," vol. IV. p. 161. Bentham, "Rationale of Historical Evidence," vol. I. p. 137. Shuttleworth, "Consistency of Religion," pp. 35, 40, 84. De Bonald, "Recherches," II. pp. 333-342. Henry

Rogers, "Defence of Eclipse," etc., pp. 40, 103.

† Dr M'Cosh, "Divine Government," First Ed., pp. 522, 530.

‡ Bouchitté, "Histoire des Preuves," pp. 498, 501.

§ Dublin Review, No. XLIV. p. 327.

|| Dr M'Cosh, "The Intuitions of the Human Mind."

(705.) The theory of Intuition, considered first in its relation to Revealed Religion, is inconsistent alike with the known facts of the case, and with all the analogies of our ordinary experience in regard to the origin of our knowledge. It is said that the truth was revealed to the minds of prophets and apostles by means, not of doctrinal propositions, but of spiritual intuitions; and that their teaching, when they spoke to their fellow-men, was an appeal to similar intuitions in the minds of their hearers, and not the inculcation of intellectual truths, or of definite articles of faith.* For this reason, "religious insight" is opposed to "intellectual processes;" and Christian truth is removed from the sphere of the "logical," to that of the "intuitional," consciousness.—We are even told that Christianity, considered subjectively, is a consciousness of absolute dependence and of perfect moral freedom, harmonized by love to God; and, considered objectively, it is that religion which rests upon the consciousness of the redemption of the world through Jesus Christ. But whence is this consciousness derived? Is it from an internal or an external source? from an intuition within, or from some information obtained from without? Does it not involve the idea both of an actual Redemption, and of a personal Redeemer? And can these historical facts be known by mere consciousness, apart from an external Revelation? Was not the mere presence of Christ as "God manifest in the flesh," and even His teaching, were He nothing more than a prophet sent from God, but a prophet who "spake as never man spake," an external Revelation to His immediate personal followers? And are not His discourses, in so far as they have been faithfully recorded in the Gospels, an external Revelation to us still? It is true that without the internal illumination of the Spirit of God, that outward revelation could not suffice of itself, either then or now, to impart a spiritual and saving knowledge of Divine truth; and that by the Spirit's grace the believer acquires such new perceptions of Divine things as may be called "spiritual intuitions;"—for he lives as "seeing God who is invisible,"—he "beholds as in a glass the glory of the Lord,"—and "obtains the light of the knowledge of that glory in the face of Jesus Christ." In this sense, spiritual intuition may be admitted in the case of a renewed mind, for its own spiritual experience is both an evidence of the truth,

* Morell, "Philosophy of Religion," pp. 64, 101, 124, 131, 138.

and a means of enabling it to form a right apprehension of its meaning; and in the same sense the doctrine of Spiritualism may be justly described as a mere plagiarism from Scripture.* But Scripture is not chargeable with the absurdity of resolving Christian faith, which relates to the person and work of Christ as a Divine Redeemer, into a mere internal intuition apart from external teaching, or of making our "religious consciousness" either the test, or the source, of that truth which Christian faith apprehends and believes.—It recognises the necessity of inward illumination by the grace of the Spirit of God, but it requires submission to the authority of Christ, and His inspired prophets, who still speak to us in the written word. And if Spiritualists admit that Christ was a prophet sent from God, and that we have an authentic record of what He taught in the Gospels, if He taught anything at all, it would seem that they are bound, on their own principles, to defer to His "intuitions" as being superior to their own; for if they hold all men to be inspired, they still admit that He was pre-eminently gifted, and they speak largely of the reverence with which they regard Him. Instead, therefore, of making their own intuitions the test or measure of His, they should rather make His teaching the rule of their faith,—and, in the event of any apparent collision between the two, say with the noble Arnold,—“I know Christ to have been so wise and loving to men that I am sure I may trust His word, and that what was entirely agreeable to His sense of justice and goodness cannot, unless through my own defect, be otherwise than agreeable to mine. . . . If I believe in Him, I am not His judge, but His servant and creature, and He claims the devotion of my whole nature, because He is identical with goodness, wisdom, and holiness. A very able and good friend of mine made this objection to Victor Cousin’s tone: ‘It was,’ he said, ‘a patronizing of Christianity;’ that is, he spoke of it as one who could judge it, and looked upon it, as it were, *de loco superiori*,—a condition inconsistent altogether with the relations of man to God, when once acknowledged.”†

(706.) The theory of Intuition has been applied, not only to Revealed, but also to Natural, Religion. The evidence supplied by

* J. H. Newman, “Theory of Religious Belief,” pp. 35, 40, 64. Henry Rogers, “Defence of Eclipse,” p. 150; “Eclipse,” pp. 71, 303, 293, 378, 386.

† Arnold, “Life and Correspondence,” pp. 336, 405.

nature and experience has been set aside or disparaged, and there has been substituted for it an "intellectual vision," which gazes direct on the absolute, and which is independent of all external aid. Our "intuitional consciousness" has been made to supersede the legitimate use of reason in the interpretation of Nature as a manifestation of the Divine perfections, and the proper use of analogy and final causes.* The result is just such as might have been expected. The mystic Pantheism of the Alexandrian School has reappeared in the schools of Germany. The doctrine of a living, personal God, the Creator and Governor of the world, has given place to a series of systems which deify the mere abstractions of the human mind. These are keenly satirized, but can scarcely be said to be caricatured, in a little brochure, entitled "Hymn to the Infinite," which appeared some years ago at Oxford, and part of which we quote, because we believe that, while ridicule is not a safe test of truth, it is often the most effective exposure of folly.

" With deep intuition and mystic rite
We worship the Absolute-Infinite,
The Universe-Ego, the Plenary-Void,
The Subject-Object identified,
The great Nothing-Something, the Being-Thought,
That mouldeth the mass of Chaotic Nought,
Whose beginning unended and end unbegun
Is the One that is All and the All that is One.

* * * * *

Thou great Totality of every thing
That never is, but ever doth become."†

(707.) The use which has been made of the theory of Intuition with reference to Natural Religion, is strictly analogous to the use which has been made of it with reference to Revealed Religion. In the one case, it has been made to supersede the volume of Nature as a natural manifestation of the being and perfections of God; in the other, to supersede the Scriptures as a supernatural Revelation of His mind and will. The most effectual antidote to this theory is the doctrine which teaches *the analogical nature and origin of all our Religious conceptions*: for if they be analogical, they arise from comparison, and not from intuition.

* Bouchitté, "Histoire des Preuves de l'Existence de Dieu," pp. 426, 428, 498, 501.

† *The Times*, June 25, 1852.

One of the great objects which Bishop Browne had in view was to show that we have no direct or intuitive perception of God or of Divine truth, but that we conceive of them by means of analogy. And surely no stronger proof could be given of the importance of that doctrine than that it cuts up by the roots the whole theory of Intuition, in its application alike to Natural, and to Revealed, Religion.

CHAPTER V.

ANALOGY APPLIED TO RELIGIOUS LIBERALISM.

(708.) Religious Liberalism in England corresponds to what is known on the Continent as "Indifference," or "Indifferentism."* It is also known in our own country under the name of "Latitudinarianism,"—a term which denotes a system apparently liberal and charitable, but which may become as rigid and intolerant as any system of orthodoxy; for "Latitudinarians, while they profess charity towards all doctrines, nevertheless count it heresy to oppose the principle of latitude."† It is closely connected with the doctrine of Spiritualism, which has been already explained and discussed; for, when reduced to its radical principle, it will be found to rest on the supposition, that there is no other than an internal Revelation, which is alike universal and permanent; and that all doctrines, beliefs, and ceremonies are the mere perishable forms in which a natural religious sentiment is successively embodied, or the manifestations of the same religious "intuitions."‡ This being assumed, it is inferred that it is of little consequence what men believe,—that they may be equally safe in any religion, or in any sect of the same religion,—that doctrinal opinions cannot materially influence either their character now or their prospects hereafter,—and that the difference between them is scarcely worthy of serious consideration, far less of earnest controversial discussion. There is reason to fear that this latitudinarian doctrine prevails extensively among the more influential classes of

* Lamennais, "Essai sur l'Indifférence en matière de Religion," 4 vols.—an able and eloquent, but one-sided and arrogant, assertion of authority in matters of faith, as opposed to the unbridled license of private judgment; written while the author was still an apologist for the Church of Rome. See also Neckar on "The Importance of Religious Opinions;" and Amyral-

dus, "Treatise concerning Religions in refutation of the Opinion which accounts all Indifferent." Amyraldus was Professor of Divinity at Saumur, and his Treatise was translated in 1660.

† J. H. Newman, "Theory of Religious Belief," p. 294.

‡ Benjm. Constant, "De la Religion," vol. I. pp. 12, 19. Morell, "Lectures," pp. 157, 165, 176.

society ;—among Politicians, who seem to imagine that it is of little consequence what Religion is encouraged, or what Church is endowed, provided only the one and the other can be made an engine of State policy, and the means of subjugating the people to the dominion of human law ;—among Cosmopolitans, who have travelled in many lands, and found that somehow society can be kept together under every variety of creed,—and among Literateurs, who have surveyed the history of many nations and ages, with the same superficial glance which many travellers bestow on the different forms of faith and worship, and finding that human life could go on, and its material interests could be to some extent secured, whatever religion was professed, have never thought of inquiring either into the moral, or the religious, effects which have flowed from different views of God and of man's duty to Him.*

(709.) The spirit of Liberalism is often cherished as a vague, ill-defined feeling, even where it has never shaped itself into distinct tenets, or found expression in articulate propositions. In this form it may be justly described as the spirit of the present age. It meets us everywhere,—in Parliament, in cultivated Society, and in the Press. It is confined to no party in the State,—men of all parties being equally Liberal when they have to deal with the interests of Religion. It assumes the garb of History, of Philosophy, and even of Poetry. Pope's couplet expresses the thoughts of many :—

" For forms of faith let senseless bigots fight ;
His can't be wrong whose life is in the right."

The lines of another poet have been applied to prove that " We are all of us (though not all equally) mistaken, and the cherished dogmas of each of us are not, as we had formerly supposed, the pure truth of God, but simply our own special form of error,—the fragmentary and refracted ray of light which has fallen on our own minds.

" Our little systems have their day—
They have their day and cease to be ;
They are but broken lights of Thee,
And Thou, O Lord, art more than they.'"†

* D'Alembert, " Miscellaneous Pieces," p. 109. J. H. Newman's " Theory of Religious Belief," pp. 115, 120.

† Greg, " Creed of Christendom," and " In Memoriam," p. xx.

This beautiful figure, which had long ago been anticipated by Tatham,* is applied as if light ceased to be light when it is thus refracted, or as if any Truth concerning God, "who is the same yesterday, and to-day, and for ever," could cease to be true by merely passing through the mind of man. And so we read such strains as these:—

———"Thou art more than all

The shrines that hold Thee ; and our wisest creeds
Are but the lisplings of a froward child
To spell the Infinite."

"Creeds are but Schoolbooks kindly given
To teach our stammering lips to spell
Thy name : all help the good to heaven,
And none can save the bad from hell."

"There's room in God's wide-circling arm
For all that swear by all the creeds." †

(710.) Liberalism has been applied equally to Natural and to Revealed Religion. It makes little account of any slight difference which may be supposed to subsist between Christianity and Heathenism. All the creeds of Paganism—Fetichism, Polytheism, and Idolatry,—are only the variable and transient forms of the One Absolute Religion—the Religion which is so perfect as to render a Revelation superfluous ! We must distinguish, it is said, between the *sentiment* and the *form* ; the religious sentiment is essentially the same in all, and is different only in the form of its manifestation ; and wherever that sentiment exists, it is a faith so powerful that it counteracts any evil influence which might be supposed to be exerted by the immoral character of the Heathen Gods.‡ On this ground Missions to the heathen were objected to in a former age, and when their claims were urged, they were supposed to be sufficiently disposed of by the oracular, but somewhat irrelevant,

* "As a ray of the sun, that sublime and significant emblem of Truth, passing through a prism, is divided into a beautiful variety of shades and colours, so that ray of truth which is sent down from Heaven on the human mind, as it passes through these different channels of knowledge (the Intellect, Imagination, etc.), differs in strength and degree, exhibiting an illustrious specimen of that beauty and variety of

effect which, in every part of creation, distinguish the works of God."—"Chart and Scale," I. B. 17.

† Blackie, "Lays and Legends," pp. 184, 247. See an extreme example in Miss Bremer's "Brothers and Sisters," vol. I. pp. 228, 241 ; and Rousseau's Indifferentism as described by Lamennais, vol. I. pp. 89, 108.

‡ Benjamin Constant, "De la Religion," vol. I. pp. 52, 55.

dictum,—“better a good Hindoo, than a bad Christian.” Such men as John Foster and Robert Hall were regarded as narrow-minded bigots when they insisted on the difference between “the religions of men and the Religion of God.” Modern Spiritualists have gone quite as far in their extreme indulgence for Idolatry, and even for Atheism.* Indeed Atheism would seem to be the only scheme which can lend a consistent support to Liberalism, in its application to Natural Religion; and we find, accordingly, that Hobbes was one of the first to teach that “a society of Atheists might be as virtuous men, as a society of other people professing Religion;” and that “religious opinions and beliefs had no influence at all upon men’s actions.”† And, in our own day, M. Comte congratulates the disciples of the Positive School on the fact, that they alone are qualified to canonize men of all creeds; for in its later developments, Positivism, which at first excluded all knowledge of Causes, efficient or final, yielded so far to the natural sentiment of “religiosity” as to provide an object of worship,—namely, Humanity, in its more illustrious representatives,—and set apart a day for the religious celebration of Moses, of Christ, of Socrates, of Plato, of Confucius, of Mahomet, of Paul, of Augustine, and of many more, who are all duly tabulated in the “*Calendrier Positiviste*”—which is a mere parody on the Calendar of the Romish saints.‡

(711.) It need excite no wonder, if Liberalism, having thus sanctioned all the different and conflicting forms of Natural Religion, should make little account of the differences between the various sects into which the Christian Church has been divided. It looks down with superb indifference, or supercilious scorn, on the controversy between Popery and Protestantism, or Socinianism and Trinitarianism, or Episcopalianism and Presbyterianism and Independency, or Pædobaptism and Anti-pædobaptism,—as if there were either no evidence applicable to the determination of the questions discussed between them, or as if the solution of these questions were a matter of no importance. We find accordingly that a very able and accomplished writer inculcates the

* Henry Rogers, “Eclipse,” pp. 107–132.

† Wm. Law, “Remarks on the Fable of the Bees,” p. 105.

‡ Comte, “Cours de la Philosophie

Positive,” vol. V. pp. 328, 449. The “Calendar” is appended to a very curious work, entitled “*Reflexions Synthétiques au point de vue Positiviste*,” Paris, 1856.

doctrine that Popery, Protestantism, and Philosophy, should all live quietly and comfortably together, and should all continue the same,—that Popery and Protestantism are both necessary, and adapted to different wants of the human mind—the one being best fitted, by its claim to infallible authority, to meet the wants of the sceptical and irresolute,—the other, by its principle of free inquiry, to satisfy the wants of the more active intellect of others; and that both are partial, or one-sided, developments of truth.* This indulgent view of all the errors which have corrupted the truth, and all the heresies which have divided the Church, as matters of no serious or vital importance, is shared in, more or less fully, by all the advocates of Liberalism, in its application to Revealed Religion.

(712.) When it is thus extended so as to embrace both Natural and Revealed Religion, the theory of Indifference has a tendency to pass into the form of Syncretism, which may be regarded as its culminating point, or its natural and ultimate development. By Syncretism we mean that system of opinion which virtually obliterates the distinction between truth and error, and even between virtue and vice,—by representing error as nothing more than partial truth, and vice as an effect, alike inevitable and salutary, of the laws of human development. According to this system, both error and vice, when viewed in relation to the progress of the race, are good and useful, and Atheism as well as Idolatry is described as “providential.”† Both Maret and Valroger ascribe its origin to the principle taught by the Eclectic school, that *error is partial truth*,—a principle which, instead of distinguishing between the two, confounds the one with the other, as if they were only different species of the same genus, or different aspects of the same reality: and which is plausible at first sight, only because we are apt to understand it as if it were intended to affirm merely the undeniable fact, that truth and error are often mingled together in the same system of opinion; and that it is necessary, therefore,

* Guizot, “Etudes Morales,” pp. 58, 80, 144, 158.

† Cousin, “Cours,” I. 174, 179, 190; II. 145; III. 22, 422. Maret, “Essai sur le Pantheisme,” 19, 26, 37, 77, 68, 85, 252, 290, 390, 409. Riambourg, “Rationalisme et Tradition,” pp. 110, 125. Valroger, “Etudes Critiques sur le Rationalisme Contem-

porain,” Paris, 1846, pp. lxi. 97–101, 115, 121, 151, 200, 232, 308, 316, 375, 412, 417. See also Buddeus, “De Atheismo et Superstitione,” pp. 184, 212, and Stapfer. “Institutiones Theologiæ Polemicæ,” tom. III. c. xiii. “De Indifferentismo Religionum, Latitudinariis, et Religione Prudentum.”

to eliminate the one, while we retain the other,—to winnow the wheat from the chaff, and to separate the ore from the dross. In this sense there may be a sound Eclecticism, such as every one will acknowledge to be alike necessary and useful in the study of truth,—for almost every error which has prevailed in Philosophy, and every heresy which has gained credit and currency in Religion, has contained some fragment of truth which gave it a plausible appearance, while that fragment was enveloped and encrusted in error. There is either no such thing as a system of pure unmixed error, or, if there be, it is not likely to obtain the general suffrages of mankind. Error and heresy arise from a partial and one-sided view of the subject to which they relate, or from the preference of one truth to the neglect or exclusion of another which is not necessarily inconsistent with it. Thus in Philosophy, a Materialist is not one who believes in the existence of matter, for that is the fragment of truth which his theory contains, but one who believes in the existence of matter only, to the utter exclusion of mind or spirit, for that is the error with which the former truth is combined ; and so an Idealist is not one who recognises the operations and results of pure reason, for these are equally recognised by his opponents, but one who insists on these exclusively, and refuses to acknowledge the testimony of sense, or the evidence of an external world. And so in Religion, a Unitarian is not one who believes in the Unity of God, for that is the portion of truth which he holds in common with all his opponents ; but one who denies a Trinity in Unity, or a plurality of persons in the one Godhead ; and this being the characteristic feature of his doctrine, as distinguished from, and opposed to, that of the Catholic Church, his proper designation is, not Unitarian, but Antitrinitarian. For this reason Eclecticism, in the sound sense of the term, is not only lawful, but indispensable, in considering the claims of any system of mere human opinion. But this is not the sense in which it is affirmed that *error is partial truth*. It is not only held that a complex system of opinion may contain truth mingled with error, and may be described therefore as partly true and partly false,—but that error, as such, is truth,—partial truth, indeed, but still truth ; whereas error is not truth at all, but the very reverse of truth ; and any attempt to obliterate the distinction, or to deny the opposition, between the two, must inevitably issue either in utter scepticism, or in that mongrel doctrine of Syncretism,

which Valroger has described as "Eclecticism transformed," and which, like a huge menagerie of clean and unclean animals, offers an asylum for "all the creeds,"—for Fetichism, for Polytheism, for Idolatry, for Pantheism, and even for Atheism itself,*—perhaps for Judaism and Christianity also, if they would only come in on equal terms, and consent to become parties to this holy alliance.

(713.) Syncretism has been applied to obliterate, not only the distinction between truth and error in matters of opinion, but also the distinction between virtue and vice in the sphere of morals; and it has been extended so as to become a theory of fatalistic Optimism, which holds that "whatever is is right," and that "partial evil is universal good." In this form it has been applied to History, as a philosophical explanation of the whole scheme of Providence in relation to man; to the Passions, as a philosophical vindication, not of their legitimate use merely, but of their utmost license; to Religion in general, and to Christianity, as one of the forms of Religion, in particular,—as if all forms were very much on the same level, and had their common origin only in the religious sentiment of humanity.† This fatalistic Optimism, which obliterates the distinction between truth and error,—virtue and vice,—is not only essentially different from, but diametrically opposed to, the Christian Optimism which every enlightened believer will gladly embrace;—an Optimism which holds that "the Judge of all the earth will do what is right"—right in the estimate of omniscient wisdom with a view to the ultimate ends of the Divine government,—that He will do nothing, and permit nothing to be done in His Universe, at variance with these ends,—and that even error, and sin, and suffering, when they do appear, not without His sovereign permission, among His intelligent creatures, will all be overruled for the manifestation of His own glory, and

* Valroger, "Etudes," p. 412. "N'a-t-il (M. Leroux) pas tiré la conséquence rigoureuse de ces principes, quand il a osé soutenir que *l'Atheisme est providentielle à certaines époques*." Speaking of Cousin, Valroger gives this summary of the consequences deducible from his fundamental principle. "S'il ose soutenir ouvertement que le Sensualisme, le Scepticisme, et l'Athesisme, ont été providentiels partout où ils ont triomphé; s'il about le Polythéisme, le Dualisme, et le Pan-

théisme; s'il admire à même titre Zoroastre et Moïse, Epicure et notre Seigneur Jesus Christ, les hérésiarques et les Pères de l'Eglise, Bossuet et Voltaire, Pascal et Kant, Malebranche et Schelling, Fenelon et Saint-Simon,—je ne saurais voir là qu'une application franche des principes posés plus ou moins nettement par nos professeurs d'Eclecticisme."—P. 126.

† Valroger, "Etudes Critiques," pp. 115, 126, 129, 308, 316.

the greater—the eternal—welfare of all His obedient subjects. This is an Optimism which is taught in Scripture, and which commended itself to the large minds of Leibnitz and Chalmers; but it is opposed at every point to the spurious Optimism of infidelity. It makes no attempt to obliterate the distinction between truth and error, or between virtue and vice; on the contrary, it recognises the existence, and even the prevalence, of error and vice, in the present state of human nature, and insists on the necessary and eternal antagonism between what is true and false, right and wrong; while it holds, notwithstanding, that all events will be overruled, by means known only to omniscient wisdom, for the glory of God, and the good of His spiritual kingdom. But in order to the accomplishment of these ends, truth and error, virtue and vice, must stand out in their true character as distinct from, and diametrically opposed to, each other; and His adorable perfections will be manifested chiefly in the treatment which He bestows on each of them respectively.

(714.) We have said enough to indicate the general character and tendencies of the scheme of thought which is known under the name of religious Liberalism. It may be useful, however, to consider some of its leading principles, in connection with the pleas which have been employed in support of them, and to inquire what analogies are applicable to the refutation of each of them respectively.

(715.) It is necessary, in the first instance, to single out, and separate from the errors with which they are combined in that scheme, some principles which are not peculiar to the advocates of Liberalism, but common to them with all who acknowledge the right and duty of private judgment, and which, when rightly stated and duly limited, may be said to constitute the fragment of truth that gives it, in some of its aspects, a certain measure of plausibility. The disciples of this school are wont to declaim with much vehemence on such principles as these,—the unlimited right of free inquiry and the free expression of opinion,—the duty of strict impartiality in forming our judgments, unbiassed by predilection or prejudice,—the great law of universal toleration, as opposed to persecution for conscience sake,—and the beauty of a catholic spirit as contrasted with bigotry in regard to matters of faith. They often speak as if they were entitled to claim a monopoly of these principles, and as if all others must be held to

have abandoned them who oppose their more peculiar tenets. Yet these principles are held in a sound sense, and honestly professed, by all the Protestant Churches; and they could have given no occasion for controversy between those who hold them in common, were it not that the advocates of Liberalism have imposed upon them such a sense, and associated them with such other opinions, as have the effect of transmuting wholesome truth into dangerous and deadly error. For this reason, in speaking of these principles as truths, we have thought it right to qualify our statement by adding, "when they are rightly understood and duly limited," for it will be found, in regard to every one of them, that Liberalism understands them in a sense of its own, and makes them to rest on grounds essentially different from those on which alone they can be firmly established or rationally defended.

(716.) The right of free inquiry, and the right also, within certain limits, of the free expression of religious opinions,* are equally maintained by all who contend for the duty of private judgment, in connection with the doctrine of personal responsibility in matters of faith. This doctrine constitutes the best and only sure foundation of that duty; and by denying it, as we shall afterwards see the advocates of Liberalism almost invariably do, they cut away the firmest support of the right for which they contend; since it can only be effectually vindicated by arguments derived from the moral and responsible, rather than from the mere intellectual, nature of man. An acute Deistical writer, in contending for that right, placed it distinctly on this ground. "In matters of opinion, it is every man's natural right and duty to think for himself, and to judge on such evidence as he can procure to himself, after he has done his best endeavours to get information. . . . As it is every man's natural right and duty to think and judge for himself in matters of opinion, so he should be allowed freely to profess his opinions, and to endeavour, when he judges proper, to convince *others also of their truth*, provided those opinions do not tend to the disturbance of society. . . . The grand principle of men, considered as having a relation to the Deity, and as under an obligation to be religious, is that they ought to consult their reason; and of Christians and Protestants, that they ought to

* S. Bailey, "Essays on the Formation and Publication of Opinions;" and "Essays on the Pursuit of Truth."

consult the Scriptures as the rule of their faith and practice.”* In this sense, and to this extent, the right of free thinking and free speech is involved in the great Protestant principle of private judgment and personal responsibility, viewed in connection with the Christian duty of “holding forth the word of truth,” and proclaiming “the Gospel to every creature.” But if by free-thinking be meant the right of every man to think and to speak as he pleases, without having regard to the evidence of what he believes, or the truth of what he says;—if it claims exemption from all authority external to the mind itself, and refuses to be taught either by Nature or Revelation,—then such freedom is inconsistent with all the conditions of human knowledge, and with all the analogies of our common experience; and such free-thinking, if it must be so called, is rather the caprice of the will or the fancy, than an intelligent exercise of our rational powers.†

(717.) The duty of strict impartiality in forming our judgments, and of the utmost candour in the treatment of evidence, is admitted by every one who has a sincere love of truth for its own sake, and is inculcated by none with greater earnestness and confidence, or, we may add, with better reason, than by those who feel constrained, notwithstanding, to oppose the claims of Liberalism. The impartiality which all the enlightened advocates of Religion enjoin, is not the impartiality of Indifference.‡ God forbid! They know and believe that there is a radical and irreconcilable difference, and even a necessary and eternal antagonism, between truth and error; and they are far from supposing that it can be a matter of indifference, with reference either to our secular or spiritual welfare, whether we embrace the one or the other. Such indifference, when it relates to the most solemn and important questions which the mind of man can entertain, would be unnatural, and even inhuman.§ To suppose that any one can, or should, come to the consideration of the question, whether there is reason to believe in the existence of God or not, —or whether the Scriptures contain a revelation of His mind and will, is to conceive of man as a mere intellectual machine,—a

* Ant. Collins, “Grounds and Reasons of the Christian Religion,” Pref. pp. v. vi. xiii.

† Bentley, “Remarks upon a late Discourse on Free-thinking.”

‡ Whately, “Essays on the Difficulties in the Writings of Paul,” Pref. vi. pp. 3, 16.

§ Pascal, “Pensées,” pp. 154–157.

being destitute alike of all moral sentiments, and all regard to his own interests and prospects. "The indifference," says Hallam, "which Locke recommends to everything except truth itself, so that we should not even wish anything to be true before we have examined whether it be so, seems to involve the impossible hypothesis that man is but a purely reasoning being. It is vain to press the recommendation of freedom from prejudice so far, since we cannot but conceive some propositions to be more connected with our welfare than others, and consequently to desire their truth. These exaggerations lay a fundamental condition of honest inquiry open to the sneers of its adversaries; and it is sufficient, because nothing more is really attainable, first, to dispossess ourselves of the notion that our interests are concerned where they are not; and, next, even when we cannot but wish one result of our inquiries rather than another, to be the more unremitting in our endeavours to exclude this bias from our reasoning."* The extreme Indifference of Locke, like the initial Doubt of Descartes, may be plausible in speculation, but is impossible in practice. In point of fact, no man can come to the study of the great questions of Natural and Revealed Religion in a spirit of entire indifference as to the result of his inquiries; and, what is more, he is so constituted that he should not, if he could. The mere idea of God, as being, even possibly, the Creator, Governor, and Judge of the world,† and the mere idea of Christ as being, even possibly, what He professed Himself to be, the Redeemer and Saviour of sinners, has a direct relation to the conscience, and imposes an obligation to inquire into the evidence with impartial candour, but not with any feeling of indifference as to the result; for that result must have an important bearing on our clearest duties here, and on our highest interests here and hereafter, and indifference in regard to it would imply a sinful disregard of both. The pure and disinterested love of truth for its own sake, like the pure and disinterested love of God for what He is in Himself, is the consummation, rather than the spring of thoughtful inquiry,—it is a moral virtue, which is not the spontaneous product of the soil, but the fruit of mental culture,—and it is gradually acquired and matured by the patient exercise of reflective thought. Inquiry finds its origin in

* Hallam, "Literature of Europe," vol. IV. p. 294.

† Dr Chalmers, "Works," vol. I. c.

ii. p. 56, "On the Duty which is laid upon Men by the Probability or even the Imagination of a God."

a much lower principle—the principle of curiosity, stimulated into action by our instincts and desires, our hopes and our fears. Christianity never speaks to man as if he were a merely intellectual being; it recognises his intelligence, but it recognises also his sentient nature, as liable to be affected by pleasure and pain; his moral nature, as cognizant of right and wrong; his emotional nature, as susceptible of hope and fear; and it addresses itself to all his faculties, on the supposition that in their normal state, whether original or renewed, they are “not conflicting but conspiring forces,” and may all co-operate harmoniously in leading him on to a right faith and practice. It is adapted to “the complex system of a human life, a life in which all the elements move and play simultaneously, and with something more than mere simultaneity or co-existence, acting and reacting each upon the other,—nay, even acting by each other and through each other.”* In this respect it accords with the true philosophy of human nature, and with the analogy of our whole experience in regard to our mere natural knowledge; for were our sentient, moral, and emotional feelings ignored or disregarded, there would remain no motive sufficiently strong to stimulate inquiry, and no reason for believing that inquiry was in any respect either a matter of duty, or a means of promoting our present or future welfare.—If it be said that inquiry conducted on these principles must be biassed by predilection or prejudice,† it is enough to say in reply that, constituted as we are, we are necessarily subject to certain influences arising from the conditions of our sentient, and the state of our moral, nature, which may be either wholesome or injurious according to their nature, and that Free-thinking itself is equally liable to be affected by them with the most Religious disposition.‡

(718.) The principle of religious Toleration, and of the sinfulness of persecution for conscience sake, has been supposed, on very insufficient grounds, to be a peculiar and characteristic feature of Liberalism, which has been often found, like ancient Pagan-

* Thomas de Quincey, “Works,” vol. XV. p. 73.

† Dumarsais “Essai sur les Préjugés.”

‡ Valroger, “Etudes Critiques.” “Préjugés, vraiment! et les préjugés irreligieux sont-ils moins à redouter pour l’indépendance de la Philosophie? . . . Une doctrine ne

s’attire pas des partisans par ce qu’elle est fausse,—j’en conviens. Elle ne s’attire des partisans que par ce qu’elle a de vrai,—je le nie. Nous n’aimons pas, nous ne cherchons pas le faux, en tant qu’il est faux; mais nous pouvons l’aimer et le chercher, en tant qu’il est favorable à des passions qui nous sont chères.”—Pp. 62, 116.

ism,* willing to tolerate all religions except one. The disciples of this school often speak as if they thought that a firm adherence to truth, in opposition to error, amounted to bigotry or intolerance. Their views of the nature of Toleration, and of the grounds on which it should be maintained, are essentially different from those of its religious advocates. The Toleration for which they contend is one springing from the idea that all Religions and all Creeds are matters of indifference; and the grounds on which they seek to establish and defend it are,—either the uncertainty of all opinion,†—or the impossibility of uniformity of sentiment, on any subject of human thought,‡—or the indifference of any opinion in regard to God and Divine things.§ Their doctrine, in short, amounts simply to this, that the Religious sentiment is equally manifested in every form of Religious opinion, and that, for this reason, all forms should be equally tolerated, as manifestations of the same intuitions.|| These are not the true grounds of Religious Toleration. The only ground which will stand the test of rigid scrutiny is the great principle, that “God alone is Lord of the conscience, and has left it free from the doctrines and commandments of men in matters of faith and worship;” or, in its Christian form, the doctrine of the sole Headship of Christ, and the personal responsibility of every man to Him, and to Him alone,—for “the Head of every man is Christ”—as that doctrine has been taught and witnessed for by the suffering Church in Scotland, along the whole line of her most instructive history.¶ We cordially agree with Archbishop Whately in thinking that the Scriptural arguments for Toleration are the best, and, indeed, the only conclusive ones;** and that some of the grounds on which it was made to rest in the otherwise able works of Jeremy Taylor, Locke, and Bayle,†† in so far as they insisted on the uncertainty

* Tertullian, by Reeves, pp. 286, 299, 358. Warburton, “Works,” II. 206.

† Channing’s *Memoirs*, p. 552.

‡ Ellis, “Half Century of Unitarianism,” p. 290.

§ Saisset, “*Spinosas*,” cxi. cxxxvi. *Spinosas*, “*Tractatus Theol. Politicus*,” pp. 249–251.

|| Morell, “*Lectures*,” pp. 157, 165, 176. Mackay, “*Progress of Intellect*,” p. 135.

¶ Hugh Miller, “*The Headship of Christ*.”

** Whately, “*Errors of Romanism*,” pp. 275, 277, 302.

†† Jeremy Taylor, “*Liberty of Prophesying*.” Locke, “*Letters on Toleration*.” Bayle, “*Compel them to Come in*.” See also C. Noodt, Professor of Civil Law at Leyden, “*Two Discourses on Sovereign Power, and Liberty of Conscience*,” translated by A. Macaulay, with Notes and Illustrations by Barbeyrac. 1781.

of human opinion, and the impossibility of uniform agreement, as the chief arguments in support of it, have little or no validity in comparison with the great principle of *every man's individual responsibility to God*. If this principle be admitted, it follows as a necessary corollary, that every man is free to judge and to act for himself in matters of religious faith and worship; but it does not follow that it is a matter of indifference what he believes, or how he worships. It proves,—what might be established also on other grounds, especially from the very nature of religion as an intelligent and voluntary service,—that no man can be compelled, or should be coerced, to adopt any form of faith or worship by the usurped authority of his fellow-servants, or subjected to persecution on account of his differing from them; but it does not prove that he is right in believing, or safe in acting on, any doctrines which he may have been led to embrace, whether these doctrines be in accordance, or at variance, with truth. Any supposition of this kind would contradict the analogies of our whole experience in regard to mere natural truth; for assuredly it is not a matter of indifference, with reference to our secular interests, whether we believe and act upon truth or error.

(719.) Viewed in different aspects, Christianity may be said to be either *tolerant* or *intolerant*,* and in both respects it exhibits a striking contrast to religious Liberalism. It is intolerant of error, just because it is loyal to truth; and yet it is tolerant towards all men,—not in the sense of approving or excusing those who err, but in that of allowing both tares and wheat to grow together till the harvest,—just because it is loyal to Him who is “the Judge of all.” It recognises the claims of Divine truth, but it also recognises the personal responsibility of all men; and, on the one, it founds the duty of believing,—while, on the other, it founds the duty of forbearance towards unbelievers and heretics, after the example of Him who maketh “His sun to rise on the evil and the good, and sendeth rain on the just and on the unjust.”† De Quincey describes Pope as “a philosophical Christian, intolerant of nothing but intolerance, a bigot only against bigots;”‡ a statement which implies that he could tolerate every error except

* Vinet, “Vital Christianity:” “The Tolerance and Intolerance of the Gospel,” pp. 210, 218.

† Matt. v. 45.

‡ De Quincey, “Works,” XV. p. 138.

one; whereas Christianity is, in one sense, tolerant, and in another, intolerant, of every error without exception:—tolerant, in the sense of being forbearing, tender, and compassionate towards all persons who are involved in error, whatever their error may be; yet intolerant, in the sense of being opposed to, and testifying against, every error in Religion; and this for the same reason, namely, that truth, and truth only, can secure or promote the welfare of any rational, moral, and responsible being. The author of Christianity exhibited in His own person, and throughout His whole life, the rare combination of an inflexible regard for the claims of Divine truth, with a spirit of forbearance and long-suffering towards those who rejected its claims,—insomuch that some, unable apparently to reconcile these two aspects of His character, have felt as if two different Christs were exhibited in the Gospel—the one gentle, tender, and merciful, the other stern, inflexible, and severe.* This delineation of His character is strictly analogous to the twofold manifestation of God in Nature and Providence, which exhibit many tokens of His merciful forbearance and patient long-suffering, but many presages also of a coming judgment, and a righteous retribution. Liberalism stands out in striking contrast both with the character of Christ, and with the teaching of Scripture. It is tolerant of the grossest error, and intolerant only of the purest truth;—and, if it would protect the erring from persecution, it does so on a ground altogether different from that on which alone Christian Toleration should be enjoined and defended. It denies the personal responsibility of every man to God for his belief, and thereby deprives Toleration of its strongest and best support. And not content with the free toleration, it often advocates the indiscriminate encouragement and endowment, of all religions and sects,†—making no distinction between the claims of truth and error, or between simple permission and active support,—and exposing itself to the scathing ridicule and scorn even of those who benefit most by this sad compromise of principle.‡

(720.) The advocates of Liberalism in religion are fond of expatiating on the beauty of a catholic and charitable spirit, and

* J. G. Holyoake.

† Franck, "Certitude," pp. lxx. lxxvii.
Defence of French Establishment.

‡ Lamennais sur "l'Indifférence,"
vol. I. 65, 68.

of contrasting it with the bigotry which, as they imagine, is necessarily involved in, or invariably connected with, a firm adherence to doctrinal articles of faith. All Christian men, however deficient they may be in the practice of the duty, will cheerfully acknowledge the obligation which lies upon them, as disciples of "the meek and lowly Jesus," to cherish a truly catholic spirit, and to manifest it in every way which is compatible with a faithful adherence to truth. But true charity has for its object the persons, and not the errors, of men; and one of its highest exercises may consist in testifying against those errors by which men are deluded and led astray. Nor does such a testimony imply an arrogant assumption of personal infallibility, or even of superior wisdom; it implies nothing more than a conscientious belief of the truth, which is not sought to be imposed on others by authority, but is only submitted for their consideration, along with the evidence on which it rests. There may be a truly catholic spirit, and the utmost tenderness towards the doubts and scruples of others, where there is, notwithstanding, a firm adhesion to truth.* But there is a wide difference between such catholicity and the spirit of Liberalism. The latter is the catholicity, not of faith and love, but of indifference or unbelief.† It requires no magnanimity, and little charity, to tolerate diversities of opinion, when all opinions are held to be equally good and safe; but the sublime grace of a truly catholic spirit shines in its highest lustre when it is associated with a firm faith in truth, and a deep sense of its fundamental importance, and yet manifests itself, notwithstanding, in the considerate, tender, and generous treatment of all who come within the range of its influence. The catholicity of the Christian believer has its prototype in the faith and love of the martyr Church in primitive times, which adhered so firmly to the "faith once delivered to the saints," in opposition to the errors of Polytheism and Idolatry, as to be ready to die for it; while the catholicity of the religious Liberal has its prototype in the servile homage which Philosophers did not disdain to offer to the worst forms of Paganism, by conforming to its outward rites, while they laughed at the superstitions of the people. The principle of the supremacy of

* Christoffel's "Life of Zuingli," translated by John Cochrane, Esq., pp. 358, 368, 380.

† Whately, "Bampton Lectures," pp. 44, 227, 241; "Errors of Romanism," p. 318. J. H. Newman, "Theory of Religious Belief," p. 118.

truth, and the religious obligation of individual belief, was a conquest won by the primitive Church in an age of prevailing indifference and scepticism;* it was a new and startling doctrine to the Gallios of those days; and it aroused then, as now, the fierce opposition of Philosophic indifference, and Sadducean unbelief. The alleged intolerance of Judaism and Christianity rested on the same ground,—the eternal antagonism between truth and error,—the truth of God, and the error of man; and neither in the one case, nor in the other, was it incompatible with a truly catholic spirit, although it might easily be perverted, by Pharisaic pride in ancient times, and by ignorant bigotry in our own, into an apology for narrow exclusiveness, or even for active persecution. But Liberalism itself is liable to a similar perversion, for there is a bigotry of unbelief, as well as a bigotry of faith.† There is an intolerance of truth, not less than an intolerance of error. And both rest ultimately on belief,—for “it is most important to keep in mind the self-evident, but often forgotten, maxim that Disbelief is Belief, only they have reference to different conclusions. . . . The proper opposite to belief is either conscious ignorance or doubt. And even doubt may sometimes amount to a kind of belief; since deliberate and confirmed doubt, on a question that one has attended to, implies a verdict of *not proven*—a belief that there is not sufficient evidence to determine either one way or the other.”‡ In this sense, sceptical Atheism itself becomes dogmatic, when it pronounces a judgment against either the possibility, or the sufficiency, of a proof for the existence and attributes of God. And how catholic and tolerant Atheism is, let the first French Revolution tell: how catholic and tolerant Deism, Rationalism, Spiritualism, and even Liberalism are, let the writings of their respective advocates testify, when they refer to Judaism and Christianity, or to any definite form of Religious faith. The truth is that bigotry is the indigenous fruit of every narrow and ignorant mind,—while a catholic spirit is the slow growth of spiritual culture, which thrives best under the influence of external teaching, and is only matured by some experience of the conflict between truth and error; for according to the profound dictum of Augus-

* J. Taylor, “Restoration of Belief,” pp 75, 86.

† Berkeley, “Minute Philosopher,” p. 491.

‡ Whately, “Rhetoric,” p. 82.

tin,—“they are the most uncharitable towards Error, who have never experienced how hard a matter it is to come at the Truth.” Liberalism ignores the difference between truth and error; and it is equally prone to obliterate the distinction between virtue and vice. It is opposed not only to a strict adherence to definite articles of faith, but also to a strict conformity to the precepts of duty in so far as they transcend the current morality of the world. It satirizes saintship as Puritanism, just as it ridicules faith as bigotry. And it has been humorously, but not unjustly, described as a system which would take “not” out of the commandments, and insert it in the creed.*

(721.) We have thought it right to explain, in the first instance, those principles which are professed both by the advocates and the opponents of religious Liberalism, and to illustrate, at the same time, the different grounds on which they are maintained by these parties respectively. We now proceed to bring under review certain other principles which constitute the peculiar and distinctive features of this latitudinarian theory, and to inquire what analogies may be derived from our common experience, and applied to the refutation of each of its various pleas. The principles which are usually adduced as pleas in support of it, when it is made the subject of argumentative discussion, are such as the following;—that Truth, whatever it may be in itself, is, relatively to us, purely subjective, and a matter of opinion only,—that it is of no consequence what a man believes, or whether he has any belief at all, on the subject of religion,—that all creeds are safe, and all opinions indifferent,—that belief is involuntary, and unbelief is neither sinful nor punishable,—that the importance which is attached to faith by the sacred writers, the command to believe the Gospel, the ascription of guilt to unbelief, and the denunciation of judgment on account of it, are all unphilosophical, as being at variance with the laws which regulate and determine our religious opinions,—that all particular forms of religion are partial and delusive, except in so far as they are manifestations of the same natural intuitions or sentiments,—and that sincerity is a man’s justification, whatever he believes,—a justification even of Atheism itself.

(722.) When the theory of religious Liberalism is traced to

* Henry Rogers, “Eclipse of Faith,” p. 242.

its source, it will probably be found to spring from the idea, more or less consciously entertained, that, relatively to us, truth is purely subjective, and a matter of mere opinion. According to this idea, truth is confounded with opinion, and all opinions, however conflicting, or even contradictory, are equally true. The reality of objective truth is denied, or at least the possibility of its being ascertained by us, and discriminated from the impressions of our own minds. But if this idea be tenable at all, it can admit of no partial application to religious truth, and must be carried out consistently and applied to all truth whatever. If it be thus impartially applied to the whole theory of human knowledge, it will be found to be the germ of universal Scepticism. It is defensible only on the principles of Pyrrho and Sextus Empiricus,* and not even on these, if it be expressed in the form either of affirmation or denial. When it is thus extended, as it must in consistency be, to truth of whatever kind, we can bring all the analogies of our common natural knowledge to bear upon it. It may be, and we believe it is, the most difficult problem in Philosophy to show *how* the human mind can know anything excepting itself and its own modifications;† but although Philosophy, considered as a system of pure Rationalism, may be unable to solve the *quomodo*,—the Philosophy which combines reason with experience will have no difficulty in recognising, as common sense invariably does, the undeniable *fact*, that we do know many truths relating to the external world which are entirely independent of our opinion in regard to them, and which are equally real whether they are known or unknown, believed or disbelieved, by any conceivable number of individual minds. All our reasonings with others, when we attempt to correct their defective or erroneous views in regard to any part of natural truth, such as the facts of History, or the laws of Nature, or the principles of Morals, proceed on the supposition that there is a standard of common appeal to which all men are bound to submit,—that individual opinion must be tested by evidence, which may exist where it has not yet been discerned,—that mere opinion, however sincerely cherished and tenaciously held, is not necessarily

* Sextus Empiricus, "Hypotyposes." Bartholmæss, "Huet."

† Valroger, "Etudes Critiques," p. 187—"Un problème qui déconcert tous les efforts du Rationalisme

depuis Kant,—*Comment le Moi peut-il connaître aucune chose que lui-même ? Je ne crois pas que le Rationalisme puisse jamais résoudre sans inconvénience ce mystérieux problème.*"

true,—and that errors in judgment may be rectified by adducing,—not the mere opinion of another man, for that is equally fallible and may be equally false,—but the reasons on which that opinion is founded, which may be such as are sufficient to justify it, and to commend it to the intelligence of his fellow-men. The analogies, which may thus be derived from our actual experience and our common natural knowledge, are abundantly sufficient to neutralize any objection against our Religious faith, which is founded on the idea that truth is merely subjective, and a matter of opinion only; and still further they afford a strong argument for believing that, just as in respect to our natural knowledge, we are subject to error, which can only be corrected by an appeal to evidence external to the mind itself, and independent of it; so, in respect to our Religious knowledge, we may be equally prone to form erroneous judgments, and equally dependent, therefore, on some external authority, for the right apprehension of truth. The whole analogy of our experience, in regard to our knowledge of natural truth, is opposed to the idea of truth being merely subjective, or of opinion being synonymous with truth. It justifies us in affirming that religious Liberalism, in so far as it is founded on the idea that truth is purely subjective, and matter of opinion only, is at variance with all the lessons which experience teaches in regard to the nature, origin, and evidence, of our common natural knowledge.

(723.) But if that idea be at variance with all natural analogy, the plea that all doctrines are indifferent, and that it is of no consequence what a man believes, or whether he believes anything at all, on the subject of Religion, is still more flagrantly absurd. Many distinct analogies,—some derived from the known constitution of the human mind, others from every man's personal experience and the facts of universal history,—may be applied in refutation of this monstrous plea. If we look to the constitution of the human mind, and the relation which subsists between its various powers and properties, it is manifest that, with reference to the duties and interests even of the present life, our desires, affections, and passions are designed to be subordinated to the control of reason and conscience, and that these governing faculties can only guide us aright in so far as they are themselves directed by the light of truth. Our feelings and sentiments may supply the motives of action, but the rule of action can only be

determined by our intellectual and moral powers, enlightened and informed by experience and instruction. Reason, duly instructed, is "a directive light," designed and fitted to regulate "the will and the walk." * If we believe amiss, we shall act amiss, with reference even to our temporal welfare; and erroneous opinions, as often as we act upon them, will involve us in disappointment and danger. We are so constituted that our conduct, and all the consequences which depend upon it, must be determined, to a large extent, by our knowledge and belief; and everything that can be said in favour of a *well-regulated* mind supplies an argument, from analogy, against the doctrine that it is of no consequence what a man's opinions are, or whether they be true or false. If we look, again, to the facts of experience and history, we find that, practically, beliefs, true or false, right or wrong, govern the world, and that it is well or ill governed in proportion as truth or error prevails.† It has been made a question, indeed, whether in the last resort the world is governed by opinion or force;‡ and much may be said in support of the latter as the *ultima ratio*, or rather the indispensable buttress, of mere human authority; but one thing is certain, that it must be governed by the one or by the other, and that the less it is governed by enlightened public opinion, the more it must be subject to mere brute force. It has also been said that men are influenced chiefly not by their reason or their faith, but by sensible impressions; by their passions, and their prejudices; §—but this statement, however true as a description of the actual condition of multitudes, cannot be accepted as a correct description of their normal state, or as a proof that their opinions are matters of indifference, unless it could be further proved either that there is no real difference between truth and error, or that the influence of the one is as safe and salutary as that of the other. It will scarcely be maintained by any class of educated men in the nineteenth century, that it is of no consequence what the people believe in regard to natural truth; for although in former times some may have acted as if they thought that, in some cases, error might be politically expedient, and truth, generally diffused, dangerous to society, yet when a crisis has arisen, and the people have begun

* Culverwell, "Light of Nature," p. 205.

† Lamennais, "l'Indifference," vol. I. 36, 39, 320.

‡ Pascal, "Pensées," p. 308.

§ Nicole, "Pensées," p. 430.

to act on their erroneous opinions,—when they have attempted to raise the price of labour by artificial means, by compulsory strikes or widely extended combinations,—when they have resisted the introduction of machinery invented to facilitate production and to diminish the burden of human toil,—when they have adopted levelling opinions, and denounced all aristocracies, whether of wealth, or talent, or rank, statesmen of all parties have been compelled to acknowledge that the diffusion of an enlightened public opinion was the only effective safeguard against anarchy and revolution. They have found that, even on mere utilitarian principles, truth is preferable to error, just as virtue is preferable to vice.*

(724.) All the facts which prove the value and importance of a sound and enlightened knowledge of natural truth, may be applied, on the principle of analogy, to prove the necessity of right views of Religious truth, unless it can be shown that there is some peculiarity in the latter, such as exempts it from the operation of those laws which connect truth with utility in every other department of human knowledge. There is a manifest inconsistency in ignoring or denying the radical difference between truth and error in Religion, when it is acknowledged in every other department of inquiry, unless there be something so peculiar to Religion as to place it beyond the jurisdiction of these laws. Yet from this glaring inconsistency, the advocates of Liberalism in Religion have shown no disposition to shrink. We are gravely told that any, and every, opinion of God is innocent, and that all creeds are equally safe.† This bold statement is probably founded on the principle that man is not responsible for his belief, which will require separate treatment,—but in the meantime, looking, not to the principle on which it rests, but to the import and truth of the statement itself, we affirm that, in so far as it represents every diversity of opinion concerning God to be a matter of indifference, it is opposed to all the facts of experience, and to all the analogies which these facts supply. What can be more undeniably certain, in the light of experience and history, than that men's conceptions of the character of God, if they be, in one sense, determined by the state of their moral nature, have a tendency also to react upon it, and either to foster depravity,

* Berkeley, "Minute Philosopher," Works, vol. I. pp. 322, 324.

† Saisset's "Spinoza," Pref. clxxxvi. exc. Spinoza, "Tractatus Theologico-Politicus," pp. 249-251.

when they are false, or to cherish holiness, when they are true? Can the same moral effects be expected to arise from belief and worship, if the object of that belief and worship be a Moloch or a Mammon, a Bacchus or a Venus, a Juggernaut or a Scheva, as when God is known and adored in His true character, as infinitely wise, and holy, and just, and good? Does not all experience show that the conceptions which men form of God will exert a powerful reflex influence on their own character,—that if the object of their worship be impure, lascivious, vindictive, or unjust, their very Religion will degenerate into license and immorality? Is it not one of the clearest facts of history, that men cannot dishonour God in their conceptions of His character, without degrading themselves, and sinking into a state of moral debasement, from which nothing but *true* Religion will ever be sufficient to rescue them? What have been the moral effects of Paganism in India, in China, in Africa, and among the degraded aborigines of America, Australia, and New Zealand? Nay, what were its moral effects in the best ages of Greece and Rome, when they had reached the highest point of civilisation and refinement? And what was the cause of their moral degradation? Had it no connection with their Religious opinions, and the character of the objects of their worship? The apostle accounts for it, by ascribing it to a melancholy change in their views of God,—in a passage which is so true to nature, that, apart from his inspired authority, it commends itself to our belief by its entire accordance with all the analogies of experience. “When they knew God, they glorified Him not as God, neither were thankful; but became vain in their imaginations, and their foolish heart was darkened. Professing themselves to be wise, they became fools; and *changed the glory of the uncorruptible God into an image made like to corruptible man*, and to birds, and four-footed beasts, and creeping things. . . . They changed the truth of God into a lie, and worshipped and served the creature more than the Creator, who is blessed for ever. . . . And even as they did not like to retain God in their knowledge, God gave them over to a reprobate mind, to do those things which are not convenient: being filled with all unrighteousness, fornication, wickedness, covetousness, maliciousness; full of envy, murder, deceit, malignity; whisperers, backbiters, haters of God, spiteful, proud, boasters, inventors of evil things, disobedient to parents, without under-

standing, covenant-breakers, without natural affection, implacable, unmerciful.”*

(725.) The chief plea of religious Liberalism,—and that on which its advocates seldom fail to fall back when they cannot defend the absolute indifference of all Religious opinions in respect either to their truth or their moral influence,—consists in maintaining that they are indifferent, at least, in respect to the safety of those who hold them; since belief, whether true or false, is involuntary, and cannot, therefore, in any case, be either sinful or punishable. On this ground its advocates object to Christianity, because it requires belief in certain facts and doctrines, as if belief were a moral duty; and denounces unbelief, as if it were a sin, and worthy of punishment. They cannot tolerate the idea that salvation is dependent, as the Gospel declares it to be, on the belief of the truth; or that unbelief should expose any one to censure, and far less to final condemnation. They hold that belief and unbelief are determined simply and solely by the strength or weakness of the evidence which is presented to the mind in any particular case,—that in every case it is involuntary,—and for that reason exempt from all moral responsibility. Such is the extent to which they carry this doctrine, and such the legitimate consequences of the principle on which it is founded, that, were it true, it would afford a justification for all men, whatever their opinion or belief may be in regard to the evidences and truths either of Natural or Revealed Religion. It is comprehensive enough to justify not only every heresy in regard to Christian doctrine, but Deism also, which entirely disowns the authority of Revelation; and even Atheism, which rejects the evidence of the being and perfections of God. All the three are equally innocent; insomuch that the whole universe might contain none but Atheists, and yet this universal unbelief would be free from guilt. Some of the advocates of Liberalism may be unwilling to carry their doctrine out to the full extent of its legitimate application; but the principle on which it is founded,—namely, that all belief is involuntary, and incapable, therefore, of being, in any case, sinful or punishable,—is quite as applicable to the defence of Atheism, as to that of Deism, or Socinianism.

(726.) To this extent it must be carried by all consistent and

* Rom. i. 21-31.

consequent reasoners. The principle is a universal one, and admits of no partial or one-sided application to any particular form of error. It must justify the innocence of all beliefs, if it can justify the innocence of any. All human belief is said to be involuntary, and for that reason we are held to be irresponsible on account of it. The principle is stated, accordingly, in this general form. "When we talk of the submission of our belief, we employ a metaphor which is deceptive and mischievous. Belief cannot submit: belief is an act of the understanding, submission an act of the will: belief is perfectly involuntary, and is determined by evidence, submission perfectly voluntary, and is determined by motives."* The doctrine that belief of any kind is essential to salvation is summarily dismissed. "To declare any one unworthy of the name of Christian because he does not agree with your *belief*, is to fall into the intolerance of the Article Churches. The moment that the name *Christian* is made necessarily to contain in its signification belief in certain historical or metaphysical propositions, that moment *the name itself becomes a creed*; the length of that creed is of little consequence."† The doctrine that belief is essential to salvation is admitted to be taught in the Gospels as they have come down to us; but it is ascribed to the error of the biographers, not to the teaching of Christ. "As the doctrine is at variance with the spirit of the mild and benevolent Jesus, so it is too obviously unsound not to have been recognised as such by One whose profound and splendid genius was informed and enlightened by so pure a heart. . . . Belief is an effect, produced by a cause. It is a condition of the mind induced by the operation of evidence presented. Being, therefore, an *effect*, and not an *act*, it cannot be, or have, a merit. . . . In sane and competent minds, if the evidence presented is sufficient, belief will follow as a necessary consequence; if it does not follow, this can only arise from the evidence adduced being insufficient. . . . To disbelieve in spite of adequate proof, is impossible; to believe without adequate proof, is weak or dishonest. . . . But it will be urged, that the disbelief which Christ blamed and menaced with punishment was—as appears from John iii. 19

* Martineau, "Rationale of Religious Inquiry," p. 25.

† Blanco White, "Letter to Martineau," Appendix to "Rationale," p. 105.

—the disbelief implied in a wilful rejection of His claims, or a refusal to examine them—‘a love of darkness in preference to light.’ If so, the language employed is incorrect and deceptive, and the blame is predicated of an effect instead of a cause; it is meant of a voluntary action, but it is predicated of a specified and denounced consequence, which is no natural or logical indication of that voluntary action, but may arise from independent causes.”* Whatever else may be thought of this reasoning, one thing is clear, that the principle on which it is founded is equally applicable to Atheistic, as to Deistic, or Socinian, unbelief;—and accordingly Spinoza tells us that “all opinions concerning God are innocent,” and Holyoake generalizes the doctrine so as to make sincerity a sufficient justification of Atheism itself.†

(727.) But the range of its application may be still further extended. It is only the partial statement of a more general theory, which affirms that man is irresponsible in so far as either his opinions, or his will, or his affections, or his actions, are subject to natural laws, and influenced by external circumstances; and rejects the doctrine of human responsibility altogether, on the ground that all the four are undeniably determined, to some extent, by such laws and influences. In this form it is presented in the writings of the late Robert Owen, whose favourite maxim was, that “man’s character is made *for* him, not *by* him,” and of course he cannot be responsible for it at all.‡ This is only the consistent and consequent result of the principle by which it is sought to prove that man is not responsible for his belief, and that all error is necessarily innocent. That principle is founded on the fact that human belief is regulated by certain intellectual laws, and dependent on the perception of evidence: but the fact is equally certain, that the will, the affections, and actions of men are also subject to natural laws and affected by external influences; and the only question which need be raised in regard to either is, whether these laws and influences operate so necessarily and so fatally as to exclude personal responsibility, or whether, notwithstanding their operation, there may not be room for such a measure of free moral agency as is sufficient to make every man

* Greg, “Creed of Christendom,” p. 154.

† Holyoake, “Trial of Theism,” pp. 127–139.

‡ “The New Moral World.”

accountable, alike for the nature of his Religious beliefs, the determinations of his will, the state of his affections, and the actions of his life.* These cases are all related to each other by the bond of a common Analogy. They resemble one another in this, that, in every one of the four, we are subject to certain laws from within; and to certain influences from without; and if it be admitted, as it generally is, that responsibility is consistent with these laws and influences in the case of our will, affections, and actions, it may be equally consistent with them in the case of our opinions and beliefs. If belief cannot be enjoined or regarded as a matter of duty, because it depends on evidence, why should a right state of the affections be required, seeing that these are equally dependent on the nature of the objects which are presented to them; or a right determination of the will, since that depends on the influence of motives; or a right course of action, since that depends on the combined influence of all these causes? It would be difficult to show that it is more unreasonable to require man to believe God's word, than to love God Himself, or to obey His will; for if it be made a question whether belief can be commanded, it may also be made a question whether dispositions or affections,† or the determinations of the will, can be commanded; since the latter, not less than the former, are regulated by certain natural laws. It were equally easy to show that Christianity, in requiring belief in God's word, love to God Himself, and obedience to His will, and treating all the three as matters of moral duty, proceeds on the same ground,—namely, on the assumption that it offers sufficient evidence that it is God who speaks,—that it reveals His character as the proper object of love,—and makes known His will, as an authority which is binding on all His intelligent and responsible creatures. There is a close connection, in this respect, between the doctrine of the Divine authority of Revelation, and the duty of believing and obeying it: the one is *analogous* to the other; and the doctrine cannot be accepted, while the duty is disowned or denied.

(728.) In considering the philosophical principle which has been applied to prove that man is not responsible for his Religious belief, and that unbelief cannot, therefore, be sinful, we should

* Isaac Taylor, "Man Responsible." | † Vinet, "Vital Christianity," p. 270.

bear in mind that while belief is, and should be, determined by evidence, unbelief may spring from other causes than the want or the weakness of evidence. There can be no vision without light; but there may be light where there is no vision, as in the case of blindness,—or where there is distorted vision, as in the case of jaundice,—or where there is painful vision, as in the case of a diseased eye, which the purest light serves only to irritate and inflame. Food is essential to the support of life, but disease may arise from other causes than the want or even the insufficient supply of food, and a diseased stomach will loathe and reject the most wholesome nourishment. In like manner, belief may depend on evidence, and yet unbelief may arise from other causes than the want of it. When it is said that “if the evidence presented is sufficient, belief will follow as a necessary consequence, and that if it does not follow, this can only arise from the evidence adduced being insufficient,”—this statement, which is equally applicable to Atheistic and Deistic unbelief, makes no distinction between the existence of evidence, and our perception of it, or the treatment which we bestow upon it. It may be true that, in some cases, such as the rejection of Paganism or Mahommedanism, unbelief may not be the “natural and logical indication” of a love of darkness in preference to light, but may arise from independent causes, such as the want or weakness of evidence; yet it is equally true that, in the case of Christianity, unbelief may arise neither from the want nor the weakness of its evidence, but from an indisposition to consider it,—from an unfair and uncandid treatment of it,—from a repugnance to admit the authoritative claims of Revelation, or an aversion to its pure and spiritual truths, and to the moral restraints which these truths, if believed, must necessarily impose. Christianity does not require belief without evidence; on the contrary, it offers evidence of the Divine authority of Scripture, and, that being established, it offers God’s testimony as an infallible proof of every truth contained in it. It recognises the fact that, according to the laws of our mental constitution, the understanding is, and should be, determined and ruled by evidence;* and it assumes that the evidence which it offers is sufficient,—not, indeed, to command the attention, or to compel the assent of all men,—but to afford a solid foundation for belief in the case of those who will

* Baxter’s “Works,” vol. XXI. pp. 256, 266.

consider it in a candid and serious spirit, and to supply an instrument of moral probation, and a severe test of character, in the case of every individual to whom it is presented.* And the reason why it declares unbelief to be sinful is,—not that men refuse to believe without evidence, for this they are neither required nor expected to do,—but that, when sufficient evidence is offered to them, they either refuse to consider it at all, or treat it in a partial, captious, and uncandid spirit, or reject the truths which it proposes for their acceptance from a hatred of the truth itself.

(729.) The moral causes of unbelief, and the real ground of its condemnation, were taught by our Lord Himself in a few pregnant words, which most men will acknowledge to be true to nature, and in strict accordance with the analogies of Experience: “This is the condemnation, that light is come into the world, and men loved darkness rather than light, because their deeds were evil; for every one that doeth evil hateth the light, neither cometh to the light, lest his deeds should be reproved.”† Such is the Philosophy of Unbelief, as it was expounded by One “who knew what was in man;” and His disciples would receive the testimony of Him who is “the Searcher of hearts,” were it to be regarded simply as a revelation of what could only be known by Himself. But it is one of those revelations which are confirmed by a large body of natural evidence, and by many natural analogies. The advocates of Liberalism often complain that Christians, when they speak of the sinfulness of unbelief, assume a prerogative which does not rightfully belong to them—that of judging the heart; and that, in ascribing unbelief to a hatred of truth, or a disposition to cherish immoral passions, and continue in immoral habits, they are equally unjust and uncharitable. The orthodox, it is said, “assert that belief results from the state of the heart, and that if this be right, belief will inevitably follow. This is simply *false* in fact. How many excellent, virtuous, and humble minds, in all ages, have been *anxious*, but *unable* to believe; have prayed earnestly for belief, and suffered bitterly for disbelief—in vain!”‡ The most orthodox believer may have much sympathy with sad, serious, earnest, thoughtful doubt, for it is not improbable that, in

* Butler's “Analogy,” Wilson's Edition, pp. 402, 408, 417, 473, 475.

† John iii. 19, 20.

‡ Greg, “Creed of Christendom,” pp. 155, 156.

the earlier stages of his progress, he may have felt the same ; but his own experience has taught him that such doubt did not arise from the want of sufficient evidence, and that it did arise from some other cause of a less justifiable kind. He, too, has felt the rising pride of intellect, as opposed to authority,—the inveterate power of natural ungodliness,—the instinctive aversion to spiritual truth,—the revulsion of feeling, the absolute loathing and disgust, occasioned by some of the peculiar doctrines of Revelation,—which are more or less experienced by every unrenewed mind, when it is first brought into close contact with the Gospel message : and if he now sees cause to condemn these feelings in himself, and to confess that they were sinful, his experience should be sufficient to teach him the lesson of forbearance and tenderness towards all sincere inquirers after truth who are now passing through similar trials. But he would belie his deepest convictions, founded on the testimony of Scripture, and confirmed by the experience of his own heart, if he should treat either unbelief, or the causes from which it springs, as sinless or indifferent. He feels as Arnold felt when he said, “ I am learning to think more and more how Unbelief is at the bottom of all our evil,”* and cannot regard that as innocent which is at once the product, and the prolific cause, of sin.†

(730.) The analogies which are applicable to the refutation of the doctrine that unbelief is sinless, and cannot, therefore, be dangerous, may be divided into two classes—the one relating to the natural consequences of unbelief,—the other to its moral desert as a sin for which man is judicially responsible. It cannot be a matter of indifference, if it can be proved either, that, whether it be sinful or not, it must inevitably be followed by consequences which have an important bearing on our welfare here and hereafter ; or that it is itself immoral and justly punishable by the righteous judgment of God.

(731.) Looking merely, in the first instance, to the natural consequences of unbelief, apart from the question of its innocence or sinfulness, all experience shows that God may have connected our welfare with the knowledge and belief of certain truths. It may

* Arnold, “ Life and Correspondence,” p. 298.

† Whately, “ Cautions,” p. 99.
Bishop Berkeley, I. pp. 490, 525.

Dégérando, “ Signes,” II. p. 137.
Henry Rogers, “ Eclipse,” pp. 193, 196.

not be sinful to be ignorant of, or not to believe in, that property of the magnet by which it points to the pole; yet ignorance or unbelief in regard to it would deprive us of all the advantages of modern navigation. It may not be sinful to be ignorant of, or not to believe in, many of the natural laws which regulate the economy of material nature; yet ignorance or unbelief in regard to them would expose us to the most serious evils, if we disregarded them in practice. This is the only legitimate application of the doctrine of natural laws, as taught by Combe and Volney;* it implies,—not the moral obligation of these laws, and, still less, the sinfulness of disobeying them, if that were possible,—but simply the inevitable loss and danger that would be incurred by disregarding them in practice; and, viewed in this light, it furnishes a natural analogy in favour of the doctrine that, even were ignorance or unbelief in regard to religious truth perfectly sinless, they might still be connected, in the way of natural consequence, with serious injury to our highest interests. It may be right or wrong—consistent or inconsistent with the dictates of human philosophy—in accordance, or at variance, with the analogies of our common experience,—but the fact is certain, and so far from being denied, is made a ground of objection by unbelievers, that Christianity does connect the enjoyment of salvation, now and hereafter, with faith in the Gospel of Jesus Christ,—for “he that believeth on Him is not condemned; but he that believeth not is condemned already, because he hath not believed in the name of the only-begotten Son of God;”—“Whoso believeth shall be saved, whoso believeth not shall be damned.” These solemn words imply, indeed, much more than that perdition is the natural consequence of unbelief,—they imply that it is its judicial award and merited punishment;—but suppose that it were only its natural and inevitable consequence, arising from the unchangeable constitution of the Gospel which connects salvation with faith, it would still involve, at least, the forfeiture of all the blessings which that salvation includes, and leave us exposed to all the evils which it is designed to avert or redress. If we be diseased, and refuse or even neglect the means proper for our recovery, we suffer inevitably, in the way of mere natural consequence, even were there no criminality in the reckless

* Combe's “Constitution of Man,” and Volney, “La Loi Naturelle.”

disregard of life and health ; and the natural consequence will not be averted by the plea of unbelief in regard either to the nature of the disease, or the efficacy of the remedy. The Gospel offers the free pardon of sin, deliverance from all danger of future punishment, the privilege of adoption, the grace of sanctification, the assurance of God's love, and the inheritance of eternal life ; but it connects all these blessings with faith. It follows that not one of them can be enjoyed in the absence of faith, and that, in the way of mere natural consequence, unbelief operates effectually in excluding us from the enjoyment of them, while it leaves us under the unmitigated pressure of all those evils in our natural condition to which the Gospel is adapted, as a remedy is to a disease.

(732.) The consideration of the evil and danger which may be incurred by unbelief in the way of mere natural consequence, must appear to every prudent and thoughtful inquirer to be one of great practical importance. He must clearly perceive that, even if he could succeed in proving the sinlessness of unbelief, it might still deprive him of all the benefits of salvation, and leave him with his sins unforgiven, and his heart unrenewed. One of the most recent advocates of Liberalism makes a statement which should be seriously weighed in connection with this subject : " Liberal views of Religion do *not* exclude the just working of the wrath of a holy God from this world ; nor do they by any means require the teaching that death is salvation for everybody, and that there is no state of hell beyond the grave."* It may be added that neither Atheism nor Pantheism, the two extreme forms of unbelief, can secure us against a state of conscious existence or of conscious misery after death.† Both leave our future prospects uncertain only, and afford no protection against any kind, or degree, or duration of suffering ; they do not even give us the consolation of knowing that it will be regulated by a Being of infinite wisdom, and justice, and goodness, but leave it to be determined by blind chance or inexorable fate.

(733.) But if, besides its natural and inevitable consequences, Unbelief can be shown to be sinful both in respect to its moral causes and results, it is doubly dangerous. No one will deny that

* G. E. Ellis, " Half Century of Unitarianism," p. 329. | 165. Breckenridge, " The Knowledge of God," pp. 64, 72.

† Lammenais, " l'Indifference," II.

it is spoken of, and treated, as sinful in the sacred writings. They are vehemently objected to on this express ground. Liberalism, relying on a mere speculation of "philosophy falsely so called," sets it up in opposition to whatever authority these writings may possess. It teaches men to peril their everlasting welfare on the truth of one or other of these alternatives,—either that they are not responsible for their belief at all, or that, if they be, God has not supplied sufficient evidence of the truth. On the former alternative, the plea is general, and offers a justification of Atheism itself; and on the latter, it is equally general, unless it can be shown that there is such a difference between the evidence of Natural, and that of Revealed Religion, as is sufficient to prove that unbelief in regard to the one is sinful, while unbelief in regard to the other is innocent. The Bible applies the same principles to both. It affirms the sufficiency of the evidence in the case of each, and the responsibility of man in his treatment of that evidence. Man's responsibility to God is the great lesson both of Natural and Revealed religion; that man is irresponsible in matters of faith,—either from the constitution of his mind, or the want of sufficient evidence,—is the counter lesson of Liberalism. And the question which will fall to be determined at the judgment of the great day is simply this,—Which of these lessons is true?

CHAPTER VI.

ANALOGY APPLIED TO BELIEF IN MYSTERIES.

(734.) To any one who has ever seriously reflected on the nature and origin of human knowledge, or on the extent and limits of the human understanding, it can scarcely be a matter of surprise that there should be Mysteries in Religion, or even that Revelation itself should leave many of them unexplained. Our common natural knowledge affords innumerable analogies to show, that there may be a real Revelation of truth, and one, too, of great practical value, while it supplies no answer to many speculative questions, and leaves many perplexing difficulties unresolved. If the natural Revelation of truth can be proved to teach some intelligible lessons on subjects which are nevertheless left in partial obscurity, and incapable of being fully comprehended in all their aspects and relations, we can have no reason to object to a supernatural Revelation, should it be found to contain, in like manner, a mixture of intelligible truth with inscrutable mystery. On the contrary, the analogy of our natural experience, in this respect, will serve to accredit the supernatural message.

(735.) Yet no objection has been more frequently raised, or more confidently urged, against Religion, both Natural and Revealed, than that which is founded on the mysterious nature of the truths which they respectively teach. The supernatural and the sur-intelligible have been equally rejected, and for a similar cause,—the one as being beyond the compass of nature, the other as beyond the comprehension of reason.* There must be no mystery in Revealed Religion,† and none in Natural Religion;‡ and to give some appearance of verisimilitude to this plea, we are gravely told

* Mercier, "De la Certitude," p. 216. Crousse, "La Philosophie Prémière," pp. 74, 79.

† "Purpose of Existence," p. 292.

‡ "Système de la Nature," i. 128.

that there is no mystery in Nature,* and that "Christianity," itself, "is not Mysterious." We demur to that plea in each of its aspects; we hold that there is mystery in our common secular knowledge,—that there is mystery also in the truths of Natural Religion,—and that there is, and must be, in accordance with these analogies, mystery in the lessons of Revelation itself.

(736.) Something must be said, in the first instance, in the way of explanation,—as the subject, in some of its aspects, is not without difficulty, and is sometimes misunderstood. Many seem to suppose that, when we speak of Mysteries in Religion, we mean to denote by that term a class of statements to which we can attach no intelligible meaning; and that, when we insist on the duty of believing them, we are virtually divorcing faith from knowledge, and treating it as if it were, not an intelligent assent to truth, but a blind, implicit adherence to a mere form of words, which can convey no instruction to the mind. It is not wonderful that, under this impression, they should either deny the existence of Mysteries altogether, or at least the necessity—we might even say the possibility—of believing them. But this is not the sense in which any intelligent defender of Revealed Religion makes use of these terms. It is necessary, therefore, to form a distinct and definite conception of what we mean when we speak of Mysteries in Religion,—to distinguish them from certain other things with which they are apt to be confounded,—and to ascertain in what sense they are said to be *revealed*, by God, or *believed* by men, while they are still described as incomprehensible and ineffable.

(737.) It can scarcely be necessary, excepting for the purpose of preventing a groundless prejudice against them, to say that the Mysteries of Revealed Religion have no resemblance to the Mysteries of Paganism, which were different from the national religions, and confined to the Priesthood and the initiated. These Pagan Mysteries were founded on a distinction which Christianity nobly rejects—the distinction between esoteric teaching for the few, and exoteric teaching for the many—which served as a pretext for maintaining a huge system of popular superstition and idolatry, while Pantheism, Deism, and even Atheism were taught and transmitted in secret.† Nor have the Mysteries of Revealed

* Baden Powell, "The Order of Nature," pp. 43, 167, 269.

† B. Constant, "De la Religion," vol. II. p. 300; III. 14, 16, 21, 30, 49, 58, 229; V. 65. Riambourg, "Rationalisme et Tradition," pp. 88–94.

Religion any necessary connection with that superstitious use of the Sacraments, under the name of the Sacred Mysteries, which found entrance at an early period into the Christian Church itself, and which, by a singular coincidence, came to be associated also with the doctrine of "reserve" in teaching, and with the "*disciplina arcani*."* It may be thought, however, that the Mysteries of Revealed Religion have some connection with the various schemes of Mysticism which have successively appeared in the history of the Church, and that they have a tendency to generate and foster the dreamy spirit in which these schemes originated. But there is a sound and healthy, as well as a diseased and degenerate, Mysticism. The former is the natural product of a sense of dependence and helplessness,—and of the sentiments of wonder, awe, and veneration,—which serve many important purposes in connection with true Religion; while they may be perverted or misdirected, and debased into a grovelling superstition, by the depravity of the human heart. It has been justly said that Philosophy, as well as Religion, begins and ends in Wonder;—it begins in the wonder of ignorance and curiosity, and ends, when truly enlightened, in the wonder of adoration.† If this be called Mysticism, it is nothing but spiritual piety; and should be carefully distinguished from that spurious form of it which, like superstition, is a mere corruption of true Religion. The mysterious truths of Religion afford themes of inexhaustible meditation, and supply the appropriate aliment of an enlightened and elevated piety; while experience has abundantly shown that they are no more akin to a false and superstitious Mysticism than are the mysterious facts of Nature, or the metaphysical speculations of Reason. Witness the reveries of the Alexandrian Theosophists, and of the German Illuminati.

(738.) With these preliminary explanations, we proceed to state what we mean when we speak of revealed Mysteries, and the duty of believing them. Warburton speaks of there being two sorts of Mysteries in Scripture. "Of the dark parts of Revelation there are two sorts,—one which may be cleared up by the studious application of well-improved talents; the other, which will always reside within the shadow of God's throne, where it would

* Whately, "*Errors of Romanism*," | † Coleridge, "*Aids*," p. 184.
pp. 81, 82.

be impiety to intrude." With the former sort—the *δυσνόητά τινα*, of which Peter speaks, in the writings of Paul, and also in "the other Scriptures"—we have nothing to do in connection with our present theme; and with the latter sort, we have to speak of them only *in so far as they have been revealed*. Warburton seems to have overlooked this necessary distinction, when he tells us that "the impenetrable nature of the latter totally unfits them for objects of religious belief"—and that "they cannot make part of the essential doctrines of our faith."* This statement would be true, did it refer merely to "the secret things which belong to the Lord our God;" but it is not true if it be meant to apply to any of the "revealed things which belong to us and to our children." There are "secret things" which God has not revealed, and which must ever "reside within the shadow of His throne;" but there are also "revealed things," which are *really*, but not *fully*, made known; and which, while they are perfectly intelligible, in so far as they are revealed, are, nevertheless, utterly incomprehensible beyond the limit to which revelation extends. The doctrine of the Trinity is revealed, and certain intelligible lessons are taught respecting the distinctions between the persons of the Godhead,—it is not, therefore, "a secret," but a "revealed" truth; yet the precise nature of the relation which subsists between the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, and which is denoted by generation in the case of the Son, and by procession in the case of the Spirit, is nowhere explicitly revealed. In like manner, the doctrine of predestination is revealed,—predestination not only to outward privileges, but also to grace here, and to glory hereafter; yet who the predestinated are, and the sovereign reasons of the Divine purpose in regard to them, are not revealed,—they are among "the secret things which belong to the Lord our God." There is room, therefore, for a distinction between "secret things"—such as "the times and seasons which God has kept in His own hand"—and other things which have been partially, but not fully, revealed; and this distinction affords the true explanation of all Mysteries in Religion.

(739.) Dr Campbell made it his object to show that, according to the usage of the sacred writers, the term Mystery is applied to denote a truth which had been unknown, and was even undiscover-

* Warburton, Works, vol. IX. p. 15.

able, before, but which was now revealed or made manifest.* Many examples of this usage might be adduced. A few may suffice. "To you it is given to know the mystery of the kingdom of God"—it was a mystery hitherto unknown by all, and still unknown by those who were "without," but *made known*, in the sense of being revealed to the disciples, and, to some extent, understood also by them. "I would not have you to be ignorant of this mystery, that blindness in part hath happened unto Israel"—implying that the mystery referred to might now be known. "The revelation of the mystery which was kept *secret* since the world began, but now is made *manifest*, and by the Scriptures of the prophets, according to the commandment of the everlasting God, *made known* to all nations for the obedience of faith"—a secret disclosed, a truth revealed, or made manifest, is the "revelation of a mystery." "We speak the wisdom of God in a mystery, even the *hidden* wisdom which God ordained before the world unto our glory; which none of the princes of this world knew, . . . but God hath *revealed* it to us by His Spirit;"—a truth long *hidden*, but now *revealed*, is a Mystery. "By revelation He made known unto me the mystery, as I wrote afore in few words; whereby, when ye read, ye may understand my knowledge in the mystery of Christ; which in other ages was not *made known* unto the sons of men, *as it is now revealed* unto the holy apostles and prophets by the Spirit, that the Gentiles should be fellow-heirs, and of the same body, and partakers of His promise in Christ by the Gospel;"†—the mystery being, not the future calling in of the Gentiles,—for that had been clearly predicted by the prophets,—but the manner of their incorporation with the Christian Church, without becoming proselytes to Judaism, or being subjected to the rite of circumcision,—a truth which the apostles themselves were slow to understand, until it was specially revealed to Peter when he had the vision which for ever abrogated the *διαστολή* between Jew and Gentile, and the concurrent attestation of the Holy Ghost when He descended on Cornelius and his company of devout Gentile worshippers. From these, and many other, examples it is manifest that, by a Mystery, the sacred writers mean a truth, previously unknown, and even undiscoverable, but now revealed or

* Dr Campbell on the Gospels. | † Mark iv. 11; Rom. xi. 25, xvi. 25;
Dissertation IX. Part I. Vol. I. p. 352. | 1 Cor. ii. 7; Eph. iii. 3.

made manifest; and in this sense, every peculiar lesson of Revelation might be justly called a Mystery, however clearly and expressly it may be taught in the sacred writings.

(740.) It will not follow, however, as some seem to imagine, that a Mystery revealed is no longer a Mystery in any sense, or that it is, in all respects, comprehensible by those to whom it is made known. Many argue as if they supposed that Mystery and Revelation are incompatible with each other,—that any truth, as soon as it is revealed, must forthwith be divested of all mystery,—and that it is the very object of Revelation to bring to light what was hitherto shrouded in darkness,—to make known, and to make intelligible also, what was undiscoverable by the unaided exercise of reason. There is an important truth, combined with a grave and serious error, in this kind of reasoning; and nothing can be more indispensable than to disentangle the one from the other,—to eliminate what is false,—and to retain only what is true. It is perfectly true that Revelation is designed and fitted, as its very name imports, to make known certain truths which were undiscoverable before, as well as to shed a clearer light on those which may have been to some extent, but less clearly and less impressively, taught by the light of nature; and to present *both* before the minds of men in such a form as to be really instructive, in the way of imparting some intelligible lessons concerning them, such as may be the objects of a rational belief, resting on real knowledge. But it is not true—on the contrary, it is utterly false—that Revelation implies the removal of all Mystery from the objects which it brings before our view,—that it is either designed or fitted to explain everything, and to make all things equally comprehensible,—that Mystery and Revelation are incompatible and cannot coexist under the same dispensation of truth,—or that there can be no useful or wholesome exercise of faith in regard to subjects which are not fully comprehensible, or which transcend, in any respect, the limits of human thought and knowledge.

(741.) There is an obvious distinction,—but one which has often been overlooked or forgotten in the treatment of this question,—between revealed truths, and the objects to which they relate; in other words, between the intelligible lessons taught by Revelation on every subject which it brings before us, and the incomprehensible nature of these subjects themselves, in so far as they have not been revealed. It is perfectly manifest from the

whole analogy of our natural knowledge, that many intelligible and useful lessons may be taught in regard to subjects which cannot be fully comprehended in their essential nature, or in all their manifold relations and dependencies; for on every subject, without any exception, our knowledge is partial, and yet may be true, as far as it goes. To deny the truth or the value of such knowledge, were to affirm virtually, if not in express terms, that there can be no true knowledge without omniscience. But, constituted as we are, we have no difficulty in believing certain truths, whose import can be intelligently apprehended, and their evidence clearly discerned, even although they relate to subjects which have not been fully revealed, and cannot therefore be adequately comprehended. This is the law which governs our common natural knowledge; and the same law, and no other, is applicable to our Religious knowledge, whether Natural or Revealed. On the supposition of a Revelation, it might be expected, from the analogy of our natural experience, that it would teach some clear intelligible lessons on whatever subjects were embraced in it; but that it would also leave many mysteries unexplained in these subjects themselves.* It must be so, unless the infinite knowledge of God could be compressed into the finite knowledge of man. It is true that a Revelation implies the communication of *new* truth, but it does not imply the communication of *all* truth. On the contrary, in shedding a clearer light than that of Nature, on some of the truths of mere Natural Religion, it may bring into view some new truths, depending on the mere good pleasure and sovereign will of God, which relate to subjects undiscoverable by human reason, and which may, for aught we know, contain new mysteries peculiar to themselves, but analogous to those which we find in our natural knowledge. It not only may, but must, be so, unless God has either revealed no new truths, or has revealed every truth relating to the subjects of Revelation so as to make them fully comprehensible by the human mind. But this is not the fact, on either supposition; for He *has* revealed some new truths, and yet has *not* fully revealed any one of the subjects to which they relate. In this respect, as in others, Revelation is to the mind, as Robert

* Dr Hampden, "Essay on the Philosophical Evidence," p. 194. Dr Merle D'Aubigné, "Faith and Criticism," p. 20. Dr Shuttleworth,

"Consistency of Revelation," pp. 29-45, 282. British Quarterly Review, No. XLIX., p. 217.

Boyle has taught, very much the same as the telescope is to the eye. The latter brings within the range of our vision many objects in the firmament which were invisible without its aid ; but it also brings before us unresolved nebulæ which are still mysteries in the heavens, although, by the aid of analogy, we are led to believe that they are clusters of stars, which have not yet been resolved, simply because our instruments are still imperfect.* And so the former, while it renders some natural truths clearer and more distinct, brings into view a new class of supernatural objects and relations, and may be expected, therefore, to multiply, rather than to diminish, the number of the mysteries by which we are everywhere surrounded. While it teaches some intelligible lessons in regard to each of these objects, it does not reveal the whole truth with respect to any of them, so as to render them in all respects known.

(742.) A Mystery in Religion may be defined or described as—a truth, revealed to us in part, so as to be, to this extent, intelligible ; but revealed in part only, and not in all its fulness, as it is known to the omniscient mind, and, therefore, incapable of being perfectly comprehended. “In a Christian Mystery,” says Bishop Browne, “there is something we do understand, and something that we are wholly ignorant of ; and it is called a Mystery in respect of both these. It is called a Mystery in respect of what we do know of it ; because it was a thing so hidden from us, that it was impossible to discover it by those powers of knowledge which we are now endowed with. . . . And it is called a Mystery in respect of that part of it, which as yet we have no notion of ; because it is utterly impossible for us in this life to attain to any knowledge of it by reason, assisted with the greatest degree of revelation that is afforded to us. . . . From whence I infer, that what we do know, and what is yet concealed from us, are in gross called the same Mystery ; and that, as we are obliged to believe what is revealed of it, so likewise we are at the same time obliged from express words of Scripture to believe, that there is more in it than we are now able to comprehend.”†

(743.) From this account of it, we can easily answer the ques-

* Ro. Boyle, “Excellency of Theology,” Theol. Works, vol. III. p. 3.

† Bishop Browne, Letter on “Chris-

tianity not Mysterious,” p. 12. See also his “Divine Analogy,” pp. 168, 180, 188, 195, 201, 213, 229, 237.

tions which have been raised concerning it ;—namely, In what sense a Mystery is said to be revealed—in what sense a Mystery is said to be believed, or to be an object of knowledge and faith,—and in what sense it is said, notwithstanding, to be incomprehensible and ineffable. It is said to be revealed, because it is made known, not fully, but in part,—certain intelligible lessons being taught concerning it, or certain luminous points brought into view in the midst of surrounding darkness.* It is said to be believed ; in so far as these revealed lessons are understood and assented to ; and in so far also as the additional lesson, which is also clearly revealed, that it cannot be fully comprehended, is distinctly recognised. It cannot be fully known, because it has not been fully revealed ; but in so far as it has been revealed, it may be understood partially and, to the same extent, believed : while over and above this intelligent assent to the clear teaching of Scripture, there may also be an intelligent assent to this other truth, which is taught alike by Scripture and Reason, that there is in it “a height and a depth, a length and a breadth,” “which passeth knowledge.” In neither of these two beliefs, is faith divorced from knowledge, or justly characterized as a blind, implicit assent ; on the contrary, in regard to those lessons which are intelligible, as having been clearly revealed, faith implies the intelligent apprehension of their import, as well as the belief of their truth on the authority of Him by whom they are taught ; and in regard to what is incomprehensible in any Mystery, we believe, because we *know*, it to be incomprehensible,—this being itself a truth which may be known and believed, like any other truth, on its being presented to our minds in the light of sufficient evidence. It were a partial and one-sided statement to say that we are to believe in Mysteries only so far as they are intelligible ; they are intelligible in part, and so far they may be understood, as well as believed ; but they are also incomprehensible in part, and we are called to recognise them as such,—not by believing any truth concerning them which

* Perrone, “Prælectiones Theologicæ,” vol. I. p. 19, lays down the proposition, “Possibilis est Mysteriorum Revelatio ;” and says, in answer to the objection,—“Si Mysteriorum revelatum est, jam non est Mysteriorum,”—that “Non est profecto Mysteriorum ex eâ parte, quâ revelatum est ; at

Mysterium remanet quoad intimam sui naturam, quæ revelata non est.” He uses the term to denote only the unrevealed and incomprehensible part of the doctrine ; Bishop Browne applies it, in different senses, to both parts of it.

has not been revealed,—but by believing a truth which has been revealed, namely, that, in their amplitude and fulness, they far transcend the utmost limits of human thought.* It may seem, at first sight, that it can be of little consequence to believe merely that there are truths which we cannot comprehend; but the moral influence of this belief is powerful and salutary. It abases the pride of human reason,—it teaches us the wholesome lesson of our ignorance and imperfection,†—it is fitted to foster a spirit of reverential humility,—it inculcates the duty of seeking, and inspires the hope of obtaining, here or hereafter, fresh discoveries of truth, and an enlarged knowledge of it,—and it should lead us to give earnest heed, in the meantime, to the light which, like a midnight lamp, “shineth in a dark place” until “the day dawn,” and “the shadows flee away.” Standing between two Eternities, the Past and the Future,‡ and surrounded by countless wonders which no human mind can ever exhaust, we can have no right sense of our actual condition, and no adequate reverence for the claims of truth, if we do not habitually feel that many things are incomprehensible and ineffable.§

(744.) Such is a general account of the nature of a Mystery,—of the sense in which it may be said to be revealed, and also believed,—to be intelligible in part, and yet not fully comprehensible. But it may be further illustrated by some useful distinctions, which Divines have employed in the treatment of this subject, and which seem to be necessary to the full exposition and defence of their doctrine in regard to it. Such distinctions may be reduced to these three;—the distinction between what is *above* reason, and what is *against* reason;—between what may be *apprehended* by reason, and what cannot be *comprehended* by it;—between what may be *known* as a matter of fact, and what *cannot be known* as the explanation—the cause, or reason, or *quomodo*,—of that fact.

(745.) The distinction between what is *above*, and what is *against*, reason, is one of fundamental importance. It has been denied, indeed, as every other distinction has been denied, by those

* Bishop Browne, “Procedure, Extent and Limits,” pp. 260, 263, 276, 284, 297. Dr Tatham, “Chart and Scale,” II. pp. 44, 48. Dr Poole, “Grand Contrast,” pp. 174, 217, 230.

† Mozley, “Augustinian Predestination,” pp. 276, 314, 317. Davies,

“Supremacy of Scripture,” pp. 104, 155.

‡ Pascal, “Pensées,” p. 309.

§ Bishop Browne, “Divine Analogy,” pp. 63, 68, 74, 177, 191, 280, 294.

who seek, whether ignorantly or intentionally, to confound truth with error. Thus Wegscheider says, "As to that which is said to be above reason, the truth of which can by no means be understood, there is no possible way open to the human mind to demonstrate or affirm it; wherefore, to acknowledge or affirm that which is thought to be *above* reason, is rightly said to be *against* reason, and contrary to it."* This might be true on the supposition that no Revelation from God has been vouchsafed, but on this supposition only; for then only could it be said that the truth of what is above reason can by no means (*nullo modo*) be understood; and even then, if it could not be proved, it could as little be disproved; it might be doubted, but could not be warrantably denied. For reason itself teaches us that there are truths *above* reason.† Man's mind is not the measure of the universe, nor is man's knowledge the measure of universal truth. There may, therefore, be truths which are unknown to him by the light of his own reason; and if any of these truths be revealed, they may justly be described as *above* reason, while he is utterly incapable of proving that they are *against* reason. They may be *above* reason in three distinct respects,—first, as being undiscoverable by it, otherwise than by means of a Revelation,—secondly, as being incapable of being proved by it, otherwise than by the testimony or authority of a Revelation, even when that has been vouchsafed,—and, thirdly, as being only partially intelligible, and in other respects incomprehensible, even when they have been thus attested. "They were never *against* reason," for reason could neither affirm nor deny anything in regard to them; but "they will always be *above* reason,"‡ however it may be enlightened by Revelation, since Revelation itself is neither designed nor fitted to bring all things down to the level of our intelligence; or, in other words, to raise our intelligence to the level of omniscience. The distinction is acknowledged, therefore, not only by all sound Divines, but

* Wegscheider, "Institutiones Dogmaticæ," p. 49. "Quod vero *supra* rationem esse dicitur, cujus veritas nullo modo a nobis possit intelligi, ejus demonstrandi vel statuendi nulli menti humanæ conceditur via: quæ—propter quod *supra* rationem esse existimatur, idem agnoscere et affirmare *contra* eam, sive ei *contrarium*

esse, recte dicitur." See Perrone's "Prælectiones Theologicæ," vol. I., for an effective exposure of Wegscheider on this point.

† Mansel, "Limits of Religious Thought," p. 36.

‡ Culverwell, "Light of Nature," p. 229.

also by all sound Philosophers, as one which is true and valid equally in the domain of natural and of religious truth.*

(746.) If there be a real and valid distinction between that which is *above*, and that which is *against* reason, and if it can be shown that the former expression, and not the latter, is the right description of a Mystery, it follows that Mysteries are not Contradictions,—that they are neither self-contradictory, nor at variance with any other truth. Some recent writers have spoken as if they thought that contradictory truths may be, and even,—owing to the limitation of our faculties,—must be, involved both in our natural and our religious knowledge. “To assume,” says one able writer, “that we cannot have two contradictory ideas,” is “a false assumption, and not true of us in the present imperfect state of our faculties, in which we may have, and have, imperfect opposing perceptions; though it is, of course, absurd to suppose that this can be the case except in a very imperfect state of being, or that there can be *absolute* and *perfect* perceptions in opposition to each other.” And he gives at least *four* examples of these “contradictory ideas” or “opposing perceptions.” The *first* relates to the principle of causality, that every event must have a cause. “This is a maxim, undoubtedly, that approves itself to our understanding”—but, “there is a *contrary truth* to it”—namely, “our originality as agents,” or “that action is original in us, and *has no cause*. . . . Here there are two contradictory instincts or perceptions of our reason, which we must make the best of, and arrive at what measure of truth a mixed conclusion gives.” The *second* relates to the Divine power, or omnipotence, as we appre-

* It is expressly recognised by Leibnitz in his reply to Bayle, who had denied or disputed it. “Je m’étonne qu’il y ait des gens d’esprit qui combattent cette distinction, et que M. Bayle soit de ce nombre. Elle est assurément très bien-fondée. Une vérité est au-dessus de la raison, quand notre esprit, ou même tout esprit créé, ne la saurait comprendre; et telle est, à mon avis, la sainte Trinité, tels sont les miracles réservés à Dieu seul, comme, par exemple, la création; tel est le choix de l’ordre de l’univers, qui dépend de l’harmonie universelle, et de la connoissance distincte d’une

infinité des choses à la fois. Mais une vérité ne saurait jamais être contre la raison; et bien loin qu’un dogme combattu et convaincu par la raison soit *incompréhensible*, l’on peut dire que rien n’est plus aisé à comprendre, ni plus manifeste que son *absurdité*.” —“Théodicée,” p. 39. See also Sedgwick, “Discourse,” 5th edition, pp. 131, 155; Buddeus, “De Atheismo,” p. 632; Shuttleworth, “Consistency of Revelation,” p. 284; Riambourg, “Rationalisme et Tradition,” pp. 472, 486; Perron, “Idées Fondamentales,” p. 170.

hend it, to which there is, as he conceives, "a counter truth," in "the existence of moral evils," and "the sense of our own originality," as free, moral, and responsible agents: "The two ideas of the Divine power and Free-will are two great tendencies of thought inherent in our minds, which *contradict each other*, and can never be united or brought back to a common goal; and which, therefore, inasmuch as the essential condition of absolute truth is consistency with other truth, can never, in the present state of our faculties, become absolute truths, but must remain for ever contradictory tendencies of thought, going on side by side till they are lost sight of, and disappear, in the haze of our conceptions, like two parallel straight lines, which go on to infinity without meeting." The *third* relates to the Divine foreknowledge: "Undoubtedly there is a *contradiction* in supposing that events, really contingent, can be foreseen. . . . Such a foresight as this is a *contradiction* to our reason. . . . Free-will, when pursued, runs into a *contradiction* to *Providence*, yet this does not show that it is false, but only that it is imperfect truth." The *fourth* relates to the doctrine of the Fall, viewed in connection with the doctrine of Divine grace: "Mankind has a sense of moral power—of being able to do good actions and avoid wrong ones,—which, so far as it goes, *contradicts* the doctrine of the Fall. The doctrine of the Fall is held *under a reserve* on the side of *the contrary truth*. The doctrine of irresistible Grace, then, must be held under the same reserve. So far as man *is fallen*, he wants this grace; but so far as he is *not fallen*, he does not want it."*

(747.) Mr Mozley does not hold that any truth, as known by the omniscient Mind, can be contradictory to any other truth; but he seems to hold that, as perceived and apprehended by a finite mind, it may be,—not only mysterious and incomprehensible in some of its aspects and relations—but absolutely contradictory to some other truth, which may be as clearly and certainly known. For our own part, we can believe in Mysteries however profound, but we cannot believe in palpable contradictions. We hold that there neither are, nor can be, contradictory *truths*, although there are many *errors* which are really opposed to the truth, but which, under the semblance of truth, may impose upon the human mind. We cannot believe that the human mind is so constituted as to be

* Mozley on "Augustinian Predestination," pp. 24–36.

capable of believing two contradictory statements, and assenting to them as equally true, when they are seen and known to be contradictory. In such a case, instead of believing both statements, it will believe neither; and will rather take refuge in utter Scepticism, than acknowledge that one *truth*, even as perceived by itself, can be at variance with any other *truth*. It will suspect that one or other of the two is, not a truth, but an error. And accordingly in every instance in which there are alleged to be *contradictory truths*, the mind instinctively seeks to show that they are not really such,—by proving, either, that one of them is not true, or that, if both be true, they involve no real contradiction. For instance, the supposed contradiction between the principle that “every event must have a cause,” and the fact of “our originality as agents,”—which is strangely represented as implying, not only that “action is original in us,” but also that it “has no cause,”—is sufficiently obviated by the doctrine which teaches that “events fall out according to the *nature of second causes*, necessarily, contingently, or *freely*.” According to this doctrine, there is no contrariety, either between the agency of a first cause, and the operation of a second,—or between the two ideas of Divine power and human Free-will; and no pretence, therefore, for saying that the one of these, respectively, is contradictory to the other. There may be a mystery—something that is partly intelligible, and something also which is altogether incomprehensible—in the relation between first and second causes, and especially in the relation between the will of God and the will of man,—but assuredly there is no contradiction involved in the supposition that each of the two is real and operative—the one as supreme, the other as subordinate. In like manner, the supposed contradiction between the certainty of the Divine foreknowledge and the contingency of future events, proceeds on the supposition, that what is contingent in the view of man, must be contingent also to the omniscience of God. In short, one or other of the contrasted doctrines is not true, or, if they be both true, they involve no real contradiction. Accordingly, in treating of the Mysteries of Revealed Religion, Divines of the most opposite sentiments have equally proceeded on the assumption of this truth. They have been at variance in other respects, but they have been at one in this,—that propositions which can be shown to be contradictory cannot both be true. Socinians have attempted to show that a contradiction is involved in

the doctrine of those who hold the Unity of God, and yet hold also a Trinity in Unity; and their opponents have met them,—not by affirming that if the two positions were contradictory they might, nevertheless, be equally true,—but by showing that the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are not said to be *one*, *eodem sensu* or *eodem respectu*, in which they are said to be *three*. And so some Necessitarians have attempted to show that, God being the only Agent in nature, it would be contradictory to affirm the free agency, or the moral responsibility of man; and their opponents have met them,—not by affirming that, notwithstanding God's being the sole agent in nature, man is nevertheless a moral and responsible subject of His government,—but by denying the truth of that supposition, and affirming that man is a free agent, subordinate to, but also distinct from, the First Cause, and that his actions “fall out according to his nature,” as a free, intelligent, moral, and responsible subject of the Divine government. And so, in all other cases, Mysteries are acknowledged, but not Contradictory Truths.

(748.) The logical laws of Identity, Non-contradiction, and excluded Middle, are applicable to every part of our knowledge, and we should incur the peril of being involved in utter absurdity or in sheer scepticism, did we disown their authority either in Philosophy or Religion. “The highest of all logical laws,” says Sir William Hamilton, “in other words, the supreme law of thought, is what is called the principle of Contradiction, or, more correctly, the principle of Non-contradiction. It is this, ‘a thing cannot be, and not be, at the same time.’”^{*} But contraries are not contradictions; there are no contradictory *truths* in the region of intelligence, although there are opposite realities in experience. Light is contrary to darkness, and pleasure to pain, while both are equally real, and both may be truly affirmed; but not so with truth and its antagonist error.[†] Our conceptions may involve a contradiction, simply because they may be partly true and partly false; there may even be some seeming inconsistency between one truth and another, arising from our ignorance, or our inability to explain

^{*} Sir William Hamilton, “Lectures on Metaphysics,” II. 368, 523. See I. 106; II. 428. Sir William Hamilton, “Lectures on Meta.,” II. 437.
[†] Bartholmæss, “Huet,” pp. 119, 160. Dégérando, “Histoire Comparée,” I. 460.

how they may be reconciled ;* yet all truth is self-consistent and harmonious, and utterly exclusive of any real contradiction. But this important principle,—which should be the more firmly maintained because sophists and sceptics in all ages have attempted to undermine it,—is not incompatible with the existence of Mysteries such as we have described ; nay, the law of Contradiction itself shuts us up inevitably to belief in Mysteries ; for there may be, as Pascal has shown, two contradictory suppositions which are equally incomprehensible,—which *cannot*, therefore, both be true,—and yet one or other of them *must* be true.† That which is *above* Reason cannot possibly contradict any truth known by reason—they may seem like railway trains to proceed in opposite directions, but there can be no collision between them, since they are not on the *same rail* ;—“ if they do not run on the same line or radius with the understanding, yet neither do they cut or cross it ”—“ they do not move on the same line or plane, and therefore cannot contradict it.”‡

(749.) The distinction between that which is *above*, and that which is *against*, reason, is one of great importance, especially because it may be applied to prove that Mysteries are not, and do not involve, Contradictions. But there is another distinction, which is also useful, and which relates, not so much to the objective truth, as to the subjective reception of it ;—the distinction between the *apprehension*, and the *comprehension*, of any object of thought. Divines have generally insisted on this distinction in regard to matters of Faith, and surely Philosophers have equal need of it in regard to matters of Science. It amounts simply to this,—that we may *apprehend*, what we cannot *comprehend*,—that we may have a partial, but true, knowledge of subjects which,—in all their amplitude and fulness, in their intimate nature and manifold relations,—far transcend the limits of human thought.§ It is well stated

* J. H. Newman, “ Theory of Religious Belief,” p. 266. Butler’s “ Sermons,” pp. 18, 270.

† Pascal, “ Pensées,” p. 22.

‡ Coleridge, “ Aids,” pp. 47, 159. For a fuller statement of our views on this topic, see “ British and Foreign Evangelical Review,” April 1859, pp. 450–458. See also Culverwell, “ Light of Nature,” p. 203 ; Mansel, “ Limits of Religious Thought,” pp. 168, 198,

204, 210 ; Berkeley, “ Works,” p. 504 ; Vinet, “ Vital Christianity,” pp. 42, 47 ; H. Rogers, “ Defence of Eclipse,” p. 98 ; Calderwood, “ Philosophy of the Infinite” (1st edition), pp. 7, 46, 76, 112, 164 ; “ Christian Errors Infidel Arguments,” pp. 31, 58, 73, 89, 110, 195, 337, 340.

§ Culverwell, “ Light of Nature,” p. 192.

by John of Wesel when he says that "faith is the knowledge of those things which cannot be *comprehended* by our intellect, but may be in some measure *apprehended* by it."* This old distinction we think sufficient to vindicate our belief in Mysteries, without the aid of those new and ambiguous forms of expression which have recently been employed in regard to them. Sir William Hamilton, and his admiring followers, are fond of speaking of Mysteries, not as *incomprehensible* merely, but as "inconceivable"—"incognisable,"—"unthinkable," "incogitable,"—as if they could in no respect, and to no extent, be *apprehended* by the human mind. These uncouth epithets are applied equally to the Infinite in the domain of natural knowledge, and to God in the domain of our religious knowledge;† and they are apt to leave the impression—although they may not have been used with the design of producing it—that, by the constitution of our nature, we are incapable of conceiving, as well as comprehending, either of them; and that they are placed, in all respects, far beyond the limits of human thought. That they cannot be *comprehended*, we admit; that they cannot be *apprehended*, and so apprehended as to be at once objects of intelligent belief, and sources of wholesome moral influence, we deny. And the mere fact that men can reason about them, even with the design of showing that they cannot be fully comprehended, is a sufficient proof that they may be at least to some extent apprehended and understood; for how can any one reason at all about that which is altogether "unthinkable" or "inconceivable?"‡

(750.) In addition to the distinctions between that which is *above* reason and that which is *against* it, as also between that which may be *apprehended*, and that which can be fully *comprehended*, there is a third, which is also both true and useful;—namely, the distinction between a fact or truth which may be clearly revealed and certainly known, and the explanation of the cause and reason,—the how, and the wherefore,—of that fact or truth. The existence of evil is a fact attested by universal expe-

* Ulmann, "Reformers before the Reformation," I. 263. "Fides enim est notitia eorum quæ per intellectum nostrum *comprehendi* non possunt; possunt autem aliquantulum *adprehendi*."

† Sir William Hamilton, "Discussions," pp. 15, 26, 29, 31. Mansel,

"Limits of Religious Thought," pp. 171, 177.

‡ Vera, "Certitude," pp. 40, 169, 173, 197. Mansel, "Limits of Religious Thought," pp. 147, 369. Baxter, "Works," XX. pp. 401, 420.

rience,—but the origin of evil, and the reason of its having been permitted—*how* it entered into the world, and *what ends* it was designed to serve,—these are among the most difficult problems of human thought. The efficacy of prayer is a truth clearly revealed, and exemplified in many facts recorded in Scripture; but the *quomodo*,—the manner in which God answers prayer,—is not so fully explained as to be equally clear and certain. In our common natural knowledge, many things are clearly apprehended and firmly believed, while their causes are unknown, and even, perhaps, undiscoverable,—a clear proof that a fact may be certain, while its explanation is doubtful. In like manner Scripture may reveal a truth, without explaining all the reasons on which it depends, or answering all the questions which human curiosity may raise respecting it. “In vindication of the Gospel,” says Warburton, “consider that it is one thing to understand the meaning of a truth delivered in a proposition, and another to comprehend all the reasons on which that truth is founded. The *first* of these is all that is necessary for man to know. . . . It was the same God who framed the Christian economy, and the Newtonian system. Why, therefore, should it be matter of objection to the one, and not to the other, that there are many things surpassing human comprehension in both? . . . I think we might as reasonably conclude against the Divine original of the Gospel, if there were *no* traces of such mysterious parts, as if there were *only* such; an unclouded splendour, and undiluted obscurity, equally discrediting the works and dispensations of Heaven.”*

(751.) Having explained what we mean when we speak of Mysteries in Religion, and illustrated some of the distinctions which are most necessary to be kept in view in the discussion of the subject, we proceed to show, *first*, that Mysteries, such as have been described, exist equally in Revelation,—in Natural Religion,—and in our common secular knowledge; *secondly*, that these three classes of mysteries are strictly analogous to one another in several important respects; and *thirdly*, that the analogy which can thus be proved to subsist between them is sufficient to accredit the mysteries both of Natural and Revealed Religion, and to neutralize every objection to them that is founded on principles

* Warburton, “Works,” vol. IX. pp. 11, 15.

which can be shown to be equally applicable to them all,—and which cannot be partially applied to one class of mysteries, without involving us in manifest inconsistency, nor yet consistently extended to all, without exposing us to the peril of universal Scepticism.

(752.) Christianity, being in part a republication of Natural Religion, and in part also a Revelation of truths which were undiscoverable by the light of nature, contains, of course, two classes of Mysteries,—those which are common to it with Natural Religion, and those which are properly and peculiarly its own. On comparing the two, it will be found that the former class includes all the most serious and formidable difficulties which have ever exercised and perplexed the minds of thoughtful men; and that the Mysteries which are peculiar to Revelation, would be comparatively easy of belief, were they not associated with, and related to, these prior difficulties, for which it is not responsible, otherwise than by recognising them as real. The one great difficulty—the existence of evil, moral and physical, under the government of God,—a difficulty into which all others may be resolved, or to which they may be traced up as their original source,—belongs properly to Natural Religion, and presses equally on every system of Religious belief; and Christianity is not responsible for it, otherwise than by simply recognising its existence, and adapting its remedial provisions to the actual state of the case. It sheds some light even on that great mystery; but it does not profess to explain it fully, and far less to explain it away; and its grand design is to reveal a Divine remedy for this evil,—a method of pardon for the guilty, and of sanctification for the depraved. If, in revealing that remedy, it brings into view some new Mysteries, which are peculiarly its own, this is no more than what might have been expected in any Revelation which should bring to light new objects of thought, unknown and undiscoverable before; for the total absence of Mystery, in such a case, would be *out of all analogy* with experience in other cases, and its presence is a presumption, not against, but in favour of, the truth of Revelation.*

(753.) That Christianity does contain Mysteries peculiar to itself, and that these partake of the twofold character which belongs, as we have seen, to every mystery—that of being partly

* Montaigne, "Essays," II. p. 255.

intelligible, and partly incomprehensible—is expressly declared in Scripture itself. The fact is certain, and it must neither be evaded nor denied. In our view, it is far from being a recommendation to any scheme of Theology, that it overlooks this fact; or that it professes, in spite of it, to make all things plain, and to bring down every truth to the level of our comprehension. Bacon's extreme conceit, that "we do most honour to God, when we believe what is absurd and incredible,"* may be rejected, as being at variance alike with the constitution and laws of the human mind, and with the real requirements of Scripture itself; while we hold, notwithstanding, that, what Coleridge calls "ultra-fidianism," which is ready to believe contradictions, and "minimi-fidianism," which seeks to draw Religion down to the comprehension of the intellect, are to be equally avoided.† Scripture does not propose contradictions, but it does propose mysteries, to our belief; and it expressly describes these as being, and as intended to be, partly intelligible, and partly inscrutable. It tells us that even angelic knowledge is far from being omniscient,—that angels adore Him whom they cannot fully comprehend,—that in their case, as well as in our own, God is partly known, and partly unknown,—and that, sensible of the imperfection of their knowledge, and seeking earnestly to know more and more of Him, they study every new manifestation of His character and will,—even such as is made to them in the scheme of Redemption in this lower world,—for "Into these things angels desire to look,"—and "Now unto principalities and powers in heavenly places" there is "made known by the church" on earth "the manifold wisdom of God."‡ It tells us that even inspired prophets, who received a direct communication of truth from the mind of God, were still sensible of the imperfection of their knowledge, and, consequently, of a mystery which they could not fathom, but which they were bound to believe, while they waited for fuller and clearer light. For "The prophets, who prophesied of the grace which should come unto you, inquired and searched diligently,—searching what, or what manner of time, the Spirit of Christ which was in them did signify, when it testified beforehand the sufferings of Christ, and the glory which should

* Bacon's "Advancement of Learning," by Devey, p. 369. See Butler's "Sermons," p. 178.

† Coleridge, "Aids to Reflection," p. 164.

‡ 1 Pet. i. 12; Eph. iii. 10.

follow. Unto whom it was revealed, that not unto themselves, but unto us, they did minister the things which are now reported unto you, by them that have preached the gospel unto you with the Holy Ghost sent down from heaven.”* It tells us that believers under the New Testament are called, equally with angels and inspired prophets, to believe such truths as have been clearly revealed, on subjects which, in their whole extent and compass, cannot be fully comprehended. It says, for instance, “Great is the mystery of godliness; God was manifest in the flesh:”† a *manifestation*, and yet a *mystery*,—a truth revealed, and yet, in some of its aspects, incomprehensible; for who can comprehend the union between the Divine and the human natures in the person of Him, who was at once “the Son of God,” and “the Son of man?” It says, again, “Behold, I show you a mystery;—we shall not all sleep, but we shall all be changed, in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye, at the last trump; for the trumpet shall sound; and the dead shall be raised incorruptible, and we shall be changed:”—the metamorphosis of the living, and the resurrection of the dead, in the last day, being equally a mystery, both as each of the two is revealed as a fact, and also as each of the two is equally incomprehensible, in so far as the mode or manner of the fact is concerned. It says, moreover, in regard to the state which comes after death in the case of true believers—“Eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither have entered into the heart of man, the things which God hath prepared for them that love Him. But God hath revealed them to us by His Spirit,”‡—intimating that God had made known by revelation some things which were undiscoverable by the light of nature; yet these same things were not so fully revealed, as to be altogether intelligible, for “it doth not yet appear what we shall be, but we know that when He shall appear, we shall be like Him, for we shall see Him as He is.” There is a clear *manifestation* on some points, but a remaining *mystery* on others. And this seems to be the universal law of human intelligence in regard even to truths revealed. The distinction of persons in the Godhead is clearly revealed, but not the nature or mode of their union as three in one; the incarnation, or the union of the Divine and human natures in the person of

* 1 Pet. i. 10-12.

† 1 Tim. iii. 16.

‡ 1 Cor. ii. 9, 10.

Christ, is affirmed; but no explanation is given of the manner in which they were united, or of the relation which subsisted between the two; the regenerating influence of the Spirit is revealed, but the mode of His agency, and the manner of its operation, are inscrutable; for "the wind bloweth where it listeth, and ye hear the sound thereof, but cannot tell whence it cometh, or whither it goeth: so is every one that is born of the Spirit."*

(754.) There are *similar* Mysteries in Natural Religion. They are not the same with the peculiar Mysteries of Christianity—for Natural Religion knows nothing of a Trinity, or an Incarnation, or a Redemption, or a Regeneration, or a Resurrection,—but they are strictly analogous to them, in so far as they resemble each other in this respect, that in both the truth is partly revealed, and partly veiled—intelligible to some extent, but, beyond that limit, shrouded in impenetrable mystery. GOD is partly revealed, and partly veiled, by Nature; there is a *γνωστὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ*—"that which may be known of God," and this is manifest, because God has made it manifest;†—but there is also an *ἄγνωστὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ*,—that which cannot be known of God, and this simply because He has not been pleased to make it known, or because our finite minds are incapable of comprehending His infinite nature. He is incomprehensible, and yet an object of true knowledge. "It is one thing to *apprehend*, and another to *comprehend*. Reason apprehends the existence of the Supreme Being, though that Being alone can comprehend it."‡ In like manner, every attribute of His nature may be, to some extent, apprehended; while none of them can be fully comprehended, simply because they are, like Himself, infinite. He exhibits some manifestation of His perfections, but "He holdeth back the face of His throne, and spreadeth His cloud upon it;"§—"Clouds and darkness are round about Him"—and with reference both to His works of Creation and Providence, it may still be said, "Lo, these are parts of His ways, but how little a portion is heard of Him! and the thunder of His

* John iii. 8.

† Sedgwick, "Discourse," p. 60. Javari, "De la Certitude," pp. 226, 230, 241, 245, 248. Maret, "Théodicée," pp. 196, 198. Lamennais, "l'Indifférence," II. 130, 152. Gioberti, "Restauration," vol. I. p. xxii. Archb. King on "Predestination,"

appended to Whately's Bampton Lecture, pp. 468, 479. Dr J. P. Smith, "First Lines in Theology," p. 125.

‡ Coleridge, "Confessions," p. 147.

§ De Bonald, "Recherches," II. p. 84. H. Rogers, "Defence of Eclipse," p. 66.

power, who can understand?"* We may say of every one of His adorable perfections, as David says of His omnipresence and omniscience, while he recognises them as being alike real and clearly manifest,—“Such knowledge is too wonderful for me; it is high, I cannot attain unto it.”†

(755.) EVIL is another unfathomable Mystery in Natural Religion,—its origin, its permission, its prevalence, its duration, its cause, and its end,—are all inscrutable. It may be justly said to be the one great Mystery, into which every other may be ultimately resolved,‡ and we are not at liberty either to evade or to deny it. “It must be always understood that there *are* difficulties in the way of all religion,—such, for instance, as the existence of Evil, which can never be fairly solved by human powers; all that can be done *intellectually*, is to point out the equal or greater difficulties of Atheism or Scepticism; and this is enough to justify a good man’s understanding in being a believer. . . . The main point is that we cannot, and do not pretend to, remove *all* the intellectual difficulties of religion; we only contend that, even intellectually, unbelief is the more unreasonable of the two,—and that, practically, unbelief is folly, and faith is wisdom.”§

(756.) The scheme of Providence is, in many of its aspects, deeply mysterious,—there are “hard chapters”|| in it, which human sagacity is utterly unable to explain.

“God moves in a mysterious way,
His wonders to perform;
He plants His footsteps on the sea,
And rides upon the storm.

“Deep in unfathomable mines
Of never-failing skill
He treasures up His bright designs,
And works His sovereign will.”

On a review of the whole series of His dispensations towards the Church, the Apostle exclaims, “O the depth of the riches both of

* Job xxvi. 9, 14; Ps. xvii. 2.

† Ps. cxxxix. 6. Bouchitté, Anselm’s Monologium and Proslogium, pp. 76, 86, 93, 281. Sedgwick, “Discourse,” p. 108.

‡ Whately, “Cautions,” p. 130. Tholuck, “Guido and Julius,” 10, 18,

26. Whately, Bampton Lect., p. 555. Butler’s Analogy (Wilson’s Edition), pp. 291, 292.

§ Arnold, “Life and Correspondence,” p. 248.

|| Dr Collinges, “The Actual Providence of God,” Part III. pp. 450–740.

the wisdom and knowledge of God! how unsearchable are His judgments, and His ways past finding out?" and with reference to the events of His common Providence towards all men at large, the Psalmist says, "Thy judgments are a great deep;"—"Thy way is in the sea, and Thy path in the great waters, and Thy footsteps are not known."* Apart from the authority of the sacred writers, these statements commend themselves as true to every thoughtful student of the vast scheme of Providence. It contains mysteries which have often perplexed the most devout minds,—especially the irregular distribution of good and evil under the Divine government,—the sufferings of the righteous even for righteousness' sake—the prosperity of the wicked even by means of their very wickedness—and the indiscriminate calamities which have often involved multitudes of men, women, and children—the righteous and the wicked alike—in one common ruin, as in the case of earthquakes, shipwrecks, war, famine, and pestilence.—These and similar dispensations have often sorely tried, and even, for a time, staggered, the faith of the best and wisest of men. "As for me," says Asaph, "my feet were almost gone, my steps had well nigh slipped; for I was envious at the foolish, when I saw the prosperity of the wicked." "I returned," says Solomon, "and considered all the oppressions that are done under the sun; and behold the tears of such as were oppressed, and they had no comforter, and on the side of their oppressors there was power." "There is a just man which perisheth in his righteousness, and there is a wicked man that longeth his life in his wickedness." "All things come alike to all; there is one event to the righteous and to the wicked, to the clean and the unclean."† These startling facts belong properly to the sphere of Natural Religion, and they have often been pled by unbelievers as a reason for denying the existence of a Moral Government altogether; as in the case of Goethe, who was so shocked, while he was yet only in his seventh year, at the indiscriminate destruction of multitudes by the earthquake at Lisbon, that his reliance on God as a Moral Governor was shaken, if not undermined, although "surely," as De Quincey says, "the Lisbon earthquake yielded no fresh lesson—no peculiar moral beyond what belonged to every man's experience in every

* Rom. xi. 33; Ps. xxxvi. 6, lxxvii. | † Ps. lxxiii. 2, 3; Eccles. iv. 1, vii.
19. | 15, ix. 2.

age,—and a passage in the New Testament about the fall of the tower of Siloam, and the just construction of that event, had already anticipated the difficulty.”*

(757.) These three—the nature and attributes of God,—the existence of Evil, moral and physical,—and the inscrutable dispensations of Providence, have been selected as specimens merely of a numerous class of Mysteries which belong properly to the sphere of Natural Religion, and for which Christianity is in no way responsible, otherwise than as it recognises them, and leaves them, in a great measure, unexplained. But by disowning Religion, whether Natural or Revealed, we can by no means escape from the region of Mystery. We are surrounded with it on every side. It enters into every part of our common natural knowledge. And it seems to be the universal law of our secular, as well as of our spiritual education, that we must be content to learn a few intelligible lessons in regard to every object of thought, while that object itself is not revealed to us as it appears to the eye of omniscience, but presents only a few luminous points surrounded by an interminable margin of shade.

(758.) Is there any one object in nature, or any one event in time, of which it can be said with truth, that we fully comprehend it in all its aspects and relations—its causes and consequences—its intimate nature and intricate dependencies? Such is the constitution of things, and such the connection which subsists between them all, that, in this comprehensive sense, no one thing can be fully known but by the omniscient Mind. Nor is it necessary to a true, real, certain, and useful knowledge that anything should be fully comprehended, otherwise such knowledge would be interdicted and inaccessible to all orders of finite intelligences. In the case of Man, he is a Mystery to himself, and in how many respects! In respect to his origin and his destination, which are both hidden, except in so far as they have been partially revealed,—under the veil which overhangs alike the Past and the Future,†—in respect to his soul and his body each in its own nature, and especially in their relation to, and influence on, one another,‡—in respect to the barrier which intervenes between him and the lower

* De Quincey, “Works,” vol. XV. pp. 153, 155.

† Maret, “Essai sur le Pantheisme Moderne,” pp. 236, 287.

‡ D’Alembert, “Miscellaneous Pieces,” p. 89. Javari, “De la Certitude,” p. 195. De Bonald, “Recherches,” pp. 293, 297.

animals, and which makes it so difficult for him to form any conception of their peculiar modes of life ;*—in respect to thought and knowledge, the nature, and even the possibility, of either ;†—in respect to the ultimate facts of consciousness, which cannot be resolved or explained otherwise than by falling back on the constitution of human nature ;‡—in respect to the communication between mind and mind, and the relation of the individual to society ;§—all these are *mysteries*, and yet they are *facts*, and their inscrutable nature is not, and cannot be, fully expounded by any philosophical explanation of the laws of nature. ||

(759.) As Man is a Mystery to himself, so every object of thought is partly intelligible, and partly incomprehensible. There are Mysteries in Science which no human intellect can fathom ;¶ they confront us even in Mathematics, for it involves the idea of infinity, and reasons upon it, although the infinite cannot be fully comprehended.** We cannot grasp its whole meaning, yet we reason on its relations ;†† and we can even lay down some definite propositions in regard to it. For example, an able writer has specified the following :—*First*, that “the Infinite, although it is not to be *comprehended* by the human reason, may be infallibly *apprehended* by it, or may be brought within its cognizable range, and may be known as unquestionable, though it is not known as to its constituents or its conditions : *secondly*, it is a safe and sure course for the human reason to take up any of the constituents or conditions of the human constitution, intellectual or moral, and to follow it out inferentially, even though it may lead us to the unknown and the infinite. We may do this so long as each inferential step is a *fact*, or a *relation*, included in that constitution. *Thirdly*, an inference may be admitted and relied upon, as being itself a fact or a relation belonging to the human constitution, when, if we refuse to admit and to rely upon it, every kind of in-

* Montaigne, “Essays,” pp. 157, 179.

† Sir Wm. Hamilton, “Lectures on Metaphysics,” pp. 339, 361, 364. Pascal, “Pensées,” p. 368.

‡ Mill, “Logic,” I. 90, 180. Stewart, “Elements,” II. 55, 109, 350, 355, 356. Hamilton’s Edition of Reid’s Works, pp. 21, 80.

§ Dr Harris, “Patriarchy,” p. 390.

Dr Poole, “The Grand Contrast,” Pref. viii. p. 7.

|| Mill, “Logic,” I. p. 559.

¶ Thompson, “Christian Theism,” 217. Lamourette, “Pensées,” pp. 241, 244.

** Barton, “Analogy,” pp. 16–18.

†† Dégérando, “Des Signes,” I. p. 169.

ferential reasoning ought, at the same time, to be mistrusted and rejected. The human mind connects itself with the *unknown* and the *infinite* in various modes of undefined feeling, and of intuitive or irresistible persuasion.”* The recognition of the Infinite cannot be avoided by denying the existence of God, or rejecting the truth of Religion; for self-existence and eternity—two ideas which involve infinity, and include, therefore, all the mysteries which belong to Theism,—are forced upon us by the mere fact that something exists *now*—a fact which proves that something must have existed from all eternity, and that something must continue to exist for ever, unless it were possible to conceive that what exists now might have come into being, or may hereafter cease to be, without a cause either of its existence or of its annihilation. When it is said that the finite mind cannot *comprehend* the infinite, the statement is true; but it is equally true that, finite as the human mind is, it cannot but *apprehend* the infinite,—it cannot, on any hypothesis,—Atheistic, Pantheistic, or Theistic—escape from the idea of self-existent, eternal, and never-ending being;† and the very arguments, which are adduced to prove that we cannot comprehend it, are sufficient of themselves to show that we have some conception of what it means, for how can we reason about the Infinite at all, if we can attach no intelligible meaning to the term? But if it be to any extent conceivable—and still more if it be irresistibly forced upon our belief,—we are clearly brought into contact with a Mystery such as no finite mind can fully comprehend.

(760.) In short, there are Mysteries everywhere, even in our common natural knowledge. “In all departments of philosophy, human curiosity is stopped, at an earlier or at a later stage, by an impassable barrier—it meets what is inscrutable. The constitution of the elements in the material world is inscrutable; the gravitating force, and the principle of chemical affinity,—the nature of light, and the principle of vegetable life—these things are utterly inscrutable: so also is the principle of animal life; and so, in like manner, but not more so, is Mind. At all these points alike, and as to each of them for the same reasons,

* Isaac Taylor, “World of Mind,” p. 344.

† Richard Watson, “Works,” VII. p. 300. Mansel, “Limits of Religious Thought,” pp. 58, 60, 64, 76, 89, 146.

we reach a limit which the human mind has never yet passed.”* All knowledge ends in Mystery.† Nothing whatever is fully known in its essential nature, or in all its manifold relations.‡ Account for it as we may, the fact is certain, that in regard to every object of thought, we have a few distinct ideas, and can understand a few intelligible lessons, while beyond certain limits it stretches away into a region of impenetrable obscurity.

(761.) Mysteries exist, therefore, in the lessons of Revelation—of Natural Religion—and of our common secular knowledge; and what we affirm is, that these three classes of Mysteries are *analogous* to one another,—that the analogy which subsists between them is not apparent merely, but real,—not superficial, but radical and intimate,—that it depends, not on any accidental circumstance, still less on any fanciful resemblance, but on the essential nature and inherent properties of the things compared,—and that the points of resemblance between them are so marked and prominent, as to admit of being distinctly specified, and stated in articulate terms.

(762.) They are analogous, *first*, in respect to their *nature*,—as being partly intelligible, and partly incomprehensible. In regard to every one of them, we know something; in regard to none of them, do we know everything. The merest child can raise questions in regard to the objects of our common natural knowledge, which the profoundest philosopher cannot answer. And yet our natural knowledge is real and true, so far as it goes, and practically useful, also, as a guide in the conduct of life. If this be the character of our natural knowledge, it may equally be the character of our Religious knowledge, whether it be derived from the light of nature, or the lessons of Revelation,—and this, too, without affecting either its substantial truth, or its practical utility. The three classes of Mysteries are analogous, therefore, in their *essential nature*.

(763.) They are analogous, *secondly*, in respect to the *causes and conditions* on which they severally depend. The truth of our

* Isaac Taylor, “World of Mind,” p. 8.
† Henry Rogers, “Eclipse of Faith,” pp. 228, 409. Professor Fraser, “Essays,” pp. 34, 51, 87, 116.

‡ Dr Poole, “Grand Contrast,” Pref. vii. Mozley, “Augustinian Predestination,” pp. 20, 23.

knowledge, so far as it extends, is dependent on two causes or conditions,—the existence of faculties in our minds which enable us to apprehend the truth, and the existence of certain manifestations by which the truth is made known; and the imperfection of our knowledge arises,—either from the limitation of our faculties,—or from the partial exhibition of the truth.* Each of these causes or conditions is equally indispensable to the existence of true knowledge; and the absence of either must leave us involved in utter ignorance, or in inscrutable mystery. In treating of the “Limits of Religious Thought,” Mr Mansel† has insisted chiefly on the limitation arising from our finite intelligence; but there is another limitation arising from the extent or measure of the manifestation of truth which is presented to us,—a limitation which is perfectly consistent with the former, and may be justly conceived to be in some respect proportioned or adapted to it—but which is, nevertheless, distinct from it, and cannot be shown to be necessarily commensurate or identical with it. There is no reason to suppose that God has revealed, on any subject, *all* the truth which it was possible for the human mind to understand or to believe. On the contrary, we can easily conceive that many truths,—respecting, for instance, the fall of angels,—the reasons why no redemption was provided for them, while a Divine Saviour was appointed for fallen men,—the wisdom which dictated the method of a progressive Revelation, as compared with a full Revelation at once,—the *rationale* of the scheme of Redemption and Grace,—the nature of the future resurrection, and of the final state of retribution, in the case both of the righteous and the wicked,—might have been more fully and clearly revealed, had it been the Divine will to make them manifest; and that the human mind might have apprehended them, in so far as they were thus disclosed, however incapable it might be of either discovering or proving them, by the unaided light of its own reason. We must recognise, therefore, two distinct causes of Mystery in our Religious knowledge,—the first being the finitude of our faculties,—the second the nature of the Revelation which has been made to us; and in both respects our Religious is strictly analogous to our natural knowledge, in respect to the laws and conditions on which they severally depend. It is quite conceivable that, if we had a larger number of senses,

* *Supra* Part II. C. i., ii., iii.

† Bampton Lecture. “Limits of Religious Thought.”

we might discover other qualities in matter besides those which we are now qualified to perceive; it is equally conceivable that there might have been a much fuller and clearer manifestation of natural truth—a larger amount of direct, intuitive, and demonstrative certainty,—than what we actually enjoy. In like manner, our Religious knowledge is limited by two conditions—the capacity of our minds, and the measure of Divine manifestation; and in both respects it is strictly analogous to that which we can acquire in regard to nature itself.*

(764.) As the Mysteries of nature are analogous to those of Religion in respect to their nature, causes, and conditions, so they are analogous, *thirdly*, in respect to the influence which they are fitted to exert on the human mind, and the practical uses which they are designed to subserve. They are manifestly intended, in both cases, to stimulate inquiry, and to encourage the pursuit of truth, within certain limits; but to remind us, at the same time, of our remaining ignorance, and our absolute dependence on external teaching for whatever knowledge we can possibly acquire. They are thus fitted, like all the lessons of experience, to inculcate *diligence* in the use of means, and to impress us with a sense of our utter *helplessness*, if these means were withheld or withdrawn. Nothing can tend more powerfully than a Mystery,—which is partly revealed, and partly hidden—at once to excite our curiosity, and to abase our intellectual pride. Accordingly we learn from experience, in regard alike to our natural and our religious knowledge, that some truths are clear and intelligible, others dark and incomprehensible. This difference does not arise from the former being intuitive and demonstrative, while the latter rest on moral evidence,—on experience, testimony and inference;—for there is something that is intelligible, and something also which is incomprehensible, in both.† It is the union of these two in all our

* Herbert, "De Veritate," p. 4. "Proinde neque *omnia* sciri posse, neque *nihil* deprehendimus, sed *quædam*."

† A different view is given by Mozley:—"Of the human mind there is a luminous, and there is a dark, side. The luminous side is that on which it clearly perceives and apprehends truths, either by simple apprehension, or by demonstrative reason-

ing; the dark side is that in which it does not perceive in either of these two ways, but either does not see at all, and has a blank before it, or has only an incipient and indistinct sight, not amounting to perception or apprehension. In proportion, then, to the acuteness with which the mind perceives truth, either by apprehension or by demonstration, on its luminous side, in that proportion it sees

knowledge—whether intuitive, and demonstrative, or moral and inferential—which is fitted to produce a frame of mind such as best becomes an intelligent, but finite and imperfect, being, like man; and that frame of mind, as it is delineated in Scripture, combines an earnest love of truth, with modesty, patience, and caution in the pursuit of it,—strict impartiality of judgment, with a candid estimate of evidence,—which may be said to be the constituent elements of a truly philosophical character.*

(765.) The three classes of Mysteries, to which we have referred, being strictly analogous to one another in respect to their nature, as being partly intelligible and partly incomprehensible,—in respect to their origin, as arising from the laws and conditions of human thought, or the extent and limits of human knowledge—and in respect to the influence which they are severally fitted to exert on the human mind,—it follows that the Mysteries which exist in our common secular knowledge may be applied to accredit, in the first instance, the Mysteries of Natural Religion, by neutralizing every objection that can be raised against them, and showing that they are in exact accordance with the analogy of our familiar experience in regard to the natural revelation of truth; and that the Mysteries which exist both in our common secular knowledge, and also in Natural Religion, may be applied, in the second instance, and in the same way, to accredit the Mysteries of Revealed Religion, and to show that, as they might be naturally expected in any Revelation from God, so they may be most reasonably believed.

the defect of perception on its dark side. The clearness of knowledge, where it is had, reveals and exposes by the contrast its absence where it is not had; and the transition from

light heightens the obscurity.”—Mozley, “Augustinian Predestination,” p. 317.

* J. F. Newman, “Theory of Religious Belief,” pp. 7–12.

CHAPTER VII.

ANALOGY APPLIED TO THE RELATION BETWEEN REASON
AND FAITH.

(766.) The claims of Rationalism having been already discussed, it might not have been necessary to advert particularly to the relation which subsists between Reason and Faith, were it not that some questions have been raised respecting it which could not be conveniently answered, until the pleas of Liberalism, and the objections to belief in Mysteries, had been considered and disposed of. By the previous exposition of these topics, the present inquiry is reduced to a manageable form, and limited to a few points, which possess considerable interest and importance, but which do not require, after what has been said, any very lengthened illustration.

(767.) It is necessary to form, in the first instance, a distinct and definite conception of the meaning of these two terms—Reason and Faith,—for the relation between the two depends entirely on the definition of each.* Yet no terms in our language have been employed in so many different senses; and this is the main cause of the difficulty which has been experienced in stating the relation between them; for confusion in the use of language, while it springs from confusion of thought, never fails to react upon it, and tends to increase and perpetuate it.

(768.) The import of each term, and the distinction between the two, as they have been generally employed and understood by Divines, is stated, with his usual precision, by Henry Rogers. He describes Reason, as including, *first*, all intuitions and self-evident axioms which cannot be proved,—undemonstrable principles which are received because we cannot help believing them; *secondly*, all necessary deductions from these first principles, such

* Bartholmèss, "Huet," pp. 32, 36, 41, 53.

as the demonstrable truths of Mathematics ; and *thirdly*, deductions from the facts of experience and observation. He describes Faith, again, as including all the truths which are received,—not without reasons, but for reasons underived from the intrinsic evidence of the truths themselves,—for reasons extrinsic to the proper meaning and significancy of the propositions in which they are announced,—such, for instance, as depend on credible testimony. This is the definition of Faith in general ; and Religious Faith, considered as one species of it, is said to consist, in so far as it denotes belief, in receiving truths on such evidence, as does not arise from their own intrinsic nature, and holding to them in spite of remaining obscurities and difficulties,—its only limit being *proven contradictions* in the propositions themselves, for then no evidence can justify belief or render it possible,—but no other difficulties will justify the unbelief of any man, if he have such evidence as he is accustomed to receive, and to act on in other cases,—thereby admitting its validity.*

(769.) This is, we believe, a correct account of the difference between Reason and Faith, as these terms have been usually employed by Divines. It will be observed, however, that belief is involved in, and inseparable from, the exercise of Reason itself,—that it is associated, and that, too, unavoidably, by the very structure of the human mind, with all our intuitive knowledge,—that it is equally involved in all our deductions, whether from self-evident principles, or from the facts of experience and observation,—and that for such beliefs we can assign no other reason than that they are imposed upon us by the very constitution of our nature. Belief is associated with the testimony of sense, with the exercise of memory, with the judgments of the understanding, and with the intuitions and deductions of reason. And hence occasion has been taken to generalize the notion of Faith—to extend it to all beliefs of whatever kind—and thus virtually to identify Faith with Reason, or to obliterate the distinction between the two. Many recent writers in England have employed the term *Faith*,—and a corresponding class of writers in France have employed the term *Foi*,—to denote—not our belief in truths which have no in-

* Henry Rogers, "Reason and Faith; their Claims and Conflicts." Oct. 1849, pp. 294–297. Reprint of Article, pp. 3–5.
Edinburgh Review, No. CLXXXII.,

tuitive or demonstrative evidence, and which depend on the credibility of testimony, human or Divine,—but our belief in truths which *are* intuitive or demonstrable,—such as may be immediately discerned in the light of their own self-evidence, or such as may be infallibly deduced from these, as being necessarily implied, or involved, in them. It is used, in a very wide and comprehensive sense, to denote belief, in general, from whatever source it may spring, and on whatever ground it may rest,—the belief which is naturally associated with the exercise of all our faculties,* and which is sometimes described as faith in our faculties themselves,—or, even as faith in our faculties arising from faith in God.† In this sense it is said that the existence, not only of God, but of our own body and soul, is known only by faith.‡ “Faith, the necessary evidence of the seen as well as the unseen, is the assumed basis of all inferential knowledge; for it is the only assurance we have of the reality of the world in which we move and live. The external something, whose existence we presume but cannot prove, as the cause of our sensation, is as much an object of Faith as the unseen Deity, or the anticipated renewal of our existence.”§ In a more restricted sense, *faith*, or *foi*, is appropriated to denote our irresistible belief in FIRST TRUTHS, or FIRST PRINCIPLES,—such as are intuitively discerned by Reason, and the belief of which is imposed upon us by a necessity of our intellectual nature;|| and that, too, as some seem to suppose, without any evidence, although, as we think, *self-evidence* is the highest of all.

(770.) It is a matter of grave doubt, however, whether this *faith* or *foi* should be ascribed to our speculative or to our practical Reason,—or, in other words, to our Reason or our Understanding. According to the Ideal theory, “man’s knowledge is a knowledge of himself only; his consciousness never proceeds beyond himself; and what he regards as a consciousness of the real existence of external objects, is no more than a consciousness of his own representations or conceptions in respect to such objects, produced according to an inward law of thought, and necessarily

* Dr Reid, “Essays,” II. pp. 155, 170, 227, 241, 244.

† Dr Reid, “Essays,” II. 249, 296. Bonchitte, “Histoire des Preuves,” p. 478.

Vera, “De la Certitude,” p. 209. Amand Saintes, “Spinoza,” p. 301.

‡ Mercier, “De la Certitude,” p. 98.

§ Mackay, “Progress of Intellect,” I. p. 41.

|| Cousin, “Cours,” I pp. 163, 168, 194; II. 40, 117.

co-existing with his sensations. . . . But what we may not know in the way of demonstration, we may know in the way of Faith,—that is, intuitive belief,—the belief dictated by the common-sense evidence which satisfies men in general.”* This would seem to point to the distinction between the *practical* and the *speculative* Reason of which Kant speaks; and to this distinction the editor of Coleridge’s “*Biographia Literaria*” refers when she says—“It was affirmed by Hume that Religion must rest on *Faith*,—that *reason* could not prove its truth. The proposition was re-affirmed by Kant, but with an utterly opposite inference from it,—that there is a power in the human mind sufficient to support and substantiate Religion, apart from the mere speculative faculty,—that spiritual truths must have their own specific evidence,—that if there is no absolute demonstration in these matters for the understanding, none is needed,—none would serve any purpose of Religion,—that theoretic Reason has performed her whole office in religious proof, when she has shown the impossibility of *disproving* the objects of Faith. Reason cannot oblige us to receive, said Kant, more than Reason can prove. But what mere speculative Reason cannot oblige us to receive, the Moral and Spiritual within us may. This is the doctrine of the ‘Aids to Reflection.’”†

(771.) But *Faith* is quite as often represented as an intuition of pure Reason,—an immediate and irresistible perception of truth in the light of its own self-evidence—such as has no connection with, and no dependence on, the logical understanding. Intuition is described sometimes as Faith, sometimes as a primitive Revelation, sometimes as a natural Inspiration.‡ It is supposed to be an immediate rational perception of the soul, the world, and God,—an intellectual vision by which we gaze on the infinite and the absolute.§ It is assumed that God’s existence cannot be proved, but can only be received by *faith*.|| Sometimes this faith is resolved into Reason,—sometimes into Sentiment;¶ and, as if to

* British Quarterly Review, Art. on Fichte, May 1846, pp. 304, 306.

† Coleridge, “*Biographia Literaria*,” vol. I. Pref. cxxxviii.

‡ Valroger, “*Etudes Critiques*,” pp. 281, 312, 356, 363. Amand Saintes, “*Spinoza*,” pp. 273, 301, 353.

§ Franck, “*De la Certitude*,” pp. 261–271.

|| Bouchitté, “*Anselm*,” lxiii. lxxxii. Also, “*Histoire des Preuves*,” pp. 498, 501.

¶ Whately’s “*Essays on Dangers to Christian Faith*,” p. 59.

"make confusion worse confounded,"—some philosophizing Divines of the Romish Church have ascribed it to the Logos revealed by Language, (*Parole*,) and have even held that Reason itself is created or constituted by Revelation in this way.* It must be manifest to every one, that while the terms are used in so many different senses, the whole question in regard to the relation between Reason and Faith must be involved in inextricable confusion; and that with a view to its solution, and the settlement of some important points which are involved in it, our first task must be to determine what it is that we mean when we speak of Reason, on the one hand, and of Faith, on the other.

(772.) It is not necessary, with a view to our immediate object, that we should embarrass ourselves with the subtle distinctions which have been drawn between the speculative and the practical Reason—or between our intuitive perceptions and our inferential reasonings—or between what has been called our intuitional and our logical consciousness,—for however they may be distinguished in other respects, there is no difference between them in this—that *belief* is associated with them all. Nor is it necessary to discuss the question whether that belief might, or might not, be fitly called *faith*, as being the result of a real, though perhaps unintentional and unconscious, submission to the authority of laws imposed upon us by the very constitution of our nature; for even were the terms *belief* and *faith* used interchangeably, it would still be necessary to distinguish between different kinds of belief, in respect alike to their nature and their origin. It is convenient to retain the use of both terms in order to mark that distinction; and if we employ *belief* as a general expression which may be applied to denote all our rational convictions of whatever kind, we may appropriate *faith* to the more special object of denoting that class of our beliefs which depend on *testimony or authority*.

(773.) By Reason, then, we mean our whole cognitive faculties,—whether intuitional or logical, speculative or practical,

* Lamennais, "L'Indifférence," II. pp. 144, 152, 159, 190, 248; III. 187, 348; IV. 6, 92, 98, 251, 261. Maret, "Pantheisme," p. 439; "Theodicée," pp. 4, 13, 28, 88, 106, 114. "Tous jouent," says Bartholmæss, "sur le mot *parole*. . . . On pense sa parole,—

on parle sa pensée. La parole est *verbum*—*λόγος*—*ratio*—*oratio*; donc, *identité* entre la parole primitive de l'homme et la nature Divine—entre la parole même articulée, et la parole Divine."—"Histoire Critique," II. p. 308.

presentative or representative; for however useful it may be to distinguish between the various faculties of the human mind, it should never be forgotten that the mind itself is one and indivisible,—and that various powers may co-operate in the production of our beliefs, and constitute one complex organ of thought,—just as many tubes, giving forth different musical sounds may all contribute to the resulting harmony. By Faith, again, in so far as it stands related to truth and partakes of the general nature of *belief*, we mean the recognition and reception of such truths as are conveyed to us by testimony, human or Divine,—there being a human faith which rests on “the witness of man,” and a Divine faith which rests on “the witness of God.” This being the meaning which we attach to these terms, we are now to inquire, what relation subsists between Reason and Faith, as thus defined, and to consider some special questions which have been raised respecting it.

(774.) Speaking generally of their relation to each other, it may be affirmed with confidence, that there is at least no necessary antagonism or conflict between the two; and that if there should arise an apparent, or even a real, contrariety between them, it is occasioned, not by the nature of the relation itself—for the two may be in entire accord—but from some error either in the conceptions of Reason, or in the testimonies which Faith receives. On which side the error lies—whether on the side of Reason or on that of Faith,—is the question which is raised by any seeming contradiction between the two; and that question is a perfectly legitimate one, since its solution is necessary to secure the harmony of our knowledge and the consistency of our beliefs. But so far from being necessarily at variance, reason and belief, although not identical but distinct, are inextricably intertwined with each other in every part of our common natural knowledge,—belief being associated with our external perceptions, with our internal consciousness, with our rational intuitions, with memory, with judgment, with reasoning, and, in short, with every act of intelligence; and so, faith when it receives truths on the credit of human testimony, and acts upon them in the daily business of life, is in entire harmony with reason, and in strict conformity with the laws of our mental constitution. Whether, therefore, we look to belief in general, or to that species of belief which is called faith on the ground of credible testimony, we have *two large classes of analo-*

gous facts which prove that there is no necessary antagonism between Reason and Faith—nothing impossible or incongruous in the supposition of their co-existence and simultaneous action,—and nothing, therefore, which should lead us to aim at effecting an unnatural divorce between the two, or to prefer either a religion so rational as to be altogether independent of faith, or a faith so blind as to be independent of the light of truth. There is an analogy between natural belief, and religious faith, arising out of their common nature as convictions of the human mind; there is a still closer analogy between human and Divine faith arising from their common dependence on testimony as the channel through which truth is conveyed: and the fact that a natural belief and a human faith are found to co-exist with, and even to be inseparable from, the legitimate exercise of Reason in its own sphere with reference to the objects of our common secular knowledge, is sufficient to prove, by parity of reason,—the cases being strictly analogous—that religious belief, and even a Divine Faith, may equally co-exist with the legitimate exercise of Reason, with reference to the objects of our spiritual knowledge.*

(775.) The *analogy* of our common experience enables us, therefore, to neutralize every objection to our Religious Beliefs, which is founded on the supposed antagonism between Reason and Faith; for, unquestionably, belief is associated with, and, indeed, inseparable from, the exercise of reason itself, even when it is conversant with intuitive or demonstrable truth,—and not the less, when the truths which are presented to it are conveyed through the medium of human testimony. Why should a Divine testimony,—supposing it to be possible and real,—be less trustworthy than the testimony of man, or more inconsistent with the prerogatives of Reason? If these prerogatives are not invaded by that large portion of our natural knowledge which is derived from human testimony, why should it be thought that they are violated by any communication of truth from the mind of God to the mind of man? If Reason receives the one, may it not equally receive the other, if both be attested by sufficient evidence? Or rather, should it not receive “the witness of God” as “greater”

* Baxter, “Works,” XXI. pp. 200, 247, 257, 357. Bishop Berkeley, “Minute Philosopher,” p. 446. Vinet, | “Vital Christianity,” pp. 93, 97, 100 (Collins’ English edition).

than "the witness of men?" Of course men may deny that there is any "witness of God;" but this denial must rest on other grounds than that of the antagonism between Reason and Faith; for the analogy of our whole experience shows that Reason and Faith may go hand in hand. This argument from analogy we hold to be a conclusive answer to everything that can be alleged against our Religious Faith on the *general* ground that it is necessarily at variance with Reason.

(776.) Before proceeding to consider some of the more special and subordinate questions which have been raised in regard to the relation between Reason and Faith, it is necessary to state that Christian Faith, while it implies a belief of Revealed truth, is not a mere intellectual assent to the articles of any creed, such as might be yielded to them by a hard, dry, dead orthodoxy; but a spiritual grace,—a vital principle—a moral virtue,—one of the gifts of God, and of the "fruits of His Spirit,"—the germ of the "new creation,"—the prolific root of "new obedience." It includes the belief of the truth, but it presupposes a spiritual apprehension of it in its real Scriptural meaning, and a heartfelt relish for it in its heavenly savour, as the very truth of God. It consists, not only in believing that "Jesus is the Christ, the Son of the living God," but in "receiving and resting upon Him alone for salvation, as He is freely offered to us in the Gospel." It involves both the assent of the understanding, and the consent of the heart, to the revealed method of God's redeeming mercy. It is not a bare and barren intellectual belief, but a vital and operative principle, which "worketh by love," and "purifieth the heart," and "overcometh the world." It is the product not of mere rational arguments, nor even of Scriptural truths, but of both carried home to the heart in "demonstration of the Spirit, and with power." There must be a subjective work of grace, in opening the blind eyes, and making the light to shine into the heart, as well as an objective presentation of truth, in order to the production of true, spiritual, saving faith. This is unquestionably the doctrine of Scripture; and it is confirmed by the experience of every believer, who will be ready on a review of his past, as compared with his present, experience to say, "One thing I know, that whereas I was blind, now I see." But when Christian faith is thus considered as distinguishable, in some respects, from mere intellectual assent, attempts have sometimes been made to divorce it from reason altogether,—to represent it as

a sentiment which is independent of doctrinal belief—to disparage the knowledge of the truth, as if it were not necessary to make men “wise unto salvation,”—and to treat all definite articles of faith as matters of little or no importance. There are several subtle errors on this point, which are only the more insidious and dangerous because they rest on a partial and one-sided view of the truth; and as they all bear more or less directly on the relations between Reason and Faith, it may be useful to advert to them briefly in this connection.

(777.) It is sometimes said that “Christianity is not founded on argument,” and that consequently Faith cannot rest upon Reason. There is a mixture of truth and error, and great confusion of thought, in this statement. It is true, that “Christianity is not founded on argument,” if by that be meant that Christianity was not *reasoned out*, but *revealed*; and it is also true that Christian Faith cannot rest upon Reason, if by that be meant that it must find its ultimate ground in the authority of the Revealer. But it is not true, if it be understood as implying either that Christianity is presented for our acceptance without any rational evidence in support of its claims, or that we are required to believe in it without reason. On the contrary, nothing is more remarkable in Scripture than the care with which provision was made for affording evidence, both to those who received direct revelations from God, and to those also who should afterwards believe on their word. That evidence is incorporated along with the truth in the record of Revelation itself. There was always reason and evidence at every stage in the course of Scripture history, and there is the same need, and the same use, for reason and evidence still.* Those who seek to dissuade men from the study of that evidence as if it were essentially rationalistic, and to interdict all use of Reason in matters of Faith, forget that in Revelation, as in Nature, God addresses human intelligence, and adapts His lessons to the laws of the human mind. The whole *analogy* of our common secular knowledge, which is the result of a natural Revelation, may be applied to prove that a scheme of truth which is “not founded on argument,” but externally presented to the mind, may, nevertheless, be addressed to Reason,

* Bailey's “Essay on Inspiration,” pp. 10, 14, 18, 32, 78, 97, 165. Glanville's “Essays,” pp. 22, 24, 26.

and interpreted by it; and may be accompanied also with such evidence as affords a rational ground of belief. The intuitive beliefs of Reason itself are "not founded on argument," nor capable of being proved by it; and if it be said that they belong to the sphere of Faith, it cannot surely be imagined that they have no connection with, or that they can be divorced from, the Reason out of which they spring. These beliefs afford another class of *natural analogies*, which may be applied to prove that, in the event of a Revelation from God, Faith, although "not founded on argument," but on authority, may, nevertheless, be perfectly consistent with Reason. And a third class of *natural analogies*, bearing upon this point, may be found in the beliefs which rest upon human testimony: for these beliefs cannot be said to be "founded on argument,"—since no kind of reasoning could establish them, apart from the testimonies on which they are founded,—and yet Reason is largely concerned in the appreciation of these testimonies, and it is guided by the analogy of experience in pronouncing judgment upon them. So that we have here at least three classes of natural analogies—one derived from our common secular knowledge—another from the intuitive beliefs of Reason itself—and a third from our natural belief in mere human testimony;—which may be applied to prove, that what is not "founded on argument" may, nevertheless, be in accordance with Reason,—and that Faith, even when it rests ultimately on authority, is not, on that account, either necessarily divorced from knowledge, or independent of evidence.*

(778.) A more subtle form of the same error to which we have just adverted,—although apparently opposed to it,—is involved in those statements which affirm, that Theology is founded on *reason*, but not on *reasoning*; in other words, that we may have an intuitive perception, but can have no logical proof, of the existence of God, or of any truth relating to Him. For this reason a scientific theology is held to be impossible, and to involve insuperable difficulties. The truth is that Theology, whether Natural or Revealed, is founded neither on reason, nor on reasoning, but on a Revelation, addressed to Reason, and interpreted by

* Whately's "Cautions," pp. 187, 189, 238. Baxter, "Works," vol. XX. Pref. xxvi. xxviii. p. 41. Newman, | "Theory of Religious Belief," p. 175. Montaigne, "Essays," vol. I. pp. 140, 149.

it according to its natural laws. This theory would resolve Faith into Reason, as if there were no Revelation of God in Nature, and none even in Scripture, by which Reason might be enlightened and informed. The distinction between *reason* and *reasoning*,—between the faculty and its exercise, or between its intuitive perceptions and its logical processes, may be valid and useful in other respects,—but it has no relevancy when it is applied to the relation between Reason and Faith, unless on the supposition that there is no Revelation external to the mind itself, whether in Nature or in Scripture; for if such a Revelation has been given, it must necessarily be addressed to our cognitive faculties, and interpreted, like every other communication of truth from one mind to another, by the exercise of these faculties according to their natural laws. To suppose that there is a Revelation of truth, whether natural or supernatural, which has no relation to human Reason, and is utterly incognizable by it,—which can, in no sense, be intelligently understood, or rationally believed,—and which is exempt from the application of the ordinary laws of human thought,—is contrary to the *analogy* of our whole experience in regard to our common secular knowledge, and amounts, in fact, to a virtual denial, for all practical purposes, of an external Revelation altogether. But supposing that there were no other than an internal Revelation—no other distinct from, and additional to, the intuitive perceptions of Reason itself,—there would still be room for the question, whether Reason is mere faith, or intelligence also? whether there be not involved in these intuitive perceptions an *apprehension of truth*, even when it cannot be fully *comprehended*? and whether the faith which is associated with them can justly be described as altogether independent of knowledge, when the truth is revealed in the light of its own self-evidence? The *analogy* of our experience in respect to these intuitive perceptions of Reason, which lie at the foundation of our whole natural knowledge, may be applied to prove that, in the event of a supernatural Revelation, addressed directly to an individual mind, there might still be a *similar* relation between Reason and Faith,—and that the same relation may continue to subsist between them, when that Revelation is afterwards communicated to others.

(779.) The most important question in regard to the relation between Reason and Faith may be said to be—Whether Faith implies knowledge? and,—if this question be answered in the

affirmative,—Whether that knowledge must be *explicit*, or may be *implicit*?—in other words, whether we must understand the meaning of what we believe, or may rest content with a blind assent to statements which are altogether unintelligible, or at least not actually understood by us? Divines have generally held that Christian faith implies belief,—that belief implies knowledge, more or less perfect,—and that knowledge implies some perception of truth and its evidence. The whole tenor of Scripture sanctions this doctrine. Its professed design is to reveal truth, so as to make it known, as an object of faith. It is “profitable for instruction.” “The law of the Lord is perfect, converting the soul; the testimony of the Lord is sure, *making wise the simple*; the commandment of the Lord is pure, *enlightening the eyes*.” So far from superseding knowledge by Faith, or disparaging the due exercise of Reason on the truth which it reveals, it calls us to “know wisdom and instruction, and to perceive the words of understanding;” it proposes to “give subtlety to the simple, to the young man knowledge and discretion;” and it assures us that “a wise man will hear and will increase learning, and a man of understanding shall attain unto wise counsels.” “If thou wilt receive My words, and hide My commandments with thee, so that thou incline thine ear unto wisdom, and apply thine heart to understanding; if thou seekest her as silver, and searchest for her as for hid treasures, then shalt thou understand the fear of the Lord, and find the knowledge of God. For the Lord giveth wisdom,—out of His mouth cometh knowledge and understanding; He layeth up sound wisdom for the righteous.”* It never speaks as if Faith might exist apart from knowledge, or knowledge apart from an intelligent apprehension of truth. On the contrary, it speaks of Faith as including knowledge, and of knowledge as including Faith, while truth is the object of both: insomuch that to *believe* and to *know* are used as convertible terms. If it be said at one time that “who-soever *believeth*, shall not perish, but shall have eternal life,” it is equally said at another, “This is life eternal, that they might *know* Thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom Thou hast sent.” Speaking of the record of Revelation as the means of conveying the knowledge of Divine truth, the Apostle says to

* Ps. xix. 7, 8; Prov. i. 2-5, ii. 1-7.

Timothy—"that from a child thou hast known the Holy Scriptures, which are able to make thee wise unto salvation, through faith that is in Christ Jesus:" and speaking again of the Divine Agent by whose grace and power the truth is savingly applied, he prays for the Ephesian converts, "that the God of our Lord Jesus Christ, the Father of glory, may give unto you the Spirit of wisdom and revelation in the knowledge of Christ,—that, the eyes of your understanding being enlightened, ye may know what is the hope of His calling."* Indeed the very object of a Revelation is to make known certain truths in order to their being understood, and believed, and acted on, by intelligent moral agents, so as to make Religion "a reasonable service;" and, in this respect, it is in perfect accordance with the analogy of our whole experience in regard to the relation which subsists between knowledge, belief, and action, in the sphere of our common natural knowledge. It might not have been necessary to advert to a truth so self-evident as this, and so explicitly recognised in Scripture itself, were it not for the insidious attempts which have been made to divorce Faith from knowledge, and to represent it as a mere feeling or sentiment, such as has either no connection with Reason at all, or, at least, no necessary dependence on an intelligent perception of truth. It might as well be said, and for the same reason, that our natural beliefs are independent of a natural Revelation,—that they imply no knowledge of what is, nevertheless, believed—and that they have no necessary connection with truth or its evidence.

(780.) But while in this sense, and to this extent, Christian Faith is inseparable from knowledge, and implies, therefore, the exercise of our intelligent faculties, the question remains—and it is one which, in some of its aspects, is not without difficulty,—Whether the knowledge which is involved in Faith must, in all cases, be *explicit*, and whether, in some, an *implicit* belief, without explicit knowledge, may not be sufficient? Everything here depends on the sense in which these words are understood. An *implicit* faith has sometimes been denounced in terms not warranted either by Scripture or by Christian experience; and yet in the sense in which it is usually contended for by those who seem to think that "ignorance is the mother of devotion," it is utterly indefensible. But as long as there are Mysteries in religion, there

* John iii. 16, xvii. 3; 2 Tim. iii. 16; Eph. i. 17, 18.

must be a solid ground for the distinction between Faith, in so far as it relates to what is intelligible, and Faith in so far as it relates to what is unrevealed or incomprehensible. A Mystery is, as we have seen, a truth partially revealed; which may, therefore, be partly known, but must, also, be partly unknown;—and if we call the belief of it in its luminous aspect explicit faith, the belief of it in its obscure aspect might be called implicit faith. But to guard against the risk of error in the use of such terms, it is necessary to bear in mind that, in the case of a Mystery, we have, first, an explicit faith,—that is a faith enlightened by knowledge,—in regard to those intelligible lessons which have been revealed concerning it; and we have, secondly, an explicit faith also, founded on clear testimonies of Scripture, that there is more in it than we can fully comprehend; and if we may be said to believe it *implicitly* so far as it is inscrutable, this does not imply either that we believe without knowledge, or without an intelligible reason for our belief. We know, and, therefore, we believe that it far transcends our limited comprehension; and Reason itself, unless it were omniscient, must concur with Scripture in teaching us this salutary lesson.

(781.) In Scripture, Faith is opposed, not to reason, but to vision, or to sensible experience. “We walk by faith, not by sight,” but it is not a blind faith,—it is a faith which is “the substance of things hoped for, and the evidence of things not seen,” and by which we “live as seeing Him who is invisible.” “Now we see through a glass darkly, but then face to face—now I know in part, but then shall I know even as also I am known.”* “Now are we the sons of God, and it doth not yet *appear* what we shall be; but we *know* that when He shall appear, we shall be like Him, for we shall *see* Him as He is.” Faith on earth is thus contrasted with the beatific vision in Heaven. But it is contrasted also with sensible experience even in the present life; we are required to *believe* when we do not *see*,—and to *believe* in order that we may *see*. “Said I not unto thee, that if thou wouldest *believe*, thou shouldest *see* the glory of God?” “Blessed is she that believed, for there shall be a performance of these things which were told her from the Lord.” “I had fainted

* Culverwell, “Light of Nature,” | xi. 1, 27; 1 Cor. xiii. 12; 1 John
pp. 222, 236, 273. 2 Cor. v. 7; Heb. | iii. 2.

unless I had *believed to see* the goodness of the Lord in the land of the living.”* There are some things that can be known, in the sense of being realized in actual experience, only by believing;† and hence the believer’s faith is confirmed, as he advances in the Divine life, by a new experimental evidence, for he has “the witness in himself;” but even before this is attained, and with reference to “things not seen as yet,” his faith is neither blind nor groundless,—it knows the truth in part, and rests on the promise, while it waits for the performance,—it “hopes even against hope.” It is only in this sense, that the Christian is sometimes said to believe, or to trust, God *in the dark*—not that he has no knowledge or no reason for his faith,—but that while he knows some things, he is ignorant of many more, and can only cast himself like a little child into the arms of his heavenly Father. He has the promise, for instance, “that all things shall work together for good to them that love Him:” he knows this, and it is sufficient to warrant his trust in God; but he knows nothing of the way in which the promise will be fulfilled—nothing of the kind of discipline to which he may be subjected,—nothing of the reasons of those manifold trials which he is called to sustain. The dispensations of Providence may often seem dark and mysterious; and if, in these circumstances, he may be said to believe *implicitly*, he cannot be said at least to believe without some explicit knowledge, or without a reason for his belief,—since it rests on an intelligible promise, guaranteed by the faithfulness of the very God of truth.

(782.) When the distinction between explicit and implicit Faith is thus understood, the Analogy of our natural beliefs affords a sufficient answer to every objection that can be raised against Religion, on the ground, that it either requires a faith without knowledge, or a faith which transcends the limits of knowledge. For there are Mysteries, as we have seen, in Nature, in Providence, and in Natural Religion, as well as in Christianity; and Philosophy itself is compelled to recognise a distinction between *explicit and implicit Reason*, which is strictly analogous to that between explicit and implicit faith.‡ Our intuitive, not less

* John xi. 40; Luke i. 45; Ps. xxvii. 13.

† Baxter, “Works,” XX. 427.

‡ Abbé Gerbet, “De la Certitude,” pp. 32, 55, 102. Lamennais, “L’In-

difference,” I. 189; II. 420, 425; IV. 139. J. H. Newman, “Theory of Religious Belief,” pp. 246, 249, 254. Montaigne, “Essays,” I. p. 199.

than our inductive, beliefs, include something which is intelligible, and something also which is incomprehensible. And yet it cannot be said, in regard to either, that we believe without reason, or that, in believing what we cannot fully comprehend, we do violence to reason. On the contrary, Reason itself teaches us, that there are truths which it cannot grasp, and yet can as little refuse to recognise;—that it cannot help believing in the infinite, —the eternal,—the self-existent,—although it feels its utter incompetence to comprehend them,—and that, while it has an explicit knowledge of some things, it must rest content with an implicit belief of others. These convictions spring from Reason itself, not from Religious Faith, although they are presupposed in it; and they are strictly *analogous* to those Religious beliefs, which comprehend both what is intelligible to Reason, and what is incomprehensible by it. The analogy between the two is perfect; and it will become only the more striking and instructive, by comparing the Theological discussions, which have entered deeply into the grounds and reasons of Christian Faith, with the Philosophical discussions, which have arisen in regard to the grounds and reasons of Certitude in our common natural knowledge.*

(783.) There seems to be a tendency, in some recent philosophical speculations, towards a theory of human knowledge which is analogous to, if not identical with, the Sceptico-dogmatic doctrine of some Romish writers, such as Huet, Lamennais, and others, who sought to shake our confidence in Reason and the beliefs which depend upon it, with the view of establishing our Religious faith on the authority of the Church, and our common faith on the authority of the Race. In like manner some Protestant writers speak of renouncing Reason in Religion, and taking refuge in Faith, as if the one were in no respect dependent on the other, or incapable of a friendly alliance with it. The terms Faith, Foi, and Croyance, are employed to signify a belief resting on insufficient evidence, or perhaps on no evidence at all, and falling short of rational certainty; while, with strange inconsistency, they are applied to denote our intuitive and demonstrative beliefs not less than those which depend on moral or inductive

* "Faith in God, and Modern Atheism Compared," vol. II. Part iii. c. ix., "Theories of Certitude." | Abbé Gerbet, "De la Certitude," pp. 9, 85, 135.

grounds. But whether we consider Reason as denoting our cognitive faculties, or the truths which they enable us to apprehend and believe, its legitimate claims must be vindicated and maintained, unless Faith is to degenerate into a blind assent, and issue in superstition or enthusiasm. It is a vain attempt to establish Faith on the ruins of Reason, or to make Religion rest on a Sceptical basis. Whatever tends to undermine our natural beliefs must be fatal also to our religious convictions. Revelation is designed, not to supersede Reason, but to instruct and enlighten it; and it demands Faith only because it presents truth to our acceptance accompanied with sufficient evidence.*

(784.) The analogies which are applicable to this topic are such as may be derived from—the laws and conditions of thought—the manifestations of truth—and the extent and limits of knowledge, viewed in connection with the mysteries which are involved in the objects of our natural, not less than of our religious beliefs. We have merely indicated where they may be found, and offered a few specimens of the manner in which they may be applied.

* Huet propounded his sceptical theory in the "*Questiones Alnetanæ*" (D'Aulnay) and "*Foiblesse de l'Esprit Humain*," and was opposed by Bossuet and Fenelon, by Arnauld and Nicole. See Bartholmèss, "Huet," which contains an admirable critique on the subject. Lamennais propounded

his theory in his "*Essai sur l'Indifférence*," and was ably answered by Maret, Valroger, and other Romish Divines. Perrone discusses the relation between Reason and Faith at great length, *Pars iii. vol. III. p. 204*, "*De Analogia Rationis et Fidei*."

CHAPTER VIII.

ANALOGY APPLIED TO THE QUESTION OF AUTHORITY IN RELIGION.

(785.) We propose to look at this question, in the first instance, in its most general aspect, and apart from the more special controversies which have arisen with regard to it, in connection with the exclusive claims of the Church of Rome. These will be more conveniently discussed in connection with the rival Rules of Faith; but it is necessary to lay a solid foundation for that discussion by proving, at the outset, that there *is* a Rule which possesses a rightful authority in matters of Faith,—by explaining the nature of that authority, and discriminating between its just claims and its usurped prerogatives,—and by showing its consistency with the great Protestant principles of the right and duty of private judgment, and the unrestricted privilege of free inquiry.

(786.) In doing so, we must, first of all, form a distinct and definite conception of what we mean when we speak of *Authority* in Religion. For the term is ambiguous, and it has been employed and understood in different senses. “People are apt,” says Archbishop Whately, “to make a confusion in their own minds between two different meanings of the word ‘authority,’ and in consequence of that to fall into serious mistakes. When we speak, for example, of the *authority* of an act of Parliament, regularly passed, we mean that the Parliament has *power* to bind the country to submit to that act. . . . Every good subject is bound, and every subject may be compelled, to submit to, and obey, an act of Parliament; but no one is bound to approve of it, or think it wise, any farther than he sees reason for so thinking. But we use the word ‘authority’ in quite a different sense; when any one says, for example, that Macaulay is a great authority in matters of English History,—that means that he is a writer to whose statements and opinions about England we should pay attention and

deference, as the statements and opinions of an intelligent person, who has diligently examined the matters about which he writes. But no one could think of saying that a great Historian had any ‘authority’ *to force men to submit* to his decisions; or, on the other hand, that all acts of Parliament should be regarded, under pain of a misdemeanour, as perfectly wise and well-judged.”* This is only a specimen of many distinct senses in which the word “authority” has been employed; we often speak of personal, and of official, authority; of the authority of great names, and of public opinion; of legislative, executive, and judicial authority; of the authority of reason and of conscience,—of testimony and of history,—of consciousness and of memory,—of science and of religion. It might be difficult to frame a definition of it, sufficiently comprehensive to include all these senses which, on the ground of some general analogy between them, have all been attached to the same term; but there is no difficulty in stating what we mean when we speak of “authority” in matters of Faith.—It denotes, generally, the rule or standard by which our judgments ought to be regulated, and with which they must be in conformity, if they are to be right and true, whether they relate to Natural or to Revealed Religion.

(787.) The grand fundamental distinction, on this subject, is that between Divine and human authority;—the former being supreme, infallible, and obligatory, requiring the unreserved submission of the understanding, the cordial concurrence of the will, and the active obedience of the life; while the latter is, in every instance, whether in civil or ecclesiastical affairs, subordinate, fallible, and ministerial only, unless it can be shown, in some particular case,—such as that of inspired apostles, or that of an infallible Church,—to be more than human, as having been supernaturally attested and sanctioned by an authority which is Divine. Authority must be either Divine *or* human, when these are contradistinguished from each other; or it may be Divine *and* human, when “the witness of men” is combined with “the witness of God.”—No one will question either the reality or the reasonableness of the distinction between Divine and human authority in matters of Religion, who believes in the existence of God, and in the possibility of any Revelation of His mind and will, whether in

* Whately, “Cautions,” p. 132. See also “Errors of Romanism,” p. 208.

the shape of a natural manifestation of Religious truth, or of a supernatural message from His omniscient mind. The mere fact that He can neither err nor deceive makes a vast difference, in point of authority, between what is taught by Him, and what is taught by any mere human interpreter of Nature, on the one hand, or by any mere human expositor of Revelation, on the other. If our belief either of Natural or Revealed Religion is to rest at all upon authority, it must be resolved into the teaching of God, through the medium of His Works or His Word, or into the mere teaching of man, unless it can be shown that the claims of the Romish Church to be regarded as an original and infallible vehicle of Divine communication are as well founded as were those of the prophets and apostles, who were supernaturally inspired, and miraculously endowed, by God Himself.

(788.) When our Faith is resolved into the teaching of God, it is said to rest on Divine "authority," and this in the case both of Natural and of Revealed Religion. It may be thought, indeed, that the truths of Natural Religion rest on evidence rather than on authority; but that evidence is of the nature of a *testimony* which God bears to Himself as the Creator and Governor of the world, and in this light it is frequently presented in Scripture. "The heavens *declare* the glory of God; and the firmament showeth His handy-work. Day unto day *uttereth speech*, and night unto night showeth knowledge. There is no speech nor language—their voice is not heard;" yet "their line is gone out through all the earth, and *their words* unto the end of the world." "Ask now the beasts, and they shall *teach* thee; and the fowls of the air, and they shall *tell* thee: or speak to the earth, and it shall *teach* thee; and the fishes of the sea shall *declare* unto thee. Who knoweth not in all these that the hand of the Lord hath wrought this?" "That which may be known of God is manifest in them: for God hath *showed it* unto them." "He left not Himself *without witness*, in that He did good, and gave us rain from heaven, and fruitful seasons, filling our hearts with food and gladness."* In these passages, a Divine testimony is said to be conveyed through material objects and natural events, by which God bears witness to Himself as the Creator and Governor of the world; and if such a testimony can be so conveyed, why should

* Ps. xix. 1-4; Job xii. 7-9; Rom. i. 19; Acts xiv. 17.

it be thought incredible that a similar testimony may come to us, clothed in human language, through the medium of "the witness of men?" It is the testimony of God in Nature, and it is the testimony also of God in Revelation, which is the supreme and infallible authority in matters of Faith. This is the foundation of all Religion, Natural and Revealed.

(789.) Testimony, whether human or Divine, is generally and justly regarded as an "authority"* on which belief may rest; and when the testimony is Divine, the authority is infallible. God's testimony, whether in Nature or in Revelation, is not a mere expression of arbitrary will,—although it makes known His will, and claims belief and submission on the part of all to whom it is addressed—it is also a *witness-bearing* to the truth;† and for this reason it may be said that, in a subordinate sense, the "authority" on which Religion rests is that of Truth and its Evidence,—that evidence being the testimony or "the witness of God." But this statement is liable to be misunderstood, unless it be carefully guarded. There is a subtle form of error which seeks to supersede Authority in matters of Faith, while it seems to do homage to Truth and Evidence. It has been said, for instance, that "Christian teaching does not derive its truth from authority, but derives its authority from its truth,"‡—that "authority can add nothing to truth,"§—that "authority cannot make that true which was not true in itself,"||—that "authority is" even "an enemy to truth,"¶—that "undoubtedly if they (the apostles) are witnesses of the truth, their voice is the voice of authority: but this is little more than saying that the truth is the truth,"**—and that the Scripture is 'authoritative because it is true,' not true because it is authoritative."†† In these statements, there is much confusion of thought. It is never supposed by any enlightened advocate of Authority in matters of Faith that it *makes* that true which was not true before any more than human testimony does; but it is held that Divine

* Whately, "Rhetoric," pp. 63, 66, 72.

† Whately, "Cautions," p. 179.

‡ Coleridge, "Aids to Reflection," Editor's Introd. p. xx.

§ Quoted in Pearson on "Infidelity," p. 94.

|| Bunsen, "Hippolytus," I. pp. 171, 172, 180, 321.

¶ Collins, "Grounds and Reasons," Pref. lviii.

** Macaulay, "Essays," II. p. 71.

†† Dr Poole, "Grand Contrast," pp. 175, 177, where Bunsen's views are referred to.

authority, just like human testimony, may and does *make known* that to be true which was not known to be true before, and which we could have no means of either discovering or proving to be true apart from a declaration of God's mind and will. Scripture is authoritative in two distinct respects,—*first*, as it contains *Religious truth*, which has a direct relation to the conscience; and *secondly*, as it contains *Revealed truth*, resting on Divine evidence, and attested by God Himself. This is saying, not “a little,” but a great deal more, than “that the truth is the truth”—it implies that the truth is authoritative, not merely as truth, but as truth taught by One who can neither err nor deceive,—and whose bare Word, once ascertained to be His, imposes a solemn obligation, by reason of His rightful supremacy and our moral subjection, to believe whatever He speaks, and to obey whatever He commands. Instead of saying, therefore, that “Christian teaching does not derive its truth from authority, but derives its authority from truth,” we should rather say that Truth and Authority, however they may be distinguished, can never be disjoined—that they are combined in the same testimony, which is the ground of Faith—and that they should never be treated as if they were rivals or antagonists, since, in point of fact, they are not “conflicting but conspiring forces.”

(790.) The distinction between the two views,—that which represents Truth and its Evidence as the only authority in Religion, and that which represents the Divine testimony as the proper ground, and ultimate reason, of Faith,—is more important than it may at first sight appear to be. Its importance comes prominently into view in the writings of Coleridge, especially in “the Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit;” which, whatever his own personal faith may have been, have unsettled the Religious convictions of many. Looking to Truth, as it appears to an inquiring mind in the light of its own intrinsic evidence, as the only authority in matters of Faith, he finds something in the Bible which commends itself to his reason as Divine, and accepts it on that ground; but he finds much also which does not commend itself to his reason in the same way, and holds himself at liberty to refuse it, and even to reject those parts of the Bible in which it is contained. “Whatever *finds me* bears witness *for itself* that it has proceeded from a Holy Spirit. . . . In the Bible there is more that *finds me* than I have experienced from all other books put together; the words of

the Bible *find me* at greater depths of my being; and whatever *finds me* brings with it an irresistible evidence of its having proceeded from the Holy Spirit.”* Authority is thus transferred from the *Testimony*, to the *Truth*; the question is no longer, “What saith the Lord?” but, “What *finds me*?” and the answer to it is left to depend, partly on the intrinsic evidence of the truth, and partly, also,—as all experience proves,—on the tastes, the prejudices, and even the caprices, of individual minds. But Revelation,—if there be any real Revelation—from the mind of God to the mind of man, must possess an authority peculiar to itself, such as is independent of any man’s judgment in regard to the truths which it makes known; and superior to it,—or rather supreme over it,—as every lesson that is really taught by an Omniscient Mind to finite intelligences must necessarily be. It is necessary to distinguish, as De Bonald has done, between those cases in which we yield to the “authority of evidence,” and those in which our belief rests on “the evidence of authority;” † for much of our common natural knowledge rests on testimony alone, in regard to matters of fact of which we could have no information through any other medium, and our Religious knowledge is strictly analogous to it in this respect.

(791.) When we speak of an authority that is properly Divine in matters of Faith, the analogies, which are applicable to it, are to be derived mainly from *two* sources,—namely, *first*, the radical resemblance which subsists between the interpretation of Nature by Science, and the interpretation of Scripture by Theology; and, *secondly*, the resemblance, no less radical, between human and Divine testimony. Each of the two has been already referred to as a source of analogies in matters of Faith.‡ It cannot, therefore, be necessary to enlarge upon them at any length at the present stage of our inquiry; but it may be useful to recall to the recollection of our readers some of the principles which were laid down in regard to them.

(792.) In regard to the first,—namely, the interpretation of Nature by Science, and the interpretation of Scripture by Theology,—it may be conclusively proved that, in either instance, the authority lies in the volumes of Nature and Scripture respec-

* Coleridge, “Confessions,” p. 13.

† De Bonald, “Recherches Philosophiques,” I. p. 58.

‡ The first in Part II. c. vii.; and the second in Part II. c. viii.

tively,—that Reason bears exactly the same relation to each of the two, and that it has merely the same function—that of *interpretation*—in respect to both.* The distinction, and yet the analogy, also, which subsist between the two volumes, have often been marked, as well as their common relation to Reason as merely their interpreter.† Scripture is to Theology what Nature is to Science; and as Science recognises the authority of Nature as supreme and final, Theology must equally recognise the infallible authority of the Word of God. Reason is related to both in a similar way; and the same spirit of docility and submission, which is required in the study of the one, is equally required in the study of the other. This has been admitted even by many whose Theological opinions differed widely from the doctrine of the Reformed Churches.‡ In both Volumes the relation of Authority to the exercise of private judgment, and the right of free inquiry, is precisely the same, and this is the ground of the Analogy between the two.§ Free inquiry is not incompatible with the authority of Nature in Science, nor is private judgment incompatible with authority in the case of human Law; and why should either be

* Dr Hampden, "Essay on Philosoph. Evidence," pp. 262, 281, 291. Tatham, "Chart and Scale," II. 108.

† Raimond de Sebonde, "Theologia Naturalis," commented on by Montaigne in his Essays, and quoted by Hallam, "Literature of Europe," I. p. 192. Also, Lionardo da Vinci, quoted by Hallam, I. p. 306; Joseph Glanville, "Essays," Ess. iii. iv. v.; H. Rogers, "Eclipse," p. 287; Field, "Analogical Philosophy," vol. I. Pref. xxxiv.—xliii. lxxvi. 203. Mansel, "Limits of Thought," pp. 3, 10.

‡ Dr John Taylor of Norwich, "Paraphrase on Romans," p. ii. "We may not indulge our own conceits in matters of Revelation. Every point, advanced as Christian doctrine, ought to be found in Scripture, and explained by Scripture, . . . that your faith and joy may stand, not upon the wisdom of man, but upon the firm and immoveable foundation of the Word of God."

Dr G. E. Ellis, "Half-Century of Unitarian Controversy," pp. 296, 381.

"An attempt is often made to contrast, and set in opposition, those qualities which are respectively needed in Scientific and Religious investigations. Humility, simplicity, docility, and candour, are represented as peculiarly and especially requisite in the Theologian, and the implication is that the Scientific man may dispense with the fullest exercise of these qualities. But let the Scientific man dispense with them in any measure,—let him venture to disregard the least suggestion from them,—and then mark how the world will estimate his merits, or the value of his labours. . . . Our Theology, or our philosophy of Religion must respect the facts and the form of Revelation, in spite of its perplexities and its seeming anomalies, *precisely as* our Natural Philosophy has to respect the mysterious and inexplicable phenomena of Nature." See Whewell's "History of Inductive Science," I. 656.

§ Chas. Leslie, "Private Judgment and Authority," p. 181.

held to be necessarily exclusive of Divine authority in matters of Faith? There is a legitimate, and there has also been a usurped, authority both in Philosophy and in Religion; and in the one case, not less than in the other, the authority of men arrogated the place which could only belong to the authority of God. The opposition which was made to this usurped authority in Science at the revival of Letters, was strictly analogous to the opposition which was also made to a usurped authority in Theology at the reformation of Religion;—it was in either case an appeal from the authority of man, and was directed—not to the overthrow of all authority—but to the re-establishment of the authority of Nature in Science, and of Revelation in Theology. Copernicus, Galileo, and Bacon effected this revolution in the Schools; Luther, Melancthon, and Calvin effected a similar revolution in the Church; and just as the former did not supersede, but rather recognised and did homage to, the authority of God's natural Revelation, so no more did the latter supersede, or fail to acknowledge, the supreme and infallible authority of His inspired Word.

(793.) The *second* source of such Analogies as are applicable to an authority which is properly Divine in matters of Faith, lies in the resemblance which subsists between the nature, uses, and effects, of human and Divine Testimony, respectively. In no case does Testimony make that to be true which was not true before; but in very many,—so many as to be innumerable,—it makes known what could not have been known without it, and what may be most certainly known by means of it, if the testimony can be shown, by the analogy of our experience, to be trustworthy. This is, as we have shown, the grand fundamental analogy,—which is recognised by Scripture itself, when it says, “If we receive the witness of men, the witness of God is greater; and this is the witness which He hath testified concerning His Son.”* The testimony of God is, of course, the highest of all evidence, if it can be proved that God has given any revelation of His mind and will; and any denial of authority in matters of Faith must rest ultimately on the assumption, that He has made no Revelation, either natural or supernatural, of Religious truth, in such a way as to make Himself known as the Revealer. If He can do this,

* Culverwell, “Light of Nature,” | Tatham, “Chart and Scale,” II. pp.
Dr Brown's Ed., pp. 224–235. Dr | 27–33, 42.

—and, above all, if He has actually done it, both through the medium of Nature, and of Scripture,—we cannot resist the conclusion that, in either instance, Revelation must possess the authority which necessarily belongs to a Divine Testimony, and that our only duty in regard to it is to interpret, to understand, to believe, and to obey it. A man may deny the reality of a Divine Revelation, but on the supposition of its reality, it must be held to possess the highest authority.*

(794.) We have hitherto spoken only of a Divine authority in matters of Faith; and this is, in every point of view, the most important and fundamental part of the present inquiry. But a Divine authority, supreme and infallible, is not necessarily exclusive of a human authority, such as must be, from the nature of the case, subordinate and ministerial; and this human authority may even be instituted and sanctioned by that which is Divine, while no countenance is thereby given to the idea that it is, on that account, either infallible in its decisions, or entitled to exercise an absolute “lordship over God’s heritage.” The distinction between a supreme, and subordinate,—or between an absolute, and a ministerial, authority,—is one of fundamental importance in matters of Faith; and not less, as we firmly believe, in the common affairs of life. It cannot be denied, if we look to the clear and unequivocal statements of Scripture, that God has conferred on His Church and her office-bearers, a certain kind and amount of authority;—that He invested the Apostles with authority to preach the Word,—to work miracles,—to organize Churches,—to ordain office-bearers,—to administer discipline,—and to admit some to Christian privileges, while they excluded others; and that it was His declared design that other “faithful men” should succeed them in the exercise of the same authority, except in so far as it was peculiar to those who had “the signs of an apostle,” and who could establish their claims to it, by exhibiting the credentials of a supernatural Divine commission. It follows that there may still exist in the Church an authority distinct from that of God, and also of His inspired Apostles, but still real and legitimate, as having been instituted by God Himself, and expressly recognised

* J. S. Mill, “Logic,” vol. I. pp. 260, 261. Lewes, “Biographical History of Philosophy,” vol. II. pp. 190, 233.

in His infallible Word. Of course, it must in any case be subordinate to His authority, as that even of inspired apostles unquestionably was ; and it must be inferior, also, to theirs, unless it can be shown that the ordinary office-bearers of the Church are really inspired as they were ; but it is a real and legitimate authority, notwithstanding, although it is purely *ministerial*, and subject always to an appeal from its decisions, to that which alone is supreme—the authority of God Himself, speaking through His inspired Prophets and Apostles, in His Word.

(795.) There are *four* distinct kinds of human authority, which may exercise some influence in matters of faith ; and each of the four has its analogue in some corresponding facts which belong to our common natural experience. There is, first, an *official* authority, resting on a positive commission to discharge certain functions, and to exercise certain powers ; there is, secondly, a *relative* authority, arising from the relation which one man bears to another, whether that be natural, as in the case of parent and child, or conventional, as in the case of master and servant ; there is, thirdly, a *personal* authority, arising from the possession of superior knowledge, or higher natural gifts, even where these are not associated either with official, or relative claims to deference and submission ; and there is, fourthly, a *public* authority, arising from common consent, which, when it can be shown to rest on principles connatural to the human mind, or on facts universally known and believed, is felt to be entitled, not to override our private judgment, but to receive from it that measure of consideration which is due from the reason of every individual to that of the race to which he belongs. These are all mere human authorities, and yet they may, or rather must, exert considerable influence over us in matters of Faith ; and they are all analogous to the facts of our common natural experience.

(796.) There is an official authority which belongs to the Church and her office-bearers—an authority which is attached to the office, and, through the office, to the person who holds it,—and which is not dependent on his superior gifts, or even on his personal worth,—although its actual influence may be enhanced by these,—but solely on the relation which he bears to those whom he has been appointed to teach and to rule. The Church is described in Scripture as “a kingdom”—the Kingdom of God on the earth, of which Christ alone is the supreme Head, and in

which, in virtue of His sovereign authority, He has instituted a Ministry whose only function is to interpret His revealed mind and will,—to instruct the people committed to their pastoral care,—to administer those ordinances among them which He has appointed to be observed,—and to exercise jurisdiction and discipline by “reproving and rebuking” as well as by “exhorting,”—by admitting those who make a credible and consistent profession to the privileges of the visible Church, and excluding others from her communion,—and by ordaining qualified persons to office, and deposing such as give scandal and offence to the flock by their heretical teaching, or their immoral conduct. All this manifestly implies a certain measure of official authority, which does not belong to all the members of the Church, but which is vested by Christ’s sovereign appointment in those who are duly called to office in the congregation ; but as manifestly it implies, also, that this authority is subordinate to that which alone is supreme,—that it is not lordly or absolute, but conditioned by its exercise being in accordance with the revealed mind and will of Christ—and that it must be regarded, therefore, as being in every one of its acts purely *ministerial*. Its judicial sentences may, or rather must, be final in so far as they relate to the internal government of any particular visible Church ; but they can have no effect beyond its own pale, and still less can they extend to the spiritual and invisible Church, except in so far as they are in accordance with the mind and will of Christ. Apart from the Infallibility which is claimed by the Romish Church, and which is reserved for future consideration in connection with her Rule of Faith, these general principles in regard to the nature of official authority are applicable to all the other Churches in the world ;* and they plainly imply the competency of an appeal from the doctrinal teaching of men to “the law and the testimony” of God, and from the judicial decisions of men to the infallible judgment of Him who alone is supreme. The chief source of the Analogies which are applicable to this question is the resemblance between Civil and Ecclesiastical Government ; and they are equally sound and valid, when they are correctly understood, and judiciously applied. But we must not overlook the important points of difference, while we mark the points of resemblance, between the two, otherwise we shall be in imminent danger

* Cape, “Inquiry into the Use of Church Authority,” p. 12, etc.

of falling into serious error. The undue extension, or utter misapplication, of analogies derived from this source have been the cause of much evil to the Church; and for this reason we have already adduced the arguments of Romish writers in favour of a supreme Judge, and a universal organization of the Church under one supreme Head as a flagrant specimen of *false analogies* in matters of Faith.*

(797.) Besides the *official* authority which belongs, by Divine institution, to the standing Ministry of the Church, there is a *relative* authority arising from the natural relations which Providence has established between one individual and another, and especially between parents and their children. Parental authority is universally recognised, within certain limits; and within the same limits, the duty of the child to submit to it. It extends to instruction in all its branches; and it suggests many analogies which may be usefully applied to matters of Faith. These have been briefly referred to, in treating of the "Analogy between Secular and Religious Education," and the "Analogy between a Little Child and a Christian Disciple."†

(798.) There is a *personal* authority which is neither official nor relative, but which belongs to individuals in very different degrees. We speak of the authority of a witness, and that is greater or less in proportion to his mental capacity and moral worth. Some witnesses are believed at once on the strength of their known sagacity and integrity; while others are not credited, even when they speak under the solemn sanction of an oath. In like manner, we speak of the authority of an eminent physician,—of a profound lawyer—of a learned Divine—and even of a skilled mechanic, each in his own department of knowledge; and we reasonably accord to them, *within that department*, a certain measure of deference, on the ground that, having devoted themselves to their respective studies so as to acquire general confidence and respect, they may be presumed to possess a larger measure of knowledge on their favourite subjects than ourselves. Authority of this kind is largely exercised in matters of Opinion;‡ and for the same reason, it may be exercised also in matters of Faith,—for the two cases are analogous to one another. It may be safely

* Part I. c. ix. sec. iii. p. 223.

† Part II. c. ix. and x. pp. 307, 323.

‡ Sir George Cornewall Lewis, "The Influence of Authority in Matters of Opinion."

affirmed that the truths of Science itself are received as matters of Opinion, and yet as the objects of Belief, on the ground of *authority*, by the large majority even of well-educated men, and much more by the general community.* Indeed, men of Science themselves are under the necessity of deferring to this kind of authority, when they pass beyond their own proper and peculiar domain; the Geologist must pay some deference to the Botanist, when he treats of the Fossil Flora, and to the Anatomist, when he treats of the Fossil Fauna; the Political Economist must pay some deference to the Historian when he refers to the facts of History in support of his conclusions, and applies Statistics to verify and confirm them;—and we think it equally reasonable, although it is far less usual, for Philosophers, of every grade, to show some similar deference to the judgment of Divines, who have devoted years of study to the patient investigation of Religion, Natural and Revealed; and who are quite as competent as any class of Philosophers, to pronounce a right decision on the subjects which belong to their own peculiar province. No one will ever refuse to defer, to some extent, to the men of Science, when they report merely what they have discovered in investigating the facts and laws of Nature;—their authority is neither more nor less than the testimony of witnesses who are known, or presumed to be, competent and well-informed,—and it will generally receive as much deference as is due to it. But when they leave their own walk of inquiry, and enter on another with which they are less familiar,—when they forget for a time the rules of the Inductive Method, and disport themselves, even on sacred ground, as if it were a fit field for random guess-work and reckless speculation,—when they look into one source of possible evidence—and that not the least uncertain—and refuse to consider other evidences, direct and collateral,—on the subject, for instance, of “the antiquity of man,”—then their authority loses all its weight, and they leave the impression on the public mind that a body of *sçavans*, when they intrude into the province of Theology, may be, after all, no wiser than their neighbours.†

* Comte, “Cours,” vol. VI. pp. 271, 565. Sedgwick, “Discourse,” 5th Ed., Pref. clxiv. Hallam, “Literature of Europe,” II. 453; III. 77.

† Speeches reported as having been delivered at a meeting of the British

Association for the Advancement of Science, in Newcastle, 1863. See for the evidence, Natural and Historical, on this subject, Sir Matthew Hale, “The Primitive Origination of Mankind.”

(799.) There is a *public*, as well as an *official*, *relative*, and *personal*, authority, which both in matters of Opinion, and of Faith, is entitled to a certain amount of deference. It arises from general, and still more from universal, consent. This, wherever it can be proved to exist, is an indication that the belief in question arises from some principle of reason—some law of human thought—which is connatural to the human mind, and as universal as the human species. In this light it was viewed by Dr Reid when he propounded his doctrine of “Common Sense,” and it was presented in the same light by many who preceded him.* In his sense it may be admitted as an authority, without involving the necessity of adopting either the Impersonal Reason of Cousin, or the Generic Reason of Lamennais. It amounts to nothing more than the authority of those original laws of thought, which all admit to be imperative.† It is a natural Revelation of First Principles, and Intuitive Beliefs, which has been justly described as *analogous* to the supernatural Revelation of Religious truths.‡ But in any other sense, common consent, and even its chronic continuance from age to age, are precarious grounds of belief, for experience shows that men have been all but unanimous in adhering to gross errors in relation both to natural and Religious truth.§

* Reid, “Essays,” II. p. 12, 310.
 Hamilton, “Discussions;” Appendix,
 Art. “Sensus Communis.”
 † Mill, “Logic,” I. 109.

‡ Calderwood, “Philosophy of the
 Infinite,” 1st Ed., Note, p. 171.
 § Bacon’s “Advancement,” by De-
 vey, pp. 388, 412.

CHAPTER IX.

ANALOGY APPLIED TO THE RIVAL RULES OF FAITH.

(800.) When the term "Faith" is understood, in one of its Scriptural senses, as denoting the belief of truth resting on the testimony, or the authority, of God, there are only *three* rival Rules of Faith. These are, first—the Romish, which consists in Scripture and Tradition,—or, as they have been called, the written and unwritten word of God,—as both have been interpreted by a Church, which possesses in itself as a collective body, or in its office-bearers as its organs and exponents, or in its supreme Head, as the visible vicegerent of Christ, the attribute of Infallibility, bestowed upon it from the first, and guaranteed to it in perpetuity, by the sovereign will and the faithful promise of the Most High. The second is the Tractarian, which consists in Scripture, as interpreted by the Fathers of the first three or four centuries. And the third is the distinctively Protestant, which differs from each of these, and consists in Scripture alone, as the only authentic and infallible authority in matters of Faith. There are other antagonist authorities,—such as Rationalism and Spiritualism,—but these are not properly Rules of Faith, since their avowed object is, not to make known the will of God for our salvation, or to reveal an infallible rule of faith and duty, but rather to supply a critical test by which any other rule may be tried and judged. Mr Martineau, indeed, is of a different opinion; and in answer to the question, what is the Rule or Ground of Faith? replies that it is neither the Bible, nor Tradition, nor Creeds, but Reason, which must sit in judgment on them all.* But whatever function Reason may exercise in relation to the Rule, how can it be itself the Rule of Faith, unless it be the Revealer of Divine truth, when Faith is the belief of that truth, on the authority of the Revealer?

* Martineau, "Rationale," pp. 5, 118.

(801.) It is not our intention, nor is it necessary for our present purpose, to discuss the general question of the Rule of Faith on its merits, or to enlarge on the various arguments which might be adduced in favour of the Protestant, as opposed to the Romish and Tractarian, doctrine on this subject. That general question must be studied in connection with the best and ablest treatises in defence of each of the three rules respectively.* Our task is a much more manageable one,—namely, to inquire whether any, and what, analogies are applicable to it, and how far they may contribute to its solution. But even for this limited purpose it may be useful to state briefly, although we cannot discuss, the rival Rules, so as to bring out and place prominently before our readers the chief points which are involved in the controversy, and which must be understood before we can determine what sort of analogies would be most suitable with reference to each of them. The great controversy is that which relates to the Popish and the Protestant Rules; the Tractarian Rule occupies a sort of intermediate ground between the two, and was described by its authors as a *via media*; but in reality it is opposed to the fundamental principle of Protestantism, and tends towards, if it does not coincide with, one branch, at least, of the Popish doctrine on the subject. It may be conveniently considered in connection with the latter; and we shall thus have only two Rules to confront and contrast with each other; for the Popish doctrine is far more thorough and self-consistent than the Tractarian, and if it can be disproved, the theory of Patristic authority must share the same fate with that of Ecclesiastical tradition, in so far, at least, as that tradition has been committed to writing.

(802.) The question of the Rule of Faith is one of fundamental importance. It is the hinge on which the whole controversy between the Popish and Protestant Churches ultimately

* For the defence of the Protestant Rule, see Whitaker, "Disputations on Scripture;" Chillingworth, "Religion of Protestants;" Tillotson, "Rule of Faith;" Dr Goode, "Rule of Faith and Practice;" and Morren, "Biblical Theology." For the defence of the Romish Rule, see Bellarmin, "Disputationes"—"de Verbo Dei Scripto—de Verbo Dei Non-scripto;" Perrone,

"Prælectiones Theologicae," I. 141, 243, with a separate work by the same author, in three volumes, in French, on the Rule of Faith; and Wiseman's "Lectures and Conferences." For the defence of the Tractarian Rule, see the "Tracts for the Times," and Newman's "Essay on Development;" with Butler's "Letters" in reply to the latter.

turns. It is expressly recognised as such by Bellarmin, Perrone, and Wiseman, on the one side, and by Whitaker, Tillotson, and Goode, on the other. All other questions are subordinate to this, and depend for their settlement on its solution. Such being its momentous character, it is peculiarly necessary to form, in the first instance, a distinct and definite conception of what we mean when we speak of *a* Rule of Faith,—whatever that Rule may turn out to be,—and to lay down in precise terms the exact *state of the question*. This is the more indispensable because many seem to have very vague and indistinct notions of what is implied in a Rule of Faith of any kind, and because much irrelevant discussion has arisen on subordinate and collateral topics from ignorance of the one only point on which the whole argument turns.

(803.) By a Rule of Faith we mean that, whatever it may be, which reveals authoritatively the mind and will of God for our salvation, so as to enable us to receive it not as the word of man, but as the word of the living God. The phrase “Rule of Faith” is one of those metaphorical expressions which were applied at first to sensible or material things, and were afterwards transferred on the ground of analogy to denote moral and spiritual things. It is derived from a *measure* such as we apply to determine the length or breadth of any object of sight or touch, and by which we ascertain whether it is straight or crooked,—the rule itself being supposed to be straight. This idea is transferred, along with the term which expresses it, to intellectual, moral, and religious subjects; and that is said to be a Rule by which we ascertain whether anything be true or false in doctrine, and right or wrong in practice.* When it is applied to Religion, it includes both Faith and Practice—“what we are to believe concerning God, and what duty God requires of man;” and it implies that each of the two rests equally on Divine authority. For although Faith is often used to signify assent on any kind of evidence, yet, as it is employed in Theology, it denotes that species of assent which rests on testimony and authority. The Faith of which we speak is the belief of Divine truth on the ground of a Divine testimony; and that Divine testimony, *however conveyed*, is the infallible Rule, as well as the ultimate ground and warrant, of Faith. This one position, clearly apprehended and firmly grasped, will enable us to brush away a

* Tillotson, “Rule of Faith,” folio, p. 654.

multitude of irrelevant topics which have been mixed up with the present discussion, and to draw a clear and strong line of demarcation between that question which relates simply and solely to the Rule of Faith, and certain other questions which have been raised in connection with it, but have no direct bearing on its solution. It effectually relieves us of the claims of Rationalism and of Spiritualism to be regarded as the ultimate Rule of Faith; for Rationalism and Spiritualism, however they may aspire to be *critical tests* of any possible Rule, do not even pretend to be themselves a revelation of the mind and will of God for man's salvation, and cannot, therefore, be Rules of Faith at all.—It simplifies, also, the whole question as to the comparative value of Scripture and Tradition, considered, singly or combined, as a Rule of Faith,—for it teaches us to regard the Divine testimony as the Rule, in whatever way, and through whatever channel, that testimony may be conveyed to us,—and it narrows the question to this single point—Whether Scripture, considered as an authentic, inspired, and permanent record of Revelation, be, or be not, a safer and more trustworthy authority than Tradition, whether oral or written, unless it can be shown that this is equally inspired, or that it is Divinely attested by an infallible judge?—The statement of our leading position may be said to determine merely what that is which alone can be regarded as the Rule of Faith, and to leave the question as to the comparative value of Scripture and Tradition an open one, in the first instance, to be decided afterwards on the ground of their respective merits, and according to the nature of the authority which can be proved to belong to each. It is a great point gained, if it can be established at the outset that we must have a Divine testimony as the Rule and warrant of Faith, even although the question as to the mode of its conveyance—through Scripture, or Tradition, or both—is left to be determined by subsequent inquiry. And on this point, both parties are, or may be, perfectly at one—for Popish writers profess to admit that Scripture is the Word of God *written*, and plead for Tradition only on the ground that it is the Word of God *unwritten*; so that, in either case, they agree with us in holding, that nothing but a Divine testimony, and such as can be proved to be Divine, ought to be regarded as the Rule of Faith. If this general principle be established, it follows inevitably that the only question between them and us is—Whether Tradition can be proved to be as Divine

and Infallible an informant as Scripture is? and that the *onus probandi*—the task of proving—an affirmative answer to this question, rests with them; while we may warrantably content ourselves with the authority of Scripture which they profess to receive as part, at least, of their Rule of Faith, until they succeed in proving that human Traditions, interpreted and accredited by the Church, are entitled to be placed on the same level, in point of authority, with the “oracles of God,” or with those Scriptures which were “given by inspiration of God,” and which “holy men of old” wrote “as they were moved by the Holy Ghost.”

(804.) A right conception of what is meant by a Rule of Faith simplifies the question, still further, by showing that the Protestant Rule,—which is Scripture, and Scripture alone,—is not necessarily exclusive, either of other *laws of belief*,—or *sources of knowledge*—or of any one of the *means* which may be employed, ministerially, for the instruction and benefit of the Church. It is not exclusive of other laws of belief, or sources of information. It is not the Rule of our natural knowledge, although it may refer, and add its sanction, to some parts of that knowledge; it is strictly a Rule of *Faith and Practice*—of what we are to believe on the ground of Divine testimony, and of what we are to do, or to refrain from doing, in submission to Divine authority. “The word of God, which is contained in the Old and New Testaments, is the only Rule to direct us,”—not in all things, but in this one specific thing,—“how we may glorify and enjoy God.” Protestants admit that “the light of nature,” or the natural faculties of reason and conscience—and “the works of Creation and Providence,” or the natural evidences of the Divine perfections which are exhibited in the constitution and course of the world, “do so far manifest the wisdom, power, and goodness of God, as to leave men inexcusable,”—a statement which implies, both that there is a natural Revelation of God, and that this Revelation is authoritative as a Rule both of faith and practice; but this Rule, although real and binding, is not sufficient for us in our present circumstances, nor adapted to our condition as sinners, since “it doth not make known *the will of God for our salvation*. Wherefore it pleased God, at sundry times and in divers manners, to reveal *that His will* unto the Church.”* It is the only Rule,

* Shorter Catechism, Q. 1. Westminster Confession, C. 1, S. 1.

simply because it is the only Revelation of God's will on that specific subject, and the only guide "to direct us how we may glorify and enjoy Him." The subsequent question, in what form that Rule is presented to us, or through what channel it is conveyed, must be determined on its own merits; but however it may be determined, the Rule itself must be an authoritative expression of God's mind and will, for that, and that only is the ground and reason of Faith, properly so called; although it is not necessarily exclusive of other sources of knowledge. Nor is it exclusive of those *means* which Divine wisdom employs for the transmission of truth, and the ordinary instruction of the Church. Its supreme authority, as the only Rule that can bind the conscience, is perfectly consistent with the existence of a standing ministry in the Church, invested, even, with a subordinate official authority; and not only so, but with the legitimate use of Tradition itself, whether oral or written, provided always that all human authority shall be held to be purely *ministerial*—unless it can be proved to be so attested and ratified by Divine authority as to be an infallible exponent of God's mind and will.

(805.) It being admitted by all the parties in this controversy that the Scriptures do contain a Revelation of the mind and will of God, and that such a Revelation can only be the Rule of Faith, the question, when reduced to its utmost simplicity, comes to be—Whether any other form of Revelation exists which is entitled to stand on the same level with the written Word, as being of equal or co-ordinate authority? If this be the real ultimate question, it cannot be determined by any argument directed to prove merely the peculiar value which belongs to the writings of the earlier Fathers, as witnesses to the sense in which the facts, and doctrines, and ordinances of the Gospel were then understood,—or to prove the inevitable existence, and manifold advantages, of oral or written Tradition—for these may be admitted in perfect consistency with the recognition of the sole supremacy of Scripture as the Rule of Faith; but it must be proved that Patristic Interpretation and Ecclesiastical Tradition are "Divine informants,"—that they make known to us the mind and will of God,—that they convey the truth in a state of purity, unmixed with the errors and corruptions of mere human opinion,—and that we can be as well assured of their infallibility as we may be of that of inspired prophets, evangelists, and apostles, whose writings have come down to us as

“the oracles of God.” For this reason the Popish theory, were it in any respect tenable, would be the only self-consistent and logical attempt to preserve the necessary connection between Faith and a Divine testimony as its warrant and Rule, while it recognises an authority distinct from, and co-ordinate with, that of Scripture; for it boldly affirms that there still exists somewhere in the Church a Divine and infallible authority, whose teaching and decrees, even when they relate to the truths of Scripture itself, must be received with the same implicit submission which is due only to the Word of God.

(806.) Bellarmin, Perrone, and Wiseman, concur in affirming that the Word of God is the only Rule of Faith; and to those who are ignorant or ill-informed in regard to the nature and grounds of our controversy on this subject with the Church of Rome, such a statement may seem to concede all that we can reasonably expect or require. But in reality it concedes nothing to the Protestant, and is perfectly consistent with their peculiar doctrine on the Rule of Faith. For they all hold, in intimate connection with this sound general principle, the erroneous opinion that, in point of fact, Scripture is not the *only* Word of God,—that there exists another Word of God, of equal and co-ordinate authority, which may be found in the teaching and traditions, the decisions and decrees, of the Church,—and that this Word, commonly called the “unwritten Word,”—although much of it has been committed to writing since the Apostolic age—must be combined with the Scriptures to make them a complete and sufficient Rule of Faith, worship, and obedience. It may seem, at first sight, as if this were only the assertion of a co-ordinate authority such as might leave that of Scripture intact and entire; but in reality it subordinates the Scriptures to the Church, and raises the Church to a supremacy over the Scriptures, by ascribing to her, or to her accredited office-bearers, the exclusive right of interpreting the Scriptures and determining their true meaning, and a sovereign authority, also, to declare what Scriptures are to be received, as well as to interdict the free use of them by those for whose instruction they were graciously vouchsafed. The authority which is thus ascribed to the Church extends over a wide range;—she has power, not to declare merely, but to determine and fix the Canon of Scripture, and to decide authoritatively on the inspiration of the books which belong to it;—to interpret all these books, and to

declare, not ministerially but absolutely, what is their true meaning,—to pronounce judgment on all questions of controversy, not to the effect merely of declaring that this is the faith of the Church, and that those who differ from it must be excluded from her public offices, or even from the privilege of her communion ; but of affirming that this is the infallible truth of God, and that all who refuse to receive it on her authority are *ipso facto* excluded from the Kingdom of Heaven,—and to require an unconditional and unreserved submission to her decrees, as if there were no superior authority in Scripture, or none, at least, to which men might appeal in the exercise of their own private judgment. Such in point of importance, and so many in point of number, are the powers and prerogatives which the Popish theory ascribes to the Church, considered in its relation to Scripture, as the Rule of Faith.

(807.) But a theory, however logical and self-consistent in itself, if it rests on erroneous assumptions or gratuitous hypotheses, is apt to occasion great perplexity to its advocates when it is brought to the test of experience and history. And so it has fared with the Romish doctrine of the Rule of Faith. At first it seems to have amounted to little more than this,—that whatever doctrine or practice could be traced up to an Apostolic origin, as having been taught or observed in the Churches which were first planted by inspired men, ought to be received by the Church of later times on their authority, since the mode of its transmission, whether by oral or written Testimony, could not alter its essential character as an Apostolical Tradition. In this form it was taught at an early period, and applied also in the Councils of the Church. It was summed up in the famous rule of Vincent of Lerins—“*quod semper, quod ubique, et quod ab omnibus*”—which was long regarded as the best exponent of the Church’s doctrine on this subject ; and its leading principle was implied in Tertullian’s appeal to Prescription as a sufficient evidence of Catholic truth.* It was soon found, however, to be of extremely difficult application ; for it involved the necessity of having recourse, on every question which might arise, to the facts of history, which could only be ascertained by the testimonies of different witnesses, or the usages of different

* Vincentius Lirinensis, “*Commonitorum.*” Tertullian, “*De Præscriptionibus.*”

Churches; and these testimonies were often conflicting ones,—while the usages were various, and yet pertinaciously adhered to by those Churches who believed that they had been introduced and sanctioned by their respective founders. It was soon felt that a nearer and more accessible authority than that of the Apostles—the authority of the existing Church itself—must be called in to determine many questions which could never be settled, so as to preserve unity of doctrine and worship, by an appeal to historical evidence; and accordingly the Church gradually assumed a higher tone, and claimed a right to judge and determine all controversies of faith through her accredited office-bearers,—not now as the mere exponents of traditions proved to be Apostolical,—but as the successors of the Apostles themselves, who inherited, along with their office, the same authority which originally belonged to it, and the same assurance also of Divine guidance and direction which the Lord had from the beginning bequeathed to His Church;—and who were both qualified and entitled, therefore, to exercise the same supreme jurisdiction which belonged to the Apostles in primitive times, and to require the same unreserved submission to their judgments and decrees which was due to the teaching of men under the infallible guidance of the Holy Ghost. This is still the prevailing doctrine among a large majority of Romish Ecclesiastics; it affirms the actual existence *now* of a Divine and infallible authority in the existing Church, which is entitled to interpret both Scripture and Tradition,—to declare the true meaning alike of the “written” and of the “unwritten” Word of God,—and to promulgate these interpretations in the shape of decrees, which are binding on all the faithful. But even at this stage, difficulties have arisen,—and these of a most formidable character,—from the facts of history and experience. According to the old doctrine of the Church, as it was expressed in Vincent’s Rule—“*quod semper, quod ubique, et quod ab omnibus*”—it was taken for granted that the Rule of Faith was, like the Truth of God, invariable and unchangeable; but history shows, that the modern Church holds, as articles of Faith, many doctrines which were never known or received in the Apostolic age, or even in the times of the earlier Fathers,—that the date of their first introduction can be determined, on sure grounds, by comparing the authentic records of Christian literature which have come down to us from many successive ages,—and that the facts, which are thus brought to light,

are utterly irreconcilable with the theory of a uniform and invariable Rule of Faith, unless on the supposition that the Rule, in all ages, has been the authority of the Church then existing,—not merely to interpret either Scripture, or Tradition, or both,—but also to *develop*, and to ratify by its sanction, new articles of Faith, which might be implicitly contained, but were never explicitly declared, in the earlier teaching of the Church; and which are, nevertheless, to be received now as essential to salvation, because they have been promulgated by a Divine and infallible authority. The existence not only of an Interpreting, but also of a Developing, authority in the Church, is felt to be necessary, if any account is to be given of the “variations” which history shows to have occurred in the creed and worship of the Romish communion,—and such an authority, were it recognised, would leave nothing fixed and immutable in Divine truth; for the same authority which has heretofore developed the *cultus* of angels, saints, and images, may hereafter develop the cognate doctrines of Polytheism and Pantheism,—and, possibly, the Reformation itself, with its fundamental principles of the right of private judgment and the duty of free inquiry, under the sole guidance of Scriptural authority, might be shown to be a far more legitimate deduction from Apostolic teaching than any of the new doctrines which have found admission into the creed of the Romish Church.

(808.) This brief outline of the history of the question in regard to the Rule of Faith, as that question has been discussed between the Protestant and Popish Churches, may be sufficient to bring out, and place prominently before our readers, the principal points which are involved in it, and to prepare us for considering what Analogies are applicable to it in each of its various aspects. These Analogies are of different kinds, and must be derived from various distinct sources, if they are to meet the precise points to which they are respectively applied. We may advert, in the first place, to those analogous facts which Popish writers have sometimes adduced in defence or vindication of each part of their complex Rule of Faith,—and, in the second, to those analogous facts which Protestant writers have adduced to disprove that Rule, and to establish their own simple and all-sufficient one,—the sole and supreme authority of Scripture in matters of Faith.

(809.) There are some analogies,—derived partly from the

nature and origin of a large part of our common natural knowledge,—partly from the history of God's dispensations towards His Church,—and partly from the resemblance which is supposed to subsist between Civil and Ecclesiastical Government,—which have been applied with great confidence by Popish writers in support of their peculiar doctrine in regard to the Rule of Faith.

(810.) It has been said, for instance, in support of a Rule composed partly at least of Tradition, that the whole analogy of our experience is in favour of the supposition that it would be employed, in the event of a Divine Revelation, as it unquestionably is in our common natural knowledge, as a vehicle for transmitting the truth from age to age,—that Traditive instruction is manifestly a Divine ordinance for the Education of the world, and may be presumed, therefore, to occupy an important place in the Divine method for the Education of the Church,—and that the claims of Tradition are thus authenticated by the analogy of “the constitution and course of Nature.” This argument would be irresistible, were it applied merely to prove the manifold uses of Tradition in connection with every other branch of human knowledge, and the *likelihood* that *some* use would be made of it also in connection with the transmission of Revealed Religion; but it has no weight or validity when it is adduced as an argument to establish the claims of Tradition to be received as a part of the Rule of Faith, unless it can be shown that there can be no useful, and even indispensable, vehicle of instruction, except such as is entitled to be regarded as the final and decisive test of Divine truth. No enlightened Protestant denies the manifold uses of Traditive instruction. Revelation itself is a Tradition—a tradition from the mind of God to the mind of man; and it is conveyed to us through the medium of human tradition, which may be either oral or written, for the Apostle applies the same expression to both when he says, “Stand fast, and hold the traditions which ye have been taught, *whether by word, or our Epistle.*”^{*} There is no question, then, in regard to the mere use of tradition as a natural and useful vehicle of instruction—we recognise it in the Family, when parents teach their children, long before they are able to acquire knowledge from books,—we recognise it equally in the Church, when Ministers instruct their congregations by delivering to them what they

* 2 Thess. ii. 15.

have themselves been taught of the truth of God, and addressing it, often with most beneficial effect, to the ignorant and unlearned—to those, even, who are unable to read the Scriptures for themselves. The Westminster Divines had no hesitation in saying that “the Spirit of God maketh the reading, *but especially the preaching*, of the Word, an effectual means of convincing and converting sinners, and of building them up in holiness and comfort, through faith, unto salvation.”* But the question is, whether, in addition to the use of Traditive instruction,—which is not only admitted, but acted upon more fully by Protestants, who encourage both the reading and the preaching of the Word, than by their opponents, who impose restrictions on the former, and give the latter only a very subordinate place in the public services of the Church,—we must also ascribe to it supreme authority, as being, in whole or in part, the Rule of Faith, and whether we are to place it on a level, in this respect, with the written Word of God? And this question we answer in the negative, simply because all the analogies which are supplied by our experience in regard to the method of transmitting natural knowledge are fully met, and, in fact, exhausted, by the purely ministerial use of Tradition, both in the Family and the Church; and, also, because at this point some other analogies come into view, which are fatal to the claims of Tradition as a Rule of Faith, possessing an equal or a co-ordinate authority with Scripture, in declaring God’s truth, and deciding controversies in Religion.

(811.) The additional Analogies to which we now refer may be derived from various sources, and may be conclusively applied in argument unless it can be shown that the Traditions of the Church *differ* from all others in being not human, but Divine; or if human in one aspect, Divine in another, as being, like the testimony of the Apostles, inspired, and, therefore, infallible. They are sufficient, at least, to show that on no other ground than that of the Infallibility of the Church, which will be afterwards considered, can the claim of Tradition to be regarded as a co-ordinate authority with Scripture, be even plausibly defended. They may serve this purpose, if they can serve no other,—and it is an important one, for it throws the *onus probandi* on those who assert its claim, and imposes on them the necessity of proving that Ecclesi-

* Shorter Catechism, Q. 89.

astical Tradition is an exceptional case, like that of the Apostles,—and analogous, therefore, *only* to theirs.

(812.) There is a large class, for instance, of *analogous facts*, attested by our experience in regard to our common natural knowledge, which place it beyond all reasonable doubt that, in ordinary cases, Books are a better security for the preservation and transmission of truth in a state of purity from age to age, than any oral Tradition can be, unless it were sanctioned and ratified by some supernatural attestation by Divine Authority. On this point, we may safely appeal to common sense, while we still reserve the question of an infallible authority vested in the Church. “When Roman Catholics would persuade us,” says Archbishop Whately, “to receive their Traditions of Doctrine as certain truths, without examining them by the test of Scripture, . . . you may ask them whether they would as readily believe the correctness of a report transmitted *by word of mouth* in popular rumour from one end of the kingdom to another, as if it came in a letter passed from one person to another over the same space? Would they think that because they could trust most servants to deliver a letter, however long or important, therefore they could trust the same men to deliver the contents of a long and important message by word of mouth? . . . Human teaching bears the same relation to Scripture that what is called ‘paper currency’ bears to the precious metals. Bank notes and bills of exchange, though of no intrinsic value, are a very convenient circulating medium, so long as they really *represent* gold or silver, and are payable in coin on the demand of the holder. But if these notes be made a legal tender, and are required to be received in payment by the decree of the very government which issues them, and on its bare word, without being convertible into gold and silver, the result is that these metals soon disappear, and men are cheated of their goods in exchange for worthless bits of paper. Even so, as long as human teaching is really *representative* of Scripture, and Scripture proof is always ready to be given—*paid on demand*, as it were—of whatever is taught, then, and then only, we are secured against the danger of having God’s Word superseded by ‘doctrines which are commandments of men.’”*

* Whately, “Cautions,” pp. 23, 241. See also De Bonald, “Recherches,” I. pp. 7, 127, 183, 262. Glanville’s Essays, Essay iii. p. 32. Goode, “Rule of Faith,” II. pp. 20, 60, etc.

(813.) There is another large class of *analogous facts* which are sufficient to show that, so far as our natural knowledge is concerned, all traditional teaching must be tested, and either verified or corrected, by our own experience and observation; and which may be applied to prove that a similar course may be necessary with reference to the Traditions of the Church, unless they be so exceptional as to be out of all analogy with the ordinary course of human experience in that respect. No fact can be more certain, and none can be established by a larger number of practical proofs, than this,—that oral Traditions are liable to be, and have often been, corrupted in passing from one generation to another;—and that, before being received as a credible testimony to truth, they must be carefully scrutinized, and tested by whatever other evidence we may be able to obtain in regard to the subject to which they relate. It follows that mere traditional beliefs may be either true or false; and this equally in the case of our natural and our religious knowledge, unless it can be shown, with regard to the latter, that a perpetual miracle is wrought to prevent that corruption of Tradition to which it would otherwise be liable. Experience testifies that the Traditions of every people, and on every subject, have been corrupted in passing down from generation to generation; and this fact is so certain, that it has been admitted by Roman Catholics themselves.* All Traditional teaching, therefore, is subject to an appeal to Nature, if it relates to natural truth,—or to the records of History, if it relates to Historical truth,—or to some Divine and infallible authority, if it relates to Revealed truth. There is a striking analogy in this respect, as we have already seen, between our Secular and our Religious education, and between the case of a little child and that of a Christian disciple.†

(814.) The history of Religion itself, in all nations and ages, supplies another class of *analogous facts* which are deeply instructive, and have a very direct bearing on the question at issue. The universal and invariable corruption of Religion by means of Tradition is attested by innumerable proofs. It holds true both of Natural and of Revealed Religion, and that, too, whether they

* Wiseman, "Conferences," *Demonst. Evang.*, vol. XV. p. 776.
Riambourg, "Rationalisme et Tradi-

tion," pp. 18, 82. De Bonald, "Recherches," II. 45.

† Part II. c. ix. and x.

existed only in an oral, or also in a written form. The primitive Patriarchal Traditions which were pure at their source, as being derived from a primæval Revelation, soon degenerated in all nations, except where Divine communications were continued or renewed, into the gross errors and debasing superstitions of Paganism. And even after Revelation was committed to writing as the best safeguard for its preservation in a state of purity, the two great corruptions of Revealed Religion,—the one in the Jewish, the other in the Christian Church—arose from the same cause,—namely, the addition of “the doctrines and commandments of men” to the Scriptures which contained “the oracles of God.” Our Lord Himself ascribed to this source many of the grievous errors which had corrupted the Jewish Religion under the teaching of the Scribes and Pharisees.* “Why do ye transgress the commandment of God by your tradition?” “Thus have ye made the commandment of God of none effect by your tradition.” “In vain do they worship Me, teaching for doctrines the commandments of men.”† Now the fact that the Jewish Church, with the Old Testament in her hand, was corrupted in this way by Tradition, is strictly analogous to what Protestants allege to have occurred also in the Christian Church; it affords a presumption that, similar causes being still in operation, there will be a tendency towards a similar result; and this presumption is strengthened and confirmed by many solemn premonitions of danger from this source. “Beware lest any man spoil you through philosophy and vain deceit, *after the tradition of men*, after the rudiments of the world, and not after Christ. . . . Let no man judge you in meat, or in drink, or in respect of an holiday, or of the new moon, or of the Sabbath-days. . . . Let no man beguile you of your reward in a voluntary humility and worshipping of angels, intruding into those things which he hath not seen, vainly puffed up by his fleshly mind. . . . Which things have, indeed, a show of wisdom in will-worship, and humility, and neglecting of the body, not in any honour to the satisfying of the flesh.”‡ And, speaking of the “sure word of prophecy”—the prophecy of the Scripture—which “holy men of God spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost,” Peter himself forewarns the

* Mestrezat, “L’Ecriture Sainte,” pp. 515, 521.

† Matt. xv. 3, 6, 9.

‡ Col. ii. 8, 16, 18, 23.

Church of danger from this source. "But there were false prophets also among the people, even *as there shall be false teachers among you*, who privily shall bring in damnable heresies."* It may still be as necessary, therefore, in the Christian Church, as it unquestionably was in the Jewish, to test all human teaching by bringing it to the touchstone of Scripture: "To the Law and to the Testimony; if they speak not according to this Word, it is because there is no light in them."†

(815.) In the history of God's dispensations towards His Church, Romish writers have found some facts which they apply, on the principle of Analogy, in support of their Rule of Faith. They find, for instance, that the Word of God existed for many centuries only in an oral form, and was transmitted by Tradition from generation to generation without the aid of written documents at all. The fact is undeniable; but it cannot be applied analogically as an argument to a different condition of the Church, in which it is acknowledged on all hands that Revelation does exist in a written form. The real question now is,—Why it was committed to writing, and what purposes this permanent form of it was designed to serve? The Westminster Divines refer to the fact of its having passed from an oral to a written form; but they draw a very different inference from it, simply because they looked to the reasons which dictated the change,—reasons which arose partly out of the altered condition of the Race, and partly from God's designs in regard to His Church. "It pleased the Lord, at sundry times, and in divers manners, to reveal Himself, and to declare that His will unto His Church; and afterwards—for the better preserving and propagating of the truth,—and for the more sure establishment and comfort of the Church against the corruption of the flesh, and the malice of Satan and of the world,—to commit the same wholly unto writing; which maketh the Holy Scripture to be most necessary,—those former ways of God's revealing His will unto His people being now ceased."‡ The advocates of the Romish Rule object to this statement on three distinct grounds,—first, that the written word is neither designed nor fitted for "the better preserving of the truth," or for "the more sure establishment of the Church," since without a living teacher, or

* 2 Pet. ii. 1.

† Isa. viii. 20.

‡ Westminster "Confession," C. I. S. 1.

an infallible interpreter, residing within the existing Church, Scripture would be an obscure, ambiguous, and even dangerous rule of faith and practice; secondly, that Divine Revelation was not "wholly committed to writing," but part of it was committed to the Church and her office-bearers, to be by them transmitted by Tradition; and thirdly, that while God's method of "revealing His will to His people" by visions and dreams and direct oral communications may have ceased, yet He is still present with His Church, as her Divine and infallible Guide, and enables her to interpret His mind and will with an authority not inferior to that of Prophets and Apostles. Each of these allegations must be dealt with on its own merits, and every one of them must be established by sufficient evidence before we can be required to adopt the Romish Rule of Faith. But looking simply at the fact that, at a certain stage in the history of the Church, Revelation passed from an oral, into a written, form, we are entitled to say that,—while in the earlier ages of the world, owing to the longevity of the Patriarchs, the few articles of faith which were then revealed might be safely committed to the custody of Tradition,—any argument from analogy that can be founded on this fact must be defective and fallacious, which takes no account of the gradual shortening of man's life after the deluge, and the consequent increase of the chances of error in transmitting reports through a larger number of intermediate links, especially when large additions were yet to be made by successive revelations to the creed of the Church.*

(816.) The advocates of the Romish Rule find, as they think, another fact in the history of God's dispensations towards His Church, which may be applied, on the principle of analogy, to show that Scripture cannot be, as Protestants affirm it is, the only Rule of Faith. The fact on which they found is certain;—namely, that the Church existed before the Scriptures were written, and that it was called into existence by the oral teaching of Christ and His Apostles. From this they infer that it might have continued to exist, and to have a sufficient Rule of Faith, had the Gospels or Epistles never been written, especially if there be, according to Christ's promise, a teaching authority in the Church which is guaranteed against the risk of error by infallible Divine

* Dr R. Gordon, "Christ as made known to the Ancient Church," vol. I. c. xxxiv. p. 408. "The Words of God written in a Book."

guidance. They plead that there must be some analogy between the state of the Church now and the state of the Church in primitive times, in respect to the Rule of Faith; and that the analogy between them consists in this—that, as at the beginning the Rule was the oral teaching of the Apostles, so it still continues to be, at least in part, the teaching of their successors, who have a promise of Christ's presence with them even to the end of the world. But the real analogy is a deeper and more fundamental one. In the present, as well as in the primitive, Church, the Word of God, however conveyed, constitutes the Rule of Faith; and that Word has been recorded in the Scriptures that the Church in all ages might enjoy, as the first Christians did, the benefit of an Apostolic Ministry. The Twelve had no successors as *Apostles*, but only as Ministers of the Word; and their Apostolic authority was neither to pass away, nor yet to be transmitted to others, but to be abiding and permanent in the Church through the medium of their recorded testimony. "The place which the Apostles occupied while they lived is now filled, not by a living order of ministers, but by their own inspired writings, which constitute, or ought to constitute, the supreme authority in the Church of God. In these writings, the Apostles yet live and speak; St Paul, St Peter, St John, and St Matthew have not abdicated their office, or transferred it to other persons; they still govern the universal Church, decide points of doctrine, reform abuses, set in order Christian societies; so that there is no need, as there is no evidence, for the continuance of a living Apostolate. The New Testament Scriptures, as they are the only real Apostolate now in existence, so, are sufficient to supply to us the place of the inspired twelve."*

(817.) The analogies to which we have referred are fatal to the Romish Rule of Faith, unless it can be shown that there is a teaching authority in the Church which is Divine and infallible. This is the ground on which its advocates must ultimately take their stand; for on no other ground can the claims of Tradition to be regarded as a co-ordinate authority with Scripture be even plausibly defended. It will scarcely be pretended that there is any known

* Litton, "The Church of Christ: In its Idea, Attributes, and Ministry," p. 410; see also pp. 15, 17, 84, 498, | 509. Goode, "Rule of Faith," I. 420. Baxter's "Works," XX. p. 120.

analogy in favour of a supreme Judge, and infallible Interpreter, in matters of Faith. In regard alike to natural and to revealed truth, the method of God's procedure is the same—He supplies an infallible text or standard, and leaves men to interpret it, in the exercise of their own faculties, with such gracious assistance as He may have promised to bestow,—and also to do so on their own personal responsibility.* He spreads out before us the vast volume of Nature, but He erects no infallible tribunal of Science. He reveals Himself through the medium of His Works of Creation and Providence, but He provides no infallible interpreter of Natural Religion. He gave the Law and the Prophets to the Jewish Church, and appointed a succession of office-bearers to preserve them pure and entire,—to read them publicly in the hearing of all the people,—to expound them that they might be clearly understood and intelligently believed; but neither in Priest nor Levite—neither in the Temple, nor in the Synagogue, nor in the Sanhedrim,—did He establish an authority co-ordinate with that of the Old Testament; for although it has been affirmed that the Sanhedrim and the Church were then the authoritative interpreters of Scripture,† it will scarcely be pretended that they were either supreme or infallible, since they rejected the promised Messiah and “crucified the Lord of glory.” God inspired the Apostles to preach the word in demonstration of the Spirit and with power—but no infallible interpreter was provided, nor was any needed, to declare authoritatively to those who heard them the true meaning of their preaching. And when their message was committed to writing, it was put into the hands of the faithful, with no other authority to guide them than that of pastors and teachers, which was purely ministerial,—accompanied with the assurance that the Holy Spirit would be given to “guide them into all truth,” in answer to believing prayer.

(818.) The question respecting the Reason and the Resolution of Faith, which has excited so much discussion in the Church, is analogous in some respects to the question respecting the ground and principle of Certitude which has occasioned as much discus-

* Gasparin, “Les Ecoles du Doute et l'Ecole de la Foi,” p. 209. “Dieu me donne un texte absolument certain et absolument vrai. Dieu, voulant constituer l'autorité ici-bas, a jugé

bon de mettre l'infallibilité dans le texte, et la fallibilité dans l'interprétation.”

† Lamennais, “L'Indifférence,” III. p. 301.

sion in the Schools.* And any one who is acquainted with the manner in which the latter has been expounded, will have no doubt that, in Theology as in Science, we may have a sure and infallible standard of truth without the aid of any infallible tribunal or judge.

* See Franck, Javari, Gerbet, Vera, and others, "De la Certitude."

CHAPTER X.

ANALOGY APPLIED TO THE CORRECTION OF SOCINIAN ERRORS.

(819.) It is the application of a *sound doctrine of Analogy*, rather than that of *analogous facts*, of which we now speak, as affording the best corrective of the leading errors of Socinianism, and the best answer to the pleas by which they have been defended. They depend, for the most part, on an erroneous interpretation of Scripture; and that interpretation rests on the abuse or perversion of its Analogical, Metaphorical, and Typical language. The three treatises of Bishop Browne, to which we formerly referred, were chiefly directed to the correction of errors arising from this source.*

(820.) These errors may be divided into *three* classes; the *first*, arising from the undue and unwarrantable extension of the meaning of analogical terms, so as to make them include points of supposed resemblance which are not necessarily involved in them; the *second*, from a flagrant inversion of the relation which is established in Scripture between the Type and the Antitype; and the *third*, from confounding Analogy with Metaphor.

(821.) The undue and unwarrantable extension of the meaning of analogical terms, so as to make them include points of supposed resemblance which are not necessarily involved in them, is one fertile source of Socinian error in the interpretation of Scripture, and the inferences which are deduced from it. It is exemplified in the treatment which both Arian and Socinian writers have bestowed on the terms *Person*, *Father*, *Son*, as these terms are employed in Scripture. They are Analogical expressions, and imply, therefore, *some* resemblance between that from

* Browne, "Procedure, Extent, and Limits of the Human Understanding," pp. 25, 36, 38, 142, 145, 270, 277, 286, 295, 315, 321.

which they are derived and that to which they are transferred; but they do not imply a resemblance in all respects, and are perfectly compatible with the existence, also, of real and important differences between the two. Yet the analogy has been stretched so far as to imply a perfect resemblance between Divine and human Persons, related to each other as Father and Son.

(822.) Personality is ascribed, in different senses, to the Divine Being, and to the trinal distinctions in the Godhead. It is ascribed to "the One only, the living and true God," when we speak of Him as a living, personal Being. It is ascribed also, in a distinctive sense, to the Father, to the Son, and to the Holy Spirit. In each instance the expression is analogical, and implies *some* resemblance to human personality; but it does not exclude a difference, such as may be no less incomprehensible than the nature of God Himself. Every one who considers how difficult it is to explain even mere human personality will readily expect to find still greater difficulty in conceiving of the personality of God. "To me," says Berkeley, "it seems evident, that if none but those who had nicely examined, and could themselves explain, the principle of individuation in man, or untie the knots and answer the objections which may be raised even about human personal identity, would require of us to explain the Divine mysteries, we should not be often called upon for a clear and distinct idea of Person in relation to the Trinity, nor would the difficulties on that head be often objected to our Faith."* We are quite able, however, to state in intelligible terms what we know and believe, as having been clearly revealed to us in Scripture, in regard to the distinct persons in the Godhead. "The substance of what the supporters of the doctrine of the Trinity contend for is, that in the unity of the Godhead there are three distinct persons, who all possess the Divine nature or essence, and that these three persons are not three Gods, but are the one God; while the doctrine maintained on the other side is, that the Scripture does not reveal any such distinction in the Divine nature, but that God is one in person as well as in essence or substance; and that the Divine nature, or true and proper Divinity, is really possessed by no person except by Him who is styled in Scripture the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ. Now here there is brought out an *intelligible*

* Berkeley, "Minute Philosopher," I. p. 505.

difference of opinion, even though the subject treated of be in its nature and bearings incomprehensible, and though we may not be able to give a precise and exact definition of all the terms employed in the statement of the proposition—such as the word ‘person’ in the application here made of it. These two opposite propositions are at least intelligible thus far, that we can form a pretty definite conception of what is the general import of the affirmation and the negation respectively, and can intelligently bring them into contact and comparison with the evidence adduced, so as to form a judgment as to whether the affirmation or the negation ought to be received as true. But the opponents of the doctrine of the Trinity are accustomed to press us with the question, What do you mean by *persons*, when you assert that there are three persons in the unity of the Godhead? Now, the answer commonly given to this question by the most judicious divines is this: First, they maintain that they are not bound to give a precise and exact definition of the word ‘persons’ as here employed,—namely, in its application to the Divine Nature,—since this is not necessary to make the proposition so far intelligible as to admit of its being made the subject of distinct argumentation, and having its truth or falsehood determined by the examination of the appropriate evidence,—a position this, which, though denied in words, is practically conceded by our opponents, when they assert that they can prove from Scripture that no such personal distinction as Trinitarians contend for attaches to the Divine nature. Secondly, they admit that they cannot give a full and exact definition of the import of the word *persons*, or of the idea of distinct personality, as predicated of the Divine nature; and can say little more about it than that it expresses a distinction, *not identical with, but in some respects analogous to*, that subsisting between three different persons among men.”*

(823.) Similar remarks may be applied to the analogical terms Father and Son, which are used, respectively, to designate the first and second persons in the Godhead. They imply that a relation subsists between them which is similar to, and is fitly represented by, the human relation between a father and his son;

* Dr Cunningham, “Historical Theology,” vol. II. p. 195. See also pp. 198, 206, 210, 212, 230, 258. Browne, “Procedure, Extent, and Limits,” pp. 305, 325, 328. Browne, “Divine Analogy,” pp. 272, 304. Breckenridge, “Knowledge of God,” pp. 228–232.

but neither the paternity which is ascribed to the one, nor the sonship which is ascribed to the other, can be justly held to import an exact resemblance in all respects between the Divine and the human relation. An eternal sonship and a Divine generation are implied in the words of Scripture, when our Lord is called, not only the Son of God, but "the only-begotten of the Father;" since such expressions are evidently designed to distinguish Him from all created beings, even the most exalted,—“for unto which of the angels said He at any time, Thou art My Son, this day have I begotten Thee? And again, I will be to Him a Father, and He shall be to Me a Son.”* But they do not imply that the Son was begotten or generated in time as human children are,—still less that He was produced after the same manner; and any attempt to stretch the analogy beyond the mere resemblance in point of relation, must involve us in the necessity of admitting conclusions which are at direct variance with the express teaching of Scripture.†

(§24.) The inversion of the relation between Type and Antitype is another Socinian error, which lies at the foundation of most of the arguments by which an attempt has been made to set aside the evidence in favour of the doctrine of the Atonement arising from the application of sacrificial terms to the death of Christ. The nature of that relation has been already explained;‡ we merely refer to it now, as one of the sources of sound Scriptural analogies in matters of Faith, for the purpose of showing that it has been entirely misconceived and perverted by Socinian writers. No fact can be more certain than that large use is made in Scripture, both for the illustration and proof of Christian doctrine, of the Types and Figures of the Old Testament as having a preordained connection with the facts of the New, and especially with the person, offices, and work, of Christ; and that they are invariably applied on the supposition that they were designed to foreshadow a great reality which should only be made manifest in “the fulness of time.” They are said to be

* Heb. i. 5.

† Browne, “Procedure,” etc., pp. 26, 36; “Divine Analogy,” pp. 21, 35, 55, 175, 200, 223. J. H. Newman, “Theory of Religious Belief,” p. 265. On the general subject, see

Dr Kidd, “The Eternal Sonship;” Treffrey on “The Eternal Sonship;” Richard Watson, “Remarks on Eternal Sonship,” in reply to Dr Adam Clark, Works, vol. VII. p. 3.

‡ Part II. c. xv. p. 382.

“a shadow of things to come, but the body is of Christ.”* The priests under the law are said to serve “unto the *example* and *shadow* of heavenly things, as Moses was admonished of God when he was about to make the tabernacle, for, see, saith He, that thou make all things according to the *pattern* showed to thee in the mount.” “Almost all things are by the law purged with blood: and without shedding of blood is no remission. It was, therefore, necessary that the *patterns* of things in the heavens should be purified with these, but the *heavenly things* themselves with *better sacrifices* than these.” “For the law, having a shadow of good things to come, and not the very image of the things, can never with those sacrifices which they offered year by year continually make the comers thereunto perfect.”† It is surely implied in these words that there was both a preordained connection, and a real resemblance, also, between the Type and the Antitype; and not only so, but that their relation to each other was such as subsists between figure and substance, or between shadow and body. “They sufficiently indicate the relation which exists between the two: that the likeness is to be sufficiently correct as a resemblance, but not very close nor exact in all its parts—not that which an *image* bears to the person it represents, . . . but that which obtains between an object and its *shadow*.” “This suggests another important consequence,—that the Type must necessarily be inferior to its antitype. It is only a figure, and an imperfect figure; not a pattern, nor an image, but a shadow.”‡

(825.) In their interpretation of the sacrificial language which is applied in Scripture to the death of Christ, Socinians invert the relation which God has established between the Type and the Antitype. With them that language does not refer to a real sacrifice of atonement, offered by Christ, but is a mere allusion to the sacrifices offered under the law. These were real, but that was figurative only. The shadow has changed places with the substance. The established order of connection between the two is broken up. It is no longer the relation of Analogy between the scheme of Prefiguration and the event in which it was to find both its explanation and fulfilment. A reality,

* Col. ii. 17.

† Heb. vii. 5, ix. 22, 23, x. 1.

‡ John Peers, A.M., “Typical In-

struction, shown to be suited to all, but particularly the Early Ages of the Church.” 1828.

and one of some significance and importance in connection with the worship of God, may be found in the Old Testament, but there is no corresponding reality in the New. The same language is applied to animal sacrifices and to the death of Christ; but in the one case—that of the Type—it is literal; in the other case,—that of the Antitype—it is figurative. What the sacred writers describe as the shadow, Socinian writers represent as the only substance: and this amounts to an inversion of the whole order of the Divine dispensations towards the Church. “These observations lay open the fundamental fallacy of the whole Socinian hypothesis, which is throughout calculated to invert the natural order of all the Divine Revelations to mankind. The whole Patriarchal and Jewish dispensations were contrived by the wisdom of God, to be Prophetical only and Typical of those things which were to be fulfilled in the person of Christ. But they, instead of allowing the *things typified*—such as Purchase, Redemption, Priest and Priesthood, Sacrifice, Atonement, Oblation, Sanctification and Intercession,—to mean anything real, and solid, and true in respect of God or of Christ, . . . allow each of them a meaning of something real, only as it refers upward to some particular rite, or constitution, or transaction, under the Patriarchal and Jewish dispensations; and this is the fallacious turn they give to all the language of the Gospel, which they are not ashamed expressly to say, is *one grand Metaphor*.”*

(826.) This leads us to consider briefly the third source of Socinian errors,—their habit of confounding Analogy with Metaphor. We have already seen that the figurative language which is employed in Scripture to denote the Attributes and Perfections of God, and which is often founded, not on the mere relation of resemblance, but on some other relation of a totally different kind, has been interpreted by some of them as if it were the same in all respects with such as is purely analogical; and that many grievous errors have arisen from this source.† We now add that a similar confusion of thought has arisen, from the same cause, with reference to most of the peculiar doctrines of the Gospel, and especially to

* Browne, “Divine Analogy,” pp. 371, 372. See also Grotius, “De Satisfactione Christi,” c. vii. viii.; Turretin, “Disputationes de Satisfactione Christi,” Works, IV. pp.

60–303; Bishop Stillingfleet, “Discourse concerning the Doctrine of Christ's Satisfaction,” pp. 170–206; Outram on Sacrifices.

† Part I. c. ii. § 1, 2, pp. 68–79.

those which relate to the nature, the cause, and the results of the death of Christ. The sacrificial and typical terms, derived from the Old Testament, which are applied, in the New, to "the decease which Christ accomplished at Jerusalem," are all explained away as figurative allusions merely, or, at the most, as metaphorical language that cannot be interpreted according to its proper literal meaning. Dr Priestley says that the texts of Scripture, which relate to this subject, "must either be interpreted *literally*, according to the plain and obvious sense of the words, *which will enforce the belief of proper vicarious punishments*; or they must be interpreted *figuratively*, and then they will not oblige us to believe the doctrine of Atonement *in any sense*, or that Christ died a sacrifice in any other manner, than as any person might be said to be a sacrifice to the cause in which he dies." "In every sacrifice the victim is slain *for the benefit* of the person on whose account it is offered; so Christ dying to procure the greatest possible benefit to the human race, is said to have given his life a sacrifice for us; and, moreover, as the end of the Gospel is to promote *the reformation of sinners, in order to procure the pardon of sin*, the death of Christ is more expressly compared to a sin-offering."* A more recent writer of the same school seems unwilling to give up the doctrine of Atonement altogether, for he gives it as his "earnest, self-convinced, and solemn assertion," that Unitarians believe that doctrine. "They have found a glorious and merciful doctrine of Atonement in the Scriptures, quite different from that which Orthodoxy teaches. . . . We say that we do find a doctrine of Atonement in the Scriptures, and that we heartily and gratefully believe it; that the doctrine exalts Christ as the Saviour,—wins to Him our highest trust and love,—and brings us adoringly to praise that once alienated Father in Heaven, whose love has provided a means for the redemption and salvation of men." But in what sense they recognise an Atonement will appear sufficiently from his leading position with regard to it, namely, "That the Scriptures do not lay the emphatic stress of Christ's redeeming work upon His death, above or apart from His life, character, and doctrine; and that His death, as an element of His redeeming work, is made effectual for human salvation through its influence on the heart and life of *man*, not through its vicarious or substi-

* Priestley, "History of the Corruptions of Christianity," I. 278, 182.

tuted value with *God*, nor through its removal of an abstract difficulty in the Divine government, which hinders the forgiveness of the penitent without *farther satisfaction*." This doctrine is based on the denial of any preordained relation between the Type and the Antitype, and proceeds on the supposition that the sacrificial language which is applied to the death of Christ in Scripture has no such significance as that which we ascribe to it. For although he speaks of "the sacrificial character of His death," and says, "we hold His death to have been sacrificial in the highest sense of the word," he denies that it was "foreshadowed" otherwise than by His suffering life. "Not the most distant intimation is given in the Old Testament that the Ritual Sacrifices looked beyond themselves to an anticipation of the Sacrifice of Christ. Not a word can be quoted from Lawgiver, Prophet, or Priest, to prove that such a reference was had in view." He makes no reference, in this connection, to the Epistle to the Hebrews; but he does refer to Mr Jowett as having spoken of the death of our Lord as "the greatest of human crimes, that redeems the sons of Adam by the murder of Christ," and adds this testimony—*valeat quantum valere potest*, coming from such a quarter, and given in favour of two Divines of the Church of England,—“The scholarly works of Jowett and Stanley are a most profitable study for those, who are resolved that the Apostles shall not use a single *trope*, or other rhetorical figure, without having it urged into a literal interpretation.”*

(827.) A sound doctrine of Analogy, applied to the Typical Rites and the Sacrificial Terms of Scripture, will be found to be the most effective method of exposing the fallacy of these views. It is ably applied in this way by Dr Richard Laurence.† “The Socinians contend that, as the style of the New Testament is Hebraical and Metaphorical, when sacrificial terms are applied in it to the death of Christ, they are simply used in the way of figurative allusion,—merely as elegant elucidations,—and not as terms declarative of ideas inherently connected with the subject. . . . That the style of the New Testament is Hebraical and Metaphorical, may be granted without admitting the conclusion which the

* G. E. Ellis, “Half Century of Unitarian Controversy,” pp. 157, 161, 184, 187, 209, 212.

† Laurence, “The Metaphorical Character of the Apostolical Style, as elucidating the Doctrine of Atonement, considered.” 1810.

Socinians deduce. . . . In two significations of the same Hebrew word, we perceive that there exists a third idea, characteristic of each, in which both participate. This also is the case with perfect Metaphor, which properly contains three ideas in connection, —two, of the things compared, and a third, of that in which the comparison consists. When, for instance, God thus addresses Abraham, ‘I am thy shield,’ it is manifest that there are two ideas expressed, *God*, and *shield*, which are to be connected by a third, namely, that of *protection*; an idea which forms not a mere bond of union, but which is necessary and indispensable to the similitude. In the same way, likewise, when our blessed Saviour terms Himself ‘*a door*,’—‘I am the door, by me if any one enter in, he shall be saved,’—we instantly discover the existence and importance of the intermediate idea alluded to—indisputably that of *entrance*. . . . Socinians seem to regard it (the style of the New Testament) as convertible to every exposition which, upon their own preconceived system, they may be disposed to give it. But the fact is far otherwise; for instead of abounding with *loose and uncertain analogies*, it displays only such as are *definite and determinate*. When, for example, our Saviour represents Himself as ‘the good Shepherd,’ the subsequent clause, ‘who giveth His life for the sheep,’ points out the peculiar circumstance which characterizes the similitude, . . . indicating that the resignation of life on the part of the good shepherd for the preservation of his sheep, and that on the part of Christ for the preservation of His followers, constitutes the *precise point of comparison*. When John the Baptist denominates our Saviour ‘the Lamb of God, which taketh away the sin of the world,’ the Socinians conceive that the similitude consists in the general idea of a *benefit conferred*; . . . but, as in the instance of the good shepherd, so in this, the context itself determines the meaning by subjoining to the words ‘Lamb of God’—*which taketh away the sin of the world*. Must we not, therefore, reject the Socinian, and adopt the usual construction; persuaded that the *real point of resemblance is discoverable in an idea common to both sacrifices*, in that of being *slain to take away sin*? . . . an idea which is apposite, specific, and determinate, as well as characteristic, in its most obvious sense, both of the victim of the Altar, and the victim of the Cross.”*

* Pp. 3, 7, 9, 10, 11.

(828.) If this be the right principle for the interpretation of the Typical and Sacrificial language of Scripture, every one must see that a sound doctrine of Analogy is indispensable, and may be most effectively applied, to the correction of Socinian errors, and the establishment of some of the most important articles of Faith. The right interpretation of a large part of the Sacred Oracles depends on our carefully marking the difference between the Analogical and the Metaphorical terms which occur in them, and remembering that all Typical and Sacrificial language is based on a true and proper Analogy. "To retain," says Coleridge, "the literal sense wherever the harmony of Scripture permits, and reason does not forbid, is ever the honestest, and, nine times in ten, the more rational and pregnant interpretation. The contrary way is an easy and approved way of getting rid of a difficulty, but, nine times in ten, a bad way of solving it. . . . Of the figures of speech in the Sacred Volume, that are only figures of speech, the one of most frequent occurrence is that which describes an effect by the name of its usual and best known cause. . . . But these are far enough from justifying (I had almost said) the dishonest fashion of metaphorical glosses, which our fashionable Divines have carried to such an extent as, in the doctrinal part of their Creed, to leave little else but Metaphors."*

* Coleridge, "Aids to Reflection," p. 64.

APPENDIX.

THE SCHOLASTIC DISTINCTION BETWEEN UNIVOCAL, ÆQUIVOCAL, AND ANALOGICAL TERMS. Page 56.

One of the fullest discussions of this subject will be found in a "Tractatus" by Cardinal Cajetan, "De Nominum Analogia," which occurs in his "Opuscula," Tom. III. pp. 315–326. It is divided into eleven chapters, and treats successively the following questions:—

1. Quotuplex sit Analogia, et quis sit ejus primus modus?
2. Analogia attributionis quid sit, et quibus modis fiat, et quæ ejus conditiones?
3. Analogia proportionalitatis quid et quotuplex sit; et quomodo propriè Analogia dicatur?
4. Quomodo analogum nomen ab analogatis distinguatur?
5. Qualis sit abstractio Analogi ab analogatis?
6. Qualis sit prædicatio Analogi de suis analogatis?
7. Qualis analogorum secundum Analogi nomen definitio?
8. Qualis sit in Analogo comparatio?
9. Qualis sit Analogi divisio, et resolutio?
10. Qualiter de Analogo sit Scientia?
11. De Cautelis necessariis circa Analogorum nominum intellectum et usum.

To a modern reader the discussion of some of these topics is felt to be abstruse and intricate, and many of the distinctions which were then in common use, and which display an amazing acuteness and activity of intellect, have now become obsolete. It is still necessary, however, in treating of general terms to distinguish between such as are properly univocal, and such as are merely analogical; and this has been done with the greatest care by the Scholastic writers. Both sets of expressions are founded on the relation of *resemblance*, but the resemblance is different in the two cases. They are thus distinguished by Cajetan. "Inter univocationem et analogiam hæc est differentia, quod res fundantes univocationem sunt sic ad invicem similes quod fundamentum similitudinis in una est ejusdem rationis omnino cum fundamento simi-

litudinis in alia ; ita quod nihil claudit in se unius quod non claudit alterius ratio. . . . Res autem fundantes analogiam sic sunt similes, quod fundamentum similitudinis in una diversæ est rationis simpliciter a fundamento illius in alia, ita quod unius ratio non claudit id quod claudit ratio alterius."

Speaking of analogical terms, Cajetan distinguishes between *metaphorical* and *proper* Analogy. "Fit autem duobis modis Analogia hæc (i.e., proportionalitatis) scilicet metaphoricè et propriè. Metaphoricè quidem, quando nomen illud commune absolutè unam habet rationem formalem, quæ in uno analogatorum salvatur, et per metaphoram de alio dicitur ; ut *ridere* unam secundum se rationem habet ; analogum tamen metaphoricè est vero risui, et prato florenti, aut fortunæ successui ; sic enim significamus hæc se habere, quemadmodum homo ridens. Et hujusmodi Analogiæ sacra Scriptura plena est, de Deo *metaphoricè* notitiam tradens. *Propriè* verò fit quando nomen illud commune in utroque analogatorum absque metaphoris dicitur. Analogia hæc cæteris omnibus antecellit."

He speaks of analogical terms as standing midway between such as are univocal or æquivocal. "Sciendum est quod, quia analogum medium est inter univocum et purè æquivocum, consequens est, quòd analogum *idem* aliquo modo, et *non idem* aliquo modo, de suis prædicet analogatis." . . . "Negandum est igitur quòd in analogis non prædicatur *idem* de uno et alio analogato ; quoniam unum et idem *proportionaliter* de omnibus analogatis dicitur."—ccvi. p. 321.

The great object of the Scholastic writers in insisting so much as they did on the distinction between univocal, æquivocal, and analogical terms, was to define the sense in which they were to be understood when the same general expressions were applied to God and to created beings. They were anxious to preserve inviolate the peculiar and incommunicable perfections of the Divine nature, which can have no exact image in the creature ; and yet to guard against the error of supposing that there is no real resemblance between God and man. Hence they taught that such general terms as being, oneness, cause, truth, knowledge, wisdom, power, and goodness, were applied to God and the creature neither univocè nor æquivocè, but analogicè or proportionaliter. In the words of Cajetan,—“In divisione entis in Deum et creaturam, utrumque licet ens simpliciter sit et dicatur, absolutè loquendo, creatura tamen, in respectu ad Deum, ens secundum quid, et quasi non ens, est et dicitur.”—P. 324. And again, in regard to one of His attributes, “Nec impedit analogia hæc processum formalem ad concludendum de Deo et creaturis prædicatum aliquod eis commune ; quonium accepta sapientiæ ratione, et segregatis ab ea per intellectum eis quæ sunt imperfectionis, ex hoc quòd id, quod est sibi proprium formaliter sumptum, perfectionem absque imperfectione claudit ; concluditur ergo sapientiæ ratio non omnino alia, nec omnino hæc, sed hæc proportionaliter est in Deo ; quia similitudo inter Deum et creaturam non est univoca, sed analogica.” . . .

“Cavendum est in primis, ne ex univocatione ipsius nominis analogi respectu quorundam, credamus simpliciter ipsum esse univocum; omnia nam ferè analogia propriè fuerunt prius univoca; et deinde extensive, analogia communia proportionaliter illis, quibus sunt univoca et aliis vel aliis, facta sunt. E. g. Sapientiæ nomen primò impositum est humanæ sapientiæ, et *univocum* omnium hominum sapientiis erat. Deinde ad Divinæ naturæ cognitionem ascendentes, proportionalemque similitudinem inter nos ut sapientes et Deum contemplantes, Sapientiæ nomen extenderunt ad id in Deo significandum, cui nostra sapientia proportionalis est; sicque *univocum* nobis, *analogum* factum est nobis et Deo.”—P. 325.

THOMAS AQUINAS.

Pars I., Quæst. 3, Art. 5.

“Utrum Deus sit in genere aliquo?”

Conclusion: “Cùm Deus sit actus purus, neque in Eo esse ab essentia distinguatur, ac cujuscumque generis principium est, in nullo directè vel reductivè genere est.”

Pars I., Quæst. 4, Art. 3.

“Utrum aliqua creatura possit esse similis Deo?”

Conclusion: “Cùm Deus sit universale agens et principium totius esse, non contentum in aliqua specie, vel genere; creaturæ ei similes sunt non secundum eandem specificam, vel genericam rationem, sed secundum aliqualem analogiam.”

Pars I., Quæst. 13, Art. 3.

“Utrum aliquod nomen dicatur de Deo propriè?”

Conclusion: “Quia nomina Deo attributa modum significandi creaturarum retinent, Deo propriè ex modo ipso significandi minimè competunt; sed quo ad significatum propriè de Deo dicuntur.”

Or more fully, “Deum cognoscimus ex perfectionibus procedentibus in creaturas ab ipso; quæ quidem perfectiones in Deo sunt secundum eminentiorem modum quàm in creaturis. Intellectus autem noster eo modo apprehendit eas secundum quod sunt in creaturis; et secundum quod apprehendit, ita significat per nomina. In nominibus igitur quæ Deo attribuimus (necesse), est duo considerare; scilicet, perfectiones ipsas significatas ut bonitatem, vitam, et hujusmodi; et modum significandi. Quantum igitur ad id quod significant hujusmodi nomina, propriè competunt Deo et magis propriè quàm ipsis creaturis, et per prius dicuntur de Eo. Quantum verò ad modum significandi, non propriè dicuntur de Deo, habent enim modum significandi qui creaturis competit.”

Pars I., Quæst. 13, Art. 5.

“Utrum ea quæ de Deo dicuntur et creaturis, univocè dicantur de ipsis?”

Conclusion: "Nomina de Deo et creaturis dicta, non univocè nec purè æquivocè, sed analogicè dicuntur secundum analogiam creaturarum ad ipsum."

"Respondeo dicendum quòd impossibile est aliquid prædicari de Deo et creaturis univocè. Quia omnis effectus non adæquans virtutem causæ agentis, recipit similitudinem agentis non secundum eandem rationem, sed deficienter. . . . Et sic, cum hoc nomen, *sapiens*, de homine dicitur, quodammòdo circumscribit et comprehendit rem significatam, non autem cùm dicitur de Deo, sed relinquit rem significatam ut incomprehensam et excedentem nominis significationem. Unde patet quòd non secundum eandem rationem hoc nomen, *sapiens*, de Deo et de homine dicitur; et eadem ratio est de aliis. Unde nullum nomen univocè de Deo et creaturis prædicatur. Sed nec etiam purè æquivocè, ut aliqui dixerunt. Quia secundum hoc ex creaturis nihil posset cognosci de Deo, nec demonstrari, sed semper incideret fallacia æquivocationis. Et hoc est . . . contra Apostolum dicentem (Rom. i. 20), 'Invisibilia Dei per ea, quæ facta sunt, intellecta conspiciuntur.' Dicendum est igitur quòd hujusmodi nomina dicuntur de Deo et creaturis secundum analogiam, id est, proportionem . . . Et hoc modo aliqua dicuntur de Deo et creaturis analogicè, et non æquivocè purè, neque purè univocè. Non enim possumus nominare Deum nisi ex creaturis. . . . Et iste modus communitatis medius est inter puram æquivocationem et simplicem univocationem. Neque enim in his, quæ analogicè dicuntur, est una ratio, sicut est in univocis, nec totaliter diversa, sicut in æquivocis."

Quæst. 13, Art. 6.

"Utrum nomina per prius dicantur de creaturis quam de Deo?"

Conclusion: "Nomina quæ metaphoricè de Deo dicuntur, cùm similitudinem ejus ad creaturam significant, de ipsis creaturis prius dicuntur; nomina verò de Deo et creaturis communia, de Deo essentialiter dicta, quoad significatum prius de Deo dicuntur, quoad modum autem significandi, de creaturis prius."

"The principle," says Mozley, "which Aquinas lays down with respect to the sense in which the Divine attributes are to be understood, is philosophical,—viz., that they are to be understood neither as wholly the *same* with (*univoce*), or wholly *different* from (*æquivoce*), the corresponding attributes in man, but as *analogous* to them (*analogice*). The univocal sense confounded God with the creature; the æquivocal hid God from the creature, removing and alienating Him altogether as an object of human thought; the analogical allowed an idea of God, which *was true as far as it went*, but imperfect."*

SUAREZ agrees in substance with Cajetan and Aquinas, although he

* Mozley, "Augustinian Doctrine of Predestination," p. 276.

differs from them on some points. *Metaphysicarum Disputationum*, Tomus Prior, pp. 32, 37; Posterior, pp. 11, 49, 163.

The distinction between univocal, æquivocal, and analogical terms, is thus stated in the “*Logique de Port-Royal* :” “ Il faut remarquer que les mots sont généraux en deux manières ; l’une que l’on appelle *univoque*, qui est lorsqu’ils sont liés avec des idées générales ; de sorte que le même mot convient à plusieurs, et selon le son et selon une même idée, qui y est jointe ; tels sont les mots d’homme, de ville, de cheval. L’autre qu’on appelle *equivoque*, qui est lorsqu’un même son a été lié par les hommes à des idées différentes. . . . Ainsi le mot de *canon* signifie une machine de guerre, et un décret de concile, et une sorte d’ajustement ; mais il ne les signifie que selon des idées toutes différentes. Néanmoins cette universalité équivoque est de deux sortes. Car les différentes idées jointes à un même son, ou n’ont aucun rapport naturel entre elles, comme dans le mot de *canon* ; ou en ont quelqu’un, comme lorsqu’un mot étant principalement joint à une idée, on ne le joint à une autre idée que parce qu’elle a un *rapport*—de cause ou d’effet, ou de signe, ou de *ressemblance*,—à la première : et alors ces sortes de mot équivoques s’appellent *analogues*, comme quand le mot de *sain* s’attribue à l’animal, et à l’air, et aux viandes. Car l’idée jointe à ce mot est principalement la *santé*, qui ne convient qu’à l’animal ; mais on y joint une autre idée approchante de celle-la, qui est d’être *cause* de la santé, qui fait qu’on dit qu’un air est sain, qu’une viande est saine, parce qu’ils servent à conserver la santé.”—Part I. ch. vi. p. 53.

OPINIONS ON ANALOGY. Page 67.

Aristotle adverts to it, but very slightly, at one time as “a resemblance of ratios” (*λόγων ὁμοίότης*), at another as a “parity of reason” (*ἰσότης τοῦ λόγου*). The former expression may denote the kind of resemblance, the latter the reasoning which is founded upon it.*

Bishop Browne calls it—“the substituting the idea or conception of one thing to stand for, and represent, another, on account of a true resemblance, and correspondent reality, in the very nature of the things compared.†

Bishop Berkeley, whose “Minute Philosopher” exhibits a felicitous application of Analogy to moral and religious subjects, gives this account of it:—“Every one knows that ‘Analogy’ is a Greek word used by mathematicians to signify a *similitude of proportions*. For instance, when we observe that two is to six as three is to nine, this similitude or equality of proportion is termed Analogy. And although proportion strictly signifies the habitude or relation of one *quantity* to another, yet,

* Dr Tatham, “Chart and Scale of Truth,” I. 55. Dr Whately, “Rhetoric,” p. 9.

† Bishop Browne, “Divine Analogy,” p. 2.

in a looser and translated sense, it has been applied to signify every other habitude; and consequently the term Analogy comes to signify all similitude of relations or habitudes whatsoever. Hence the schoolmen tell us that there is *analogy* between intellect and sight, forasmuch as intellect is to the mind what sight is to the body; and that he who governs the state is *analogous* to him who steers a ship: hence a prince is analogically styled a pilot, being to the state as a pilot is to his vessel.*

Mr Barton, speaking of Analogy as common to mathematical and moral subjects, says that "its nature as applicable to both may be thus expressed;—It is that which implies a likeness between things, so as to be a foundation of parity of reasoning in some cases, together with an unlikeness excluding it in others."†

Dr Harris's definition of the term is brief but comprehensive. "By 'Analogy' is here meant, generally, a similarity of relation between things in some characteristic respects, when, in other respects, the things are different."‡

Dr Tatham, speaking of Human and Divine Analogy, says, "This divine Analogy, so essential to divine revelation; is, like the human, founded on similitude; consisting in a permanent resemblance, and correspondent reality, between the terrestrial things, or those ideas which are the direct objects of human intellect, and those celestial truths of which we can have no direct conception. . . . So that the comparison is founded on something *real* as well as *similar*; from which real similarity, as a principle, reason deduces a just and true correspondence."§

Dr Hampden commends and virtually adopts Bishop Copleston's definition, but he is speaking of analogical reasoning in a restricted sense as distinguished from induction, and as "an instrument of discovery." In this sense, he says, it presupposes "two requisites—*first*, that the two or several particulars concerned in the argument, should be *known to agree in some one point*, for otherwise, they could not be referable to any one class, and there would consequently be no basis for inference. . . . *Secondly*, that the conclusion must be modified by a reference to the circumstances of the particular to which we argue."||

David Hartley describes Analogy in the following terms:—"Things are said to be analogous to one another, in the strict mathematical sense of the word, when the corresponding parts are all in the *same ratio* to each other. Thus, if the several parts of the body in different persons be supposed *exactly proportional* to the whole bodies, they might be said to be analogous in the original mathematical sense of that word. But

* Berkeley's Works (Wright's Ed.), I. 402.

† Richard Barton, B.D., "The Analogy of Divine Wisdom," 38.

‡ Dr Harris, "The Pre-Adamite Earth," p. 65.

§ Dr Tatham, "Chart and Scale, II. 145.

|| Dr Hampden, "Philosophical Evidence of Christianity," 60.

as this restrained sense is not applicable to things as they really exist, another of a more enlarged and practical nature has been adopted, which may be thus defined: Analogy is that resemblance, and in some cases sameness, of the parts, properties, functions, uses, etc., any or all, of A to B, whereby our knowledge concerning A, and the language expressing this knowledge, may be applied in the whole or in part to B, without any sensible, or, at least, any important practical error. Now analogies, in this sense of the word, some more exact and extensive, some less so, present themselves to us everywhere in natural and artificial things; and thus whole groups of figurative phrases, which seem at first only to answer the purposes of convenience in affording names for new objects, and of pleasing the fancy, pass into analogical reasoning, and become a guide in the search after truth, and an evidence for it in some degree.”*

Mr Grinfield, in reply to Copleston, says, “The points which are at issue between us relate principally to your account of Analogy, and of the attributes of God in their relation to our moral faculties. According to your opinion, Analogy implies no similarity in the subjects which are compared; it signifies merely a sameness in their relations, but it includes no likeness originally subsisting in the subjects themselves.” “You say ‘that Analogy does not mean the similarity of *two things*, but only the similarity of *two relations*.’ In all cases, and in all sciences, I apprehend, it *implies* the former, whilst it *expresses* the latter; because there could be no relations of any kind without some congeniality in the subject-matter; but it is this very congeniality which furnishes the substratum of Analogy.” “I am persuaded that this doctrine of relations, without any regard to the subject-matter of the things which are compared, has no solid foundation in the nature of things. The doctrine of proportions even in pure mathematics has still a reference to the *nature* of magnitude, and if the moral qualities of man had no resemblance to the moral attributes of the Deity, I see not whence they could derive their authority,—they would be mere *entia rationis*, or unintelligible mysteries.” “I have endeavoured to show that the analogies, even of pure mathematics, are founded on the universal properties of magnitude. Secondly, that there can be no moral relations which do not arise from some common properties in the subjects compared. Thirdly, that moral analogies depend on such moral relations, and that they necessarily imply a resemblance in their subjects. Fourthly, that our moral qualities have such real relations to the nature of the Divine Being as are implied in the words *resemblance* and *similitude*.”† “Analogy implies some relation amongst things partaking of some *common properties* :”—“We can never hope to penetrate into things as they are in themselves, we must always be content to judge of their nature by

* D. Hartley “On Man,” p. 185.

† Grinfield, “Vindiciæ Analogicæ,
Part I. pp. 3, 7, 14, 31.

the manifestations which they exhibit:" "how are we to judge of their *nature* but by the *qualities* which they exhibit?"* "In moral subjects, it is those things *alone* which can be looked upon as analogical, which do resemble each other in the likeness of their *subjects*, as well as in the likeness of their *relations*; for if there be a mere likeness of relation without some original congeniality of subject, it becomes a comparison of bare proportions, which does not amount to a moral analogy."†

* Pp. 17, 10, 20.

† P. 33.

THE END.

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